Bureau of Construction and Repair War History

As in all other sections of the war history of the Bureau of Construction and Repair it is impracticable throughout the text and on all illustrations and diagrams to reiterate the joint responsibility and authority of other bureaus and offices of the Navy Department in connection with the various features included. In order to give a complete review of anyone subject, such as the “Destroyer Programme”, it has also been necessary to deal briefly with some matters primarily under the control of other bureaus. It is therefore, desired to acknowledge in general the hearty and efficient cooperation of all other sections of the Navy Department, without which the accomplishment of the results attached would have been impossible, and to acknowledge in particular the joint responsibility and authority of the Bureau of Steam Engineering over the conception, design and execution of the “Destroyer Programme”.

The facts, statements and estimates contained in this sketch are believed to be correct as nearly as can be determined at this date, January 1920.

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DESTROYER PROGRAMME.

During a period so filled with vast and unprecedented operations and undertakings, it is difficult now, when all is still viewed from such close range, to pick out the really great events and great accomplishments. Some, due to their close and intimate effect on the daily lives and habits of the people, loom large in the public eye today; others, carrying and overmastering appeal to the human emotions, will occupy great places in history; and still others will to-day and to-morrow hold high place in the popular esteem because of their association with great and appealing personalities. But back of all of these will be found the undertakings which have provided the gigantic framework of material without which all the rest would have been impossible. Of such undertakings perhaps the least known and appreciated are those which have been carried out by organizations already in existence when the war found us prepared in some directions but woefully lacking in others. Of this class unquestionably the greatest single war project of the Navy Department was the Destroyer Programme. The comparatively small amount of attention and publicity, other than purely local or professional, which this has attracted is due to the fact that it was conceived, planned and administered by the already existing Department organization and was executed by the great private shipyards whose years of experience in the building of naval vessels fitted them to undertake this great task, chiefly by experience of their existing plants and organizations. The college fund of such a program is the more creditable to the organizations of the Navy Department and of the American shipbuilders in that it did not necessitate the setting up of new agencies and authorities whose activities always of necessity overlap and interfere with the operation of older and established agencies of existing authority.

In order to understand the vital necessity for this program from a military point of view, it is necessary to review briefly the situation, before our entry into the war, in regard to the distribution of our own naval strength in the general naval and military position of the allies at the time of our entry into the war and as it developed subsequently. Likewise, to grasp the magnitude and difficulty of this undertaking, is necessary to make a short survey of the developed capabilities of our industrial resources for destroyer production is affected by man-power, availability of material and limitation of plants.

NECESSITY FOR THE PROGRAMME.

Our entrance into the war found of the United States Navy proportionately weaker in destroyers than in any other type of fighting ship, even when measured by the standards existing before the outbreak of the European war. In 1914 the generally accepted major use for destroyers was in connection with the main battle fleet, and to them was assigned the double duty of protecting their own capital ships from the attacks of any me destroyers and other minor units and of delivering similar attacks against the main fleet of their opponents. It was usually estimated that, to perform these duties, from 4 to 6 destroyers for each capital unit of the fleet would be required. At the beginning of 1917, our battle fleet consisted of 42 battleships, all but two of which were in commission or practically completed, while of seagoing destroyers reprocessed only 59, including those still under construction. The great three-year building program, authorized by Congress in August 1916, provided for 50 destroyers, but these were only sufficient to provide the minimum allowance for the 10 battleships and six battle cruisers included in the same program. The development in the use of various types of warships during the first two years and a half of the war only serve to accentuate our relative weakness in destroyers, as was shown by the fact that Great Britain, although she was far better equipped with destroyers in proportion to the size of her fleet than the United States, concentrated more effort on the production of additional destroyers than on that of any other type of war vessel. It was already recognized the naval circles that the destroyer was the most effective any doubt for the submarine and it was the German policy of the use of the submarine against merchant vessels that was the immediate cause of our entry into the war. The opening months of our participation in the fray brought a rapid series of events, each one demanding destroyers and more destroyers. When a representative of the Navy Department had established a liaison with the responsible naval representatives of the allies, the first request for assistance was one of four destroyers to be sent immediately. To meet his very first request of the allies meant taking away from our own battle fleet is already inadequate screening of destroyers, but this hard decision was taken, with the result that the arrival of our first division of six destroyers and Queenstown in May 1917 mark the first participation of the Armed Forces of the United States in the active prosecution of the war against Germany. During the months of April, May and June, the German attempt against the allied lines of communication at sea reached its peak, and so successful were their efforts that the whole allied cause was more seriously threatened that any other period of the war,- and the demand was destroyers and more destroyers. While we were rushing to the scene of activity every destroyer in the service, including even the small coast defense destroyers built nearly 20 years before, the question in the mind of all was: will it be possible to build new and additional destroyers in time to avert the impending calamity? It was during the same period of the convoy system for the protection of merchant shipping was tried and so triumphantly demonstrated its success, but the enthusiasm of oak by the success was dampened by the unalterable fact that the convoy system could not be utilized fully because we did not have sufficient destroyers,- they were the only type of craft capable of performing this arduous duty on the high seas, even through the limited submarine zone as it existed then. Later the activities of enemy submarines on her own Atlantic coast, and the information, obtained through the Secret Service, that the Germans were constructing a large size heavily armed cruiser submarines showed beyond the shadow of a doubt that the submarine campaign would no longer be confined to a comparatively narrow strip of ocean off the European coast would extend far afield with the result that our cargo and troop ships would have to be convoyed from the moment of leaving their home ports until they had safely completed their round trip after delivering their precious freights of food and munitions and men. Again this threat demanded destroyers and more destroyers. During all this time we knew that the gravest sources of worry to the commander-in-chief of the British “Grand Fleet” on which rested the allied command of the sea, was the shortage in the number of destroyers attached to that fleet, for they had been withdrawn for use in protecting merchant shipping against the submarine until the great allied battle fleet was actually seriously inferior in destroyer strength to the German “High Seas Fleet”. Enough has been told show reason for that insistent cry for “destroyers and more destroyers”. Not only was the accomplishment of the entire American war effort dependent on meeting this demand, but also the actual result of the war hung in the balance. The problem confronting the Navy Department was not only to produce new destroyers in the quickest possible time but also was to make it possible for every one of our existing boats to be on the scene of action and to operate day in and day out on a schedule never before contemplated as possible for vessels of this class. Where is a few of the above causes were apparent when we became a belligerent, others did not take definite form until months afterwards, and it is to the credit of all branches of the Navy Department that this great problem was foreseen and taken up with unanimity and energy even before our declaration of war; it is one case where foresight proved as good as hindsight. Later the measures taken to meet the situation will be given in detail but it can be told once that they have resulted in the United States Navy be now better equipped with this indispensable type of war vessel than with any other type, and, partially to the size of our battle fleet, better equipped than any other Navy; what previously was our weakness is now our strength.

PRE-WAR BUILDING CAPACITY FOR DESTROYERS.

The questions which at once assumed the highest importance were: what already developed capacity for destroyer-building was available? and, To what extent could this be expanded to meet the emergency? The answer to the first question and the difficulty of finding a satisfactory answer to the second can only be appreciated by following the development of the construction of this type of vessel in the modern Navy.

From 1886 1896, there were laid down a total of 33 torpedo boats and 16 small destroyers. These were built by 12 different firms but all of them encountered such difficulty in meeting the exacting requirements for this type of craft that only two of them were prepared to continue work of this class when in 1906, after a lapse of eight years, destroyers were again included in our Building Programme. From the latter date an average of six destroyers a year were provided for in our naval appropriations. As a result of the steady increase, five private yards, all on the Atlantic coast, had had considerable experience in destroyer building when the war emergency arrived. The actual average production of destroyers for the previous decade was six each year, or little more than one from each building yard. The maximum number anyone yard had ever turned out any year was for, and no yard had ever had more than six under construction at any one time. The usual contract time for the construction and delivery of a destroyer had been two years, and, although there were a limited number of performances bettering this figure, it was generally exceeded, as is shown by the fact that during the years from 1907–1917 the average actual construction period was 25 months. For this same period the record show that the average time on the building slip was 11½ months. These figures show that prior to the war there were in the whole country only six building ways habitually devoted to destroyer building and 12 was the maximum number occupied at any one time. It was estimated during this period that in the building yard a total of about 105,000 man days was required to build a destroyer. It was considered that for this work only the most expert mechanics could be utilized. It will thus be seen that normally only about 2,700 highly skilled men had been normally employed on destroyer construction in this country. These figures are representative of the volume and rate of destroyer construction during a period of peace when, on one hand, there was no war emergency to act as a spur to production, but on the other, there was no handicap due to shortage of men or material; there was not only no interference from other urgent government work, but, on the contrary, this period as a whole was won during which the demand for new ship construction of every kind was at a very low ebb. The destroyer has always been considered to represent the highest development of the arts of the ship designer and builder, for the type is based solely on the use of minimum weight of material in such a manner as to withstand the maximum of stress. This condition precludes the use of ordinary commercial material and demand special alloys and special forms combining the twin attributes of lightness and strength; it also demands the greatest care and I a skill in the fitting and joining of these materials to form the completed structure. In ordinary times it would’ve been comparatively simple to double or quadruple the previous average volume of destroyer construction, but this probably represents the maximum normal increase practicable without resort to special measures. The correctness of this estimate is indicated by the fact that when the Navy Department in September 1916, invited bids for 20 destroyers, tenders were received for a total of only 24, of which eight were from yards which had not previously built vessels of this class. When, however, the Navy was faced with the necessity of suddenly increasing his destroyer production to the maximum possible extent, the times were far from ordinary; our shipyards had in hand the greatest I am of warship construction our country had ever known; in addition they had under construction or under contract for domestic and foreign owners such a number of merchant vessels that the industry was already disorganized by the competitive demand for men and materials to meet the rush of orders; as soon as we entered the war it became evident that one of our greatest contributions must be a sufficient by move production of merchant tonnage to offset the ravages of the submarine which were at that time sinking such vessels about four times as fast as the shipbuilding industry was turning them out, and to meet this demand the United States shipping Board was formulating a program of construction which alone would require more than quadrupling the entire industry; likewise, during the two years preceding, our steel and general metals’ trades had been running full blast, due to the demand for raw materials and manufactured goods of all kinds for the allies; upon our declaration of war there was at once superposed on industries, already running to capacity, the demands of our government for war materials of every kind and description. These were the conditions under which the department undertook to put through a program which in ordinary times would’ve been termed amazing but was actually inaugurated with very little public notice at a time when the difficulties of accomplishment were enormously enhanced. Reduced to facts and figures what was undertaken was to purchased 267 destroyers of a larger, more powerful and more speedy type than any previously built and to do it in a period of approximately 2½ years. This meant an expansion of almost 16-fold in the building facilities previously devoted to destroyers; that there would be required an increase in building slips from 6 to 90 and in man from 2000 to about 38,000 unless great savings could be contrived in time and labor by improved methods, four, not one concession involving decreased efficiency of the boats themselves was made in order to save time, while on the contrary, every effort was made to increase their efficiency by incorporating improvements whose value had been demonstrated in actual war operations. That economies in time and labor, due to improved methods and quality of production, were made will be seen later when actual increases involved are shown in connection with an analysis of the results of the programme.

NATIONAL POLICIES TO SUPPORT PROGRAMME.

The decision to build destroyers having, therefore, been taken even before our entry into the war, as will be shown hereafter, it became necessary it wants to make certain decisions on matters of major national policy if an extended destroyer program was to be brought within the limits of the possible. Four steps of nationwide effect, requiring either cabinet action or agreement between the heads of government departments concerned, all with presidential approval, were decided upon at once. Work was stopped on all warships of large size, principally battleships and battle cruisers, with the exception of three battleships which were nearing completion and could be finished in time to be available for use in the war in case of necessity. It was agreed that the Navy Department would have first call up to 70% of their capacity, on the resources of the five principal shipyards of the country, all of which by previous experience were particularly well fitted for warship construction. Material for destroyer construction was placed in the first category for priority of war material, but this did not mean that destroyer material could be obtained at once and without difficulty, for, not only did it have to share the first category with a number of other vital demands of the war and Navy departments, but also much of the material required was of such a special character that the developed production capacity of the country was not sufficient to supply it in the quantities required. Finally, workmen engaged on destroyer construction, along with other shipyard labor, or given special exemption from compulsory service under the draft.

LEGISLATIVE ENACTMENTS FOR PROGRAMME.

the necessity which inspired this program having been grasped in the difficulties which confronted its realization having been examined, the first step to translate intention and action was to obtain the necessary legislative sanction of Congress. The Naval Appropriation Act of August 29, 1916, a date which will prove to be one of the most important in the naval history the United States, authorized a continuing three-year building program, including provision for practically all essential types of war and auxiliary vessels, but for the purpose of this sketch the authorization for 50 destroyers, to be laid down within the next three years, is of paramount importance. Of these 50 destroyers, this act authorized 20 to be commenced at once, while was the intention to authorize 15 to be started in each of the next two fiscal years. Contract replaced for the first 20 in November 1916 as follows:

November 10, 1916, four vessels, Nos. 75–78, Bath Iron Works, Bath, Maine.

November 21, 1916, eight vessels, Nos. 79–86, Fore River shipbuilding Corporation, Quincy, Massachusetts.

November 21, 1916, six vessels, Nos. 87–92, Union Iron Works, San Francisco, California.

November 22, 1916, two vessels, Nos. 93–94, United States Navy Yard, Mare Island, California.

When, therefore, we broke diplomatic relations with Germany, no authority existed for additional destroyers and no funds were available for their construction. In accordance with our constitutional system, the regular session of Congress would terminate on March 4, 1917, and it was, therefore, assumed that by that date the appropriation bill for the next fiscal year would have become law and would authorize the second 15 destroyers of the program. 15, however, was a mere beginning of the number which it was already anticipated would be necessary. It was also realize that to expedite the construction and completion of the 20 destroyers already ordered and the 15 destroyers which would be ordered after the passage of the new appropriation bill would require greater expenditures for overtime, labor and other items than had been provided for in the original legislation. On the initiative of the chief constructor, Rear Adm. D. W. Taylor, U.S.N., The Sec. of the Navy recommended, and Congress enacted the following clause which appeared in the Naval Appropriation Act of March 4, 1917, and the fund thus made available became known as the “Naval Emergency Fund”:

“To enable the President to secure the more economical and expeditious delivery of materials, equipment, and munitions and secure the more expeditious construction of ships authorized and for the purchase or construction of such additional torpedo boat destroyers, submarine chasers and such other naval small craft, including aircraft, guns and ammunition for all of such vessels and aircraft and for each and every purpose connected therewith, as the President may direct, to be expended at the direction and in the discretion of the President, $115,000,000, or so much thereof as may be necessary, and to be immediately available.”

Immediately after the passage of this Act, bids were invited from all the shipyards equipped for doing destroyer work, and in less than three weeks contracts had been placed for 24 boats with three builders who believed that they were in a position to push these additional vessels to prompt completion. These contracts were:

March 28, 1917, eight vessels, Nos. 96–102, Fore River shipbuilding Corporation, Quincy, Massachusetts.

March 28, 1917, ten vessels, Nos. 103–112, Union Iron Works, San Francisco, California.

March 29, 1917, six vessels, Nos. 113–118, Wm. Cramp & Sons Ship & Engine Building Company, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.

Of these 24 boats, 15 were covered by the second year’s allotment of the three-year building program, while mine were covered by the authority contained in the naval emergency fund clause. This number was realized to be entirely inadequate to fulfill the demand, and negotiations were at once opened with other builders possessing the necessary facilities for destroyer construction, but not at that time in a position to undertake such work voluntarily on account of the large amount of work of other kinds already on hand. Numerous conferences were held with the executive officers of these companies, in order to determine how best utilize their facilities, and elaborate investigations were made to determine whether much time could be gained or considerable increase in by move production attained by a reversion to building duplicates of earlier and smaller destroyers, and it might be said here that this investigation, together with considerations of military policy, resulted in a decision to adhere to the large fast type already underway in the plants mentioned above. These conferences brought out the fact that by voluntarily undertaking destroyer construction and concentrating their efforts on vessels of this type, many, if not all builders would render themselves liable for large penalties for delays on contracts previously accepted by them in good faith from private owners. To obviate this legal obstacle, it became necessary for the Navy Department to utilize another special power conferred on the Executive by the Naval Appropriation Bill, which authorized the President in time of national emergency, “to place an order with any person for such ships or war material as the necessities of the government, to be determined by the Pres., may require and which are of the nature, kind, and quantity usually produced or capable of being produced by such person. Compliance with all such order shall be obligatory on any such person to whom such order is given, and such order shall take precedence over all other orders and contracts theretofore placed with such person.” Under this authority and that of the Naval Emergency Fund, orders were placed in May and June for:

May 19, 1917, six vessels, Nos. 119–124, at Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Company, Newport News, Virginia.

June 18, 1917, six vessels, Nos. 125–130, at New York Shipbuilding Company, Camden, New Jersey.

The investigations of possible further development of building resources and conferences with the principal companies continued. These investigations had to be carried to the sources from which materials, equipment, fittings, auxiliary machinery, etc., would have to be obtained and involve numerous conferences with manufacturers and others who were sub-contractors for these various parts. All this was accomplished in the shortest possible space of time despite the fact that many other major and minor items of the war program had to be pushed simultaneously and that the Bureau’s personnel was still inadequate in number to meet the many demands on its time. As a result, it became more apparent that more destroyers could be put in hand but would require expansion the contractors’ plants and special arrangements with outside shop for doing certain definite parts of the work. These extensions and special arrangements required financing and new capital on a scale beyond the resources of the companies themselves; so, by utilizing other special powers conferred on the president by war legislation, the Navy Department undertook to finance either wholly or in part the required extensions under special rental agreements. These measures permitted placing the following additional orders:

July 5, 1917, four vessels, Nos. 131–134, Bath Iron Works, Bath, Maine.

August 7, 1917, one vessel, No. 135, United States Navy Yard, Charleston, South Carolina.

July 20, 1917, six vessels, Nos. 136–141, United States Navy Yard, Mare Island, California.

July 20, 1917, 15 vessels, Nos. 142–156, Wm. Cramp & Sons Ship & Engine Building Company, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.

July 31, 1917, four vessels, numbers 157–160, at New York Shipbuilding Company, Camden, New Jersey.

August 2, 1917, ten vessels, Nos. 161–170, Fore River Shipbuilding Corporation, Quincy, Massachusetts.

August 3, 1917, ten vessels, Nos. 171–180, Union Iron Works, San Francisco, California.

August 9, 1917, five vessels, Nos. 181–185, Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Company, Newport News, Virginia.

By utilizing to the full all existing authority and funds provided by Congress, there were, by Midsummer, 117 destroyers under construction, including six of the previous program which were not yet completed and 20 contracted for in the fall of 1916. In other words, during the first four months of the war, arrangements were completed for expanding our building capacity for destroyers sufficiently to permit placing orders for early completion of 91 destroyers, despite the fact that the opening of facilities found us with 26 destroyers under construction, or double the number which represented the developed building capacity during the previous decade. But even this enormous program was not considered as sufficient to meet the probable needs for successfully combating the submarine menace which at that time was so grave that the result of the war hung in the balance. Already merchant tonnage was inadequate to supply the normal needs of the European allies for food and war materials, and it was foreseen that in additional and what promise to be unbearable strain would be put on the same shipping resources when the American Army was ready to move in force. But each month showed a sickening decrease in available tonnage, for the sinking’s largely exceeded the new production. As a consequence, active work was continued to develop ways and means for increasing the facilities for producing still more destroyers. As a result, it was decided that by building several new plants, taking over some existing plants and making extensions to still others it would be possible to attain the desired end. Congress, therefore, on the recommendation of the Navy Department included in the Urgent Deficiency Bill of October 6, 1917, a clause conferring wide powers of the president, “for acquiring and providing facilities for the expeditious construction of additional torpedo-boat destroyers, and for each and every purpose connected there with”, and provided the sum of $350,000,000 for the purpose. Steps were at once taken to give effect to this authorization and orders were placed to the principal builders of destroyers for the new plants and extensions necessary to carry out this new program. Simultaneously, orders were placed with them for the construction of 150 additional destroyers, as follows:

Oct. 11, 1917, 20 vessels, Nos. 186–205, Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Company, Newport News, Va.

Oct. 9, 1917, 25 vessels, Nos. 206–230, Wm. Cramp & Sons Ship & Engine Building Company, Philadelphia, Pa.

Oct. 11, 1917, 20 vessels, numbers 231–250, at New York Shipbuilding Company, Camden, N.J.

Oct. 9, 1917, 10 vessels, Nos. 251–260, Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corporation, Fore River Plant, Quincy, Mass.

Oct. 9, 1917, 35 vessels, Nos. 261–295, Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corporation, new Squantum Plant, Squantum, Mass.

Oct. 9, 1917, 35 vessels, Nos. 296–335, Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corporation, new Union Iron Works, San Francisco, Cal.

A few months later, the department placed orders for nine more destroyers under the authority of the “naval emergency fund”, additional funds for which were appropriated in the deficiency Bill of October 6, 1917, as follows:

Jan. 22, 1918, 6 vessels, Nos. 336–341, United States Navy Yard, Mare Island, California.

Jan. 25, 1918, 3 vessels, Nos. 342–344, United States Navy Yard, Norfolk, Virginia.

The regular naval appropriation bill for the fiscal year 1919, which was approved July 1, 1918, automatically carried the authorization for commencing the last 15 destroyers of the three-year program. With the orders already placed, no further immediate results could be obtained by placing these additional orders until one or more of the builders had slips which could be vacated at a reasonably early date by the last of the boats previously ordered. This condition was reached prior to the Armistice by only one Builder, to whom the following order was given:

July 25, 1918, 3 vessels, Nos. 345–347, Bath Iron Works, Bath, Maine.

FINANCING THE PROGRAMME.

The estimated cost of the 267 destroyers forming the wartime program was about $430,000,000, for the boats themselves, while in addition there were errors necessary approximately $130,000,000 for guns, torpedoes ammunition and a sum of about $40,000,000 for new plants and extensions in a whole plants, or total of approximately $600,000,000. Of this amount, $350,000,000 was made available by the special clause of the Urgent Deficiency Bill of October 6, 1917, about $175,000,000 was allotted from the naval emergency fund, and about $75,000,000 was included in the regular “Increase of the Navy” appropriations for carrying out the three-year building program.

As has been previously stated, the carrying out of this program requires not only extensions to existing plants and yards but also the establishment of entirely new ones. Some of these were made by the private companies themselves under arrangements by which the department agreed to pay special rentals for their use up to an amount which would represent fairly the difference between their original costs and their value to the contractor on a post-war basis. Others were made by the Department itself and will eventually it would become the property of the government or will be sold outright to the contractors of evaluation to be agreed upon. The approximate cost of these projects is about as follows:

INSERT

in addition to providing these plan extensions, it was necessary to make advances in actual cash to the contractors, for, though partial payment on monthly returns were provided for, the initial outlay required was on such a vast scale is to be far beyond the usual requirements of these companies for working capital. These advances were repaid by the contractors in installments by deductions from the monthly payments due them and do not, therefore, represent out-of-pocket expense to the government. The total of advances thus made was $31,200,000.

FORMS OF CONTRACT.

Even before the war was definitely upon us, that is, in the Summer of 1916, it was found that the material and labor markets were fluctuating so rapidly that it would be impossible to please contracts for vessels of the size and value of the battle cruisers on the usual basis of a fixed price for the delivery of a completed vessel. To meet this condition, Congress authorized, on the recommendation of the Navy Department, the placing of contracts for these vessels on the basis of actual cost plus profit. When the same conditions became more acute a mealy before and after our declaration of war, and it was evident that the total contracts for destroyers and other types of naval craft would run into the hundreds of millions, it was found necessary to apply the same form of contract to destroyers, and the powers conferred on the president by the Naval Bill of March 4, 1917, were sufficiently broad to permit this procedure. Under these contracts is applied to destroyers numbers 95–185, the builder was to receive the actual cost of building the vessel plus a net profit of 10%. This was modified for destroyers numbers 186–235 by providing that the builder should receive a fixed profit of $135,000 on each boat, which represented 9% of the estimated cost of $1,500,000, and a further profit amounting to one-half of the amount by which the actual cost might be less than this estimated cost.

In addition to this method of payment, new in our government practice, although previously utilized by some private owners, these contracts contain an entirely new set of provisions under which it would be possible for the contractors to provide the additional plant and building facilities necessary to permit the most rapid possible construction of the destroyers. These provisions were of two kinds. The first was known as a special rental agreement, under which the builder, at his own expense, provided additional facilities and the government in return paid a special rental for these facilities in an amount sufficient to reimburse the contractor for their depreciation while used for government work and for the excess cost due to their installation at a time of excessively high prices; in general these rentals amounted to the aggregate of about 50% of the original cost of the improvement of the contractor. Under the second form, the government paid in the first instance the complete cost of the plant extensions and upon completion of the contract they became the sole property of the government, which can remove them for use elsewhere, Solomon the open market or dispose of them to the contractor at a price to be agreed upon. The amounts paid by the government in the form of special rentals have been included in the cost of the boats themselves, while the amounts paid for improvements direct[ed] by the government having carried in a separate account.

Complete and exhaustive trials of a completed vessel have always been an outstanding requirement of Navy Department contracts. These trials not only gave the most severe test of the vessel as a whole and every one of its working parts but also, by means of careful measurements and observations, established exactly what the vessel’s capabilities were in regard to speed, power and fuel consumption. Such trials took considerable time and also require the services of a number of the most expert engineers and workmen. These requirements were evidently inconsistent with the demands for quantity production in the minimum time, while on the other hand, it was absolutely essential that the characteristics of each group of boats should be known with a fair degree of accuracy and that every boat should demonstrate its capability before being placed in active service. The contracts therefore require that the first boat of each group from each builder should be given the usual exhaustive trials and that all the votes thereafter should be given simply a doctrinal of machinery followed by a four-hour full power trial in the open sea, during which the usual high speed maneuvering tests were to be held. By these reduced requirements all essentials were obtained with a minimum of delay, as the characteristics in regard to speed, revolutions, power and fuel consumption of the first boat of each group apply with reasonable accuracy to the others, which, except for minor variations due to workmanship, are exact duplicate of one another, while the four-hour full power trial demonstrated the strength and ability of the boat to operate up to its maximum design requirements.

There were many additional minor variations from the previous standard form contract, and the contracts with these builder and for each successive group opposed different from one another in order to cover the special conditions in each case in such a way as best to facilitate and expedite the production of the boats and at the same time both to safeguard the interests of the government financially and to ensure that the boats themselves were of the highest possible quality.

THE COMPENSATION BOARD.

The most difficult part of the administration of these new forms of contract was to ascertain, with fairness to the builder and protection to the government, the actual cost of construction and to do it in such a manner as not to delay the construction of the destroyers themselves. To accomplish this task, the difficulties of which could be but dimly foreseen and which an execution proved to be extremely arduous and complex, the Navy Department created a new agency which was called the “Compensation Board”. This board was made up first of three and later a four officers of high rank and prominence in the service, together with the Chiefs of the Bureaus of Construction & Repair and steam Engineering. This board supervise the cost accounting work at 34 shipyards and 14 manufacturing plants, and in each case not only had to determine the costs of construction and manufacture but also the costs, depreciation and valuation of plant extensions made for purposes of government work. To carry out this work, the board had to form an organization totaling about 50 in their Washington Headquarters, with a field force of about 900.

DEVELOPMENT OF DESIGNS.

The first appearance of destroyers in the United States Navy was in 1898, during the Spanish-American War, when 16 boats of 420 tons displacement were authorized, costing a little more than $250,000 each. It is interesting to note in passing that these little vessels of our first destroyer program performed excellent service in the War Zone, operating in the Mediterranean from Gibraltar and on the French Coast.

The next eight years saw no increase in this type of vessel in our Navy, but in 1906, Congress authorized three new destroyers in the designs of these marked the beginning of the steady development which has led to our present magnificent fleet of destroyers. We then adopted certain basic design principles which have since been faithfully adhered to. The first of these was to provide for the heaviest guns, the greatest number of torpedoes and the largest quantity of ammunition possible on a vessel of its size, and in any event to insure that these offensive features were in excess of any contemporary farm design. The next outstanding feature was to proportion the vessel, especially by increased length, that the minimum power of propelling machinery would be required to attain the desired speed, so that the weight available for this purpose would not have to be utilized solely for the purpose of developing the maximum power and would consequently permit the use of types of machinery, boilers and auxiliaries which could give the greatest possible economy in fuel consumption under service conditions, thus resulting in a larger radius of action without the necessity of carrying great quantities of fuel. These two principles resulted in the third, which was that our hulls had to be of the lightest possible construction which can only be attained by the use throughout of very special material and the highest grade of workmanship. The influence of these principles will be seen in the comparison given hereafter between our program destroyer and the latest types of British Navy.

The steps in our development of the destroyer can be seen by glance at the table on the following page (Plate II). Such a brief statement of principal characteristics cannot, of course, tell the whole story of improvement growth, which includes the introduction of such new features as radio telegraphy, direction finders, gyroscopic compasses, listening devices, arrangements for mine laying and mine sweeping, director fire control, installations for carrying kite balloons, facilities for making minor repairs on board, etc., and also the increases in comfort and convenience of living on board, such as forced ventilation, mechanical refrigeration, laundry machinery, oil burning galleys, more and larger boats, and closed bridges, emergency cabins, etc. Plates III to VI, show in pictorial form the development during these 20 years. Plate III shows the U.S.S. Macdonough, laid down in 1899; Plate IV, the U.S.S. Fanning, laid down in 1910, which sunk the German submarine U-58 and captured her entire crew in November 1917; Plate V the U.S.S. Sampson, laid down in 1915, and Plate VI, the U.S.S. Robinson, of the war program (this picture shows the war paint, or camouflage, which was applied to all destroyers operating in the war zone). These vessels are representative of the group whose principal characteristics are given in columns 1, 2, 3, and 4, respectively of the Table, Plate II. A typical war program destroyers shown on the frontispiece, Plate I, the U.S.S. Burns.

For the present purpose, the most interesting design developments are those which were made during the war period. The first one hundred boats of the programme lay down the basis of the designs prepared in the Summer of 1916, which had been developed from our previous practice, modified as necessary to meet what we could learn as neutrals of the demands arising from the war. During the Spring and Summer of 1917, there was freely placed at our disposal the accumulated experience of the European Allies, supplemented by our own personnel and material in active operations against the enemy submarines. As a consequence, changes and modifications were introduced in the design of the 150 boats for which orders were placed in the fall of 1917, but such changes were held to the absolute minimum essential for efficiency, as the best results, from the point of view solely of production, could be obtained only by absolute duplication of the first 100 boats, and time and production were the very essence of our efforts.

Although our destroyers already had greater cruising radius than most of the foreign destroyers, it became evident early in our war operations that a maximum possible mileage would have to be obtained on a single filling of the oil bunkers. This was brought about largely by the adoption and development of the convoy system for the protection of merchant ships and troop transports, which necessitated destroyers accompanying such vessels, frequently of high-speed type, many hundred miles out to sea, then cruising perhaps for several days before picking up, to escort to port, another inbound convoy. During all of this time, the destroyer had to have in reserve sufficient field permit of operation for short periods at maximum speed whenever an enemy was sighted or call of distress was received from a sinking ship, perhaps several hundred miles away. Also, as is stated elsewhere, it had already become evident that eventually we would have to provide destroyer escorts for important convoys entirely across the Atlantic, to guard against the big German submarine cruisers which were then being built in considerable numbers. Consequently, the fuel oil capacity was increased from 275 to 375 tons.

Our information through Secret Service channels, the German economy did mounting guns as heavy as 5-inch on her new cruiser submarines, made it evident that we would have to provide longer-range guns. Consequently, provision was made for mounting our 5-inch gun, a gun of very high power with a range as great as contemporary 6-inch guns. (Due to problems of production, 4-inch guns have actually been installed on most of this class of destroyers, but the 5-inch can be installed in the future with little or no structural change). This armament likewise makes this class almost equal and gun power to the British Destroyer Leaders, which mount five 4.7-inch guns

the experience at sea in the war in firing at submarines at long range in rough weather, when a destroyer has, to say the least, a very lively motion, combined with the adoption of the larger size gun, demonstrated the necessity of adopting the director fire control for use on destroyers, and as this was provided for, necessitating the erection of high permanent structures above the bridges.

One of the developments in the use of the destroyer against the submarine which had never been foreseen and was purely a war measure was the invention and adoption of the depth charge, which is a large bomb containing explosive charge of 300 pounds of T.N.T., With a detonator which would not set off the charge until it had sunk a predetermined distance below the surface of the water. This depth charge had been developed and utilized by the British Navy before our entry into the war, but at that time, only 2 to 4 were being fitted in a position ready either to be dropped by means of control gear from the bridge were to be thrown to a distance of 50 to 100 feet by a low powered gun. American destroyer officers developed new tactics for use with this new weapon with the object of putting into the water as quickly as possible a considerable number of depth charges, equally distributed over an area within which the presence of an enemy submarine was suspected. In order to accomplish this, the arrangements for carrying and dropping or throwing depth charges had to be very extensively increased and improved. The installation finally adopted included to light racks carrying about 20 charges each and arranged so that the entire number could be dropped in quick succession; also, to “Y” guns, or double-barreled throwers, the two barrels being mounted on one base and making an angle of about 60° between them, thus permitting to charges to be simultaneously fired on opposite sides of the ship. By this arrangement, six depth charges could be released practically simultaneously, and these could be followed with additional sets of six at intervals whose frequency was only limited by the expertise of the crew in reloading the “Y” guns. A total of 50 depth charges was arranged for, but some destroyers operating in the war zone carried as high as 90 charges in positions where they could all be utilized easily and quickly. The photograph of the after deck of one of our destroyers (see Plate VII) gives some idea of the appearance of these depth charges when in position to be used at short notice.

Our destroyers had, up to the war, been designed to give the best possible performance at sea under bad weather conditions and had, on a number of occasions in the heaviest North Atlantic weather, establish their reputation as fine sea boats, and this reputation did not suffer as a result of their very strenuous service in honey submarines and convoy and transports throughout the winter of 1917–18. One of the features of our design which contributed to these performances was our adherence to the pointed or cruiser form of Stern rather than the flat Stern characteristic of recent British destroyers. Our practice had been established in this respect by experience with the first 16 destroyers lay down in 1898, among which were examples of both types. In the special use of destroyers for hunting attacking submarines during the war, however, it was found of a larger turning circle, inherent in our type of Stern, was a considerable handicap. Though under the special conditions many of our destroyer commanders felt that we should adopt the flat Stern in order to obtain the quick maneuvering power conferred thereby, the consensus of responsible opinion was that we should not sacrifice, in any way, the demonstrated fine a compromise was therefore made seagoing qualities of our boats. A compromise was therefore made in the new design by retaining the general character of the stern but cutting away the deadwood to the greatest possible extent and increasing the size and power of the rudder.

The constant cruising in all kinds of weather, frequently at high speed, combined with the necessity not only for an increasing and vigilant lookout for any sign of a submarine, but also for the instant readiness of every man on watch, including the gun crews, soon demonstrated that officers and men must be provided with more efficient protection from the weather than had previously appeared necessary. In the new designs, therefore, closed-in bridges, emergency cabins, where the commanding officer could get snatches of sleeping to be available for instant call to action, deck shelters for gun crews, and better protected lookout stations were provided for.

Another interesting development was the fitting of about one third of the destroyers with automatic winches and other facilities to permit their carrying kite balloons. These balloons would be towed in the air by the destroyer at practically all speeds, and each balloon carried an observer who, from his lofty position could command a large area of the sea and report by telephone to the commanding officer any unusual or suspicious circumstances which he might observe.

There were, of course, numerous minor changes in the design; some as a result of our war experience, others as a result of experience during the construction of the earlier boats of the program and adopted in order to simple fly and expedite the work of building, and still others arising from engineering and scientific developments, both fields of thought having been much stimulated by our war conditions. But the above represent the more important improvements brought about by actual participation in war operations.

COMPARISON WITH BRITISH DESIGN.

In 1914, when the war first started, the British were building two distinct types of destroyers. The larger, of about 1,700 tons displacement, was designated a “Destroyer Leader” and was meant to be a group or division flagship capable of carrying a larger complement and a heavier battery and of maintaining a high rough weather speed. The other type was about 1,000 tons displacement and corresponded with our contemporary designs of the same displacement but differed in the emphasis placed on several of the essential characteristics. They had shorter and heavier hulls, fewer guns in torpedo tubes, about the same fuel capacity, and later but less economical machinery, giving a higher speed but less cruising radius. For the next two years this latter type, with several minor changes, was laid down, but due to their size and power, could not be turned out in large numbers. The need for a more powerful type than the 1,000-ton boat, but suitable for production in larger number than the leaders, was strongly felt, so in 1915, at about the same time we were first developing our war program design of 1,200-ton boats, the British designed in place orders for a considerable number of a type intermediate between their smaller destroyers and they leaders. This type, known as the “V” Class, is closely comparable with our war program destroyers in size and principal characteristics. A comparison of the two designs show[s] that the British boat has a hall of the same length but considerably heavier than hours, the same number and size of guns but only half the number of torpedo tubes, an equal fuel capacity and machinery of about the same power and weight but giving both a lower speed and less cruising radius. The higher speed of our design is due chiefly to the much lighter hull structure, as at full speed a difference of 80 tons in displacement will make about a not difference in speed. The better cruising radius of our boats is due to the more economical machinery installation which has always been a characteristic of American designs.

From this brief comparison of types, it will therefore be seen that the units of our destroyer fleet, composed almost entirely of the war program type of vessels, are individually larger and more powerful than the great bulk of the British flotillas but are not comparable with their leaders, while being practically of a class with their intermediate type. It should be mentioned in this connection that the British Navy did not continue their intermediate type, but during the last year and a half of the war reverted to building both small destroyers and leaders. The table on Plate VIII, following, gives a comparison of the chief characteristics of the three British types with our destroyers.

BUILDING OF PLANTS AND FACTORIES.

Having reviewed the necessities which inspired the program, the legislative action authorizing it, the financial and contractual arrangements for executing it and the designs on which the actual construction was based, we can now turn to the successive stages in the accomplishment of the program. With the exception of laying down boats on existing slips and proceeding rapidly with their construction, the first accomplishments were necessarily the extensions of existing plants in the construction of new plants and shops. The expenditures on these projects have already been given. In the case of each of the principal yards, it was found the considerable sums had to be expended on enlargements of the principal shops: machine shops, plate and angle shops, boiler shops, sheet metal shops, foundries, etc., and for the mechanical equipment for these extensions, in order that the work in the shops could be kept abreast or ahead of the work of assembly on the slips. One of the principal items for which every yard had to provide was additional storage and assemblage areas, both undercover and in the open, for the building of destroyers on the basis of quantity production required facilities for the receipt and storing for ready use of in Norma’s quantities both of raw materials and of small manufactured articles. As a consequence, it will be found that in every yard new storehouses were erected, plate and angle storage yards were provided, and areas close to the slips were set apart for partially assembling structural members before putting them in position on the slips. All these arrangements required additions to, and rearrangements of the transportation system of the yards, including provision of additional locomotive cranes, cars, etc. another feature for which new facilities were almost universally required was in the arrangements for handling and caring for the greatly increased number of employes, such as new gate-houses for checking in and out, lunchrooms and sanitary features. Naturally, the increased item of work required more office space, not only for the contractor’s own organization but also for the large government inspection and accounting forces. These extensions so briefly referred to our common to practically all of the yards to greater or less degree and will not therefore be referred to in detail, but the general character of the extensions in each of the principal plants is interesting.

The Bath Iron Works had always played a leading part in the construction of torpedo craft since the early vessels of this class, but was a small yard with a limited capacity, having only to building slips. When we entered the war, they already had under contract for destroyers, which under normal conditions would have kept the plant fully occupied for nearly two years. Under the special rental agreement, this company purchased additional land and installed two more building ways and put in new and complete crane equipment for handling material at all floor slips, in addition to general extensions such as those referred to above. The effect of these and other measures is well illustrated in the case of this experienced and well established builder. Under former conditions, no deliveries would have been made before the Armistice, whereas, actually at that date for vessels had been delivered, four were in an advanced state towards completion, and three more had been well started. In other words, this company expanded from a pre-war actual output of between one and two destroyers per year to a capacity of at least four destroyers per year.

The Fore River Plant, at Quincy, Massachusetts, of the Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corporation, was well fitted for all classes of ship construction prior to the war and had built a number of destroyers during the previous ten years, and at the outbreak of hostilities had under contract eight of these vessels, none of which had yet been laid down. In addition to these, the company had on hand the number of submarines and one battle cruiser for the Navy, and a very large program of merchant ships. The portion of the extension of the yard which was used principally for destroyer construction consisted of a tract of 20 acres adjacent to the plant and belonging to the State of Massachusetts, from which it was leased for a period of 20 years. On this tract, four destroyer building slips with crane equipment were erected. In addition to the slips, sometimes two and sometimes three of large building slips in the main part of the plant were used for destroyers, two being laid down on each. Although not directly used for destroyers, the provision in another part of the yard of three new ways, new shops and a fitting-out pier for submarines resulted in releasing a larger proportion of existing facilities for destroyer work, as in the Navy priority schedules submarines ranked next after destroyers in importance. One unusual undertaking in connection with the enlargement of this plant was the widening of one of the streets of Quincy and double tracking the street railway for distance of about two miles in order to avoid great congestion in the handling of the increased number of workmen. The building of the Squantum Plant, which was carried out by this company, will be treated separately.

The art of William Cramp and Sons’ Ship and Engine Building Company, at Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, was likewise one of the large well-equipped yards of the country. Being situated in a build-up section of the city, it was not practicable to make large extensions requiring additional land. No new slips were constructed an effort on plant extension was concentrated on refitting, re-arranging and improving shop and material handling equipment so as to obtain the maximum capacity from the existing building ways. Large storage facilities were, however, provided on Petty’s Island in the Delaware River opposite the plant. Of the eight ways in this yard, four were used currently during the war for destroyer work, nine being carried on simultaneously. The maximum number on the ways at one time was thirteen. Plates Nos. II and X, which show structural material fabricated and laid out on the ground ready for assembly on the slips, were taken at this plant and give a good idea of the magnitude of one of the problems which had to be solved in fitting a yard for quantity production of destroyers.

On the opposite bank of the Delaware River is the plant of the New York Shipbuilding Corporation, at Camden, New Jersey, which was also one of the large well equipped plants of the country, and like the others, was filled to capacity with work when the War Emergency arose. This company undertook the construction of ten destroyers in their existing plant, but found it necessary to make a large extension, which amounted almost to a small new yard, when they were directed in the Fall of 1917 to proceed with construction of 20 additional destroyers. This extension was made on 15 1/2 acres of reclaimed land, adjacent to the main plant. At the beginning of the work, this tract was largely marsh which required banking, filling and draining. Six covered and for uncovered building ways, with complete overhead Crane service were erected, together with usual new shop, storage, office and handling facilities. In the old and new portions of the plant, the maximum number of destroyers simultaneously on the building ways was 18. Plate No. XI shows eight destroyers at one time alongside the fitting-out piers, which were part of the extension of this plant.

The fourth of large long-established yards on the Atlantic coast which were engaged [in] destroyer construction was the plant of the Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Company, at Newport News, Virginia. The principal extension here consisted of a tract of nearly 30 acres adjacent to the old plant. This area required a sea wall, filling and grading before available for the installation of four new ways for destroyers, as well as to 900-foot ways for Battle Cruisers. New shops and facilities of all kinds were added to the existing plant in order that the shop capacity might be equal to that of the building ways. It is estimated that the plant as enlarged can employ 15,000 men but not more than 10,000 were utilized, due to the lack of housing facilities, a difficulty felt at all of the yards, but particularly acute in this community. In addition to the for her new ways, four of the old ones were used for destroyer work, a maximum of eleven boats eating on the ways at any one time.

The Union Iron Works, of San Francisco, Cal., Is another plant of the Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corporation. Although at one time extensively engaged in naval shipbuilding, this plan had done no government work for nearly ten years, with the exception of a few small submarines, until the Fall of 1916 [when] it took a contract for six destroyers and six submarines. At that time it was fully occupied on merchant ship construction and the old Potrero Plant and the new Alameda Plant were excellently equipped for this purpose. When the insistent demand for destroyers arose, all merchant work was cleared from the Potrero Plant as rapidly as possible and the five slips were devoted exclusively to the construction of submarines and destroyers. Two destroyers were at all times under construction on each of four slips. The principal extension of the existing facilities here consisted of the construction of a very large additional machine shop at the Alameda Plant and extensions of the street railway system to permit the more expeditious transportation of workmen to and from the yard. As neither of the plants of this company possessed a steel foundry in the existing resources for castings on the Pacific Coast were inadequate, the department financed extensions to the plant of the Columbia Steel Company, about 40 miles from San Francisco, thereby doubling its capacity.

The largest development, however, consisted in the construction of a practically entirely new shipyard on the site of the old Risdon Iron Works, where a number of old buildings were available. Six new slips with overhead cranes were built, a large boiler shop, with a capacity of six 7,000 H. P. boilers per week, was installed and blacksmiths, sheet metal, pipe, machine, electric and plate shops were created. City gas and electricity were utilized for power, but a large 7,000-ft. air compressor plant was installed. The acquisition of the property under a lease for the duration of the war and the construction of the plant was authorized by the department on October 31, 1917. Before the end of the year, or in less than two months, the keel of the first destroyer, the Hazelwood, was laid in the new plant, and it was delivered a little more than 13 months later, or in 15 1/2 months after the order for the plant in which to build it was given.

By far the most interesting and important development was the construction for the Navy Department by the fore River company of an entirely new yard at Squantum, Massachusetts, together with a boiler factory at Providence, Rhode Island, and a turbine plant at Buffalo, New York, all for the building of 35 destroyers assigned to that company in October 1917. The site of the plant was selected on account of its accessibility from existing housing facilities with ready means of access. An area of about 700 acres of marsh land and tidal flats was commandeered by the Navy Department from the New York, New Haven and Hartford Railroad Company and about 97 acres of this area is occupied by the plant. It was necessary to dredge a 12-foot channel from the site, which faces on Dorchester Bay, to the Neponset River Channel and to fill and grade the land to an average depth of 7 feet. The plant consists of 10 covered building slips and 6 wet berths, also under roof with complete structural, pipe, sheet metal, paint and general machine shops, all arranged with communicating crane service for the most efficient and expeditious construction work. Electric power is obtained from the Boston-Edison Company and the plant powerhouse consists of electrically driven air compressors and boilers for heating and auxiliary purposes. Plate No. XII gives the general layout of the plant and Plates Nos. XIII, XIV, XV, XVI and XVII are general and interior views. Work on the site was started on October 7th and by January have progressed sufficiently to permit fabricating work to be started in a portion of the shops. In April the keels of the first five destroyers were laid, the first of which, the U.S.S. Delphy, was launched in July and delivered in November,- in less than 14 months after work on the marshy flats had been commenced. This plant is now owned and occupied by the Navy.

While these extensions to the shipbuilding yards themselves were sufficient to provide for the building of the holes in the assembly of the completed boats, they were not sufficient to provide the capacity necessary for the production of all the main turbines, boilers and auxiliaries. The Bureau of Steam Engineering in conjunction with the builders made arrangements with outside factories for the construction of much of this machinery. To complete the picture of plant extensions necessary for the realization of the destroyer program, brief reference will be made to this most important of these.

For the supply of main turbines, the following plants were utilized:

A new shop of the General Electric Company, at Erie, Pa., was fitted with suitable tools for the production of turbines for portion of the boats at the Union Iron Works.

The Westinghouse Company, of Pittsburgh, together with their sub-contractor, the Alice-Chalmers Company, of Milwaukee, undertook the production of turbines for the destroyers at Newport News and at the New York Shipbuilding Company.

The Cramp Company bought for the account of the Navy Department the entire shops of the De La Vergne Machine Company in New York, for the purpose of increasing their own facilities for the production of turbines.

The Fore River Company in conjunction with the project at Squantum built a large plant covering about 11.5 acres at Tonawanda, New York, just adjacent to the city of Buffalo, for the manufacture of the turbines for 35 destroyers. The plant is complete except for a foundry, castings being obtained from a large number of separate foundries with good transportation connections to Buffalo.

For the supply of boilers the following arrangements were made:

The boilers for a large portion of the boats at Cramps, New York Shipbuilding Company, and Newport News were undertaken by the Babcock & Wilcox Company, who greatly enlarged their plant for the purpose.

The new boiler shop at the Riedon Plant, with its capacity of six 7,000 H.P. boilers per week, has already been referred to. This shop supplied the boilers for the boats at the Union Iron Works.

The boiler shop at the Fore River Plant was doubled in size and was able to maintain the supply to all the destroyers assigned to that plant.

But with the new Squantum development it was necessary to increase the capacity for boiler production, and the development at Providence was the result. The plant occupies 3 acres of ground leased from the city government. Some of the work, such as castings and the bending and bumping of heavy plates, is done by outside shops, but otherwise this new plant was able to do all the work necessary for the production of 12 boilers per month. The plant later undertook the manufacture of condensers for portion of the boats at Squantum.

For the supply of auxiliaries certain special arrangements and new facilities were necessary.

The Blake & Knowles Plant of the Worthington Pump and Machinery Corporation, at East Cambridge, Massachusetts, was more than doubled in size, their capacity being increased from 8 to 23 complete sets of destroyer pumps per month. The pumps for the entire 150 destroyers, ordered in October 1917, were assigned to this company.

The plant of the Wellman-Seaver-Morgan company, at Akron, Ohio, was enlarged by the addition of six new buildings and their equipment. This company had never previously done any ship work but were builders of heavy machinery of various types. They undertook the supply of practically all the condensers to the destroyers at Newport News, Cramps, and New York Shipbuilding Company. Also the sheet metal work for the boiler up takes and smokestacks, the manufacture of certain tanks, the supply of certain parts of the main steam piping, and finally the manufacture of 70 steering engines under sub-contract from the American Engineering Corporation.

Extensions were financed for three valve manufacturing companies, for several forge shops in various parts of the country, for one blower manufacturer and for the Falk Company at Milwaukee, which undertook the production of the main reduction gears for 91 of the destroyers of the programme.

PRODUCTION OF THE DESTROYERS.

From the preceding account it will be seen that the war program consisted of the following groups of orders:

20 boats ordered in November 1916.

24 boats ordered in March 1917.

67 boats ordered in June-August 1917.

150 boats ordered in October-December 1917.

12 boats ordered in January-July 1918.

273 boats total

These were distributed among the various builders as follows:

66 boats to Bethlehem S.B. Corp., Union Iron Works, including new Risdon Plant.

36 boats to Bethlehem SB Corp., Fore River plant.

35 boats to Bethlehem SB Corp., Fore River plant, new Squantum plant.

46 boat to Wm. Cramp & Sons Ship and Engine Building Company.

31 boats to Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Company.

30 boats to New York Shipbuilding Company.

11 boats to Bath Iron Works.

14 boats to United States Navy Yard, Mare Island, Cal.

2 boats to United States Navy Yard, Norfolk, Va.

1 boat to United States Navy Yard, Charleston, S.C.

273 total.

The first actual deliveries were made in April 1918, or just one year after our entry into the World War. The first one actually delivered was the U.S.S. Little on April 5, 1918, by the Fore River Company, which built the vessel ready for service in 16 1/2 months from the date of the order. The following day, April 6, 1918 the Mare Island Navy Yard commissioned the U.S.S. Fairfax. Both of these boats were in the group ordered in the Fall of 1916. The first destroyer of those ordered when the war emergency was upon us in March 1917, was the U.S.S. Rathburne, delivered by the Cramp Company on June 24, 1918, in 15 months from the date of order.

From the first deliveries in April until the Armistice, deliveries were made with increasing rapidity, the number per month being:

3 boats delivered in April 1918

2 may

4 June

7 July

5 August

10 September

5 October

2 November 1–11

38 boats delivered prior to the Armistice.

These were delivered by the following builders:

16 by the Fore River Shipbuilding Corporation

6 by the Wm. Cramp & Sons Ship & Engine Building Company.

4 by the Bath Iron Works.

4 by the Newport News Ship Building and Dry Dock company.

4 by the Union Iron Works.

4 by the Mare Island Navy Yard.

These 38 boats, together with six boats belonging to previous program is but delivered subsequent to April 7, 1917, make a total of 44 new destroyers added to the Navy during the war period. In this connection it is interesting to note that two new boats were actually delivered on November 11, 1918, the day of the Armistice.

At the time of the inception of the program, and for number of months thereafter, both the builders and the Navy Department itself made optimistic estimates of what could be accomplished in regard to deliveries of the new boats which could not be fully met, but by the time of the Armistice not only had these estimates been carefully revised but the greatest difficulties in the way of the program had been met and overcome. As a consequence, it is believed that had the war continued, the estimates of deliveries as made on November 1, 1918, could have been fully met. At that date the following schedule of deliveries was anticipated

13 boats to be delivered in November 1918

11 December

15 January 1919

14 February

15 March

19 April

17 May

12 June

9 July

11 August

11 September

11 October

11 November

10 December

38 1920.

This schedule called for an average rate of delivery of about 12.8 boats per month during 1919.

After the Armistice, production was immediately slow down a careful survey was made in order to determine what contracts could be canceled without involving undue loss by the scrapping of work already done or material ready for incorporation in the boats. It is an indication of how rapidly work on the entire program had proceeded that it was found practicable to stop the construction of only six boats parenthesis (Nos. 200-205). Despite the facts that the contractors shifted workmen from destroyers to merchant work, that the department did not desire the early delivery of these boats and that war time pace no longer held in industry in general, the program had gained such momentum and was on such a sound production basis that deliveries were actually made as follows:

7 boats delivered in November 11–30, 1918,

4 December

6 January 1919

6 February

10 March

9 April

8 may

12 June

12 July

6 August

12 September

11 October

7 November

9 December

119 total

This shows an average rate of delivery of about 8.5 boats per month during 1919, even under post-war conditions when it was desired to slow down deliveries, so that it appears highly probable that no difficulty would have been encountered in meeting the schedule of 12.8 boats per month if the war had continued.

The record show that the maximum number of boats on the ways at one time in the various yards was

Bath iron works 4

Fore River shipbuilding Corporation 10

Squantum plant 10

New York shipbuilding company 18

William cramp and sons 13

Newport News SB and DD code 11

Union iron works 8

Region plant 6

Norfolk Navy yard 3

Charlestown Navy Yard 1

Mare island Navy yard 3

Total 87

So that from a total of six destroyers actually on the ways at the outbreak of war, the number steadily increased to a maximum of approximately 87. The maximum number of men employed on the program in building yards only was approximately 30,000.

On Plate XVIII are given three diagrams showing the performance of the various builders in the execution of the war program compared with pre-war practice. The first diagram shows the time which elapsed between the date of the contract and the delivery of the first boat by each builder. It will be noted that the best time was made by the new Squantum plant, which made its first delivery in less than half the time required before the war. The average for all of the builders was a little more than 15 months, or nearly 10 months better than the pre-war average. In considering these figures it must be borne in mind that during the period when the first boat was being billed the contractors were extending their plans, increasing their working forces, assembling and fabricating material for the boats to follow and in general preparing for quantity production. For this reason a fairer basis of comparison appears to be that given on the second diagram which gives the average time which each builder took to deliver his boats after the laying of the keels. The averages given are for all boats (exclusive of Nos. 75-94) delivered up to the end of 1919 and include therefore the numerous ones built wholly or in part under post-war conditions. This period was selected as being most representative of the rate of construction attained on the program as a whole. The average time for all builders was 11.1 months, were only 60% of the time required before the war. A similar average for the boats delivered prior to the Armistice gives 9.7 months, or about 51% of the pre-war average. The time of 12.7 months given in the diagram for the mare island Navy yard is not a fair measure of accomplishment of that yard, as, due to the small number of boats included in the averages and to the fact that after the Armistice men were diverted to other classes of work considered more important by the Navy Department; the average time for the four boats delivered by the yard during the war. Was only 7.5 months the third diagram shows the best performance of each builder; it will be seen that, with the exception of the last two, these best performances do not differ very materially from the average for each of the builders, which indicates that the work on the program was carried forward at a uniformly rapid rate. The two exceptions are, of course, not representative of a rate of construction which could be maintained in practice, but are indicative of the rate which can be attained in actual assembly when all material, fittings and machinery of every kind are ready.

The first of these two records was made by the Mare Island Navy Yard in the construction of the U.S.S. Ward. The second was made by the new Squantum Plant under the management of the Fore River Plant of the Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corporation in the construction of the U.S.S. Reid. In both cases structural material was fabricated and assembled so far as practicable on the ground before erection on the ways, and the extent to which this is practicable is shown by the fact that in the case of the Ward 183,000 rivets were driven prior to laying the keel, while 165,000 rivets were required from that date to assemble the vessel ready for launching.

The records in both cases for maintained speed in riveting are worthy of note: Squantum showed an average of 66 and mare island 72 rivets per gang per hour during the period of construction on the slip. The table, given below, of the principal dates in connection with both of these records, shows that whereas mare island excelled in the rapidity of work on the building slip, Squantum made an unequaled record in the rapidity of installation of machinery and final completion of the vessel.

Insert

Plates No. XIX, XX, XXI and XXII are photographs of the USS Ward during assembly on the slip and shown a graphic way to speed with which this work was done.

COST OF CONSTRUCTION.

the average price for destroyers for which contracts replaced between the years 1912 in 1915 was about $840,000 for boats averaging about 1,090 tons in displacement, and in power about 17,000 S.H.P. Due to the increase in size to 1.185 tons and in power to 27,000 S.H.P., and to increases in cost of labor and material, which were already felt in the summer of 1916, the limit of cost fixed for the first boats of the type which formed the war program was placed at $1,200,000 and the contracts for these boats were placed at figures very closely approaching this limit. By March 1917 cost of labor and material that further increase to such an extent as to make it necessary to raise the limit to $1,300,000, and by the fall of that year the same factors had shown such a continued and sharp upward trend that it was estimated that the cost of construction, exclusive of profit, would be $1,500,000 each, or total of $1,635,000 after the fixed fee to the builders was included. The actual percentage increases in cost of labor and material subsequent to 1915 were very close to 80% and 100% respectively. The application of these percentages to the proportional parts of the contract prices ruling in 1915 shows of the basis of estimate for the final figure arrived at in the fall of 1917 was sound and that, if the vessels were built in accordance with the methods used during the earlier period, the final cost could be expected to approach closely to the estimated figure. It is believed that any considerable saving from this figure can be fairly attributed to improvement in methods and economies due to quantity production. At the present date, absolute final figures are not yet available for any considerable number of boats, for numerous items can only be determined finally after prolonged investigation and adjustment. Figures are available, however, for about 70 boats based on returns which are from 90% to 99% complete, the balance in each case being carefully estimated. These give the following cost per boat, inclusive of profit, for each of the private builders:

Insert

A comparison of these figures with the respective times of construction, as given by the diagrams on plate number 18, shows with a remarkable consistency that rapidity of production has gone hand-in-hand with low-cost. This fact goes far to confirm the opinion previously expressed, that savings below the estimated cost figures can be attributed to economies and improvement in methods introduced to permit of quantity production.

RESULTS ON TRIAL.

On Plates Nos. XXIII and XXIV are given tables showing the results on trial representative boats of each builder. The results in displacement, speed and fuel consumption vary considerably between different builders, due chiefly to different designs of main propelling machinery. With the exception of the first 11 boats of the Newport News company, which have direct drive machinery, all boats can be divided into two general classes or designs. The ones built at Bath, Cramps, New York Ship, Newport News and the Navy Yards, 125 votes in all, are based in general on the machinery installations is designed by the Bath Iron Works, while the ones built at Fore River, Squantum and Union Iron Works, 137 boats in all, are in accordance with the machine redesigns of the Fore River company. In comparing these results, it should be borne in mind that boats subsequent to number 185 have a design displacement of 1,215 tons as against 1,185 tons in those prior to this number, the increase being due to incorporation in the design of various new features, the desirability of which had been indicated by war experience. The variations in trial displacements from these figures are due to differences in the actual weight of material worked into the boats by the various builders and not to any differences in the method of loading the boats for trial.

An average of the trial results given tables on Plates Nos. XXIII and XXIV can be considered as representative of the boats of the war program as a whole. Following condensed table gives this average result compared the results of the U.S.S. Wickes which showed on the whole the best results of any boat tried to date.

Insert

BRITISH DESTROYER PROGRAMME.

It is of interest to compare our war destroyer program with that of the British Navy in regard to size, raider production, and methods employed. The two cannot, of course, be directly compared as the circumstances under which they were carried out varied so widely. As has already been stated under the discussion of design, the British did not concentrate on one single type but built four distinct types. In August 1914, at the outbreak of the war, there were nearing completion 13 destroyers of the “M” Class (of the 1913 program), all of which were delivered in the early months of the war. There were 10 of this class of the 1914 program underway. These were followed by the first work order for about 72 of the same type, and subsequently at intervals by orders for 56 of the “R” class, 50 of the “V” class, 69 of a “modified” R class, and finally by 54 more of the “V” class. During the course of the war, 28 destroyer leaders were also ordered. The total war program was therefore approximately 339 vessels (note: all figures are approximate), of which number about 225 were delivered up to the date of the Armistice.

The orders for destroyers were distributed among 13 firms of whom five or six had never previously built vessels of this class. As the orders were given at intervals during four years in the type was changed from time to time, both due to the exigencies of the war as it developed, it was not possible to plan for quantity production of single type, as was done in our program. The results obtained therefore are representative of what can be accomplished by previously accepted methods applied by experience builders under the stress of war emergency.

The first delivery of a war program boat was in October 1915, or, in a little more than 14 months after the outbreak of war, which is precisely the same period which elapsed before the delivery of our first war program boat.

For the first 19 months of the war, corresponding, so far as production is concerned, with our full period of war, British builders delivered 42 boats and our builders delivered exactly the same number, including in both cases all boats of previous programs under construction at the outbreak of hostilities. Omitting, however, boats which were nearing completion at that date and including only those properly belonging to the war program, the British deliveries were 30 against 38 in the United States, or at the rate of 4.3 boats per month against 5.4 boats per month for the. After deliveries had actually begun.

For the early part of each program, therefore, the results obtained are closely the same. From this point on, comparison cannot well be made, as the result of quantity production methods then begin to come become apparent. For the entire period of more than three years from the delivery of the first boat until the end of the war, the British maintained a remarkable average of 5.8 new boats delivered every month.

The average time required by British builders from the receipt of order to delivery of each boat was about 16.6 months. This is less than the average for the same period which could have been accomplished for the boats of our programme, due to the initial delays occasioned by the necessity for expanding plants, preparing for quantity production, etc., as has already been related. Estimating from the perspective deliveries at the time of the Armistice, it appears that the average time from the placing of contracts to the delivery of all boats would have been about 19 months. The best British record appears to be about 11 months, which is approximately the same as the best in this country.

As a measure of the actual speed of construction, the time from laying the keel to the delivery of the completed boat affords a good basis of comparison. The British average is about 12.1 months, while the United States shows an average of 9.7 months for all vessels delivered up to the Armistice. This again shows the effect of the methods adopted for quantity production.

SERVICE AND CASUALTIES IN THE WAR.

Although not, strictly speaking, a part of the story of the “destroyer programme”, it is interesting to follow briefly the career of our destroyers under war conditions, with special reference to material matters.

The existing destroyer fleet, including all boats up to No. 68, the last one to be completed before the outbreak of war, all saw service in the war zone with the exception of the old boats lay down in 1898 and two of the more modern boats. They were operated from three principal bases: Queenstown, Ireland; Brest, France, and Gibraltar. In each of these bases there were stationed one or more United States Navy repair ships, whose resources were supplemented by temporary shops erected on shore. The repair ships were operated by Navy personnel on a basis of 24 hours a day, the schedule made possible by providing barracks in which the additional personnel necessary could be birthed. The usual operating schedule for destroyers was 5 to 6 days at sea and 2 to 3 days in port, with a five-day period in port once a month. Then once in every 4 to 6 months each boat was given a 10-day docking and refit, for the comfort of which the British Admiralty placed at our disposal the necessary facilities either in government dockyards or in private repair plants. This schedule resulted in the boats being actually at sea on average of 50% of the entire time, while frequently the time at sea would be as high as 65% during a single month. When it is considered that these percentages help through winter as well as summer, to storm and son, and that the service at sea meant constant steaming, often at top speed in bad weather, the record is a truly remarkable one. The average mile steam for months by each boat was close to 5,000, and many individual boasted more than 7,000 miles in a month. A representative month’s record is that of the U.S.S. Kimberly, the second one of the war program to be completed, which, during the first full month in the war zone was actually at sea 470 hours, or 65% of the time, during which 7,019 miles were steamed.

As indicating the amount of repair work performed on destroyers, including both routine docking an overhaul to keep them at the highest notch of efficiency, and the repair of major casualties, there was spent at the principal repair plant, the yard of Messrs. Camell, Laird & Company, Ltd., at Birkenhead, England, a total of about $2,500,000, and the total at all yards and plants was at least a million more than this. The largest single job was that on the U.S.S. Manley, which amounted to nearly $300,000.

There were a number of cases of large damage due to casualty, but only two of these were due to enemy action: the U.S.S. Jacob Jones was torpedoed and sunk and the U.S.S. Cassin was struck in the stern by a torpedo which destroyed one propeller and the steering gear but the vessel continued to steam in a circle on one shaft at a good speed for several hours, during which she repelled further attack by the German submarine. The latter is an instance showing the remarkable resistance to damage of these light vessels. The conditions of operation in the war zone, necessitating frequent maneuvering at high speed in the close facility of numerous other vessels and often at night without lights, were such as naturally caused many collisions in accidents. It is a tribute to the fine seamanship of our destroyer officers that on an average only 2½% of our boats in the war zone were out of action due to the repairs necessitated by such causes. All of these casualties have demonstrated the truly remarkable ability of these lightly built vessels to remain afloat and in many cases to continue to operate their machinery under damages sufficiently severe to have sunk vessels of a much heavier type.

The U.S.S. Manley, in going alongside a British vessel at sea for the purpose of delivering messages to that vessel, came in contact with it in such a way as to exploded depth charge carried on the Manley, which explosion resulted in the explosion of a large number of other depth charges, each one containing 300 lbs. of T.N.T. the entire after end of the Manley, abaft of frame 147, including the after deck house, was blown off. Other serious damage to the vessel resulted because of the explosion and subsequent fire. The vessel was nevertheless kept afloat and subsequently brought into port and repaired. The U.S.S. Shaw was in collision, due to the disabling of her steering gear, with the H.M.S. Aquitania, October 9, 1918. The Aquitania struck the Shaw just forward of the bridge and cut completely through her, severing the bow from the rest of the ship for about 1/4 of her length, setting fire to the fuel in the forward oil tank. Subsequent to this damage, the officers of the ship navigated her, Stern first, into Portland Harbor (England), under her own power.

Plates XXV and XXVI give views of the damages to the Cassin, Manley and Shaw.

Insert table.

Courtesy: Chris Wright, Warship International.

Navigation

Table of Contents

FOREWORD.

DESTROYER PROGRAMME.

NECESSITY FOR THE PROGRAMME.

PRE-WAR BUILDING CAPACITY FOR DESTROYERS.

NATIONAL POLICIES TO SUPPORT PROGRAMME.

LEGISLATIVE ENACTMENTS FOR PROGRAMME.

FINANCING THE PROGRAMME.

FORMS OF CONTRACT.

THE COMPENSATION BOARD.

DEVELOPMENT OF DESIGNS.

COMPARISON WITH BRITISH DESIGN.

BUILDING OF PLANTS AND FACTORIES.

PRODUCTION OF THE DESTROYERS.

COST OF CONSTRUCTION.

RESULTS ON TRIAL.

BRITISH DESTROYER PROGRAMME.

SERVICE AND CASUALTIES IN THE WAR.