U.S.S. McFARLAND AVD-14

AVD-14/A16-3

Serial No. 052 SECRET

December 15, 1942.

From:     The Executive Officer
To:      The Commanding Officer.

Subject:    Action, report of.

Reference: (a) U.S. Navy Regulations, Arts. 712 and 874(6).
      (b) U.S.S. McFARLAND Mailgram 262230 October, 1942, to SECNAV. (Report of casualties).

Enclosure: (A) Pertinent extracts from the Ship’s War Diary.
      (B) Photographs.
      (C) Executive Officer’s Report.

    1.   This letter together with its enclosures is submitted as the report required by reference (a).

    2.   The ship was in the Tulagi – Guadalcanal area for a period of about a month and a half. Because of rather unusual and possibly interesting occurrences during this period the report of the actual engagement with the enemy has been extended. The narrative of events is told by pertinent extracts from the War Diary, which was elaborated as necessary to give the details required by a report of this nature. The photographs, enclosure (B), are included to indicate the damage to the ship and how she was camouflaged.

    3.   No citation for any particular officer or man has been proposed as a result of this action, nor has any recommendation been submitted for meritorious advancement in rating. This is because it is considered that all hands acted together as a team. Like a good team it had no outstanding members. All were stars, and in order to commend one it is necessary to praise them all.

    4.   In support of this the following are offered as some samples of accomplishment among the many which came to the notice of the Commanding Officer.

    (a) The Navigator (Executive Officer) “hit the nail on the head” in making landfall at Nura Island at dawn on October 16th after encountering varying winds and currents during the night. No radar aboard.

    (b) The officers’ chief steward weighs about 100 lbs. and has a bad knee. Nevertheless he worked like a Trojan all afternoon, rolling gasoline drums.

    (c) The attack was a complete surprise, yet the guns were manned and effective fire opened within a few seconds.

    (d) Some of the “war neurotic” passengers were panicky, yet there was no panic among the crew. All did what was necessary to be done quickly, efficiently and with a minimum of direction; sometimes with no direction at all.

    (e) The port throttle was broken by the explosion, and steam equivalent to about 1/3 ahead was entering the turbine . When he received a backing bell the engineer admitted more steam to the astern turbine, overcame the ahead thrust, and backed down. This action probably saved the ship which, without a rudder, had drifted dangerously close to the beach in enemy territory.

    (f) At dark the ship was nearing the middle of the channel, settling by the stern and listing badly. It was feared she would sink. The Commanding Officer was engrossed in trying to make good a course toward Tulagi. It was then that the ship’s officers proved their worth, for they made readiness to abandon, corrected list and trim and rigged a spare engineroom pump and gained on the water. Nearly all of this was done in advance of orders from the bridge. In other words, the Commanding Officer could concentrate on the business at hand; his every need was anticipated.

    (g) For some weeks after the bombing all hands spent a considerable period every day at gun stations watching enemy planes overhead. At times the tactical situation became such that it seemed that the whole Solomons area would fall to the enemy. At no time did anyone aboard lose their nerve.

    (h) There had been no previous centralized organization at RINGBOLT when the Commanding Officer was assigned to command that base. This meant a big job to do, and the Commanding Officer explained this to the ship’s officers. The next day all the officers who could be spared from the ship asked, without prompting, to be put to work. It was the Communication Officer who first set up Radio Tulagi, the Air Officer who supervised the construction of the Naval Air Station at Lalavo, the Engineering Officer who laid the foundation for an adequate boat repair shop, and the Executive Officer who started the base along the lines of proper organization.

      The men too, volunteered to help, and became the key men in their departments in the subsequent development of the base.

    4.   The casualties in the action were reported by reference (b). The Commanding Officer considered that all men listed as “missing” are dead beyond a reasonable doubt. Under similar future circumstances it would seem desirable if these men could be declared dead without positive identification for the benefit of dependents at home.

    5.   The experience gained in carrying cargo to CACTUS and in commanding the naval base at RINGBOLT has led to the conviction that additional solutions should be sought to the problem of supplying an advanced base against enemy opposition. The following suggestions are offered as being of possible application:-

    (a) Designate the naval activities at an important advanced base as a task force. Make the task force commander responsible for all naval operations within the advanced base area.

    (b) Make suitable weight handling and moving equipment part of the deck load of the first ships to be unloaded at an advanced base. In particular provide plenty of cranes.

    (c) In the initial load of equipment provide torpedo nets with handling facilities, and have at least one position in which a ship can unload without fear of submarines.

    (d) Provide small high speed cargo carriers for emergency use. The executive officer suggests this in enclosure (C). However the length of time involved in the design and construction of a new type of vessel might make it better to continue the present practice of using old type destroyers, particularly if these were modified slightly to render them more suitable for this duty.

    5.   It is understood that the department intends to convert the destroyer seaplane tenders into plane guard ships for the auxiliary carriers. These ships have proved themselves so valuable that it is considered that their number should be increased rather than diminished. Except for the laying or sweeping of mines they can do practically anything that any other old type destroyer can do and in addition tend seaplanes and transport gasoline. Experience gained in operating PT boats at Tulagi has shown that these ships would make good PT boat tenders. They could also act as tenders for seaplane fighters and dive bombers should these be developed. A few comparatively minor changes in these ships would greatly increase their efficiency in performing their many duties. Those recommended are:-

    (a) If at all possible install two 5"-25 cal. guns to give the ship a fighting chance with a Japanese destroyer and increase its AA effectiveness. If this cannot be done install 40 MM.

    (b) Change stanchions, deck fittings, etc. to provide for better cargo stowage on deck. Install awnings for protection against the sun. Convert the after bomb stowage into cargo space.

    (c) The ship’s gasoline tank together with the surrounding void holds approximately 50,000 gallons. Provide alternative gasoline for few oil storage, and thus increase the potential cruising range 50%. Shifting from gasoline to fuel would not be a big problem. Changing back to gasoline would require considerable washing and steaming of the tank.

    (d) Install TBS radio and latest radar.

    (3) Turn 90% of aircraft spare parts carried over to the nearest large seaplane tender or aircraft base, and habitually carry only small items of known utility.

/s/
J.C. ALDERMAN

Distribution:
  1 advance copy to COMINCH.
  2 Copy to COMPAIRPAC