S-E-C-R-E-T November 27, 1943.
From: The Commanding Officer.
To : The Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.
Via : The Commander South Pacific.
The Commander Task Force 39.
The Commander Destroyer Squadron 23.
Subject: Report of action 24-25 November 1943 off Cape Saint George.
Reference: (a) U.S.N.R. Art. 874(6).
(b) Cincpac Conf. Ltr. 36CL-42.
(c) Concpac Rost. Ltr. FF1/A16-3; Serial 3899 of 19 Oct. 1942.
Enclosures: (A) Track Chart (see Comdesron 23 Serial 0018).
(B) T.B.S. Log (see Comdesron 23 Serial 0018).
(C) Chronological Log (see Comdesron 23 Serial 0018).
1. This vessel in company with Destroyer Squadron Twenty Three, less FOOTE, THATCHER, AULICK and STANLY during the night of 24-25 November 1943 engaged six Japanese vessels. Four Japanese vessels were observed to sink and one was heavily damaged and reported by aircraft to be burning and exploding the next morning. No damage was received by this vessel.
2. The situation leading up to this engagement is briefly outlined as follows: Desron 23 was in Purvis Bay on 22 November when intelligence was received indicating the possibility of enemy surface traffic between Rabaul and Buka. This squadron proceeded immediately at high speed to intercept enemy forces so engaged. No contacts were made on the night of 22-23 November. The squadron proceeded to Hathorn Sound for fuel and immediately returned to the Buka – Rabaul line. Thus, on the night of 24-25 November this squadron was again on the hunt, the general plan being to proceed to a point fifty five miles west of Buka arriving there at 0145 Love, thence five miles to the north, then on a southeasterly course until 0300 Love and then to retire if no contacts were made.
3. The divisions were in line of bearing, Desdiv 46 bearing 190° from Desdiv 45, interval 5000 yards. Desdiv 45 consisted of CHARLES F. AUSBURNE (Flying the pennant of Capt. A. A. Burke, U.S. Navy, Comdesron 23) CLAXTON and DYSON; and Desdiv 46, consisted of this vessel (Flying pennant of Comdr. B. L. Austin, U.S. Navy, Comdesdiv 46) and SPENCE. The course was north, speed 23 kts. At 0144 Love a Sugar George radar contact was made on a group of three enemy vessels, bearing 082° T, speed 25 kts., distance from this vessel 22000 yards. Desdiv 45 immediately closed to attack and 0155 fired a half salvo of torpedoes. All three enemy vessels were hit, with two apparently having internal explosions started by torpedo hits and sinking immediately. The third ship stopped. Desdiv 46 was directed to finish off any ships of this group remaining afloat while Desdiv 45 pursued a second group of three targets which meanwhile had been detected to the northeast.
4. Desdiv 46 now maneuvered to get into a torpedo firing position which would not menace Desdiv 45. At 0150 the CONVERSE fired a half salvo of torpedoes at the remaining enemy vessel. Two explosions resulted. At this time on the radar screen one large pip and one extremely small one were visible. The small one immediately disappeared and is believed to have been hit by a wing torpedo of the spread fired at the large target which also was hit. The small pip is believed to have been some remaining part of the other two ships. At 0219 a heavy thud was felt as though the ship had been struck by a dud torpedo. A turn away was made at 0221 to avoid enemy torpedoes and at 0222 course was changed to close to engage with guns. At 0228 fire was commenced by DesDiv 46. Fires immediately broke out over the length of the enemy ship until it was completely outlined. No return fire was noted. The enemy is believed to have been a Yubari class Cruiser. At 0254 after a series of four major explosions, apparently of individual magazines, the target sank quickly.
5. Left with no target within range Desdiv 46 increased speed to 31 kts. And changed course to 020° T to close Desdiv 45, which had disappeared in that direction in pursuit of the three remaining Japs. Desdiv 45 was outside of radar range at this time and T.B.S. contact had been lost. At 0309 and 0310 explosions and fires were observed ahead and a little to port. At 0312 course was changed to north. Heave smoke clouds which were first thought to be from burning ships were sighted to port. Explosions, fires and gun flashes were sighted ahead. Tracers could be intermittently observed through the smoke which is now believed to be muzzle smoke of flashless powder. At 0317 radar contact with Desdiv 45 was reestablished bearing 005° T, distance 13 miles. At 0326 with T.B.S. contact reestablished Desdiv 46 changed to 330° T to intercept enemy targets. At 0334 course was changed to 365° T in pursuit of the enemy believed heading for St. George Channel. At 0405 no radar contact had been established with enemy ships, but with New Ireland appearing on the radar screen course of the Squadron was changed to 150° T and retirement commenced. At 0504 our night fighter dropped a flare to illuminate a possible enemy bearing 010° T, distance about six miles. Nothing could be detected in the area. Retirement continued without incident until about 0450 when debris consisting of wood wreckage and life jackets was passed. At 0651 fighter coverage of sixteen P-38’s appeared on station and were gratefully received. No further incident occurred.
6. Four enemy vessels were observed by this ship to be destroyer and a fifth to be heavily damaged. Three sank under direct observation and the fourth could not have failed to sink as a result of the explosions which were seen.
7. At about 0219 this ship was hit by what may have been a dud torpedo although no damage to the hull has been located. The blow was sufficient to cause the ship to heel a few degrees and to wrack, similar to a tug making a hard landing alongside. Immediate action was taken by the repair party to locate any damage. None was located and no leaks have developed. Subsequent inspection by a diver revealed no damage.
8. (a) Material performance was in general excellent.
(b) Just prior to contact with the enemy the Fox Dog lobing motor burned out. No spares had ever been obtained and the director was coached by Sugar George radar and no real difficulty encountered. The first salvo was seen to hit. This was possible with a surface target but would not have been possible with air targets, which luckily were absent. Under worse conditions of visibility it would not have been possible to obtain early hits on a surface target. When once the enemy was on fire no problem existed. Such a fortunate outcome should not be anticipated and every effort should be made to get adequate radar spares to vessels operating habitually in the advance areas.
(c) T.B.S. failed momentarily. The consequences could well have been serious but by fortune were not. While every attention is given this all important equipment to make it reliable it should be paralleled with a second T.B.S. to insure against loss of the tactical command circuit, without which night operations at the face pace required for success are impossible.
(d) Battery performance of the 5"/38 guns was as usual excellent.
(e) Flashless powder which was used throughout contributed much to the success of the engagement. At no time was any of the bridge or fire control personnel hindered in the execution of their duties by loss of vision. Flashless powder is a boon to the Commanding Officer and the Conning Officer. Only those who have experienced considerable use of both can appreciate it fully. While it introduces the nuisance of smoke the smoke clears long before night vision returns after being thoroughly blinded by smokeless powder.
9. (a) It is hard to single out individuals for praise when a crew both men and officers have performed as competently as has this one. This ship and its crew were utterly untrained, unknown and unknowing just a little over one year ago. Since then they have lifted themselves by their boot straps to be competent and battle-tried veterans. Four officers deserve to be mentioned.
(b) Lieut. Comdr. E. H. McDowell, U.S. Navy, the Executive Officer, has trained and operates a C.I.C. which answered correctly every question asked of it. His organization furnished the torpedo control data which enable torpedo hits to be obtained on this as in previous battles.
(c) Lieut. P. E. Hurley, U.S.N.R., the Gunnery Officer so effectively handled the casualty to his primary method of fire control that the enemy was hit on the first salvo and continued to be hit on every succeeding salvo. His men achieved a salvo interval of less than three seconds with less than full salvos and no battery casualties of any kind. This was maintained as long as all guns could bear-about 22 salvos. This is better performance than that achieved by any battery in peace time so far as the writer knows.
(d) Lt.(jg) T. W. Ten Eyck, U.S.N.R. handled a loss of suction due to water so quickly and smoothly that this vessel maintained station and speed and the casualty in no way affected the demands put on the ship.
(e) Lt.(jg) R. E. Peet, U.S. Navy, as Conning Officer at general quarters handled this ship smoothly, and with outstanding professional competence. His cool and efficient conduct was of the greatest assistance to the Commanding Officer.
(f) The rank and file of the ship’s company deserves all praise and commendation for the way they have performed, not only in battle, but in the laborious preparation for the arduous operations leading up to battle. This action occurred on the third full night of general quarters with intervening days fully occupied with a return dash to Hathorn and hurried fueling and a high speed dash back to the operating area. All this climaxing over a month during which three bombardments, one pitched night battle between task forces, one full size day air attack on the task force, one night attack resulting in the sinking of an enemy submarine, numerous night aircraft torpedo attacks on the task force and so many night snooper actions involving from one to a dozen planes that count has been lost. Such a month leaves little time for rest yet those men climaxed it with performance second to none and are ready to go again.
D. C. HAMBERGER
