2. At 0226, October 25, 1944, contact of enemy ships standing up Surigao Strait was made by PT picket, at which time Destroyer Squadron 54 proceeded to launch torpedo attack. At 0300 units of Destroyer Squadron 54 proceeded to launch attack and reported five (5) enemy targets. At 0337, having been ordered to launch torpedo attack, Commander Destroyer Squadron FIFTY-SIX directed a three (3) section attack by ships of his squadron. The first section, composed of U.S.S. NEWCOMB, RICHARD P. LEARY and ALBERT W. GRANT proceeded to attack from ahead.
3. At 0404 at a range of 6200 yards, this vessel fired five (5) torpedoes at a FUSO Class battleship, after which retirement was taken at maximum speed in a northeasterly direction. Hits on this target were indicated by the track maintained in Combat and by actual observations by topside personnel at correct run to hit time. At 0408 we made funnel smoke, and zigzagged to right and left of course. These may have been some aid in effecting our retirement without damage, as several splashes were observed close aboard.
4. Shortly after the turn to the north for retirement had been ordered the RICHARD P. LEARY was observed close astern and the ALBERT W. GRANT appeared to be dropping aft. At 0407 it was observed that the ALBERT W. GRANT was being hit by gunfire, and was slowing down. We stood on out to post attack rendezvous, and at 0432 were ordered to proceed to assist ALBERT W. GRANT, RICHARD P. LEARY standing by. At 0630 NEWCOMB had ALBERT W. GRANT under tow alongside to clear battle area, while supplying power for pumping and receiving casualties aboard.
5. All times referred to herein are local times (-9 Zone).
6. (a) This vessel had been engaged in shore bombardment and fire support missions as a unit of Task Force 77.2 since its arrival in Leyte Gulf on October 18, 1944. On the afternoon of October 24, 1944 word was received that a Japanese surface force was preparing to force its entry into Leyte Gulf through Surigao Strait. Battle orders were received and Task Force 77.2 was ordered to form battle disposition A-1.
(b) As a ship of destroyers left flank our mission was to close the enemy and attack with torpedoes when ordered. The tactical situation envisages a strong attacking group estimated as 2 BB, 2 CA, 2 CL and 6–10 DD, attempting to force its way into Leyte Gulf by way of Surigao Strait. This attempt was to be met by a superior force of own ships disposed in battle formation within the Gulf.
(c) Own forces consisted of following units:
(1) Right Flank
Cruisers (CruDiv 15, modified)
PHOENIX, BOISE, SHROPSHIRE (RAN).
Destroyers (DesDiv 47)
BACHE, BEALE, HUTCHINS, DALY, KILLEN,
ARUNTA (RAN).
(2) Battle Line
Battleships (BatDivs 2, 3, 4)
TENNESSEE, CALIFORNIA, PENNSYLVANIA
MARYLAND, WEST VIRGINIA, MISSISSIPPI.
Destroyers (DesDiv XRAY)
CLAXTON, THORN, WELLES, AULICK, CONY
SIGOURNEY.
Pickets (DesRon 54)
REMEY, MERTZ, MONSSEN, McDERMUT,
McGOWAN, McNAIR, MELVIN.
(3) Left Flank
Cruisers (CruDiv 4 and 12, modified)
LOUISVILLE, PORTLAND, MINNEAPOLIS,
DENVER, COLUMBIA.
Destroyers (DesRiv 56, modified)
NEWCOMB, BENNION, H.L. EDWARDS,
R.P. LEARY, LEUTZE, ROBINSON,
A.W. GRANT, BRYANT, HALFORD.
(d) This vessel attacked with torpedoes one battleship, identified visually at 6000 yards as FUSO Class. Total enemy forces estimated to be at least 2 BB, 2 CA, 2 CL and 6 DD.
(e) Weather conditions excellent with slight sea and wind. No moon made ships invisible over six (6) or seven (7) thousand yards.
PART II. CHRONOLOGICAL ACCOUNT OF ACTION.
1. Contact was made with enemy forces at 0320, range 33,000 yards, bearing 185° T. Estimated three (3) ships in this group. A track was commenced and gave enemy on zigzag course based north at speed of twelve (12) knots. At 0333 order to attack was received by Commander Destroyer Squadron FIFTY-SIX and on order sections carried out previously order three (3) section attack. NEWCOMB was leader of section one (1). Section two (2) was in column ahead and section three (3) in column astern, approximately one (1) mile north of deployed cruiser (left flank) line, which was on a course of 090°, speed 5 knots. All sections turned simultaneously by column movements to south. Section three (3) maneuvering to clear astern of cruise line and proceeded down west side of Strait. Section two (2) increased speed, passed ahead of cruiser column and proceeded down east side of Strait. Section one (1) maintained ten (10) knots, allowing sections two (2) to clear and also allowing sections two (2) and three (3) to advance to their firing sectors. It was necessary for section one (1) to maneuver to east to clear cruiser line. At 0353 increased speed to twenty-five (25) knots and the attack proper was commenced on course 200 – 230 T. At this time one (1) large target was seen on SG radar at about 23,000 yards, while FD target, believed to be other heavy ships, was seen on same bearing at 33,000 yards, and optically observed as glowing dimly. The close heavy ship was chosen for the target of this ship. There were no light forces observed near this target. Track of target at this time indicated course north speed twelve (12). At range of 9000 yards torpedoes were set high speed. At range of 8300 yards target course changed radically to left and torpedo speed was set back to intermediate. Range was closed to about 7000 yards, at which time (0400) course was changed to 270° T. Track of enemy indicated a course of 290° speed 9 knots. At 0404 torpedoes were launched, using half salvo plan.
2. At 0406 course was changed to north and speed increased to thirty-two (32) knots. At 0407 course was ordered to zigzag twenty (20) degrees each side of 030° T. At 0408 Funnel smoke was commenced. At 0408 course changed to approximately 060° T. At 0410 ceased funnel smoke. At 0411, when Combat indicated the target to be in torpedo water, two (2) heavy explosions were seen. A track of target after the time of NEWCOMB firing indicated that it changed course at 0405 to approximately south – speed twelve (12).
3. Throughout the torpedo run we were under fire from the enemy. At 0350 our battle line opened fire and this fire was observed to pass overhead, verifying that we were in the direct line of fire.
4. At 0407 own fire was observed to be falling near our section and this information was passed to OTC.
5. At 0411 ALBERT W. GRANT was observed hit and glowing. A track was commenced immediately on ALBERT W. GRANT. She was stopped; dead in water, at 0426.
6. We retired generally eastward, followed closely by RICHARD P. LEARY, to post attack rendezvous three (3) miles north of Hibuson Island.
7. At 0432 NEWCOMB and RICHARD P. LEARY left rendezvous point and proceeded to assist ALBERT W. GRANT. While standing toward ALBERT W. GRANT target was tracked still proceeding south and observed by director crew to be burning fiercely. AT 0440 SG contact was lost.
8. Navigational track was made from [ ], plotting SG ranges and bearings is enclosed as Enclosure (A).
PART III. PERFORMANCE.
1. Torpedo battery performance was excellent. A total of five (5) torpedoes were launched, and all performed normally.
2. Enemy gunfire was not sufficiently accurate to obtain hits on this vessel, but did hit the ALBERT W. GRANT, which was third ship in column. Salvo splashed of enemy and own gunfire landed very close to this vessel, but caused no damage.
3. Copy of torpedo firing report is enclosed as Enclosure (B).
PART IV. BATTLE DAMAGE.
1. Own battle damage — none.
2. Enemy battle damage — hits on enemy battleship, FUSO Class, which subsequently sank, either by virtue of torpedo hits sustained by the battleship, or by combination of said hits plus gunfire and torpedo fire of other ships. It is estimated that all hands on this ship were lost, although no definite information is at hand concerning what Japanese prisoners were taken from the water.
PART V. MATTERS OF SPECIAL INTEREST.
1. No special comment.
(a) Communications were satisfactory.
(b) Radars (SG and FD) worked excellently.
(c) No air operations during this vessel’s action.
(d) Tactics — covered in narrative.
(e) Smoke, Camouflage, Deception. As mentioned in narrative — Funnel smoke and zigzagging at maximum speed aided successful retirement.
(f) CIC — made possible the success of our mission by maintaining a continuous, up to the minute, accurate plot.
(g) Navigation — handled in Combat.
(h) Engineering — Excellent engineering performance.
(i) Supply — No comment.
(j) Medical — This vessel removed all wounded personnel from the ALBERT W. GRANT and treated them on board. Our Medical Officer was assisted by the Medical Officers and pharmacist’s mates from the RICHARD P. LEARY, McGOWAN and REMEY. None of the NEWCOMB personnel were injured. All ALBERT W. GRANT personnel on board were rushed to the hospital ship MERCY at transport area for further treatment as soon as ALBERT W. GRANT was towed clear of battle area.
2. Other reports — none.
3. Lessons learned, conclusions. This engagement proved the valuable qualities of destroyers when opportunity allows them to perform their best mission in high speed, night torpedo attacks by sections. In this manner, the enemy is bound to be passing through torpedo waters, no matter which way he turns. It would be well to insure that all firing ships be coached with the fact that the flank destroyers must retire after their torpedo attacks, and be on the alert not to open fire on them.
PART VI. PERSONNEL PERFORMANCE.
1. This night torpedo attack against a Japanese surface force of large ships was the first night engagement under fire of the enemy surface ships that this vessel has engaged in. It is accepted to be one of the most dangerous combat functions in a fleet engagement, and it is with keen pleasure that the Commanding Officer reports that every member of the ship’s company performed his duties in a most courageous an efficient manner, well in keeping with the highest traditions of the Navy.
L. B. COOK
Advance copy to:
Cominch
Supreme Comdr. Allied Forces, Southwest Pacific Area.
Cincpac.
