On October 30, the U.S. cruiser Atlanta and destroyers Aaron Ward, Benham, Fletcher, and Lardner had arrived at Lunga Roads with a convoy carrying heavy artillery for the Marines. The DDs lingered in the area long enough to lend fire support to a Marine drive on Point Cruz. Destroyers Shaw and Conyngham steamed into this effort on the morning of November 2. Between them, the two hurled 803 rounds of 5-inch shells at Jap gun positions in the jungles bearding the mouth of the Umasani River. Five days later, destroyer Lansdowne arrived at the “cactus” front with 90 tons of ammunition for Vandegrift’s troops. She joined a hunt for a Jap submarine, which had torpedoed a Navy cargo ship off Lunga Point that day, but the U-boat got away.
Meanwhile, Halsey received word that Japanese war shipping was concentrating at Truk, Rabaul, and various points in the Upper Solomons. The shipping off Buin, Bougainville and the Bismarcks was not the run-of-the-mill “Tokyo Express.” Something big was coming down the “slot,” and something bigger was coming down from Truk. To meet the threat, some 6,000 additional army troops and Marines were dispatched “special delivery” from Espiritu Santo and Nouméa to Guadalcanal. Admiral R. K. Turner’s amphibious force warships did the delivering.
The convoy moved in two contingents. The first contingent was composed of three attack cargo ships under escort of a force commanded by rear admiral Norman Scott. This force consisted of flag cruiser Atlanta, and the destroyers Aaron Ward, Fletcher, Lardner and McCalla, under Captain R. G. Tobin, ComDesRon 12 in Aaron Ward. The contingent left Espiritu Santo on November 9 and reached Lunga Roads on the 11th.
The second contingent, commanded by Admiral Turner, contained four transports, including flagship McCawley, under escort of a task group composed of two cruisers and three destroyers. These ships left Nouméa on the 8th. When the contingent arrived off San Cristobal Island on the 11th, the convoy was joined by three more cruisers and five destroyers. All of the warships with Turner’s contingent were units of Task Group 67.4, a support group under command of Admiral Daniel J. Callahan in flag cruiser San Francisco.
When Scott’s contingent reached Lunga Point, it was promptly assailed by enemy dive-bombers. American fighters zoomed up from Henderson Field to intercept, and the Jap planes were able to do little damage. One attack cargoman was injured. She was escorted back to Espiritu by destroyer Lardner.
Arriving at Lunga Point on the 12th, Turner’s contingent made haste to unload. Air and submarine alarms hurried the proceedings at 1317. Enemy aircraft were reported in the offing, and Turner led his ships out into Savo Sound, where there was room for evasive maneuvering. The attacking Japs ran into American fighter planes and a storm of flak from seagoing AA batteries. Nearly all of the 25 Jap planes which struck at Turner’s vessels were gunned down.
However, destroyer Buchanan (Commander R. E. Wilson) took such a beating from friendly anti-aircraft fire that she had to be sent out of the battle area. A Jap bomber, winged by gunfire from McCawley, made a suicide crash into cruiser San Francisco. The crash doused the deck with blazing gasoline, wrecked a gun director and the ship’s fire control radar, and killer 30 cruiser men.
This air assault on Turner’s force was only a curtain raiser to the onslaught that was coming. Heading down from Truk and points north were Jap battleships Hiei and Kirishima, Jap light cruiser Nagara, and 14 of the Emperor’s destroyers. Poised to come down the “slot” from the Bismarck-Bougainville area was a group of ten transports and twelve destroyers. In the backfield to the north of the Solomons were Jap carriers Hiyo and Junyo, and there were more where those came from.
Turner knew his forces in Savo Sound were heavily outweighed and outnumbered. Compelled to cope with impossible odds, he sent his convoy steaming away out of danger.
At that critical hour, the Enterprise force, the “Big E,” had just returned after rush repairs, with battleships Washington and South Dakota steaming northward from Nouméa. But these big guns were still a day away. Yet something had to be done to prevent a blasting of Henderson Field by the oncoming enemy battleships. To Callaghan’s support group fell the defense of Guadalcanal.
In the twilight of November 12, Turner led his transports eastward, back toward Espiritu Santo. His ships were to be escorted to Espiritu by destroyers Buchanan (damaged), Shaw and McCalla (low on fuel) and old timers Southard and Hovey (minesweepers). Callaghan’s warships screened the convoy through Lengo Channel, then turned back to re-enter Savo Sound and cover the approaches to Lunga Point. The opening moves of this back-to-the-wall defense were left up to Admiral Callaghan.
The odds against Callaghan’s force were appallingly long. The Japanese striking force which was advancing on Savo Sound included battleships Hiei and Kirishima, light cruiser Nagara and 14 destroyers. Somewhere behind them were two aircraft carriers, and up the “slot” was a large group of transports and 12 more destroyers, all on their way to pound Henderson Field and retake Guadalcanal.
Against the Jap striking force and its potential reinforcements, the American force included heavy cruisers San Francisco (flagship) and Portland; light cruiser Helena, anti-aircraft (AA) cruisers Juneau and Atlanta, eight destroyers, Aaron Ward, Barton, Monssen, Fletcher, Cushing, Laffey, Sterett and O’Bannon. Two heavy cruisers and three light cruisers against two battleships and a light cruiser, and eight destroyers against fourteen. So stood the support group against the Japanese striking force. It was going to be a battle in which brains would have to make up for brawn.
Steaming westward through Lengo Channel in total darkness, the support group was strung out in a long serpentine column. In the van were destroyers Cushing, Laffey, Sterett, and O’Bannon. They were followed by cruisers Atlanta, San Francisco, Portland, Helena, and Juneau, in that order. Destroyers Aaron Ward, Barton, Monssen and Fletcher brought up the rear. This sort of column had been favorably employed by Admiral Scott in the Battle of Cape Esperance, but on the present occasion the alignment could have been better in respect to radar work. Three cruisers and two destroyers, which carried the new SG surface radar, had been given rear positions. Some critics considered that the destroyers in the rear were positioned too far astern to aid the van in the event of a surprise encounter.
In command of the Japanese striking force, Vice Admiral Hiroaki Abe himself committed one or two errors in judgment on the eve of battle. He had been informed that a group of American warships were in the vicinity of Lunga Point, but he chose to assume that these men-of-war had retired eastward at sundown. Since his mission was to destroy Henderson Field, he loaded his guns with bombardment ammunition for that purpose and single-mindedly pressed forward into Savo Sound. (continued)
