’’U.S.S. McFARLAND AVD-14

Serial No.

December 8, 1942.

From:     The Executive Officer
To:      The Commanding Officer.

Subject:    Japanese Bombing Attack of October 16, 1942 – Report of.

Reference: (a) Article 948 U.S. Navy Regulations, 1920.

    1.   The following report of the subject action is submitted in accordance with reference (a).

    2.   The McFARLAND was pumping bulk aviation gasoline into drums on a large sectional barge and one tank lighter secured alongside, on the afternoon of October 16, 1942. The ship was anchored about 500 yards east of Lunga Point, Guadalcanal Island, B.S.I.P. approximately 300 yards from the beach. The cargo of 37 MM ammunition, aircraft flares, 12 torpedoes, 188 drums of avgas and 20 drums of avlube had already been unloaded. The barge was secured alongside to starboard, abreast of the galley deckhouse. The tank lighter was alongside to port.

    3.   Throughout the unloading of the cargo the boats proceeding to the ship to be loaded brought many passengers and 60 walking hospital patients for evacuation to BUTTON. A list of the ambulatory patients was furnished but no list of the other evacuees was received. One group brought the word that the last group to board the ship would bring a complete list. Among the ambulatory patients were many diagnosed as “war neurotics.”

    4.   At 1710 we received word from the shore station that a submarine periscope had been sighted rounding Lunga Point. Special sea details were stationed, the anchor was weighed, and at 1715 the ship got underway and stood out on an easterly course with the barge and tank lighter alongside. The pumping of gasoline was continued. The McFARLAND men assisting on the barge were recalled to the ship in case it became necessary to cast off. It was believed that by maintaining 1/3 speed the ship could keep ahead of the submerged submarine and at the same time be able to discharge the remainder of the bulk gasoline. The barge had motive power of its own and would have been able to make its way back to the beach with its load after being cast off.

    5.   At 1700 the shore station was asked if the condition was Red (enemy aircraft overhead); a negative answer was received at 1705. At 1710 many fighters were observed taking off from the airport. At 1710 the following message was sent to the shore station: “ARE FIGHTERS TAKING OFF TO REPEL RAID.” The following answer was received at 1715: “FIGHTERS ARE PRACTICING NEW TACTICS.” In view of these replies to our enquiries the special sea details were kept at their stations instead of sending the crew to general quarters. At 1725 the shore station was notified of the ship’s plans by the message: “AM STANDING DOWN CHANNEL TOWING BARGES UNTIL ALL FILLED.”

    6.   While proceeding at 1/3 speed to the eastward the ship at 1750 was attacked by Japanese dive bombers. The number and type of the attacking planes was reported as nine, Aichi 99 Dive Bombers. The attack was made from the starboard side. I did not observe the attack as I was engaged in clearing a jam in the Browning Automatic Rifle which I use at general quarters. The two starboard 20 MM guns opened fire and maintained a curtain during the entire attack. The two air cooled aviation 50 caliber machine guns on the after deckhouse maintained their file until put out of action by a bomb hit. Number one 3" gun expended one round. One plane was shot down in flames by #3 20 MM gun manned by ZAKHAR, Louis GM3c, U.S.N.; another plan was damaged by #4 20 MM gun manned by COLLINS, Gustave E., BM2c, U.S.N. It was observed wobbling and latter jettisoning its bombs after having passed over the ship.

    7.   Each plane reportedly dropped two bombs (about 100 lb.). Several near misses were felt on the port side of the ship. At least one of the misses was amidships and very close as PROBY, W.W., SM1c, U.S.N., was blown off of the port bridge bulwarks and Ens. S.J. Robinson, U.S.N., and MAZOWAY, L.A., CQM(PA), U.S.N. were blown into the pilot house from the port wing of the bridge. The next morning several pieces of shrapnel were found inside of the pilot house. It is not believed that the near misses caused any personnel or material casualties on the ship.

    8.   During the attack the gasoline barge was cast adrift by RAIDENNE, CPM(AA), U.S.N. The tank lighter was cast loose from the opposite side. Several men observed the rear seat occupant of the planes throwing out small black objects. It is possible that these were incendiaries and that one of them hit the barge, as the gasoline exploded and flames shot several hundred feet into the air. It is believed that the twelve marine and sailor members of the barge crew perished in the flames.

    9.   The last plane to attack the ship scored one or possibly two hits on or in the immediate vicinity of the depth charge rack on the port side of the fantail. A tremendous explosion occurred. Steering control was lost and all attempts to communicate by phone and voice tube with the steering engine room and after steering station failed. CALLISON, V.E., QM1c, U.S.N. went aft to determine the cause of the loss of steering control. At this time it was not definitely known that a direct hit had occurred. The ship meanwhile was being steered in the general direction of Tulagi. CALLISON returned very shortly in an excited state and informed me that I had better get back aft. I left the bridge and ran aft where I found the entire stern of the ship blown off from the after bulkhead of the washroom - aft. The head and washroom spaces were filled with many mangled bodies of dead and dying marines and sailors. The water was rising rapidly in the after living spaces. I sent LIVINGSTON, E.S., SOM3c, U.S.N.R. forward to report conditions to the Commanding Officer. Lieutenant (jg) GEMMILL arrived soon afterwards and assisted in carrying several of the crew, who began to arrive on the scene, after the Doctor. Several marines standing nearby were asked to assist in carrying other wounded from head and washroom. They were evidently in a highly nervous state as they made no move but stared vacantly ahead. After adminstering morphine to several wounded I went to the bridge and reported the extent of the damage to the Commanding Officer. By this time the ship was settling rapidly by the stern with a port list. Orders were given to flood the forward peak tanks, pump oil from the “D” group of oil tanks to the forecastle group, and to shift all able personnel to the starboard side. When I returned aft the chief pharmicist’s mate was administering morphine, and stretcher bearers were carrying the wounded forward to the sick bay where the Medical Officer was treating them.

    10.   The vessel maintained a course, by maneuvering the engines, in the general direction of Tulagi. The flooded peak tanks, shifting of oil and personnel brought the ship on an even keel. She stopped settling and it became apparent that she would probably keep afloat. However, the life boat was lowered to the rail ready to receive badly wounded patients, the gripes were cast off of the other boat and all liferafts were made ready to drop in case the ship should sink. About 2050 a fire was reported in the after crew’s compartment. The after magazine sprinkling system was opened. The after compartments were filled with dense smoke. COSGROVE, R.L., CCM(PA), U.S.N.R. assisted by HARP, G.L., CGM(AA), U.S.N. located and extinguished a burning mattress in the after compartment.

    11.   At 1925 communications were established with the signal station on Gavutu Island. The services of a YP boat and Higgins boats were requested for towing and transfer of the wounded. At 1950, PT boats and tank lighters arrived from Tulagi. At 1950, a PT boat attempted to take the ship in tow but was not successful. While awaiting the arrival of the YP boat the passengers and wounded were transferred to the tank lighters. At 2055 the YP-239 appeared and took the ship in tow at 2103. At 2340 the anchor was dropped in Tulagi Harbor just of “D” Medical Company Hospital. At 0100 the process of identifying and transferring the dead for burial was begun.

    12.   During the attack many marines, probably the war neurotics, went into a highly excited state and congregated in the passageways thereby greatly hindering the passage of the crew to their general quarters stations, the passing out of arms and ammunition from the armory, restricting the movements of the damage control party, and hampering the stretcher bearers. It is possible that by their action and shouts they had some effect on the nervous state of members of the ship’s company, thereby reducing their efficiency. It is not believed that small ships should be asked to evacuate mental patients under any circumstances.

    13.   The following is a list of men killed, wounded or missing as a result of the bombing ...

    14.   General Comments and Observations:

    (a) It is believed that a number of small, fast, armed freight and personnel carriers about the size of new destroyers should be assigned and built to service advanced outposts. In the present amphibious war it is not believed that the Allies have sufficient ships capable of slipping in to advanced positions at high speed, unloading troops and cargo and retiring before the enemy has time to strike. Similarly small fast tankers fitted with high capacity pumps could be very gainfully employed. These types of vessels should be equipped with sound gear, radar, depth charges, and excellent AA protection. They would be capable of traveling singly or in groups. Convoy protection would be unnecessary.

    (b) As previously stated it is not believe that small vessels should be hampered by the evacuation of mental patients.

    (c) It is believed that all personnel, soldiers, sailors and marines should be issued some small type of lifejacket or belt as his personal equipment so that when and if he is transferred for transportation to a small ship there will not be a shortage of lifejackets.

    (d) It is recommended that the sounding tubes to magazines, storage spaces etc., and all distant operating valve rods on vessels of this class be extended to the main deck. In case of flooding of the lower deck compartments this arrangement permits the operation of these fixtures.

    (e) It is believed that the designation of vessels of this class should be changed from AVD to some other designation indicating a combatant status. In connection with this it is further believed that the 3" guns should be replaced by 5" dual purpose guns, and that the present battery of automatic AA weapons should be at least doubled.

    (f) It is believed that the four boats at present carried should be replaced by Higgins personnel boats to allow the rapid handling of personnel and cargo.

    15.   It is believed that every member of the crew conducted himself during the action in a thoroughly exemplary manner. It is not believed that any single man should be singled out for praise. No one committed any acts requiring censure. It is believed that the wholehearted teamwork and spirit of the entire ship’s company pulled the McFARLAND out of “a tight spot” and enabled her to return to base after successfully completing her mission.

/s/
E.G. GARDNER JR.