E. Andrew Wilde, Jr., Editor

The U.S.S. Glennon (DD-620) in World War II: Documents and Photographs

Needham, Massachusetts
Privately published by the editor
First Edition 1999
Revised 2001
Survivors of the USS Glennon (DD-620),

I hope you like the booklet I've put together on your ship! Don't try to remember who I am, because I never served on the Glennon. I was just a Boy Scout on the Home Front during World War II. I saw combat later, on a destroyer off Korea, but it was very tame compared to what you experienced - and I can only try to imagine the trauma of losing your ship.

I've now completed booklets on 17 destroyers sunk in World War II. It's been a very rewarding hobby for me over the past six years, and I hope I will be able to complete many more. My admiration for you veterans just continues to grow. You all endured great hardships, and you on the Glennon participated in The Great Crusade!

I hope you share this booklet with your family and friends. Unfortunately, I don't expect to have any extra copies, so if you wish additional booklets please have them made at a copying store. Even the pictures reproduce well.

I wish to thank your shipmate Gus Ide for all the help he has given me. Of course my job would have been easier (and my booklet much smaller!) if he hadn't provided me with so much fascinating material. However, I'm very proud of the final product.

Finally, you don't owe me anything for this booklet, but contributions will be appreciated. I incurred the costs of copying, binders and postage - and I have also donated copies to about a dozen naval museums/libraries to make sure that your sacrifices will be remembered.

Enjoy the booklet!

E. Andrew Wilde, Jr.
Commander, USNR (Ret.)
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**TOTALS**

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E. A. Wilde, Jr.
July, 2000
Any man who may be asked what he did to make his life worthwhile can respond with a good deal of pride and satisfaction, "I served in the United States Navy."

-President John F. Kennedy, addressing the new class of midshipmen at the United States Naval Academy on August 1, 1963.
The late Rear Admiral James Henry Glennon, USN (1857-1940), graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy, Class of 1878. He was proud of the fact that all three of his sons attended the Academy and served in the Navy, and that all four of his grandsons graduated from the Academy and served in either the Navy or Marines. When the Admiral retired in 1921 he was Commandant of the 3rd Naval District.

(Photograph courtesy of Col. James B. Glennon, Jr., USMC (Ret.))
Glennon

James Henry Glennon, born 11 February 1857 at French Gulch, Calif., was appointed a cadet midshipman on 24 September 1874. He served as a midshipman in Lackawanna, Alaska and Pensacola, and later as an officer in Ranger (1881–86) and Constellation (1885–88). He commanded a forward gun turret in Massachusetts when that battleship on 4 July 1898 joined Texas in sinking the Reina Mercedes. While executive officer and navigator in Vicksburg, he participated in the actions against the Philippine Insurgents. During 1912 to 1913 he was President of the Board of Naval Ordnance and of the Joint Army-Navy Board on Smokeless Powder.

He served as Commandant of the Washington Navy Yard and Superintendent of the Naval Gun Factory from 1915 to early 1917 when he was appointed the Navy Department representative in a special mission under Elihu Root sent to Russia. At the risk of his life, he persuaded mutinous Russian sailors who had taken over command of Russian ships-of-war in waters of Sevastopol, to restore authority to the officers of the men-of-war. After completing the mission to Russia, he took command of Battleship Division 5 with his flag in battleship Connecticut.

He was awarded the Navy Cross for meritorious service in this command, including the instruction of midshipmen and thousands of recruits for duty as armed guard crews of merchant ships. Detached from this duty on 17 September 1918, he became Commandant of the 13th Naval District until 3 January 1919, then was Commandant of the 3d Naval District at New York. Having reached the statutory age for retirement, he was transferred to the Retired List on 1 February 1921. Rear Admiral James Henry Glennon died at Washington, D.C., 29 May 1940.

The 1,620-ton Gleaves-class destroyer USS Glennon (DD-620) on the ways prior to her launching at the Federal Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Co. in Kearny, New Jersey in August, 1942. This stern view shows the after two 5-inch/38 dual-purpose guns (Mounts Nos. 3 & 4) before their shields were installed and the after gun platform (just forward of Mount 3) where two twin 40-mm Bofors antiaircraft guns and their directors will be mounted. (U.S. Navy Photograph)
The sponsor's party on August 26, 1942: (Front row, L to R) Miss Edith Blair Cross, granddaughter; Mrs. James H. Glennon, Admiral Glennon's widow; (sponsor) Miss Jeanne Lejeune Glennon, granddaughter; Miss Frances Reading Glennon, the granddaughter who sponsored the second destroyer named Glennon, DD-840, at Bath, Maine, in 1945; (Second row) Lt. Cdr. Harrison R. Glennon, USN (Ret.), son; Ellie Lejeune Glennon (Mrs. James B. Glennon) and Captain James B. Glennon, USN, son. (Official U.S. Navy Photograph.)
Miss Jeanne Lejeune Glennon was selected by the Navy Department to sponsor the U.S.S. Glennon (DD-620), named to honor her grandfather, the late Rear Admiral James Henry Glennon, USN (1857-1940). Her father (at right), Captain James Blair Glennon, Sr., USN, joined her for the christening held on August 26, 1942. He graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy, Class of 1909, as did his son, James B., Jr., in 1939. (Official U.S. Navy Photograph.)
The Gleaves-class destroyer USS Glennon (DD-620) after she was launched at Kearny, New Jersey, on 26 August 1942. She was "fully dressed" for the occasion, with the national colors displayed at the masthead and on the flagstaff at the stern, and a rainbow of signal flags from bow to stern over the mast. (U.S. Navy Photograph.)
Everyone cheered when the USS Glennon (DD-620) slid down the ways at the Federal Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., Kearny, N.J., on August 26th, 1942. Prior to the war it took 17 weeks to complete these ships, but the Glennon was commissioned just 6 weeks later! (Official U.S.N. Photograph)
The Commissioning Ceremony for the U.S.S. Glannon (DD-520) held at the New York Navy Yard on October 8, 1942. Rear Admiral F. J. Harquart, USN, Commandant of the Yard and Third Naval District, is shown giving his Address, while the Commanding Officer, Lt. Comdr. F. C. Camp, USN, is at far left, looks on. The Glannon conducted training exercises off the East Coast until December and was then assigned to coastal convoy work with the Service Force, Atlantic Fleet. (Courtesy of Gustavus W. Hays, Jr.)
U.S.S. Glennon (DD-620)

Commissioning Address
by Rear Admiral E. J. Marquart, USN

Navy Yard, New York
October 8, 1942

Captain ........ Officers and men of the U.S.S. GLENNON:

It is a real pleasure for me to be here and to bid you welcome on behalf of our Navy, as your good ship starts her active service with our battle fleet. The Navy is happy to have this splendid new destroyer join its ever-growing numbers, and I know that you are proud to have been chosen as the first crew to take the GLENNON into fighting warfare against our arrogant enemies.

Your ship, as it is delivered into your hands today, symbolizes the will and determination of the American people to fight to the finish, and to win this war which has been forced upon us. It is all American - design, material and workmanship - put together with a prayer and confident hope of every citizen that, in your hands, it will bring our ultimate victory much closer. The engineers and workmen responsible for its planning and building have worked into your ship all the deadly power that is known about modern naval warfare. None better was ever built - none ever built in such record time. American workmen have driven themselves day and night with all their strength and intelligence in order to speed this ship to completion. What still remains to be done, in order to fit you out for sea, will be rushed through with the same speed and efficiency by the Navy Yard shipworkers during the next few days.

Now it is up to you officers and men to take hold and carry on. It is your ship. You must give it life, spirit, character, -- and make its reputation. You must make yourselves into an offensive-minded fighting team, real man-of-warsmen. You must make your fine ship a real man-of-war, a tough fighting unit, fully able and eager to deliver all that great battle punch built into her, and make her measure up to her enormous powers for destruction.

The concerted effort to a common goal shown by all those who have had a hand in building the GLENNON must now characterize you officers and men as you turn to, with selfless devotion, on your great task - your big responsibility. The record in building this powerful ship must be matched by you in making her into a hard-hitting fighter. The time allowed you for doing that is short, desperately short; for every available ship is needed on the battle line and is needed now. You must spare no effort in mastering the tasks assigned you, so that when the moment of trial confronts you, as it surely will in the near future, you will be able to deliver decisive blows. It will be your high duty as the crew of this vessel to seek out and destroy the enemy. Your nation expects you to fulfill this purpose in a way that will strike terror into the hearts of our enemies everywhere. And I know that you will richly justify the hopes and prayers of your countrymen, for I see in your faces the firm resolve to conduct yourselves in accordance with the noblest traditions of the U.S. Navy and be worthy of our great country which it serves.

Your ship is named to honor the memory of Rear Admiral James Henry Glennon, U.S. Navy. In active service throughout many years, his career was marked with outstanding achievement, and his name stands out in bold type on the list of
our Navy's distinguished officers.

I am confident that you officers and men are fully determined to make the U.S.S. GLENNON have a record of glorious deeds in our Navy's history of its ships.

Welcome to the Fleet, best o'luck and God bless you!

E. J. MARQUART,
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy
Commandant, Navy Yard, New York
and Third Naval District.

(Courtesy of Gustavus R. Ide, Jr., in October 1998)
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1 Source: The ship's Personnel Diary on microfilm at the National Archives (Archives II/College Park, MD).

Enlisted complement at commissioning: 186

E. A. Wilde, Jr.
July, 1998
### ASSIGNMENT OF OFFICERS

**NAME**                  | **RANK** | **DUTIES**                | **ADDITIONAL**               | **QUARTERS** | **WATCHES**
---                       |         |                          |                            |              |              
G.A.                      | USN:     | Officer:                | Navigator: Chief Censor:   |                           |              
Ferriter, Lt.: Engineer of Repair: | Exam: | Forward: | Deck Watch Officer: |
J.B.                      | USN:     | Officer: Dem-Bd. “E” Div: | Engine:                     |                           |              
 adherence Control: SC: | Audit: S.S: | Room: | (Port and Sea): |
Maddocks, Lt(jg): Gunnery: | Commissary: | Control: | Deck Watch Officer: |
J.W.                      | USN:     | Officer: | “O” Div. Off: | |
Hadar, E.G.: Lt(jg): First: | Ship’s Service: | A.A: | Deck Watch Officer: |
USN: Lieutenant: | 1st Div: | Control: Officer: |
D-V(G): | Off: | SC: | Exam: | |
Dix, J.C.W.: Lt(jg): 2nd Div: | Coding Bd.: | 40 Mm: | Deck Watch Officer: |
L.V.G.: | Off: | Radar: | Warden: | Battery Officer: |
Exam: | Room: | Mess: | Officer: | |
Stix, D.: Ens.: | Communications: | “C” Div. Off: | Bridge: Deck Watch Officer: |
Exam: | Coding Bd.: | | |
H.M.: | USN: | Officer: | Coding Bd: Asst. Room: |
Exam: | Coding Bd.: | Asst Censor: |
D-V(G): | Coding Bd: | Communication: |
Off: | War Diary: | War Diary: |
USN: Officer: | Control: Off: | Watch Off: |
D-V(G): | Coding Bd: | Asst Censor: |
Exam: | Coding Bd: | Asst Censor: |
Stegall, Ens.: Asst En: | Repair: | Deck Watch Officer: |
Exam: | Coding Bd: | |
Huston, Lt(jg): Medical: | Coding Bd: | Medical: |
Exam: | Coding Bd: | |

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*Courtesy of Gustavus R. Ide, Jr., in October 1996.*
History of the U.S.S. Glennon (DD-620)*

(DD-620: dp. 1,620; l. 348'4"; b. 36'1"; dr. 17'4"; s. 37.5 k.; cpl. 270; a. 4 5".2 40mm., 5 20mm., 5 21" tt., 6 dcp., 2 dct.; cl. (Heaves))

The first Glennon (DD-620) was launched 26 August 1942 by the Federal Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., Kearny, N.J.; sponsored by Miss Jeanne Lejeune Glennon, granddaughter; and commissioned 8 October 1942, Lt. Comdr. Floyd C. Camp in command.

After shakedown training along the New England coast, Glennon guarded troops and supply convoys for the occupation of Sicily (9–15 July 1943). It was here that the giant assault on Europe began sweeping in from the sea. She returned to New York on 3 December 1943, then made two round-trip convoy escort voyages to the British Isles and one to Gibraltar. She arrived in New York from Gibraltar on 22 April 1944 and stood out of that port 5 May with a task group which arrived Belfast, Ireland, on the 14th. Assigned to Assault Force "U" of the Western Naval Task Force, she arrived in the Baie de la Seine, France, on 6 June. After patrolling around the bombardment group for submarines and fast German torpedo boats, she joined in gunfire support of troops ashore.

On 7 June she hurled in 430 5-inch shells ashore in support of troops advancing northward Quinéville. Under command of Comdr. Clifford A. Johnson, she was again approaching her gunfire support station at 0830, 8 June, when her stern struck a mine. A small boat picked up survivors while minesweepers Staff and Threat arrived on the scene, one passing a towline while the other swept ahead of the damaged destroyer. Destroyer escort Rich closed in the wake of the minesweepers to assist, then felt a heavy explosion as she slowly rounded Glennon’s stern to clear the area. Minutes later a second explosion blew off a 50-foot section of Rich’s stern, followed by a third mine explosion under her forecastle. She went under within 15 minutes of the first explosion.

Minesweeper Staff found she could not budge Glennon whose fantail seemed to be firmly anchored to the bottom by her starboard propeller. Most of her crew boarded Staff and those remaining on Glennon lightened her stern by pumping fuel forward and jettisoning depth charges and topside gear. On 9 June salvage equipment was assembled; and some 60 officers and men of the Glennon came back on board. The following morning, just as Comdr. Johnson was preparing to resume efforts to save his ship, a German battery near Quinéville found her range. A second salvo hit Glennon amidships and cut off all power. After a third hit, Commander Johnson ordered abandon ship and the men were taken off in a landing craft. Glennon floated until 2145, 10 June 1944; then rolled over and sank. She suffered 25 lost and 38 wounded. Glennon was awarded two battle stars for services in World War II.

The USS Glennon (DD-620) in October, 1942, prior to her final fitting out at the New York Navy Yard. There is no fire-control radar antenna on the main-battery director above the pilothouse, and there are no depth charges in her stern racks. She is also missing two twin 40-mm. Bofors antiaircraft mounts on her after gun platform. Her after funnel is covered, so only her forward boilers are lit off at this time. (Official U.S. Navy Photograph.)
U.S.S. Glennon (DD-620)

Summary of Commanding Officers

Cdr. Floyd Charles Camp, USN (1904-1954)
Dates* 10/8/42-8/30/43 Captain
Cdr. Clifford Arthur Johnson, USN (1910-1972)
Dates* 8/30/43-6/10/44 Captain

* * * * * * * *

Source: The ship's Deck Logs/War Diary at the National Archives

1 Captain Camp's date of death is not on file at the U.S. Naval Academy, but his passing was noted by the secretary for the Class of 1927 in the May 1954 issue of Shipmate magazine.

E. A. Wilde, Jr.
October, 1998
Lt. Comdr. Floyd Charles Camp, USN, shown here at the Glennon's commissioning on October 8, 1942, was the commanding officer until August 30, 1943. He was awarded a Letter of Commendation (with Ribbon) for outstanding performance of duty during the amphibious assault on Sicily when the ship provided effective gunfire support for the landing in July, 1943. (Courtesy of Gus A. Ide, Jr.)
Captain Floyd Charles Camp, United States Navy

Floyd Charles Camp was born in Yellville, Arkansas, on December 4, 1904. He entered the U.S. Naval Academy, Annapolis, Maryland, from Arkansas, in 1923. Graduated with the degree of Bachelor of Science in Electrical Engineering and commissioned Ensign on June 2, 1927, he subsequently advanced in rank to Captain, his date of rank March 20, 1945.

Following graduation from the Naval Academy in June 1927, he had duty afloat until 1929, serving successively in the USS MEDUSA, of Training Squadron 2, Fleet Base Force; the USS MARYLAND, operating with Battleship Division 5, Battle Fleet; the USS GALVESTON, a unit of Special Service Squadron. He returned to the United States and early in 1930 was again ordered to sea, serving for four years on Asiatic Station, in the USS JOHN D. FORD, a unit of Destroyer Division 43, operating on Yangtze Patrol.

Instruction in General Line duties at the Postgraduate School, Annapolis, Maryland, was followed by duty in the USS NEW MEXICO, from Division 3, Battle Force. Detached from the NEW MEXICO, he reported to the Navy Department, Washington, D.C., for duty in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. While there, he also served as a Naval Aide at the White House.

Late in 1939 he was ordered to Asiatic Station, and served first as Executive Officer and Navigator of the USS MINDANAO, and later in the USS MARELEHEAD, prior to and during the early period of World War II, until the summer of 1942, when he returned to the United States.

He has the Ribbon for, and a facsimile of the Navy Unit Commendation awarded the USS MARELEHEAD for "outstanding heroism in action against enemy aircraft in the Java Sea Area on February 4, 1942...." Fitting out the USS GLENNON at the Federal Shipbuilding and Drydock Company, Kearny, New Jersey, he commanded that destroyer from her commissioning, October 8, 1942, until August 1943, while she operated on trans-Atlantic Convoy duty and later participated in the Sicilian Invasion.

He received a Letter of Commendation (with Ribbon) from the Secretary of the Navy for "outstanding performance of duty as Commanding Officer of a United States vessel during the amphibious assault on the Island of Sicily from July 10 to 12, 1943...." The citation states that he "provided accurate and effective gunfire support for the initial landing of the Allied Assault Forces at Gela and....materially assisted in the rapid advance of our troops...."

Returning to the United States, he reported to the USS EVANS, building at the Gulf Shipbuilding Company Yards, Chickasaw, Alabama, and assumed command at her commissioning at Mobile, Alabama, on December 11, 1943. Arriving at Pearl Harbor, T. H., in March 1944, that destroyer joined Task Group 57.8, and conducted independent antisubmarine patrols in the Marshall Islands, and participated in the Marianas Operation.

Relieved of command of the EVANS on November 1, 1944, he reported for a tour of duty in the Training Division of the Bureau of Naval Personnel, Navy Department, where he remained throughout the war, and until March 1947. He next commanded the USS NANTAHALA (AO 60), and after two years in that command was ordered to the University of Utah where he was Professor of Naval Science in the Naval Reserve Officers Training Corps Unit, from September 1948 to June 1951. In July 1951 he reported to the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Department of the Navy, preparatory to his assignment as U.S. Naval Attache and U.S. Naval Attache for Air to Belgrade, Yugoslavia. On February 19, 1952, he was ordered to duty as Inspector of Naval Recruiting and Naval Officer Procurement, First Naval Recruiting Area, New York, New York.
In addition to the Commendation Ribbon and the Ribbon for the Navy Unit Commendation to the USS MARBLEHEAD, Captain Camp has the Second Nicaraguan Campaign Medal, the Yangtze Campaign Medal; the American Defense Service Medal; the American Campaign Medal; European-African-Middle Eastern Campaign Medal; Asiatic-Pacific Campaign Medal; Philippine Defense Ribbon; Philippine Liberation Ribbon; and the World War II Victory Medal.

His official address is in care of the Navy Department, Washington, D.C. His next of kin is his sister, Mrs. M. C. Gaar, who resides at 4283 Whitehaven, Baton Rouge, Louisiana.

Captain Camp is a member of the Army-Navy Club, Washington, D.C., and the Army-Navy Country Club, Arlington, Virginia.

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NAVY Biographies Section, OI-023
17 July 1953

Retyped 30 October 1998 by E. Andrew Wilde, Jr. from a copy obtained at the U.S. Naval Historical Center, Operational Archives, Washington Navy Yard.
### Clifford Johnson Loses Destroyer in French Battle

**Barrington School Graduate Battles Enemy on Coast on D-Day, June 6**

A Barrington family was the subject of world-wide press reports in recent days when the news was given out by military authorities that Commander Clifford A. Johnson, 32, graduate of Barrington High school, class of 1927, lost his ship, the destroyer U.S.S. Glennon, in action during the invasion of Normandy on D-Day, June 6. His ship was one of only three destroyers reported lost during the invasion.

The Glennon, a modern ship built since 1940, was one of the first vessels to approach the invasion area. The commander, when interviewed Saturday during his visit in Barrington, said that his men sent several hundred rounds of ammunition from five-inch guns into German fortifications on the beach before an explosion at the stern caused the ship to sink slowly in shallow water in the Bay of Seine.

Enemy shells fell all around the destroyer and there were a number of casualties in wounded and dead. The ship was set on fire by the hot fying steel and by the explosion. Rescue boats picked up most of the men, leaving only a skeleton crew. Repairs were attempted during the night but the following morning orders were given by the commander to abandon the ship completely.

The commander is now waiting for another ship to be placed under his command for action against the enemy.

### Life Story of Commander

Commander Johnson was born in Minneapolis, Minn., the son of Mr. and Mrs. Frank Johnson. The family came to Barrington in 1925 and the commander attended Barrington High school during his junior and senior year, graduating in 1927.

Following graduation he attended the University of Illinois for a year. Then he went to the Naval academy at Annapolis, graduating in 1933. Several years were spent on the U.S.S. Texas battleship, and a year on the U.S.S. New Mexico battleship. For about two and one-half years Johnson was attached to an Asiatic station, returning in 1937. Then he served for two years on the U.S.S. Somers, a destroyer, as lieutenant junior grade.

After doing post graduate work at Annapolis in 1939, he was stationed on the U.S.S. Phillip, a destroyer on the West coast, as a gunnery officer and first lieutenant. During 1940 to 1942 he served in communications, Navy department, Washington, D.C.

Early in 1942 he went to sea as executive officer on the U.S.S. Glennon and remained on the ship until it was sunk by enemy action. He became commander of the ship in September, 1943. The destroyer engaged in action in the Mediterranean and in the Sicilian campaign over a period of at least two years.

In 1934 the commander married Miss Josephine Graff of Baltimore. The couple have two children, Anne Carolie, nine, and Clifford Arthur Jr. six. The family resides at 615 North Lakewood avenue, Baltimore.

The commander and his family arrived in Barrington early last week and stayed with his sister, Mrs. Edward Schroeder and his parents, at 300 Grove avenue until Monday evening when they went to Port Brady, Mich., to visit his sister and her husband, Captain William Hagstrom for several days before returning east.
This starboard quarter view shows how the USS Glennon (DD-620) looked when she was commissioned in October, 1942, before her final fitting out. The two clusters of four tanks mounted on her stern are chemical smoke generators. When compressed air was mixed with the toxic chemicals in these tanks it produced a dense white smoke, sort of an artificial chemical fog, which could screen friendly ships from the enemy. The two 5-inch gun mounts shown were designated Mounts Nos. 3 & 4. (Official U.S. Navy Photograph)
"A Lovely Ship"

Destroyers! Mention the word and the layman’s mind will conjure up a picture of a little ship streaming death-defying, head-on into the fire from an enemy battlewagon’s heavy guns. In the heavy seasway the little ship is tossing like a cork, with the white water breaking high over her bows. Then suddenly she swerves hard to starboard. There are a couple of splashes on her portside and a moment later appears the bubbling wakes of the tin fish she has sent on their voyage of destruction. And a short while later there is a terrific crash. The enemy’s sides and decks are clothed in sheets of smoke and flame from the explosions that tear her inwards apart. And another naval battle is won.

It is an inspiring picture that has adorned many a calendar sent by solicitous ship’s chandlers and seed stores to their customers, to be remembered by for the rest of the year. The practice looks different. Whether it’s even more romantic than the calendar artist envisioned, or just a drab, humdrum existence, depends very largely on the point of view of the individual man who crewed a “tin can.” One thing, however, can be said for it: it’s most versatile. If Kipling’s crack about the liner has of late found an officially sanctioned variation to describe the glamour girl of the Navy, “The Carrier, she’s a Lady,” then it can safely be varied once again: “The destroyer, she’s a workhorse.”

Pulling binder, hay rig, threshing machine or the “democrat” for the family on its way to church, it’s all one to a farmer’s workhorse. A Navy workhorse may be on antisubmarine patrol today: dropping depth charges in their prescribed pattern all over the spot where the cooperating Navy fighter believes he has seen the underwater raider; tomorrow, she may be riding herd on a convoy of merchantmen: running breathlessly and tongue-lolling around her flock, shooing stragglers into line, and then tackling, in the manner of good and faithful sheepdogs anywhere, all enemies regardless of size and number, whether aircraft, surface squadron, or wolf pack. Or they might install a pair of steel ovaries on her decks and give her a load of ugly horned eggs to drop in waters the enemy’s fleet is certain to traverse. Then again, they might give her a pair of paravanes to tow and send her out to sweep the channels leading to a new invasion beach clear of the mines which the enemy himself has sown there, and then the next day convert her into a fast transport and send her in with a deckload of Marine Raiders who are to establish the first beachhead foothold. And while weird landing craft are yet on their way with reinforcements, supplies, tanks and artillery, the destroyer that has landed them will stand by to give the Leathernecks who are digging themselves in on the narrow coral strip whatever fire support her 4- or 5-inch guns are capable of.

Then again, on duty with a task force, the destroyer is in the van and on the flanks of the capital ships, scouting, protecting, running interference and when the actual engagement begins, throwing a smoke screen around the carrier or battlewagon to spoil the enemy’s gunnery. When disaster comes, when carrier, battleship or cruiser has received the deadly wound that causes the decks to buckle and burst with the explosion of magazines and fuel tanks, it’s the destroyer that rushes in close, though the heat may blister what patches of paint are still left on her sea-bitten plates, and takes off the men still left alive after the unsuccessful battle to save their doomed ship. As the hull of the big capital ship slowly drifts down with the tide, a roaring inferno, yet still floating, it is the destroyer’s job to come in and send the once proud craft to the bottom with a torpedo, to save her from the last ignominy of having her dead body defiled by the enemy’s hands.

Rescue missions generally are hardly more than mere routine assignments among the manifold jobs that are a destroyer’s lot. Many a flier, shot down by ack-ack, or forced down in a gale, later got back in the fight simply because some indefatigable DD would not give up the search. A quart of whiskey for her skipper and ten gallons of ice cream for her wardroom became the traditional price that any carrier gladly paid to a DD for each of its fliers delivered back aboard or safely landed in port.

“Let the DD’s do it!” has almost become axiomatic with the Navy whenever there is a particularly unpleasant or difficult job under discussion. Their speed, their maneuverability, their relatively high firepower
for their size, and their comparatively low building price, have made destroyers not merely the most versa-
tile, but ton for ton the most efficient, naval craft ever
designed. They are the Navy's true "expendables."

The spirit of the little ships reflects itself in that of
their crews. Destroyermen are a bit apart from the
rest of our man-of-war men. On their small ships they
have to do without many of the comforts the crews of
carriers, battleships or even cruisers enjoy. They live
in cramped quarters. There is no canteen or ship's
service booth where a man might get a coke, an ice
cream or western story pulp magazine. Yet the de-
stroyerman, though he beefs about it all and swears
it's a dog's life, in his innermost heart glories in the
hardships his particular trade imposes upon him. He's
inclined to look down on the men from the big ships
as "softies." His walk is a "destroyer roll." His hat
sits precariously on one eyebrow. He is the bane of the
Shore Patrol.

He'll abuse his ship roundly as the most uncom-
fortable, leakingest, buckingest crate that ever went to
sea. But let somebody else pass unfavorable comment
on her and he's up in arms. Asked why he wasn't ap-
plying for a transfer after he had given a lengthy and
extremely critical recital of his ship's famed action, a
survivor of the *Borie* put it all in a nutshell. "Me?
No, thanks! There's too much red tape on a big ship
for me. On a destroyer you know everybody with
their good sides and their faults. And everybody
knows you. You can't sham on a DD. You gotta be a
sailor, mister."

Destroyers get into the blood not merely of the men
that serve in them, but of anybody who has been given
a chance to get acquainted with them. Even a master
of the hard-boiled school of writing like John Stein-
beck can wax dithyrambic over a little ship. After
spending part of his correspondent's tour of duty
aboard a DD he wrote:

"A destroyer is a lovely ship, probably the nicest fight-
ing ship of all. Battleships are a little like steel cities or
great factories of destruction. Aircraft carriers are float-
ing flying fields.

"Even cruisers are big pieces of machinery, but a de-
stroyer is all boat. In the beautiful clean lines of her, in
her speed and roughness, in her curious gallantry."
The U.S.S. Glennon (DD-620) (Lt. Comdr. Floyd C. Camp, USN) after her final fitting out at the New York Navy Yard, October 22, 1942. Due to armament changes from earlier Gleaves-class vessels (four 5-in./38 mounts instead of five, and five torpedo tubes instead of ten) the Glennon is also listed as a Bristol-class destroyer. Two twin 40-mm. Bofors ant-aircraft mounts have been installed on her after gun platform, and a fire-control radar antenna has been mounted atop the Mark 37 director over the pilothouse.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Standard Displacement</th>
<th>1,620 tons</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Length Overall</td>
<td>348'1/4&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beam</td>
<td>36'3/4&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shaft Horsepower</td>
<td>50,000 H.P.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rated Speed</td>
<td>37 knots</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Official U.S. Navy Photograph.)
The 40-mm Bofors gun fired a two-pound explosive shell with an effective range of about 2,800 yards. It was primarily an antiaircraft weapon, but destroyers also used their 40-mm's against enemy strongpoints when they provided close-in gunfire support during landings. The gun crew for a twin mount consisted of a pointer, a trainer, a gun captain and four loaders (two for each barrel). The Bofors was capable of firing about 160 rounds/barrel/minute, but the number of rounds actually fired depended on the ability of the loaders to provide an uninterrupted supply of ammunition.
(New York Navy Yard, 5/24/43) This view of the Glennon shows an SA air-search radar antenna atop the mast and, below it, the curved ("barrel stave") antenna for an SG surface-search radar. A Mk 12 fire-control radar antenna is mounted on the Mk 37 main-battery director over the pilothouse. (U.S. Navy Photo)
(New York Navy Yard, 4/1/43) Looking aft at the Glennon's quintuple torpedo-tube mount located amidships between the two stacks. In World War II the Navy's standard surface-ship torpedo, for use only against surface targets, was 24 feet long and 21 in. in diameter. It carried an 825-lb. warhead and had a range of 6,000 to 15,000 yards, depending on the speed setting (26½, 33 or 45 knots).

(Official U.S. Navy Photograph.)
(New York Navy Yard, 5/24/43) Looking forward at the Glennon's after stack from the top of 5-in. Mount No. 3. The two twin 40-mm Bofors mounts on the after gun platform are in the foreground, along with their associated Mk 51 directors. Note the paired vertical tubes on the shielding surrounding the 20-mm. guns abreast the stack. The taller, inboard, tubes were for storing spare gun barrels, while the wider ones, called "dip pots," could be filled with water and used to cool overheated barrels. The curved metal rods over these guns prevented them from being fired accidentally into the ship's masts or superstructure. (Official U.S. Navy Photograph.)
(New York Navy Yard, 4/1/43) This view shows the Gliennon's two stern depth charge racks. Called "cansons" due to their shape, depth charges were the primary anti-submarine weapon of U.S. destroyers in both WWI and WWII. Set to explode at the estimated depth of the enemy submarine, they were rolled from the stern racks and fired to the side by "K"-guns in a pattern to increase the chances of damaging the submarine. Depth charges were normally lethal when they exploded within 30 feet. The charges in the Gliennon's racks are Mark 7s, each weighing 750 lbs. and containing 500 lbs. of TNT. Note that one of the Gliennon's two smoke generators has been landed, probably to compensate for the weight of added equipment. (U.S.N. Photograph)
In 1941 the 20-mm Oerlikon air-cooled machine gun began to replace the .50-cal. water-cooled machine gun as the Navy's standard light antiaircraft weapon. (It was also called a machine cannon because it fired explosive shells.) This early Mark 4 version with an open-ring sight required a four-man crew: the gunner, a trunnion operator (to adjust the height of the gun carriage) and two loaders. When fitted with the Mark 14 gyroscopic sight, introduced in 1943, a range setter was also required to enter range data. The Oerlikon had an effective range of 1,600 yards and fired at a rate of 450 rounds/minute. (Official USN Photo.)
On 11 July 1943 (D-day plus 1) the Glennon provided gunfire support for U.S. troops at the Gela beaches on Sicily’s southern coast. The ship received high praise for her action against German tanks and machine gun nests from VAdm. H. K. Hewitt, Commander U.S. Naval Forces, Northwest African Waters:

"The U.S.S. GLENNON by excellent teamwork with the shore fire control party, extremely accurate shooting at shore objectives and general outstanding conduct throughout contributed materially to the success of the operation. Accurate gunfire was maintained while subject to frequent aircraft attack, and the vessel may have shot down two enemy planes in addition to neutralizing shore objectives."

The Glennon was strafed by enemy planes a few weeks later at Palermo, on Sicily’s northern coast. Seven were wounded, but no one was killed.

E. A. Wilde, Jr.
May, 1999
SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
SECRET

ACTION REPORT

USS GLENNON
DD 620
SERIAL 015
14 JULY 1943

ACTION REPORT ON OPERATION ___ HUSKY.

[COVERS LANDING AT GELA, SICILY FROM
6-12 JULY 1943.]

OFFICE OF NAVAL RECORDS AND LIBRARY
U. S. S. GLENNON (DD620)

14 July 1943.

From: The Commanding Officer.
To: The Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.
Via: (1) The Commander Destroyer Squadron SEVENTEEN.
      (2) The Commander Task Force 81.

Subject: Action report on Operation Husky.

Reference: (a) U.S. Navy Regulations Article #712.
           (b) Command Naw Ltr. A2-11/A16-3 Serial 0120 of June 6, 1943.
           (c) Western Naval Task Force Operation Plan 2-43 of 26 May, 1943.
           (d) Task Force 81 Operation Order G-43 of 29 June 1943.
           (e) Commander Destroyer Squadron 17 Ltr. Al6-3(EC) Serial 0035 of 2 July 1943.

1. For Operation Husky, this command was attached to and operated with Task Force 81 in Task Groups 81.6 and 81.5 in accordance with references (a), (b) and (c). A narrative report in accordance with reference (a) and (b) follows.

2. Operation Husky commenced for this command 25 May 1943, on which date I reported to Comphliblant for duty. The period 25 May - 6 June was spent in preparation and training for the subject operation. Ten gunnery exercises, including surface, anti-aircraft, and shore bombardment, were conducted, using all armament on board except torpedoes which had been fired a short time before. All ammunition was received, including special ammunition for this operation. The ship was fueled and provisioned to capacity. A total complement of 16 officers and 265 men were aboard. The ship was considered ready for any operation for which it had been designated.

3. On 7 June 1943, I sailed from Hampton Roads as a unit of the inner screen of Task Force 65, under command of Vice Admiral KIRK, U.S. Navy. The ship was exercised in all departments, daily, with emphasis on shore bombardment and anti-aircraft fire control. Test firing of all guns were conducted, including 5"-38 white phosphorous smoke projectiles. The trip was made without incident or enemy action detected by this command.
U. S. S. GLENNON (DD620)
Serial (015)

CONFIDENTIAL


14 July 1943.

4. On 16 June orders were received detaching the USS NELSON (CDS-17) and the USS GLENNON to escort the USS BOISE and USS SAVANNAH to proceed to Algiers, via Mers-el-Kebir, at 1100Z/17, to arrive prior to 0800B/21 June and report to CTF 81. These orders were carried out without incident or enemy action.

5. The period 21 June - 6 July was spent in the conduct of patrols off the Harbor of Algiers under direction of His British Majesty's Naval Commander at Algiers. During this period, a search was made for enemy submarine which had torpedoes and sunk LST 387 three miles off Dellys Bay. No results were obtained. Later eye witness reports by observers indicated the submarine actually had been a mine. Also, a British merchant tanker, the ABBEY DAME, was escorted safely to port after having been torpedoes 50 miles east by north of Algiers. A practice landing by CTF 81 was conducted on beach NW of Algiers. Very little engineering overhaul was possible during this period due to continued interruptions. No repairs were urgently required, except for certain radar equipment. There were no radar experts available.

6. At 1500, 6 July, (Note: All times Baker to end of report) the USS GLENNON was underway on signal from CDS-17 to conduct anti-submarine sweep of Task Force 81.2 sortie from Algiers for Dime Assault Area. At 1645, 6 July, detached from sweep group to screen USS BOISE and USS SAVANNAH to join covering Task Group 80.2. Reported to USS BOISE for duty at 1720, sighted and joined Covering Group at 1800, was detached and proceeded and took station in anti-submarine screen in Task Force 81.2 standing out of Algiers. The USS SAVANNAH and USS BOISE joined at 0835, 9th. The trip from Algiers to Gozo was made without incident or enemy action.

7. (Note: All times Baker.) Upon passing Gozo abeam to starboard, distance 6 miles, at 1915, 9 July, the Dime Assault approach disposition was formed. I adjusted position in screen to cover sector on starboard beam. At this point, remaining groups proceeding Dime Assault Area, Force 81 joined convoy. At 2028, went to General Quarters. At 2255, noted first signs of activity on the mainland of Sicily behind the Gala-Scoglitti Sector. Numerous flares and violent anti-aircraft machine gun fire was believed to be an enemy action to repulse US Army para-troopers landing as the Diversion Force. At 2355, sighted HMS SHAKESPEARE beacon light, bearing 355 degrees (T). At 0015, transports
executed change of course to 314 degrees (T), the line of
departure. At 0020, reached line of departure and patrolled
area until last ship in line, the USS BOISE, had turned and
stopped. At 0025, proceeded on reverse of approach course to
position 10,000 yards, bearing 224 degrees (T) from USS BOISE,
passing around end of LST, LCI groups still on approach course.
Completed sweep at 0100 and commenced figure eight patrol
8,000 to 12,000 yards to seaward and parallel to transport area
with USS MURPHY, USS BUTLER and USS HERNADO, at 0245, E-hour,
D-day. At 0325, noted naval gunfire, apparently against Dime
beaches, shore batteries, and searchlights. At 0445, noted un-
identified explosion which sent smoke and flares several hundred
feet into the air about 15,000 yards in direction of Licata.
At 1700, bombs were noted falling in water inside transport area,
no planes were sighted. At 1845, air attack on convoy; moved into
transport area. Only one plane, JU88, was sighted headed inshore.
Attack ended. Returned to former patrol.

8. D plus 1, July 11th. At 0505, left outer patrol
area to relieve US3 JEFFERS as destroyer fire support Task Group
85.2, reporting to USS BOISE at 0530 on right flank of Dime
Assault Area. At 0650, sighted 3 unidentified planes. At 0651,
bombs were seen dropping in left flank of transport area. Planes
beyond range before bombs seen dropping, thus identifying them.
Did not fire. (Note: All communications noted were with Shore
Fire Control Party #5, Dime Attack Force.). At 0750, established
communication with Shore Fire Control Party. At 0845, received
fire designation in H336345. At 0847, ready to open fire, salvo 1.
At 0850, received word from Shore Fire Control Party that they had
to close down. Did not resume fire due to unclear situation. At
0917, regained contact with Shore Fire Control Party #5 with
following message "Enemy counter attack, need all support available," fol-
lowed by request for air spot and fire by cruiser. Message was
relayed to USS BOISE with answer that air spot was not available
due to lack of fighter cover by plane. At 0927, received fire
support designation H338337. At 0929, first salvo, 5"48, four
guns. At 0932, spot up 400. At 0933, second salvo, At 0934, spot
no change. Third salvo. At 0937, no change, rapid fire. At 0938,
rapid fire for one minute. At 0940, spot up 100, left 500. At
0941, rapid fire one minute. At 0942, left 200. 0943, rapid fire
for one minute. 0944, no change. Reversed course. 0948, rapid
fire for one minute. 0949, down 200, 1 salvo. 0950, salvo. 0951,
down 400, left 100. 0953, salvo. 0954, down 200, left 400. 0954,
salvo. 0955, down 200. 0956, salvo. 0957, no change, rapid fire
0957, resumed rapid fire for one minute. 1000, received message, "Suspend fire; tanks attacking; wait." Phase completed, having expended 193 rounds 5"-38 ammunition. At 1543, sighted flight of 24 JU88's approaching left flank of transport area. 1547, commenced firing. 1549, ceased firing. Expended 65 rounds 5"-38, 4 rounds 40MM, and 100 rounds 20 MM. One U.S. merchantman in left flank area burning apparently damaged by bomb hits. One plane noted crashing in flames. At 1640, two enemy dive bombers seen attacking shipping in transport area; unable to fire due to proximity of own ships. At 1700, one U.S. merchant vessel, previously damaged, blew up and sank, causing fire to break out on another U.S. merchantman ROBERT ROWAN. At 1925, the USS M2 LANAHAN sank U.S. merchant vessel, ROBERT ROWAN, to prevent damage to other ships by explosion. At 1945, a flight of 18 enemy bombers sighted, commenced firing. 1950, ceased firing, no hits observed by aircraft or ships. 2020, received urgent fire designation from SHCCP #5 in H330330. 2025, first salvo. 2029, spot down 200, right 500. 2030, second salvo. 2032, up 300 right 500. 2033, third salvo. 2034, right 100, rapid fire. 2035, resumed rapid fire for one minute. 2037, up 100 rapid fire. 2039, resumed rapid fire one minute. 2040, up 300, rapid fire. 2041, resumed rapid fire one minute. 2043, up 500, rapid fire. 2044, resumed rapid fire. Commenced 180 degree turn. 2048, completed turn resumed rapid fire. 2050, right 300. 2055, one salvo. 2056, no change, rapid fire. Resumed rapid fire for one minute. 2057, "Cease firing. Good Shooting." 2109, new target designation received. 2109, commenced 180 degree turn. 2113, first salvo. 2116, spot no change. 2117, second salvo. 2118, received from Shore Fire Control Party Five, "Cease firing, too dark, thanks. The last targets were machine gun nests." 165 rounds expended, no casualties. 2130, darkness set in, bright moon. At 2150, bombs were seen to land about 100 yards on the starboard quarter and the noise of a dive bomber plane pulling out was heard. Went to General Quarters. 2200, enemy planes dropped three flares in immediate vicinity. Attacks were noted on other sections of area. Commenced fire on planes wherever seen. 2203, had three successive additional attacks by single dive bombers. All guns bearing fired on attacking planes. Each plane dropped a stick of two or three bombs, estimated as 500 lb. delayed action bombs. The first landed 75 yards astern, the second 75 yards on the port bow and the third 100 yards abreast to starboard. No damage was sustained, probably due to delayed action of fuses bursting charges underwater. No hits on other surface craft were
U. S. S. GLENNON (DD620)

Subject: Action report on Operation "Husky"

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noted. Three planes were seen falling in flames. Possible hits were claimed by crews of both 40 MM and 20 MM. 2315 attacks ended, word received that friendly night fighter cover was overhead. Cease firing was given, secured from General Quarters, set Condition II, MA. Ammunition expenditure, 210 rounds 5"-38 caliber, 280 rounds 40 MM, 1200 rounds 20 MM. 2350, warning received of possible E-boat attack. Smoke screen laid by destroyers in screen.

9. D plus 2, 12 July. At 0734 received target designation from shore fire control party five, B338-334. 0739, first salvo. 0743, cease firing. 0802, no further communication from shore fire control party five. Four rounds 5"-38 expended. 0900, 50% ammunition remaining, relieved of shore fire support duty by the USS HERNDON and directed to report to CTU 86.6.2 for inner anti-submarine screen. Closed USS NELSON for receipt of communications concerning screen and laying of mine field. Proceeded and reported to CTU 86.6.2 for screening duty. At 1604, received instructions from CTU 86.6.2 to screen eastern half of area inside mine field and to keep vessels from passing through newly laid mine field from inside, due to lack of knowledge concerning it. 1700, floating mine sighted, attempts to sink by gunfire unsuccessful. Sighted another mine a short distance from the first. Reported position to CTF 81 and requested mine disposal vessel. At 1715, received orders to close CTG 86.6. On closing CTF 86.6 at 1737, sighted enemy dive bombers estimated at twelve in number. Went to General Quarters and closed convoy. Unable to open fire due to proximity of planes to own ships. Three enemy planes seen shot down. 1805, air attack over, secured from General Quarters, set Condition II MS.

10. Received orders to screen sortie and proceed with Task Group 81.2. 1848, commenced sortie, screening starboard beam of convoy standing out of northwest swept channel Gela. 2058, convoy formed, proceeding to Algiers. Screen consisting of USS NELSON (CDS-17) - Commander Screen), USS GLENNON, USS JEFFERS and four ships of Desron 7. Return trip made without incident or action with enemy. Arrived off Algiers 0600B/15.

11. Comments on Operation "Husky";

(a) General. The operation was enormous in its scope and number of vessels of all types and descriptions involved.
The routing of convoys was particularly good. The approach from Gozo to the Dime Assault Area by GTF 81 was an excellent maneuver, executed well in spite of heavy seas for the small craft involved. No confusion during the approach was noted at any time. It was a pleasure to operate with a force so well planned and coordinated.

(b) Personnel. In spite of the fact that this vessel had not seen action before, the battle performance of the officers and crew was excellent without exception. During all aircraft attacks, officers and men remained at their posts and did their jobs excellently. There was no loss of control over the personnel at any time. In separate correspondence, the shore bombardment fire control group on board are being commended for their excellent performance. The longest single period at General Quarters was 10 hours. During one period a total of 20 out of 24 hours were spent at General Quarters.

(c) Gunnery. The shore bombardment went off very well indeed in spite of communications. (See "Communications, under (d).) Only praise was forthcoming from the shore fire control group. The anti-aircraft situation was not good. The problem was difficult due to close proximity of mountains from which to approach. It was further complicated by not knowing whose planes were in the air. Often fire had to be held until bombs dropped because the situation regarding own air cover was not known. Many enemy attacks were delivered without Force warning. Radar control was hopeless due to high mountains on approach bearings. It is recommended that in future operations of this nature, aircraft spotters be landed ashore to take up points of vantage to warn of approaching enemy aircraft, too much reliance not being placed on radar. More experience with enemy planes would have undoubtedly helped the situation.

The 5"-38 and MG battery performances were excellent. All firing was done quickly without casualty in 5"-38 and with only minor stoppages on the 20 MM, which was quickly cleared.

The anti-aircraft fire apparently did some good because with approximately 200 planes of all types attacking, only 4 bomb hits were noted while seven enemy planes were definitely seen shot down.

(d) Communications. Communications generally were fair. The plan looked satisfactory at the outset. Interference by a harmonic of a frequency used by GTF 81 was very bad on 5100 kcs., the ship-shore fire control circuit. This interference blanked
Subject: Action report on Operation Husky.

out communications entirely at times and was particularly disturbing to comparatively inexperienced operators on shore.

The TBS circuit was used too much for routine work and reports which made its use for contact reports impossible at times. This circuit is most disturbing on the bridge when used 24 hours a day for blasting reports which are of no concern to the commanding officers of 90% of the ships. It is recommended that this circuit be used only as a contact, maneuvering and combat circuit in future operations where ships performing different operations are involved.

(e) Damage Control. No damage suffered. The repair parties were used to clear 5"-38 empties and prepare and serve meals while crew was at General Quarters.

(f) Engineering. The Engineering department operated without casualty except for minor electrical grounds due to shock of firing.

(g) Hull. Minor damage was sustained by gun blast, particularly in bridge structure from #2 gun firing aft.

(h) Medical. No serious personnel injuries were suffered. Ten men were treated for superficial blast burns and crot in eyes.

(i) Navigation. All routes set down in appendix T to reference (d) were followed. No navigational difficulties were encountered. For shore bombardment, navigational beacons or markers, located on assault beach would have been of aid. For long periods of bombardment as in this case, they would have been worth while because it was difficult from all positions to fix the ship due to obstructions between this vessel and known navigational marks.

12. The Executive Officer's report is incorporated herein and no separate report will be submitted.

F. C. CAMP

Copies: Cominch: Original via chain of command, 1 copy direct.
Comnavnaw (1)
Comphilnav (1)
CDS-17 (1)
ANTI-AIRCRAFT ACTION BY SURFACE SHIP

Location of ship **Gela** (Operation Husky)  **U.S.S. Glennon** (DD620)
Date **July 11, 1943**

Attack commenced at 2200.

NOTES

(a) **REPEL ATTACK FIRST** - Then collect data for this report!
(b) Do not "Gun Deck" this report - if data cannot be estimated with reasonable accuracy enter dash in space for which no data is available.
(c) These sheets are to be filled out immediately after action is completed with data available from ship's log, memory, and consultation with ship's officers. Information is essential in order that the effectiveness of our equipment can be determined. Where data is of doubtful accuracy fill in with general terms. The obtaining of this information must not be allowed in any way to adversely affect the handling of equipment during action.

1. **SURPRISE ATTACK** (Yes or No) **Yes**.
2. **METHOD OF PICKING PLANE UP**: Naked eye.
3. **RANGE PLANE WAS PICKED UP**: Less than 5 miles.
4. **NUMBER OF PLANES**.
5. **TYPE OF PLANE**: Medium bomber. **TYPE OF ATTACK**: Night, low level.
6. **SPEED AND ALTITUDE**: Low and fast.
7. **GUNS FIRING**: Size **5"/38, 40 MM, 20 MM**. 
   Number **4-5", 2-40 MM, 5-20 MM**. Method of control **5" - Director, barrage fire, 40 MM - Director, 20 MM, MK14 sight**.
8. **AMMUNITION EXPENDED**: 210 rounds special **5"/38, 340 rounds 40 MM, 1400 rounds 20 MM**.
9. **PERCENT SERVICE ALLOWANCE EXPENDED**: **5" - 52%, 40 MM - 3%, 20 MM - 7%**.
10. **APPROXIMATE TIME TRACKING TO FIRST SHOT**.
11. **APPROXIMATE TIME OF FIRST HITS**.
12. **APPROXIMATE TIME FIRST SHOT TO LAST SHOT**: One hour.
13. **APPROXIMATE POSITION ANGLE OPEN FIRE**.
14. **APPROXIMATE POSITION ANGLE CEASE FIRE**.
15. **APPROXIMATE BEARING FIRST SHOT**.
16. **APPROXIMATE BEARING LAST SHOT**.
17. **APPROXIMATE RANGE FIRST SHOT**: 2000 yd. barrage.
19. APPROXIMATE ALTITUDE OF BOMB RELEASE ________
20. APPROXIMATE RANGE TORPEDO RELEASE ______ SIZE OF TORPEDO ________
21. HITS ON SHIP None WAS SHIP STRAFED No SIZE GUN ________
22. NUMBER OF NEAR BOMB MISSES 3 CASUALTIES FROM NEAR MISSES None
23. PLANES SHOT DOWN - Sure POSSIBLE one Damaged ________
   By what size gun 40 MM ________
24. DETAILS OF DAMAGE TO TARGET BY GUNFIRE IF AVAILABLE ________
25. PERFORMANCE OF AMMUNITION Excellent ________
26. PATTERN SIZES ________

SKETCH
(a) Indicate direction of attack relative to ship's head.
(b) Show relative position of sun.
(c) Indicate own maneuvers.

(by Lt. Comdr. F. G. Campbell, USN, Commanding.)
CONFIDENTIAL

From: The Commander Destroyer Squadron SEVENTEEN.
To: The Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet.

     (2) The Naval Commander, Western Task Force. (The Commander Task Force 80).

Subject: Action report on Operation HUSKY.

Reference: (f) CDS-17 Conf. ltr. A16-3, Serial 040 of July 14, 1943.
(g) CDS-17 Conf. ltr. P15, Serial 046 of July 17, 1943.

1. The conduct of the U.S.S. GLENNON and the Commanding Officer of this ship throughout Operation HUSKY was outstanding. In reference (f) comment has been made on the accuracy of fire support ships. It is considered the fire of the U.S.S. GLENNON was extremely accurate and that the silencing of shore objectives by this accurate fire materially contributed to the successful accomplishment of the mission of the DIME Attack Force, and continued landing of troops and material on beaches assigned. It is all the more noteworthy that this accuracy of fire was maintained during a period in which several enemy aircraft attacks developed. Subject ship was several times closely attacked by enemy planes but no damage was sustained.

2. In reference (g) the Squadron Commander recommended Commanding Officer of the U.S.S. GLENNON for a Navy Cross for his conduct during Operations HUSKY and this recommendation is herewith repeated.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority AND 98133
By H.G. NAPA Date 11/49
Subject:  Action report on Operation Husky.

3. The recommendation contained in paragraph 11(c) is considered sound. All ships experienced great difficulty in picking up aircraft due to interference from high hills in close proximity to the beach. The identification radar did not function properly due to this interference and, as stated in the basic letter, fire was held too long at times because of the uncertainty as to whether approaching planes were friendly or enemy, thus allowing enemy planes, in several cases, to get to their bomb release points prior to be taken under fire. The concurrence is expressed in the recommendation that a plane identification group be landed with a shore fire control party for the purpose of identifying approaching enemy aircraft and the relaying of that information to ships off shore.

4. The total ammunition expenditure for this ship was given in reference (f).

D. L. MADEIRA

Copy to: CO GLENNON.
SECOND ENDORSEMENT to:
CO GLENNON Conf. Ltr. A16-3/
A9 (015) of July 14, 1943.

From: Commander U. S. Naval Forces, Northwest African Waters.
To: The Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.

Subject: Action report on Operation HUSKY.

1. Forwarded.

2. The U.S.S. GLENNON by excellent teamwork with the shore fire control party, extremely accurate shooting at shore objectives and general outstanding conduct throughout contributed materially to the success of the operation. Accurate gunfire was maintained while subject to frequent aircraft attack and the vessel may have shot down two enemy planes in addition to neutralizing shore objectives.

3. There is need for more timely warning to ships that enemy aircraft are approaching from over the land. In future operations it is intended to provide direct communication between the army aircraft warning service and the ships near the coast.

Copy to:
ComDesRon 17.
Com6thPhib.
CO USS GLENNON.

H.K. Newton

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: NND 968133
By: H.F. NARA Date: 4/4/84
CONFIDENTIAL

ACTION REPORT

USS GLENNON

SERIAL 019

DD 620

3 AUGUST 1943

ACTION REPORT, ENEMY AIR RAID ON PALERMO, SICILY,
AUGUST 1, 1943.

ATTACK MADE BY 48 PLANES OF WHICH 4
CARRIED RADIO CONTROLLED BOMBS.

54109

OFFICE OF NAVAL RECORDS AND LIBRARY
August 3, 1943.

From: The Commanding Officer.  
To: The Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.  
Via: (1) The Commander Destroyer Squadron SEVENTEEN.  
(2) The Commander Task Force 88.  

Subject: Action Report, enemy air raid on Palermo, Sicily, August 1, 1943.  

Reference: (a) U.S. Navy Regulations, Article 712.  

1. At 0001, August 1, 1943, the USS GLENNON was anchored in berth D-2, bearing 136°(T), 2960 yards from Molo Nord, outer harbor, Palermo, Sicily operating under the tactical command of Rear Admiral L. A. DAIVISON, USN, Commander Cruiser Division 8 in the USS PHILADELPHIA, assigned as Commander Task Force 88. The immediate duty assigned this command was escort for cruisers.

2. At 0407, flares were sighted over the inner harbor, Palermo, Sicily. They were assumed to be flares dropped from enemy aircraft. Air raid imminent. No air raid alarm was received from any outside activity. 0408, Went to General Quarters. 0412, Bombs noted falling in inner harbor. Planes heard overhead, commenced firing barrage with 20 MM and 40 MM batteries. 0415, Anchor was at short stay. 0416, Ship in inner harbor hit by bomb(s); commenced burning; illuminated adjacent area. 0430, USS PHILADELPHIA and USS SAVANNAH underway. Heaved up anchor. Bombs dropping in water, numerous places in outer harbor. 0432, Making black smoke. 0433, Underway to screen cruisers. Proceeding slowly to avoid collision in smoke-filled anchorage area. 0436, Plane attack reported to port, low altitude glide attack. HMAS COLOMBO, anchored adjacent, straddled by near miss. Plane passed overhead strafing starboard bridge wing of this vessel, apparently with tail guns.

3. Two officers and six men were wounded; one officer and two men seriously. The latter were removed to the sound room to clear bridge deck and administer first aid. Medical officer administered first aid and men were carried below by forward stretcher party to forward battle dressing station.

4. Air attack continued. 0440, Near bomb miss astern, no damage. 0445, Ceased making black smoke. 0500,
Cleared anchorage area of outer harbor, commenced screening cruiser, later identified as USS PHILADELPHIA. Used high speed and radical turns to avoid bombs. 0543, Sighted two high altitude bombers overhead, German Ju88's. 0545, Commenced firing 5"/38 battery on planes last sighted. 0546, Ceased firing, out of range. 0548, Another Ju88 sighted overhead, 7500 feet; commenced firing 5"/38's. Hard right rudder to avoid bombs falling ahead. 0549, Bomb splashes became more infrequent. 0610, Air raid was apparently over, ammunition expended: 5"/38, 72 rounds; 40 MM, 760 rounds; 20 MM 1560 rounds. 0615, Followed the USS PHILADELPHIA into port. 0646, Secured from General Quarters, set Condition II, MA and at 0719 anchored in destroyer berth, outer harbor, Palermo, Sicily.

5. Three enemy planes were observed shot down.
No hits on enemy aircraft claimed by this command.
6. General comments on action:
   
(a) Personnel. There was no loss of control over the crew at any time. All hands remained at their stations and carried out their orders without hesitation. Personnel wounded were replaced quickly. In this regard, it will be noted that one quartermaster, one signalman, and one quartermaster striker were among those wounded. This placed a heavy load on the remaining bridge personnel.

(b) Gunnery. The presence of enemy aircraft was not detected until they were over the target and had dropped flares. This undoubtedly indicates that as yet no air raid warning or detection organization had been set up in the Palermo area. Any success that the attacking aircraft scored could probably be attributed to this initial element of surprise as the only hits were those scored early in the attack. Accurate tracking and fire by the 5"/38 battery in this type of attack is quite improbable as optics cannot be used and the design of the FD radar is such that picking up a fast-moving airplane at short ranges and staying on the target for more than seconds is improbable. A high angle barrage, thrown up in the direction of an approaching aircraft, would no doubt meet with more success; but in a crowded harbor, shrapnel and fragmentation from this barrage might cause serious damage to our own forces. Use of the MK 32 fused projectiles in a crowded harbor, and when near land occupied by our own forces, will necessarily be restricted. For this type of aircraft attack we have adopted a fixed directional
machine gun barrage, fired in the direction of approaching aircraft which converges on any plane actually sighted. It is believed that not only is there a strong chance of destroying any aircraft attempting to pass through this barrage, but also that the tremendous amount of tracer fire put in the air in any one direction, would discourage any aircraft from continuing its approach below the range of those guns. This machine gun fire however, presents the same problem of endangering our own forces in the adjacent areas. The 20 MM projectile is especially dangerous since the fuse is not self-destructive and explodes on impact just as effectively when spent as when it is initially fired. However, if fired at angles of 50 or 60 degrees, the range is generally sufficient to carry it over and clear. The material performance of both the 5"/38 battery and the machine gun batteries was excellent. Except for minor jams and a 20 MM barrel that burst due to premature explosion, there were no casualties. Checking fire on the machine gun batteries is still somewhat of a problem, but much better results are being obtained now than previously. It is believed that an effectively controlled radar and sound searchlight battery ashore, which would give the large caliber AA guns a point of aim, would prove very successful against night attacks of this nature. The advance range of both aircraft fired on after daylight was out of range of the main battery. The value of this fire is questionable; however, there is no doubt that a large quantity of flak in the air proves discouraging to the bomber crews.

(c) **Hull and Damage Control.** Only superficial damage suffered.

(d) **Engineering.** The engineering department operated efficiently and without casualty.

(e) **Medical.** This was the first experience of this command in handling wounded. Of these, there were three serious and six minor cases. The battle dressing station, as previously set up and ready, in the after crew's messing compartment, was satisfactory. Carefully trained stretcher parties functioned smoothly in removing two patients in stokes stretchers from the bridge level to the forward battle dressing station. The three seriously wounded cases were attended first. Morphine was administered and hemorrhage controlled. The six minor cases were then given emergency dressings and five were able to return to duty at once. The sixth had so many minor
puncture wounds that all were not dressed before the action was concluded. The majority of wounds were from fragmentation missiles. One of the serious cases was in severe shock following a puncture wound of the right lower abdomen. One unit of plasma intravenously relieved the shock. An operative set up was made for surgical exploration of the abdomen under spinal anesthesia. Opportunity arose for transferring the three serious cases to a larger vessel. This precluded the necessity of exploratory operation on this ship, since a fully equipped and staffed operating room could be reached quickly. Morphine syrettes upheld their reputation for speed, convenience and efficiency. Other first aid gear proved adequate in quantity and efficiency and its present method of distribution and stowage.

(f) General. It is believed that insufficient stress is placed upon enemy aircraft detection and destruction during the first stages of taking over enemy controlled ports in preparation for their use as our own advance bases. Had this attack been a determined one, consisting of high altitude bombers, dive bombers, and torpedo planes; had it been pressed home with determination and coordination, it is likely that few of the 27 ships in the outer harbor would have gone undamaged. With enemy aircraft approaching from behind a mountainous background, early detection by shipborne radar is not likely. The aircraft in this attack apparently used the land background as a screen between attacks. Radars on the peaks with sufficient shore-based anti aircraft batteries would have been much more successful.

F. C. Camp.

Copies to: Cominich (direct)
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Commavnavw
FIRST ENDORSEMENT to:
C.O. GLENNON Conf. ltr.
A16-3/A9 serial O19 of
August 3, 1943.

CONFIDENTIAL

From: The Commander Destroyer Squadron SEVENTEEN.
To: The Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.

Via: (1) The Commander Task Force EIGHTY-EIGHT.
(2) The Commander U.S. Naval Forces, Northwest
African Waters.

Subject: Action Report, enemy air raid on Palermo,
Sicily, August 1, 1943.

1. Forwarded.

2. The Commander Destroyer Squadron SEVENTEEN was
present at Palermo, Sicily during the air attack described
and also in other localities when attack was made by enemy
aircraft. He cannot quite agree with the general comment
made in paragraph 6(b) of the basic letter as the paragraph
seems to intimate that anti-aircraft fire should be restricted
if there is a possibility of endangering ships which might
be under the anti-aircraft barrage due to fear of wounding
personnel or damaging ships from unexploded ammunition. To
the mind of the Squadron Commander the maximum barrage should
be placed in the air over these ships as protection even though
there is a chance of wounding some of the personnel of your
own forces. Generally during night attack aircraft cannot
be seen. The only protection against attacking aircraft is
to cover the air over the protected ships with as dense a
quantity of flak as can be placed in the air, thus discouraging
any plane from flight through this flak. The danger to person-
nel of own forces must be accepted.
August 7, 1943.

Subject: Action Report, enemy air raid on Palermo, Sicily, August 1, 1943.

3. During this attack the GLENNON was strafed with machine gun and 20 millimeter fire from an attacking plane. There were several casualties on the bridge but it is gratifying to note that the Medical Department went into action promptly and that casualties were expeditiously handled.

4. The Squadron Commander heartily agrees with the discussion contained in paragraph 6(f).

D. L. MADEIRA.

Copy to: C.O. GLENNON.
UNITED STATES ATLANTIC FLEET

A16-3/

Serial: 0296

CONFIDENTIAL

SECOND ENDORSEMENT to
CO USS GLENNON conf.ltr.
A16-3/A9 ser. 019 of
August 3, 1943.

From: The Commander Task Force EIGHTY-EIGHT,
(Commander Cruiser Division Eight).

To : The Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet.

Via: The Commander U.S. Naval Forces, Northwest
African Waters.

Subject: Action Report, enemy air raid on Palermo,
Sicily, August 1, 1943.

1. Forwarded.

2. The discussion under paragraphs 6 (b) and (r)
of basic letter is misleading and the criticism of the shore
defenses is considered unjustified. Palermo fell on 22
July. The shore radar net was partly installed and function-
ing on the 30th but communication with the ships had not
been established due to shortage of radio equipment occasioned
by the rapid advance of the 7th Army and the few roads available.
Any failure to receive warning, should be attributed to the
destroyers on outer patrol. The approach was made, however,
at low altitude to defeat radar detection.

3. From information obtained from prisoners of
war participating in this raid and from observation it can
be definitely stated that the attack was made by forty-eight
planes of which four DO-217's carried the new radio controlled
bomb. The approach was made from the northwest just off the
surface of the water and the attack at an altitude of 6,000
feet, except the DO-217's which flew at 12,000 feet. High
level, glide and dive bombing and strafing tactics were used.
The raid which lasted about an hour and forty minutes was
made in four to six waves. Illumination by enemy flares and
by burning gasoline and ammunition supplied by us was brilliant.
To the Task Force Commander the attack appeared well coordinated.
Enemy preparation included a beacon fire on the mountain side
kindled about one half hour prior to the attack. No lack of
determination on the part of the enemy was apparent. Diving
Attack in the restricted area of the harbor, the terrain of
which was undoubtedly well known, proved fatal to one plane
which crashed into the mountainside. Others of the last wave
lingered until dawn as did one DO-217 which proved unwise as

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UNITED STATES ATLANTIC FLEET

Serial: 0296

Subject: Action Report, enemy air raid on Palermo, Sicily, August 1, 1943.

the Spitfires shot them down. Known enemy losses seven.

Copy to:
CO USS GLENNOM.
ComDesRon 17.

L. A. DAVIDSON.
From: Commander U.S. Naval Forces, Northwest African Waters.
To: Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.

Subject: Action Report, enemy air raid on Palermo, Sicily, 1 August 1943.

1. Forwarded, concurring in second endorsement.

2. The indiscriminate use of 20 mm guns at unseen targets still is a moot question. However, the use of self destroying 20 mm projectiles, previously recommended by this command, combined with strict fire discipline will contribute to the solution of a difficult problem.

Copy to:
ComCruDiv 8
ComDesRon 17
CO USS GLENNON

SPENCER S. LEWIS,
Chief of Staff.
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<tr>
<td>KEELER, Charles O.</td>
<td>S02c</td>
<td>RABYGOZA, Emilio, Jr.</td>
<td>S2c</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KELLY, Duward Tom</td>
<td>S2c</td>
<td>RAMIREZ, Richard Earl</td>
<td>S2c</td>
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<td>KENNEDY, William Raymond</td>
<td>S2c</td>
<td>RANSDELL, Samuel Ray</td>
<td>S2c</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KIMBLE, Lester L.</td>
<td>GFC</td>
<td>READER, Shirley Ray</td>
<td>S2c</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KIRDAHY, Albert Gabriel</td>
<td>S2c</td>
<td>REED, Bond M.</td>
<td>S2c</td>
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<tr>
<td>KIRK, Burton LaVern</td>
<td>S2c</td>
<td>RETTING, Anthony Ernest</td>
<td>RT1c</td>
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<tr>
<td>KIRKEBY, Charles J.</td>
<td>CCS</td>
<td>RIZZO, Antonio (n)</td>
<td>GM3c</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KLING, Robert August</td>
<td>MM2c</td>
<td>ROBERTSON, James Edward</td>
<td>F1c</td>
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<tr>
<td>KOHL, Orland James</td>
<td>S1c</td>
<td>ROBINSON, Robert Warren</td>
<td>EM3c</td>
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<tr>
<td>KRAIG, Joseph A.</td>
<td>EM3c</td>
<td>ROWAN, James P.</td>
<td>MM1c</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LANG, Jacob Henry</td>
<td>TM3c</td>
<td>SANTS, Robert Gordon</td>
<td>S2c</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LANGAN, Robert F.</td>
<td>S2c</td>
<td>SAVAGE, Jessie &quot;E&quot;</td>
<td>S2c</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LARSON, Percy Norman</td>
<td>EM1c</td>
<td>SCAMPOLI, John R., Jr.</td>
<td>S2c</td>
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<tr>
<td>LAWRY, Robert C.</td>
<td>F1c</td>
<td>SCHACK, Frederick Evald</td>
<td>S2c</td>
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<tr>
<td>LEIBERT, Gerald (n)</td>
<td>S1c</td>
<td>SCOTT, Robert Peter A.</td>
<td>S2c</td>
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<tr>
<td>LESWING, William Louis</td>
<td>GM3c</td>
<td>SCOTT, Warnar &quot;G&quot;</td>
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<tr>
<td>LEVY, Bertram (n)</td>
<td>MM1c</td>
<td>SCOTT, William Calvin</td>
<td>StM1c</td>
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<tr>
<td>LIVESAY, Harold &quot;C&quot;</td>
<td>FC1c</td>
<td>SEARLES, George Theodore</td>
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<td>LUTHE, Beryl Vernon</td>
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<td>SEJKO, Walter Marion</td>
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<td>MAAS, Leo John</td>
<td>S1c</td>
<td>SHANLEY, William H.</td>
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<tr>
<td>MADANJIAN, Richard Peter</td>
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<td>SHERMAN, Robert P.</td>
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<tr>
<td>MAHAFFEY, Lloyd (n)</td>
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<td>SIEFER, Richard B.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAHANNAH, Donald Lynn</td>
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<td>SILLET, Harry King</td>
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<td>MARGERITTS, Nelson Rutter</td>
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<td>SMITH, Howard L.</td>
<td>CRH</td>
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<tr>
<td>MARSHALL, John William, Jr.</td>
<td>MM1c</td>
<td>SMITH, Milburn E.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>MC GRANEY, Lloyd Albert</td>
<td>MM2c</td>
<td>SOBIENSKY, John Edward</td>
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<td>MC CULLough, Edgar Francis</td>
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<td>SPILLER, Frank Arthur</td>
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<td>MC KENNA, John J.</td>
<td>GM3c</td>
<td>SPITZNALE, Leo Francis</td>
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<td>MC KINNEY, Kenneth James</td>
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<td>SPRING, Robert Harold</td>
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<td>MINNEX, James Junior</td>
<td>S2c</td>
<td>STELLETTO, Albert J.</td>
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<tr>
<td>MORASCO, Edward Lawrence</td>
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<td>STEWART, James A.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
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<td>STOLL, James C.</td>
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<td>TURNER, Frederick W.</td>
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<td>STOTLER, Robert E.</td>
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<td>STRANGEFF, Joseph R.</td>
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<td>VALKENBURG, John, Jr.</td>
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<td>STRINE, William (n)</td>
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<td>VAN ARMAN, Donald C.</td>
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<td>STRITTMATTER, Herman F.</td>
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<td>VENABLE, William Roscoe</td>
<td>CWT</td>
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<td>STROPEL, Max Henry</td>
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<td>VRBANIC, Michael Paul</td>
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<td>STULKEN, Thomas Eugene</td>
<td>S2c</td>
<td>WHITE, Eugene Lamoreaux</td>
<td>GM1c</td>
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<td>SUTHERLIN, Everett O., Jr.</td>
<td>S1c</td>
<td>WILSON, Earl R.</td>
<td>MM2c</td>
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<tr>
<td>SUTHERS, Walter J.</td>
<td>F3c</td>
<td>WISE, Harold L.</td>
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<td>SUTTON, Andrew N.</td>
<td>S1c</td>
<td>WOLWINE, Stanford E.</td>
<td>WT1c</td>
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<td>SWACHA, John J.</td>
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<td>WRIGHT, Edward Lee</td>
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<td>SWINEY, Billy James</td>
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<td>WRIGHT, Ralph Albert</td>
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<td>TAKACS, William George</td>
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<td>ZIMMERMANN, Hugh King</td>
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<tr>
<td>TANNER, Edwin Floyd</td>
<td>SoM3c</td>
<td>ZROWKA, John (n)</td>
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<tr>
<td>THACKER, James Franklin</td>
<td>QM3c</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

* On microfilm at the National Archives.

* Wounded by strafing during an air raid on Palermo, Sicily, 1 August 1943, according to a machine-generated casualty report prepared by the Bureau of Naval Personnel after the war. Also wounded: Lt. Comdr. Clifford A. Johnson, USN, and Lt.(jg) Milton M. Perloff, USNR. Total wounded: 2.

E. A. Wilde, Jr.
October, 1998
The Glennon was the primary rescue ship when the Benson-class destroyer USS Murphy (DD-603) (above, on April 4, 1943) was cut in half by a collision with a tanker on October 21, 1943. With the assistance of motor whaleboats from other vessels, the Glennon rescued 107 officers and men from the frigid water 100 miles off New York. The Murphy's after section remained afloat with about 100 of her crewmembers still aboard. The Glennon then towed the Murphy back toward port until relieved by rescue tugs.

(Official U.S. Navy Photograph.)
The after section of the USS Murphy (DD-603) at the New York Navy Yard on October 23, 1943. The shamrock on what had been her after stack now identifies the ship instead of a hull number - and her jackstaff is now mounted on her torpedo tubes instead of her bowl. Thirty-five officers and men were lost when the Murphy's forward section rolled over and sank three minutes after she was split in half by the U.S. tanker Bulkoil two days earlier. The entire bow had to be replaced, but after a 7-month repair job the ship was able to rejoin the fleet in time to participate in the invasion of France. (National Archives)

Editor's Notes:

1. The tanker was initially identified as the Vulcan, but this was corrected in the Eastern Sea Frontier's war diary for 21 October 1943.

2. The Casualties Folder for the Murphy at the National Archives includes a list of 38 officers and men declared missing, but a later memorandum states that 3 of those listed were rescued by the USS Jeffers (DD-621).

E. A. Wilde, Jr.
March, 1999
16-20 Continued from previous page.


C. D. ROBINSON, Lt.(jg), USN

18-20

1814, Convoy changed speed to 14 knots.

R. W. LENNER, Lt., USN

20-24

2105, Radar contact bearing 012°, distant 11,000 yards. 2108, U.S.S. MURPHY left screening position to investigate radar contact. 2114, Executed emergency turn of 45° to 220°. 2120, a number of sparks and lights seen in the vicinity of U.S.S. MURPHY (DD663). 2135, Directed by verbal Orders of Commander Screen to investigate U.S.S. MURPHY which he is unable to raise on the TBS or other signal equipment. 2137, All hands to General Quarters. 2138, Standing toward U.S.S. MURPHY, in collision with S.S. VULCAN, on various courses and speeds to effect rescue of survivors. 2140, Maneuvering to avoid tanker, 5.3. VULCAN and U.S.S. KNIGHT. 2143, Lost steering control due to jam in steering post, shifted steering to after steering station. 2146, Lowered motor whale boat to assist in rescue of survivors. 2158, Began taking survivors aboard from life rafts. Life boats were being used in rescue. U.S.S. JEFFERS and U.S.S. KNIGHT directed by Commander Screen to stand by and render assistance as necessary. This ship is going to survivors and take after section U.S.S. MURPHY in tow. Motor whale boats of U.S.S. KNIGHT and U.S.S. JEFFERS in search of survivors. 2230, Completed rescue of all survivors that could be seen in the water. Survivors on this ship consist of Commander L.W. BAILEY, USN, Commanding, twelve officers and ninety-five men. One hundred men and one officer remaining on U.S.S. MURPHY, status of remaining personnel unknown. All personnel treated for exposure to cold and fuel oil. 2235, Commenced preparations to take U.S.S. MURPHY in tow. 2340, Transferred lachanist C. P. PARKER to U.S.S. MURPHY to secure engines and direct work of salvage. First estimate of extent of damage to ship was that she was severed at frame #67. About three minutes after the collision the forward section rolled over and sank, the after section floated free. Number one fire room was flooded, number one boiler was lost, number two boiler was left hanging over break. Forward engine room, forward bulkhead at frame #56 held but had minor leaks. Salvage party strengthened this bulkhead with shoring material and stopped leaks. Position of ship at time of collision was Lat. 39.39° N, Long. 72.33° W.

Continued on next page...
OPERATIONAL REMARKS
(WAR DIARY)

20-24
Continued from previous page....

List of survivors picked up by this ship are as follows: BAILEY, L. D.,
Comdr., Commanding officer of the U.S.S. LURCH; BEAL, T. R., Lieut;
GORDON, J. R., Lieut; HILLIG, J. A., Lieut.(jg); MCGEIGE, J. F., Lieut.; SMITH, T. K., Lieut.(jg);
HEDGWAY, W. G., Lieut.(jg) MC; STRAHN, H. R., Lieut.(jg); TRAXLER, D. K.,
Lieut.(jg); VAN BRUNT, A. L., Lieut.(jg); YOUNG, J. S., Lieut.(jg); CAVARLY,
J. R., Ens; NICHOLSON, O. F., Ens.; OX, E. L., CFC; CROSS, E. F., CFC; DUBBS,
C. R., CLM; LORCH, W., CLM; PARKER, R. F., CSM; PARKS, M., CSM; FOSSEY, C. I.,
CM; ROY, C. R., CPM; WOLD, A. S., CSM; ANDREWS, C. R., BM1c; BOULAY, E. E.,
BM3c; BUCKE, E. N., BM3c; CHARDIN, L. A., BM3c; COTTWELL, S. H., BM3c;
DAVIDSON, G. E., FM3c; ENGLE, K. W., FM3c; FRAZER, H. R., FM3c;
FRAZER, T. J., FM3c; GALADICK, A., RM3c; GAVIN, J. E., WT3c; GESELLA, A. C., SLc; HICKERT,
M. J., FC3c; HEATH, F. W., SN3c; HILLER, T. E., RM3c; HORSEY, T. P., RM3c;
JOHNSON, C. L., SM3c; JORDAN, R. G., FM3c; LARITZ, E. L., SM3c;
KEVIN, T. L., SM3c; KUCHINSKI, W. C., SM3c; LEWIS, W. E., EM3c; LEWIS, J. E.,
(Eugene), FLO; LOCKE, R. C., SLc; LOW, J. J., SLc; MIKULIKOWICZ, T. J.; LEN-
DAM, P., SM3c; MENKE, F. D., SK3c; MOREHO, E. A., SLc; MOCAR, R. R., SLc;
MORRIS, R. F., SLc; MOSINA, F. J. S., SM3c; MULLINS, F. P., SLc; RATTER, D. E., FC3c;
NEVILLE, H. F., SLc; NORRIS, W. H., GM3c; O'NEIL, C. L., GM3c; OSTERHOUT,
J. D., RM3c; OSKIL, W. R., RM3c; PARSONS, F. R., SLc; PATTON, T. B., STMLc; PEACOCK,
H. A., TM3c; PETERS, H. L., SLc; POUDINGUE, J. P., GM3c; PREUSCH, R. O., SLc;
PRIOR, R. A., BM2c; PUCKETT, M. A., TC3c; PUCKETT, R. H., RM3c;
PUNTELLO, N. M., RT3c; PyNE, J. H., COx; ROCK, H., SM3c;
REEVES, B., SM3c; REEVES, F. A., RM3c; ROLK, J. S., SM3c; RUCK, C. E., SM3c;
RZAN, B. A., SM3c; RYAN, J. S., SLc; SAILER, J. W., SM3c; SAUNDERLIN, J. R.,
SM3c; SCAVINO, B. A., FC3c; SEWING, R. O., FM3c; SHANK, R. S., SM3c; SHAREY,
J. H., SM3c; SHEA, L. F., CMc; SHEEL, E. E., SM3c; SHEEPHERD, R. E., SM3c;
SHERMAN, P. F., SM3c; SILVERSTEIN, F., SM3c; SIMPSON, F. A., FC3c; SIMPSON, T. F.,
FM3c; SP pluy, E. D., SM3c; STEINER, E. H., SM3c; STONE, J. E., SM3c; TROTTER, H. S.,
SM3c; VON JOHAN, W. H., FLO; WILSON, D. A., FC3c; WATERS, R. J., RM3c;
WEST, B. A., SM3c; WILLIAMS, R. E., SM3c; ZINNIA, J. J., BM3c; SHILL, SM3c;
RIGECI, SLC; CARRIET, STM2c.

D. St.

D. St., Lt.(jg), USNR
UNITED STATES SHIP GLENNON (DD620)  

Friday 22 October 1943

OPERATIONAL REMARKS
(WAR DIARY)

00-04
0002, Ship's boat of U.S.S. KNIGHT passing tow line to U.S.S. MURPHY failed to make it fast. 0015, Starboard engine back to 1/3. 0020, Starboard engine stopped. 0030, Passed U.S.S. MURPHY line with line throwing gun. 0050, Commenced taking strain on tow line, starboard engine ahead 1/3, standard speed five knots. U.S.S. JEFFERS and U.S.S. KNIGHT departed to join convoy in accordance with orders CTF69. 0056, Secured from General Quarters, set condition II MSC. Set course 295°(T), 300°(psa). Increased engine RPM in increments of 5 to 50 turns on starboard engine. 0137, Port engine back in commission, port engine ahead standard, starboard engine stopped to aid steering. 0200, Commenced building up speed on starboard engine. 0223, All engines ahead standard, speed 5 knots.

C. D. ROBISON, Lt. (jg), USN

04-08

R. W. BENNER, Lt., USNR

08-12
0928, U.S.C.G.C. CARTIGAN came alongside port side. 0932, transferred Lt. KLEB, W.N., Executive Officer; RIDGEWAY, W.G., Lt. (jg), Medical Officer and TRASKER, D.K., Lt. (jg), all of the U.S.S. MURPHY to U.S.C.G.C. CARTIGAN for further transfer to U.S.S. MURPHY. 0935, C.C.G. CARTIGAN cast off. 1011, U.S.C.G.C. CARTIGAN came alongside starboard side. 1013, Received the following survivors from U.S.C.G.C. CARTIGAN: SENTINEL, G.M., Cox; GREGG, T.E., FC3; TANKERSLEG, J.H., R3c; HARRIS, H.R., S1c; BARGEMAN, S2c; HAMILTON, E.C., S2c; YANANTEY, C., S1c; RANDALL, R.H., S2c; SIMPSON, J.E., S2c; SKIDMORE, E.F., S2c; DUGAN, H.M., S2c; CAMERELL, R.P., S1c; SALomon, M., S1c; NEWELL, F.P., S1c; KUBISH, N.J., S1c; KUSCENO, N.A., S1c; SOLOMON, R.K., S1c; SAVOY, N.J., S1c; ROMERO, A., T3c; ASKOWSKI, E.E., S2c; DEMENT, E.E., S1c. 1105, PTC37 reported for duty. 1100, U.S.C.G.C. CARTIGAN underway from starboard side. 1115, U.S.S. MURPHY (DD603) cast off tow line to be taken by (in tow) the Civilian Tug S.S. RESCUE.

D. SIC

12-16
1204, Changed standard speed to 15 knots, all engines ahead one third. 1206, U.S.C.G.C. CARTIGAN came alongside to port to rescue survivors from U.S.S. MURPHY. The following survivors were transferred to the U.S.C.G.C. CARTIGAN: (100 officers and men). Commander L.W. BAILEY, Commanding Officer, U.S.S. MURPHY, McTIQUE, J.A., Lt. (jg), PIERSO, T.K., Lt. (jg)

Continued on next page:....

Approved:
C. D. JOHNSON, Lt. Comdr., USN

Examined:
J. B. FENRILE, Lt., USN

Commanding Officer
Navigator


OPERATIONAL REMARKS
(WAR DIARY)

12-16 Continued from previous page....

STIHL, H.R.,Lt.(jg); VAN BRUNT, A.D., Lt.(jg); YOUNG, J.S., Lt.(jg); NICHOLSON, O.J., Ens.; CROSS, E.F., CPO; PARKER, E.J., GCM; FARRIS, N., CCS;
ROY, C.R., CPO; WOOL, B.S., CSE; ANDERSON, C.W., RMC1; BOYLES, R.F., RM3c;
BURRELL, J.H., FM2c; CAFFERTY, D. P., GM2c; CHARMAN, L.A., S2c; CGS313c;
GMC3c; BARKS, J.M., F3c; DAGGER, W.C., GM2c; DAVIDSON, G.E., F3c; ENGEL, V.W., S2c;
ESSIG, B.M., S2c; FLOOD, J.J., S2c; FRANKLIN, B., TM3c; FRANZ, R.L., SM3c;
GAUGID, J.J., FM2c; GAYWIN, D.E., S2c; GERRITZ, J.C., F3c; GIFFEN, A.G., S2c; HEARSTY, M.J.,
FC3c; HEATH, G.W., S2c; HILLBERND, E.F., S2c; HILLARD, T.M., HM2c; HORD,
SBY, J.F., MM2c; JOHNSON, G.K., SM3c; JORDAN, R.G., F3c; EARN, E.C., SM3c;
KIRKIN, J.C., S2c; KOUCHINSKI, W.C., S2c; LEWIS, W.E., EM3c; LEWIS, W.B., F3c;
LOCHS, H.R., S2c; LOW, J.W., S2c; MAZURKIEWICZ, J.C; MEDINA, P., SM3c;
MENKE, E.F., EN1c; MURPHY, J.A., SM3c; MOORE, E.R., S2c; MORRIS, F.B.,
S2c; MOZINA, F.J., S2c; MILLINGS, F.P., S1c; MUNTEZ, D.E., F3c; NEVILLE, R.J.,
S1c; NORSIS, W.L., GM3c; O’NEILL, C.L., SM3c; OSTERHOUT, O.J., RM3c;
PANG, S., GM3c; PARRSONS, F.R., Blc; PAYTON, R.B., ST1c; PEACOCK, R.A.,
TH2c; PETERS, H.J., S1c; POSIDINSKI, J.P., GM3c; PREZOSCH, R.C., S2c;
PRIOR, R.A., MM2c; PUCKETT, J.A., SC3c; PUDDING, R.E., S2c; PANTERLIO, N.M.,
HF3c; PYNE, J.B., Jr., Cox; ROCH, H., S2c; REESE, A., ST1c; REESE, F.P.,
RD3c; ROSSI, J., S2c; RAUCH, G.E., S2c; ROZANSKY, E.M., S2c; RYAN, J.,
S2c; SADLER, T.W., S2c; SAUNDERS, J.R., S2c; SCANNIN, V.A., F3c; SEWELL,
R.C., FC3c; SHANK, E., S2c; SHAY, S.R., S2c; SHELLER, L.P., CM1c; SHELLER,
F.E., S2c; SHEDD, H.B., F3c; SHEPHERD, P.P., F3c; SHILL, S., S2c; SILBERSTEIN,
F., S2c; SIMPSON, F.A., F3c; SIMPSON, W., S1c; SPALDING, E.L., S2c; STEIN,
ER, E.H., S2c; STONE, J.E., S2c; TROTTER, W.S., FM2c; VAN DYKOM, W.H., F3c;
VILLASTRICO, A.A., FC3c; WATERS, R.J., ST1c; WASHINGTON, F., F3c; WILKINS,
E.R., S2c; ZENITH, J.T., FM2c; SHULL, S2c; CARRIER, ST2c;

1237, Completed transshiping survivors to U.S.C.G.C. CARTIGAN. Cast off
lines. U.S.S.C.G.C. CARTIGAN DIRECTED to proceed to NTIK. All engines
ahead 2/3/1214. All engines ahead 1/3. 1239, PT37 cast off lines, directed
screen and towing group to ZEBRA then proceed to NTIK with survivors.
1322, Hailed U.S.S. SAGAMORE turning over duties as O.T.C. to the C.O.
1330, Relieved, set course 0860 (T), speed 22 knots to rejoin convoy in
accordance with Commander Eastern Sea Frontier despatch, secret 221353 of
October. 1350, Went to routine drill General Quarters. 1542, Released
first target balloon. 1545, Completed firing. 1546, Hit target, ceased
firing. Released three more baloons for machine gun firing practice. 1537,
Ceased firing. 1558, Secured from General Quarters, set condition II E.
Total rounds fired - 175/40MM and 180/20MM.

C. D. ROBINSON, Lt.(jg), USN

Continued on next page.....
UNITED STATES ATLANTIC FLEET
Flagship of the Commander in Chief

Commendation

From: Commander in Chief, United States Atlantic Fleet.
To: Commander Clifford A. Johnson, U.S. Navy.

Subject: Commendation.

1. The Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet, notes with extreme pleasure and gratification your performance of duty as Commanding Officer, U.S.S. GLENNON in connection with the rescue of survivors and the subsequent salvage of the U.S.S. MURPHY on 21 October 1943.

2. Upon being detailed to investigate the reason for the U.S.S. MURPHY's failure to maintain radiotelephone communications with other ships of your Task Force, you discovered that the U.S.S. MURPHY had been cut in half by a collision, that the forward section had sunk, and that the after section, surrounded by many survivors, remained afloat. Despite the dark night you were able to rescue about one hundred survivors and later, when you were convinced that no more survivors remained in the area, you, with a display of excellent seamanship, took the floating after section of the U.S.S. MURPHY in tow and towed it toward port until relieved by rescue vessels.

3. The Commander in Chief, United States Atlantic Fleet, commends you upon your judgment, prompt and decisive action, excellent judgment and seamanship which materially reduced the loss of life and facilitated the successful salvage of the after section of the U.S.S. MURPHY.

R. E. INGERSOLL

Note: Typed by E. A. Wilde, Jr. in October, 1998, using the format and letterhead of a commendation issued by the same command for Cdr. Johnson's performance of duty just three weeks later. The text was obtained from an official biography of Cdr. Johnson dated 5 August 1944. The date of the commendation letter is not known, but it was probably in November or December, 1943.
TO SAVE A LIFE AT SEA

By Gustavus R. Ide, Jr.
USS GLENNON (DD-620)

It is barely Sunday, November 7, 1943 and merchant ships and U.S. destroyers are leaving the safety of their respective harbors in the British Isles to rendezvous and take up their positions in a westbound convoy, scheduled to reach the United States about November 18th. Perhaps this year, there will be a Thanksgiving at home for some of us.

At 0246, our ship, the USS GLENNON (DD-620), one of the escorting destroyers, weighs anchor off Belfast, Northern Ireland, and is standing out in Belfast Lough, steering toward the Irish Sea. At 0430, GLENNON is the first of the escorts to enter North Channel, a narrow passage which joins the Irish Sea to the North Atlantic. To the east, other destroyers are joining us from the Firth of Clyde. Probably their port has been Greencastle, Scotland, birthplace of the mighty Queens. Now, far to the south, nearly to the horizon, the bulkier forms of the merchant men take shape, joining the convoy from English ports to the south. It is for these transports' safe westerly passage that the destroyer group is responsible.

The forming-up of a sizable convoy such as this is a tedious, seemingly endless process. The twenty-four merchant ships plus the battleship USS TEXAS (BB-35) will form in seven columns of three or four ships in each column. Only seven short days ago, we escorted many of these same ships with their assorted cargoes of men, materials, and other equipment for war safely from New York. Now we must return them to America where they will again be reloaded with those implements essential for an invasion of the continent. Then we or others must deliver them to ports in the British Isles. Repetitive? Yes. Routine? Never. Even on our last eastbound crossing a sister destroyer - the USS MURPHY (DD-603) - had been cut in half by a large coastal freighter.

We are nearly through North Channel and our course is now westerly and homeward as we pass allied mine fields to the north. Other destroyers are passing us to port, taking their assigned positions in the fan shaped protective screen. Most will be some 4,000 to 6,000 yards in front of the merchant ships, while one lone destroyer will be 20,000 yards up ahead. The GLENNON's position will be at the extreme right hand side of the merchant ships, about even with the column leaders. By late afternoon, each ship has settled into its position.

During daylight hours, submarines are reluctant to patrol on the surface lest they be seen, and because of their slower underwater speeds there is no urgent need for daytime protection in the area to the rear of the convoy. However, darkness brings courage to the U-boat commanders, and they surface their crafts, not only to recharge their batteries, but also the better to use their greater surface speeds in stalking their prey. Therefore, at dusk, the destroyer on the flank of the screen drops back to the rear of the convoy to guard against the potential threat of U-boats overtaking the convoy. It is here at the rear of the mass of convoy ships that the GLENNON spends her first night of this westbound passage.

Through the night, deck, engine room, and gun watches rotate on schedule; bakers and cooks in the galley are turning out a hundred or more golden loaves, and later twenty-five gallons of ice cream before securing the galley in the small hours. We have settled into the basic routine of convoy escort duty as we head for the States on this, our fifth westbound trip.

By Thursday, November 11th the weather is gray and windy at dawn, and the forecast from the previous day appears to be most accurate. Although the rain is holding off, the winds do increase in intensity and the seas run higher and higher. Darkness comes early

Editor's Note: Written in about 1986 from personal notes and information in the Glenmon's records at the National Archives. Mr. Ide was the ship's Torpedo Officer in 1943 - and also in June, 1944, when the ship was sunk off the Normandy beachhead by a German mine.

E. A. Wilde, Jr.
September, 1998
in this latitude, and well before the evening meal we begin to prepare for some bad weather. Dinner this evening is not a time to enjoy food. In the wardroom, fiddle boards have been put on the table, and stanchions are in place from the overhead to sockets in the deck. Destroyers are seldom placid creatures, even in relatively quiet seas. But in rough weather the normal daily events including eating and sleeping become most difficult. Food spills, plates slide in their compartments in the fiddle boards, and we are glad when finally the meal is finished. On the brighter side, perhaps these seas will keep our submarine adversaries below the surface in the comparative quiet and comfort of the depths.

As the waves continue to increase in size, it becomes necessary to take the more unusual precautions to protect weather deck equipment from damage or loss. Normally it is the practice when underway to rig the lifeboats outboard in their davits so that they hang clear of the side of the ship and can be lowered more quickly in case of an emergency. However in extremely rough seas, a boat in such an exposed position can be badly damaged or even swept away. Throughout the entire convoy - for protectors and protected alike - lifeboats are rigged in and other precautions are being taken. Hatches are secured, lashings on life rafts are checked and tightened as necessary, all topside gear is covered and tied down, and passage the length of the ship on weather decks is stopped, except when an emergency dictates otherwise. We always expect foul weather in this North Atlantic, and yet we are seldom completely prepared for its unbridled fury.

Thursday passes into Friday. It is now 0230 of the 12th, our sky is moonless and starless, and a few miles ahead of the GLENNON. On the U.S. Army Transport J. W. McANDREW, Master-at-Arms William J. Lemmermann and a shipmate are swinging a lifeboat inboard into its skids. Lemmermann reaches out over the side for a line just as the McANDREW turns into a new course, takes heavy seas abeam, and rolls violently, pitching Lemmermann over the side and down into the North Atlantic. How would the end come to this seaman? Will it be quick from shock and a weight too great to be kept afloat? Will it be in the violent thrashing of his ship's propellers or those of other ships following in the column behind? Or will it come more slowly as a chilling numbness battles a stout and courageous heart to something less than a draw? Certainly in whatever form it might take, the end can not be far away.

On the bridge of the GLENNON, Lieutenant (jg) Charles D. Robison is standing the midnight to 0400 Officer of the Deck watch when the quiet darkness is shattered by an excited voice coming over the convoy's radio frequency, telling the trailing destroyer - the GLENNON - that a man has fallen overboard from the J. W. McANDREW. Immediately the Junior officer of the Deck acknowledges receipt of the message as Robison calls by voice tube to the Captain in his sea cabin behind the pilot house, and tells him of the "man overboard" message. Our captain, Lt. Commander Clifford A. Johnson, comes immediately to the bridge. It is perhaps 0140 as the raucous klaxons announce "General Quarters" - the call to battle stations - which will make all hands available to whatever needs there may be. Nothing will bring a ship to complete life and activity as will an unexpected sounding of "General Quarters." If we hope to find a man lost overboard we must use every resource available, be it mechanical, electronic, or human.

One deck below the bridge, men in the Combat Information Center (CIC) have obtained by radar, a distance and direction to the blip on the screen that we know to be the McANDREW, and using their best estimate, have adjusted this information for the distance and course that the McANDREW may have traveled since a man went overboard. Now those in CIC can give the captain on the bridge a distance and course to an estimated spot some miles ahead where we might hopefully find the man in the water.

Soon, perhaps about 0200, while reducing speed, we believe we are at a point in the North Atlantic where Lemmermann went overboard. What chance do we have to find a man in the darkness when only his head will be above water? With seas running 30 feet and more he will be disappearing from the crest of a wave to the trough and then momentarily back to a crest. And why do we believe that he has managed to survive even this long?

I am at Torpedo Control on the port wing of the bridge, and with me are my telephone talker and the port lookout. We do not risk showing a light even in this weather, and so can only listen. How we all strain to hear some
sound foreign to the storm. There! What was that? No. Just the wind.

Down in CIC, Lieutenant John B. Ferriter, our Executive Officer, has mapped a plan. We are about to commence a search by steam-
ing on courses which will take us essentially on ever increasing squares, each side calculated to be fifty yards longer than the previous leg, thereby allowing us to cover an ever increasing area, but never missing a spot by more than fifty yards - a distance across which we feel a cry for help could be heard. The search begins.

Our particular convoy escort instructions cover nearly every possible situation that we might encounter - even the length of time that we can be spared from our screening duties to search for an individual who has been lost overboard. We are allowed thirty minutes. "Oh well," we rationalize, No one could survive even that long under these conditions, so what would be the use of looking longer?"

Around our ever increasing area we steam. At first the course changes come rapidly, but now at our speed we are holding to one course for a longer time. We have covered a rather large area without success. The hands on the clock seem to have flown. A number of course changes later our search is a bit beyond the allowable time and hope has all but disappeared. Perhaps one more course change and then we must return to protect the convoy. We come to course 080 degrees - nearly due east - and the gale comes at us from off the port bow. The atmosphere is one of disappointment and discouragement. What can we hope to hear now with senses numbed by the elements?

But wait! There! I turned to the lookout at my side. "Did you hear that? Alert all lookouts for cries off our port bow." There it is again. Yes. Others have heard it now. "Captain. Cries off our port bow."

"All engines stopped. All engines back two thirds." are the skipper's orders to the engine room telegraph. This will stop our forward movement.

"All engines stopped." And this should leave us dead in the water. Now the captain has reason to risk a brief exposure of a search light.

"Signalman - train your lamp out forward of the beam. Now illuminate." A brilliant beam cuts the North Atlantic darkness, and numberless pairs of eyes scan the crests and troughs where the light has fallen. Now more cries. They seem to come from up ahead of the lighted area.

"Signalman - up forward more. Just a bit more. Hold it there." And there, incredibly there, now in a trough between waves, arms upraised, is our man - alive! Unbelievable success. Could any of us have envisioned such a miracle? Nothing to it now. Swing the ship to port, close the distance, and pick him up. Simple.

But hurry! The wind coming from the port bow which brought Lemmermann's cries to us is setting us away from him as he struggles to swim toward the GLENNON. Again from the Captain. "Starboard engine ahead full, port engine astern full," a maneuver intended to bring the heading of the ship to the left while essentially maintaining its location in the water. The engine room promptly indicates response via the pointers on the engine room telegraph. But now - our heading falls off to the right: 089, 090, 091. Because of the force of wind on the superstructure we are unable even to hold our heading while dead in the water. Again, the gale that brought the cries for help to us is now setting us further away from the man in the water, and keeps us from turning towards him.

With bull horn in hand, Capt. Johnson calls into the wind, hoping he will be heard, "I've got to back down and come in upwind of you. We will be back." Did he hear? What must he think when he sees help, now so near, vanish into the darkness? Will we really be able to find him again? "Turn off the lamp, signalman. It's of no use now."

The dead reckoning required for us to regain contact with Lemmermann will require all the innate and acquired skills of the skipper, coupled with the feel he has of his ship's characteristics.

"All engines back two thirds." And so we commence our maneuver to back down far enough so that upon resuming forward movement, sufficient steerage will be gained to effect a course change that will take us to the windward side of our man; yet still being careful not to back down so far that our chances of finding him again are lost. Shortly the order comes: "All engines stopped." And then: "All engines ahead two thirds." Followed by: "Helmsman, come left to course 070." Nearly all available hands now line the starboard rails. Some, however, must remain
on the port side in the event that our maneuver has failed to take us to the windward side of Lemmermann.

Will we be able to find him again? Perhaps his courage left him as we disappeared into the night. Maybe he had courage to spare, but his strength has come to an end. Surely we have gone far enough now. We must not go past him. Have we swung too much? Or not enough? There now. What was that. Too weak to be a cry. Again our imaginations are ruling our senses. No. It is a cry but we've gone past him.

Quickly, "All engines back full." And again the ship vibrates as our crews reverse direction. "Signalman. Off the starboard quarter. Illuminate! Now up. Just abaft the beam. Up a little more. There!"

And indeed, we have found him again. Arm held not quite so high but enough for us to feel that all is well. How amazing to have been able to locate this man not once but twice. But let's get him aboard.

Winds and seas and combinations of these can test the seamanship of the most experienced men, but the jockeying forward and astern as conditions require to keep Lemmermann on our starboard beam proves to be an anticlimax. Gradually the now helpful wind coming in on our port bow sets us down onto the survivor. Our deck gang removes a section of the rail on the main deck and puts a ladder over the side. Over too go lines and helping hands, as Lemmermann slowly paddles aft along the ship's hull to the ladder, and holding onto the ladder side rails, puts a foot on the bottom step, and starts up.

But that is all. Fresh strong hands have him now, and lift him quickly onto the main deck—aboard and safe! The group makes its way forward into the shelter of the galley passageway and then Lemmermann heads for the sick bay and some warm, dry clothes.

Captain Johnson called CIC for a course to rejoin the convoy; we secured from General Quarters; Charlie Robison returned as Officer of the Deck; and the bakers were again busy in the galley.

Six days after we picked up Lemmermann we reached New Jersey where he left the GLENNON.

**EPILOGUE**

Commander Clifford A. Johnson, USN, received a commendation from the Commander-In-Chief, US Atlantic Fleet for his "display of judgment, persistence, prompt action, and superior seamanship which has resulted in the saving of life at sea."

William J. Lemmerman died recently. He is survived by his widow, a son, and a daughter.

Gustavus R. Ide, Jr.
14 Isaac Miller Road
Westboro, MA 01581
Lemmermann Overboard,
Five Minutes From Death

William J. Lemmermann fell overboard in mid-ocean on a night when the heavy seas were lashing the convoy in which he was traveling. Struggling in the water, he watched the convoy go by in the darkness, and then he was left alone in the pitch black to swim and hope.

Today, Lemmermann, a master at arms in the army transport service, was home to tell how it feels to swim in mid-ocean with little to look forward to but the dawn. Lemmermann is a former treasurer of the Rockville Centre Chamber of Commerce and manager of the Capital Finance office in that village. He lives on Johnson place, Wantagh.

"It was about 1 o'clock in the morning, and heavy seas had pulled a lifeboat loose from its moorings," he related. "I went up to work on it and lost my footing and went over the side."

Fights Giant Waves

Fully dressed and with no lifebelt on, Lemmermann fought the giant waves as his ship vanished into the gloom of the night. One by one, the other ships in the convoy passed by in the darkness, and presently there was quiet except for the noise of the ocean itself.

"I just kept swimming around by my lonesome," said Lemmermann. "I'd swim around and rest a little, swim a little, look a lot and yell more. I took off my jacket and then I let my shoes go. I was getting set to let my pants go, too."

"You think of everything at a time like that. You wait for daylight mostly, to see if they had thrown anything over, like a preserver or a life raft."

"You float up and down on the waves. When you get on top, you look around you quick and you don't see anything but blackness. There was no moon, no stars."

Spoils A Destroyer

Lemmermann never gave up hope, he said. He was too busy keeping afloat. He was "waiting," he declared, for dawn, several hours away.

Then, after an hour and a half, he saw a destroyer through the gloom. "Apparently they had designated one to go after me," he said. "But the ship circled around and around for some time before they heard me yelling."

It took another hour for the men aboard the destroyer to get Lemmermann aboard. It was then he learned that the ship was to have searched only an hour, and that the commanding officer had set a deadline of another five minutes, after which the search was to have been abandoned.

"The men were more surprised to see me than I was to see them," Lemmermann said. "And they treated me royally. They have a tough job to do and they're really in this thing, doing great work. They deserve all the credit you can give them."

Early this year, when Lemmermann first joined the service, he was cited for diving into the frigid waters off Staten Island to rescue a ship's worker who had fallen overboard between two ships. Although Lemmermann brought him out of the water, the man succumbed to exposure. Lemmermann himself suffered from the effects of the winter submersion.

* Courtesy of Gustavus R. Ide, Jr.
U. S. A. T. "J. W. McANDREW"
Office of the Master

November 15, 1943

To: The Commanding Officer
U.S.S. Gleason

Subject: Rescue of William J. Lemnemann, Master at Arms of the
U.S.A.T. J.W. McAndrew.

Please accept my sincere thanks and congratulations for
the very fine work of rescuing my Master at Arms, William J.
Lemnemann. As a seaman I fully realize the difficulty involved,
because of darkness and the very high seas which were running at
the time. In view of the unfavorable conditions, I consider the
rescue which you and your men carried out so successfully an excep-
tionally fine piece of seamanship.

The men of the destroyer force are doing a great work in
assisting these ships to get troops across safely and deserve a
lot of credit. The men on these ships much prefer our American
escorts to those of any other Nation. It is not just because we
are Americans too, we are firmly convinced that they are "tops".

I and all my crew feel greatly indebted and appreciative
to you and your crew.

With warmest feelings for continued success, I am,

Sincerely yours,

Ivan R. Williams
Master U.S.A.T. J.W. McAndrew

(Courtesy of Gustavus R. Ide, Jr.)
From: Commander in Chief, United States Atlantic Fleet.
To: Commander Clifford A. Johnson, U.S. Navy.

Subject: Commendation.

1. The Commander in Chief, United States Atlantic Fleet, notes with pleasure, your outstanding performance of duty as Commanding Officer, U.S.S. GLENNON, when early in the morning of 12 November 1943, you rescued a man lost overboard from a ship in the convoy which you were screening.

2. When informed at about 0130, 12 November 1943, that the U.S.A.T. J. W. McAndrew had lost a man overboard, you immediately closed from your position several thousand yards distant from the point of the accident. Despite the dark night and the rough sea, you succeeded in locating and rescuing the swimming man.

3. The Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet, commends you for your display of judgment, persistence, prompt action, and superior seamanship which has again resulted in the saving of life at sea.

R. E. INGERSOLL

Note: Copy of original commendation letter courtesy of Gustavus R. Ide, Jr. Retyped by E. A. Wilde, Jr. in October, 1998, using the original's letterhead.
"Operation Neptune" was the code-name for the amphibious landing phase of "Operation Overlord," the invasion of Europe. On June 6, 1944, an armada of 2,727 Allied ships and small craft crossed the English Channel to land troops on the coast of Normandy, France, about 80 miles south of the English Channel port of Portsmouth. The Glennon provided gunfire support to the U.S. troops at "Utah Beach," at the western end of the Beachhead, and screened the heavy ships against expected attacks by German motor torpedo boats ("E-boats").

(Map from S. E. Morison's history, Vol. XI)
Soldiers, Sailors and Airmen of the Allied Expeditionary Force!

You are about to embark upon the Great Crusade, toward which we have striven these many months. The eyes of the world are upon you. The hopes and prayers of liberty-loving people everywhere march with you. In company with our brave Allies and brothers-in-arms on other Fronts, you will bring about the destruction of the German war machine, the elimination of Nazi tyranny over the oppressed peoples of Europe, and security for ourselves in a free world.

Your task will not be an easy one. Your enemy is well trained, well equipped and battle-hardened. He will fight savagely.

But this is the year 1944! Much has happened since the Nazi triumphs of 1940-41. The United Nations have inflicted upon the Germans great defeats, in open battle, man-to-man. Our air offensive has seriously reduced their strength in the air and their capacity to wage war on the ground. Our Home Fronts have given us an overwhelming superiority in weapons and munitions of war, and placed at our disposal great reserves of trained fighting men. The tide has turned! The free men of the world are marching together to Victory!

I have full confidence in your courage, devotion to duty and skill in battle. We will accept nothing less than full Victory!

Good Luck! And let us all beseech the blessing of Almighty God upon this great and noble undertaking.

Dwight D. Eisenhower

This eve-of-battle message to Allied forces was read over all PA systems once ships cleared port. Retyped from a replica of the original message, held by the Imperial War Museum, included in D-Day, by Richard Collier (New York: Abbeville Publishing Group, 1992).

E. A. Wilde, Jr.
April, 1999
German motor torpedo boats, called "E-boats" by the Allies, threatened the invasion Fleet, so destroyers at Normandy were often assigned to a screening station around the heavy ships. The vessel shown is an earlier model, but in 1944 these E-boats were powered by three 20-cylinder diesel engines rated at 2,500 hp each, giving them a maximum speed of 43.5 knots. They were 115 ft. long and displaced 113 tons. These vessels carried four torpedoes; two in their tubes and two more amidships which could be reloaded in 45 seconds. Six sea mines could be carried in place of the reloads. They were manned by 26-30 officers and men.

(Naval Historical Foundation Collection.)
REMARKS

06-04 - Steaming as an escort and screening unit of Allied Expeditionary Force, Allied Naval Expeditionary Force, ASSAULT FORCE E, USAT BATAAN, Flagship in accordance with Operation Order No. 5-L, Serial 00052, bound for initial assault area of the Seine-France, leading to invasion of Western Europe. Boilers #1, #2, #3 in use for steaming purposes. On base course 210°(T), 223°(P), speed 12 knots, steaming various courses at various speeds to support with heavy sweep channel to transport area of Western Task Force. Course 247°(P) east in U.S. Knots. Other ships present include USS NEVA, Ration, USS TUSCALOOSA, USS ENTERPRISE, USS BLACK PRINCE, destroyer squadron 11. All hands at general quarters. 0031, Changed speed to 11 knots. 0031, Changed course to 210°(T), 223°(P). 0034, Changed speed to 10 knots. 0042, Sighted small craft bearing 180°(T), distance 1 mile. Challenged and received correct identification signal. 0054, Formation of 21 American aircraft (type C-47) passed overhead on course 080°. 0110, Received correct identification signal. 0114, Marking center of entrance lane to transport anchorage area of Force E, abreast of starboard, distance 200 yards. 0125, Changed course to 210°(T), 161°(P) to proceed into transport area. 0201, Changed speed to 6 knots. 0205, USS BATAAN anchored. 0230, Commenced anti-aircraft and anti-boat screen at transport area along northeastern side of area. 0245, Large formation of C-47's passed overhead on course 080°(T). 0330, Bombing of beach area commenced. Numerous fires started by allied bombers.

W.R. MOORE
LT. (JG), USNR

06-05 - 0605, Smoke from fires started on beach visibility to drop to 2000 yards. 0615, Smoke cleared, visibility 20,000 yards. 0639, Battleships, cruisers and destroyers in fire support areas one, two, three and four. 0650, Shore, first wave of troops landed on beach. All firing by naval guns at pre-designated targets ceased. USS HOBSON in fire support station #3, hit by shore batteries. 0715, Secured from general quarters; set condition II NS; USS CONWAY prammably sunk.

R.L. McConaghy
LT., USNR

06-08 - 0800 position - Lat. 49°34.0' N., Long. 00°56.0' W. O805, Mustered crew on station without. None. 0815, Made daily inspection of magazines and S.F. samples. Conditions normal. 0825, Let fires die under #2 boiler. 0915, U.S.S. BUTLER relieved USS HOBSON in fire support position #1. USS HOBSON replaced USS CONWAY which had sunk in 6 fathoms of water in fire support position #3. 0926, Pursuant to General orders O800-120 from Commander Task Force 120, left screening station at transport area and proceeded to relieve USS SHERIDAN in fire support position #2. Went to general quarters. 0923, Steering various courses and speeds to gain fire support position #2, 1006. Passed 'Isles Saint-Marcouf' abreast of starboard, distance 2 miles. 1030, Relieved USS SHERIDAN in fire support position #2.

R.L. McConaghy
LT. (JG), USNR

12-16 - 1200 position - Lat. 49°27.0' N., Long. 00°55.0' W. 1227, Received target designation from shore fire control party. 1330, Fired on salvo at target of opportunity. Caused firing, expanded four rounds 5"/38 ammunition. No casualties. No results observed. 1354, Secured from general quarters; set condition II NS. 1400, Went to general quarters for shore bombardment. 1404, Commenced firing at target of opportunity. 1406, Caused firing, expanded 8 rounds of 5"/38 ammunition. No casualties. No results observed. 1411, Secured from general quarters; set condition II NS.

R.L. McConaghy
LT. (JG), USNR

16-20 - 1610, Main circulator pump in #2 engineroom in out of commission. 1620, Secured port engine with jacking gear. 1630, Lifting target hit by shore batteries and slowly sinking about 2000 yards bearing 122°(T).

R.L. McConaghy
LT., USNR

20-24 - Proceeding to northwest corner of area Prairie in accordance with verbal orders of Commander Bombardment Group 2207; received orders to proceed inshore for shore bombardment. 2022, General quarters to proceed back to bombardment station. 2130, Target designated was beyond range of our batteries. Secured from general quarters; set condition II NS. 2137, Proceeding to report to Commander Bombardment Group 2210, commenced screen for Force UT. Proceeding in accordance with CNO 125-8 TBS orders.

W.R. Moore
LT. (JG), USNR

APPROVED:

J.R. Johnson, Commander, U.S.N.

EXAMINED:

W.R. Moore, Lt. (Jg), USNR

J.R. Johnson, Commander, U.S.N.

J.W. Finley, Lt. (Jg), U.S.N.
The log of 7-9 June was lost in the sinking of the ship. Entries and times are, therefore, a reconstruction obtained through the questioning of officers of the deck, pertinent despatches, TBS and radio telephone CRP transmissions.

00-04 - On station as unit of anti-submarine and anti-E-boat inner screens for bombardment group in accordance with directives of GTO 125.8 dispatch 0624/24, Rollers 1 and 4 in use for steaming purposes. Steaming at 3/4 speed in NW corner of Prairie, Condition II set throughout the ship, modified by material condition report. North screen present: GTO 125.8 in U.S.S. TUSCARORA; GTFL25 in U.S.S. RAYFIELD; CSS 17 in U.S.S. JEFFERS; CSS 15 in U.S.S. FRANKFORD and various other units of the U.S. and Allied Navies of Force UTAH/0350. German aircraft identified as probably HE111 dropped 500 pound bomb 500 yards to port. No damage sustained. 0352. All hands to general quarters.

04-08 - On station as before screening heavy ships of bombardment group. All hands at general quarters. 0515. Proceeded into station #5, close fire support area in accordance with GTO 125.8 dispatch 0705/15, quoting GTFL25 dispatch 0705/15. 0550. On station. 0615. Secured from general quarters, set condition III.

08-12 - Steaming to buoy "OJ" in position #5 close fire support area. 0830. Master of crew on stations. No absences. Made daily inspection of magazines and S.P. samples. Conditions normal. 0900. All hands to general quarters to fire on targets designated by shore fire control parties (34). 0900-1200. Firing on targets #5 (4 gun 155mm batteries), target #8 (2 gun 155mm batteries), target #14 (2 gun 155mm batteries) and target #20 (artillery headquarters). Target #6 was fired on, on two separate occasions. SPCP 34 reported targets demolished. Had excellent communications with SPCP throughout morning. Approximately 200 rounds expended during this firing.

12-16 - At general quarters, as before. In position #5, standing by to fire on call from SPCP Jig Roger Mike, 1300. Secured from general quarters on being told by SPCP that no further targets were available at this time. 1500. All hands to general quarters to fire on designated targets on shore. 1500-1600. Firing on targets #6 and #7 and some targets of opportunity, including truck columns and a large radar antenna. Results unobserved.

16-20 - Ship at general quarters as before, firing on designated targets by SPCP 33. 1600-1800. Firing on target #3, spotted by SPCP 33. Target is a 155mm gun battery plus troop concentrations. On completion of firing SPCP 33 transmitted "results excellent, well done". 1800-1900. Firing on target coordinates 357 027 which is an enemy counter attack of considerable force. Two hundred rounds of 5"/38 expended. Each save spotted by SPCP 33 due to proximity of own troops. Upon completion of assignment, received from SPCP 34, "Results excellent, attack repulsed". Unconfirmed later reports from Army personnel in area indicates that upwards of two divisions of enemy troops were repulsed during this firing. 1900. Set condition III, Secured from general quarters.

20-24 - On station in close fire support area, position #5 as before. 2210. Proceeded to station in NW corner area PRAIRIE, between outer screen and heavy ships in accordance with directives of GTFL25 dispatch 0722/10 June, Steaming on courses 350°-170° to maintain station.
00-04 - Steaming as inner screen between outer screen and heavy ships in accordance with OP 125 dispatch 07/28/June. Boilers 1 & 4 in use. Ships present: CTG 125.8 in USS TUCALOOSA; CTF 125 in USS BAYFIELD; SBS 7 in USS JEFFERS and SBS 8 in USS FRANKFORD, and various units of U.S. Navy of assault force UTAH. 0220, Explosion seen in water, port bow, distant 100 yards. Cause of explosion unknown. All hands to general quarters. 0250, Secured from general quarters, set condition II MS.

04-08 - Steaming as before, inner screen station, NW corner area FRANK. 0450, All hands to general quarters for E-boat alert. 0510, Secured from general quarters, set condition III. E-boat alert determined to be false. 0530, Proceeded in to take station in close fire support area, position #5 in vicinity of buoy "CD", in accordance with directives of 06/25. 0715, On station.

08-12 - Steaming as before to buoy "CD" at station #5, close fire support area channel. 0830, Heavy shock felt coming from after part of ship. All hands to general quarters. Personnel floating around amongst debris and oil. Gig lowered to pick up personnel in water and return them to ship. Damage control officer, in forward engine room, reported stern exploded and very nearly severed from the ship between guns 3 & 4. All after compartments flooded, main engine room inoperative, after engineroom flooding through stern tubes. Explosion determined to be caused by a mine. Wounded personnel evacuated to battle dressing stations in wardroom and after mess hall. Ship assumed a list of 5° to starboard and commenced to settle by stern, to eventually 8° of freeboard. 0835, U.S.S. STAFF (AM 111) and U.S.S. THREAT (AM 124) came alongside to port and starboard bow (bow to bow) to assist. 0835, U.S.S. THREAT cast off, towline passed from U.S.S. STAFF. U.S.S. THREAT ordered to sweep this vessel under tow by U.S.S. STAFF. U.S.S. RICH (ES) approached ship but on being told no assistance required by us, left the area. 0858, (approx) Enemy gun fire straddled ship astern with three salvos of large calibre guns. No damage sustained. Cruiser fire took targets 1 & 2 under fire. 0940, U.S.S. RICH, about 500 yards astern, exploded a mine under her stern, about 50 feet of her stern floating clear. 0941, Second explosion in vicinity of bridge of U.S.S. RICH. Survivors from sinking RICH transferred to small craft in vicinity. 0945, Under tow by U.S.S. STAFF. 0900, Abandoned attempts to tow ship, broken portion resting on bottom. Sounding at taken and determined to be 31 feet. 0915, U.S.S. STAFF came alongside. 0920, The following named officers and men transferred to the U.S.S. STAFF, PFP to places indicated, in accordance with verbal orders of the commanding officer, Lieut. (jg) G. R. IDE, Jr., USNR, in charge:

ACKER, Florian L., SMCg, 500-03-07, USNR
ADAMS, John F., UTc, 622-27-03, USNR
ADAMS, Owen L., BM3c, 611-11-10, USNR
ALBERTSON, Charles F., S1c, 612-79-65, USNR
ADAMS, Thomas C., GNC, 614-10-51, USNR
BAILEY, Wallace, FM2c, 620-74-84, USNR
BAILDEN, Charles W., FMc, 631-24-74, USNR
BAGGA, Lester, S1c, 700-03-29, USNR
BIOCONITCHE, Nicholas J., W2c, 652-65-68, USNR
BENNET, Julius, SF2c, 629-49-07, USNR
BERTRAND, Andrew L., S1c, 620-90-49, USNR
BESSAZ, Douglas F., EN2c, 606-41-99, USNR
BLENNERHAUS, John L., S2c, 622-79-67, USNR
BORDENHOFF, Alexander, FM2c, 652-47-27, USNR
BROOKE, Robert F., Cox, 552-21-22, USNR - Portland, England
BUCHANAN, Harry, S2c, 621-79-43, USNR
BURKHARD, Wallace B., FM2c, 661-44-90, USNR
BUCKETT, John A., FC3c, 652-17-27, USNR
BURKHAUS, Ernest Jr., S1c, 612-79-31, USNR

Examined: L. A. JOHNSON, Commander, USN
Commanding Officer.

To be forwarded directly to the Bureau of Naval Personnel at the end of each month.
REPORT OF ACTION AND LOSS OF USS GLENNON IN OPERATION "NEPTUNE" - SUBMITTAL OF:

SCREENING BOMBARDMENT GROUP IN BAIE DE LA SEINE DURING INVASION OF NORMANDY - STRUCK MINE 8 JUNE AND SANK ON 10 JUNE 1944.
PERIOD 6-10 JUNE 1944 WITH TASK GROUP 125.6.
23 June 1944.

From: The Commanding Officer.


Enclosure: (A) Twenty copies of subject report.

1. Enclosure (A) is submitted herewith in its entirety for action, distribution, and forwarding. No advance copies have been forwarded, mailed or distributed by this command. There are twenty (20) copies of this report included herein with routing designated for only fifteen (15), leaving four (4) extra copies available for additional distribution.

-from,_

23 June 1944.

From: The Commanding Officer.
To: The Secretary of the Navy.
Via: (1) Commander Destroyer Squadron 17 (CTG 125.6).
(2) Commander Shore Bombardment Group "UTAH" (CTG 125.8).
(3) Commander Force "UTAH" (CTF 125).
(4) Naval Commander Western Naval Task Force (CTF 122).
(5) Commander Twelfth Fleet (COMNAVFEU).
(6) Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet.

Subject: Combined Action and Loss of USS GLENNON in Operation "Neptune" - report on. Acoustic Wave

Reference: (a) U.S. Navy Regulations, Art 712.
(b) U.S. Navy Regulations, Art. 841(3).
(c) USS GLENNON despatch 132213B.
(d) USS GLENNON Secret Mailgram Serial (0001) of 13 June 1944.

Enclosures: (A) Copy of reference (d).
(B) Outboard profile, USS GLENNON, showing shell hits and fragmentation. (One copy only with original)

- 1 -
SECRET

Subject: Combined Action and Loss of USS GLENNON in Operation "Neptune" - report on

I. INTRODUCTION.

1. It is not deemed practicable to separate the action report and loss of ship report because both reports are so closely related. All times, unless otherwise specified, are Baker Zone Time. Due to loss of the current Quartermaster's Notebook, the Ship's Log, and the TBS logs, times have been established only as closely as can be reconstructed by memory and other means at the disposal of the ship's officers and enlisted personnel.

2. The USS GLENNON, in company with Destroyer Squadron 17, plus the USS PLUNKETT, arrived in Belfast, N.I., and reported to Commander 12TH Fleet, for duty in Operation "Neptune", 14 May 1944. The period 29 February - 18 March 1944 had been spent in intensive training with emphasis on shore bombardment and anti-aircraft at Casco Bay, Maine. The commanding officer felt the ship was in all respects ready for any DD assignment that the ship might be given.

3. After fueling, on 15 May 1944, Destroyer Squadron 17, less USS PLUNKETT, got underway from Belfast, N.I. and proceeded to Plymouth, England for conferences and training with shore fire control parties, arriving there 16 May 1944. Sealed operation orders, plans, and correspondence in considerable volume were received shortly after arrival. Stowage was a problem, but was solved by placing part of it in a communication safe cleared for that purpose with the remainder in the commanding officer's stateroom, which was kept locked with an armed sentry at the door. The ship was provisioned to capacity. On 22 May, conference was held between key ship's officers and shore fire control officers. An assistant gunnery officer was sent with the shore fire control party for observation. On 23 May 1944, DesDiv 33 got underway and proceeded to Slapton Sand Area, where ships fired individually at shore targets with SFCP observation. Two separate phases were fired, expending a total of 40 rounds of 5"/38 caliber HE ammunition. After firing, the ships returned to Plymouth where a conference between SFCP, our shore observer, and key ship's officers cleared up minor points to be corrected. The practice was considered successful; all gunnery and communication equipment functioned very well.

4. On 24 May, Commander Destroyer Squadron 17 shifted the pennant to USS GLENNON due to damage to USS NEILSON. The period May 24 - 25 was spent in escorting the USS AUGUSTA (CTF 122) with
Subject: Combined Action and Loss of USS GLENNON in Operation "Neptune": report on.

USS MURPHY and USS JEFFERS as additional escorts, to Portland, England and return. A harbor review by His Majesty, King George VI of England was held in Portland. Upon return to Plymouth on 25 May, ammunition was replenished and GM mail for Commands in Belfast area was taken aboard. Orders were received to open all sealed secret orders. 26 May underway singly, enroute to Belfast, N.I., arriving 27 May. On arrival, Commander Destroyer Squadron 17 shifted his pennant to the USS JEFFERS.

On 26 May, the commanding officer and key officers were briefed for Operation "Neptune" by CTG 125.8.

On 31 May, proceeded in company with DesDiv 33, less USS NELSON, plus USS PLUNDER, to Clyde Exercise Area for anti-"E" boat exercises. These proved very helpful and successful, both from a gunnery and a communication standpoint. Both day and night exercises were held, using British NML's as targets. 1 June, upon completion, ship's returned to Belfast Lough and fueled to capacity.

The USS GLENNON had been sealed on 31 May and all except official outside contact by officers stopped. The commanding officer from this time went over the operation plans with key officers and made the outstanding corrections. All operation orders had been thoroughly studied by the commanding officer. Each key officer had ample time to become thoroughly acquainted with his part in the plans. All officers and men were briefed prior to arrival in the battle area. There was considerable enthusiasm shown by both officers and crew. Morale was excellent. The commanding officer had the fullest confidence in the ultimate success of the operation as a whole and of the GLENNON's part in it. The ship and about 40% of its officers and men had been through the Sicilian Campaign in the Gela sector and later in the Palermo area. It was expected that that previous experience would prove valuable.

II. THE APPROACH.

For the early approach, the GLENNON was an escort unit for Belfast Shore Bombardment Section, Task Group A. Other escort units were USS JEFFERS (CDS 17) (Captain MURDAGH, Screen Commander), GHERARDI, PLUNDER, BLESSMAN and AMESBURY. Task Group A included the USS TEXAS (CTG A, Rear Admiral BRYANT), ARKANSAS, NEVADA, HMS MONTGALM, GEORGE LEGGERS. In the late afternoon of
23 June 1944.

Subject: Combined Action and Loss of USS GLENNON in Operation "Neptune" - report on._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._.
received, by this time they were ahead but 900 yards with no way on. During the period station had been lost, the ENTERPRISE being picked up 1500 yards on port quarter, turning to port. A hard left turn was made, speed increased to 25 knots, to regain station. At that moment the ENTERPRISE turned hard right, apparently having made a zig to regain the channel. Collision was imminent. All engines were backed emergency full and every effort was made, with success, to keep clear of approaching heavy ships without interfering with their course. Collision was avoided. As the transport area was only 2500 yards ahead, the GLENNON then proceeded to and commenced patrol in her screening station to the north and west of the transport area, arriving 0150. The screen commander had been kept informed of situation ahead after dark by this vessel sending non-receipt blinder tube messages astern. It is noted here before passing that the sweepers had done a splendid job of laying their buoys in channel #1 and in the transport area under very difficult tidal current conditions.

III. SCREENING TASK FORCE 125 (UTAH).

1. In position north and west of transport area, a patrol was maintained, making every effort to separate friendly approaching convoys from possible enemy units. The Mountain area was particularly closely watched. During the period from H-4 hours, 40 minutes until orders were received to proceed to Fire Support Position #2 at H plus 3 hours, no enemy naval units were contacted by sight, radar, or sound, and no attacks were noted on Allied vessels in transport area from any source. During the period all operations in UTAH area appeared to be proceeding in accordance with CTF 125 OpOrder 3-44, this included the arrival of convoys, passage of paratroop air-transports overhead on way out, bombardment of beach installations by aircraft, and later by bombardment ships and LCHS. Some flak opposition to airborne troops was noted, but this did not appear nearly as heavy as had been noted at Gela. A TBS message shortly after H-hour relayed the word that the troops had landed and breached the sea wall in UTAH area. Word was received that the USS COHRY had been sunk, presumably by gunfire, about 4-hour in Close Fire Support Position #3.

2. At 0720, secured from general quarters for crew to get breakfast, clean up, and short rest, but kept modified material condition AFFIRM. 0825 secured #3 and #4 boilers to conserve fuel.
23 June 1944.

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IV. CLOSE FIRE SUPPORT.

1. At 0922, in accordance with CTF 125 despatch 060915B relaying instructions from NO. Spot, proceeded down boatline to relieve USS SHERBICK in close fire support position #2. Went to general quarters.

2. At 1030, relieved USS SHERBICK, reported to CTF 125.8 (Shore Bombardment Group Utah) The SHERBICK had not contacted SFCP 30, assigned her, for about one hour. In order that communication might be assured, a test was made with the SHERBICK prior to her leaving the area. Tests were also conducted from time to time with CTF 125.8. No enemy activity was evidenced. Shore bombardment ships were firing at previously designated or SFCP designated targets. The situation of our troops ashore was not clear. A close lookout was kept for targets of opportunity. About 1315, heavy shelling was noted on the UTAH beaches, apparently coming from the Quienville section, which could be observed from ships offshore there. This heavy bombardment continued for sometime, closing beaches. Contacted SFCP at 1327, fired one 4 gun salvo at target designated and was given cease firing, no results observed. About 1400, returned fire of battery observed by gun flash which fired two 2 gun salvos, the nearest about 1000 yards from the ship. After firing two 4 gun salvos, no more splashes or flashes were observed and fire was ceased. No observation of results could be obtained. The situation ashore still not being known, the commanding officer was most hesitant in firing at any targets which could not definitely be recognized as hostile. At 1620, an LCT was sunk 2000 yards to seaward, either by mine or gunfire, survivors being picked up by a number of small craft in area. If that was a battery in our sector, it could not be located. At 2000, received instruction to close USS TUSCALOOSA (CTG 125.8). At 2037, contacted SFCP 30, received target designation beyond range of our guns and transferred it to USS NEVADA. After closing TUSCALOOSA, received orders (CTG 125.8 06224H) to screen heavy bombardment group during night with other close fire support DD's. A patrol to the west of the area, inside the Area Screen, was assigned by CTF 34 for the night.

3. A close radar watch was kept on Mountain area during the night for possible "E" boat attacks. A policy was adopted of remaining at general quarters during daylight for shore bombardment with a modified condition II at night to repel surface craft. Material condition AFIRM was kept set except for supplying essential ventilation, fresh and flushing water at specified times. At 0250, an enemy air attack was delivered over UTAH, one bomb landing about 500 yards on port bow. No planes could be positively identified due to low cloud cover and none were fired on. No hits on Allied ships were observed. Allied fighters soon chased enemy out of area, the
Subject: Combined Action and Loss of USS GLENNON in Operation Neptune—Report on

attack lasting not over one-half hour. No other enemy activity observed.

4. In accordance with CTF 125 070032B, arrived in close fire support position #5 off Quienneville at sunrise, 7 June. Contact was immediately made with SFCP 34 and maintained throughout the day, communications were very good. Due to shoal water in the immediate area, just enough was kept to remain in the swept channel 200 - 500 yards south of buoy QD. When tidal currents would cause the ship to head so as to unmask the battery for fire support, the ship was anchored with chain at short stay. An anchor detail remained on the forecastle for quick heaving in.

5. Shore bombardment on the 7th of June was much more satisfying than the previous day, as several targets were designated by SFCP on which excellent results were obtained. As our own troops were advancing toward Quienneville from the eastward, we were in a good position to support them and were most anxious to do so.

6. About 0900, SFCP 34 commenced designating targets, firing on target #5 (4 gun, 155mm battery), target #9 (4 gun 105mm battery), target #14 (2 gun 155mm battery), and target #20 (artillery headquarters). Target #9 was brought under fire at two separate times. SFCP 34 claimed all targets were demolished, approximately 200 rounds of 4.5 Common expended. About 1600, splashes were noted falling close to the USS BUTLER (CDD34), the source could not be found. The BUTLER backed down as splashes approached, finally turning away when she was straddled. No hits were observed. Having almost exhausted her ammunition, the BUTLER was ordered relieved by the JEFFERS (CDS 17). During the period the BUTLER left and the JEFFERS came up, the GLENNON was directed to shift to their assigned SFCP 33. SFCP 34 had nothing for us at the moment and the shift was made to SFCP 33 with an immediate assignment to target #3 (6 gun, 155mm battery) at which 100 rounds were expended. Then the JEFFERS stood in and relieved us. While this firing was going on, three salvo splashes were seen to land about 500-1000 yards short of the GLENNON, still this battery could not be seen and as the splashes ceased without coming closer, no evasive action was taken. It is believed that the guns firing ceased due to fact GLENNON was not within maximum range.

7. Upon being relieved by the JEFFERS when that unit fired its first salvo at target #3, communications were shifted to SFCP 34. The JEFFERS was fired on by the same battery that had fired on the BUTLER and GLENNON. After one hit retired out of range.

About 1800, a target designation (Grid Coordinates 357027) was received. The enemy was counter attacking in force (estimated at two divisions) and fire would have to be closely controlled to avoid hitting own troops. About 200 rounds were expended in this assignment.

The fire was very enthusiastically reported by the SFCP with a final word that the results had been excellent and the enemy was falling back in quick retreat.

8. No further targets were designated on that day by SFCP, and at 2300 received word from CTG 125.8 to take screening station on heavy ships. This ship took up patrol inside bombardment group to prevent attack by "E" boats which might penetrate picket line and approach from direction of the beach. No enemy surface action was noted during the night. About 0230 enemy aircraft were again over the area, but no planes were clearly identified as hostile and no shots were fired. One bomb landed about 50 yards on the port bow, throwing fragments on board but causing no damage.

9. At sunrise, 8 June, returned to close fire support #5, by order CTG 125.8 and contacted SFCP #34. The SFCP had no targets and the ship was told to wait.

IV. MINE AND MINI SHELLFIRE, SUBSEQUENT ATTEMPT AT SALVAGE.

1. At 0303, 8 June 1944, with degaussing-coils set in position latitude 50° 32' N, longitude 11° 12' W, the ship was again mined by two mines, one just astern and one ahead. The mines were active, and the ship was damaged. The ship was able to continue on course, but the damage was severe. The ship was unable to make any appreciable speed. The damage was assessed to be about 500 yards south of "CD" buoy, and the effect of the explosion was felt, apparently coming from the vicinity of the stern.

2. The effect was violent throughout the ship. All power was lost due to the tripping of circuit breakers, but regained in about three minutes. The force of the explosion had been of such magnitude as to throw two men, who were standing on the fantail, 40 feet in the air, landing them in the water. One of these men was later recovered with both legs broken and possible internal injuries. A 600 pound depth charge was torn from the stern racks and thrown 50 feet, landing on the torpedo platform abreast #3, 5" gun mount. A 150 pound cement dan buoy anchor was thrown 125 feet from the fantail to the port 20mm gun nest, torpedo platform. Water rose to a height of 25 feet above equal on the port and starboard quarters.

3. General quarters was sounded. A boat was lowered to pick up 16 men who had been thrown into the water. Repair parties assembled aft for rescue and salvage work. After an immediate report of damage, word was passed over the loudspeaker circuit, "The ship will not sink, all hands remain on board, repair parties proceed with
Combined Action and Loss of USS GLENNON in Operation "Neptune" - Report on: Rescue and Salvage Work. CTG 125.8 was informed of mine damage by visual with a request for assistance. Immediate attempts to raise PT boats on picket lines had been futile. They were called to aid picking up survivors in water, assisting ship's MWB. Use of engines was not attempted because such action would have been useless, causing further damage to plants. An anchor was not dropped because set of current was favorable.

4. About 0330, the STAFF (AM114) and the THREAT (AM24) closed the ship and came alongside port and starboard bow respectively, bow to bow. Other small craft, RML's and PT's, began to close. As all survivors had been picked up by our own MWB and returned aboard to forward battle dressing station, these small boats were told no assistance was required.

5. There was no thought of immediately transferring personnel, the THREAT (AM24) was shoved off to sweep us out and the STAFF (AM114) was passed a tow line to undertake towing the GLENNON to the Transport Area. While this was being undertaken, the USS RICH (DE) approached from eastward, asking by visual if assistance was required. A visual reply was sent immediately, "Negative, clear area cautiously due mines." The RICH circled the stern and headed away at about 5 knots. At this time a 4 gun salvo from an enemy shore battery splashed about 200 yards astern. TBS contact was immediately made with CTG 125.8, requesting covering fire on targets #4 and #14, where fire appeared to be coming from. A second salvo straddled the GLENNON in range but was 150 yards astern. The cruisers opened with covering fire. A third salvo splashed 50 yards astern, again straddling in range; Cruiser fire was then effective and enemy fire ceased.

6. About 0840, almost coincident with the end of enemy shellfire, when apparently in the swept channel headed westward about 1500 yards from the GLENNON, the RICH detonated a mine under her stern. The after 50 feet of the stern broke away, floating about 3 to 5 minutes before sinking. The forward section drifted away. Fifty to sixty seconds after the first detonation another mine exploded under the bow of the RICH. The ship broke across the forecastle just forward of the bridge structure and sank almost immediately. Fortunately there was an AM and many small craft, which were proceeding away from the GLENNON, quite close to the RICH, and survivors, who must have been very badly injured, were picked up almost immediately. No aid was sent because ample assistance was already at the scene. A report of the RICH was made by TBS.
By 0845, the damage control officer submitted a rather complete report of the damage to the GLENNON. The mine had exploded at or near the port propeller shaft. Underwater damage could not be determined accurately but was estimated. The ship was torn from the keel about frame 155 up the port side to the main deck at frame 163. The tear extended across the deck at frame 163, then going down and forward on the starboard side to an undetermined depth. All inside framing, piping, etc., was torn away in the break as far down as could be seen. This rupture had appeared immediately on the port side to about 5 feet inboard of deck edge and then slowly torn away to starboard as the stern settled. The whole stern was down at an angle of approximately 30 degrees, with the top of #4 gun mount about 2 feet out of water. C201L was flooded but could and was being pumped out. The after bulkhead was ached. C202L, C302M, C302M and C301M were flooded and could not immediately be made watertight and pumped out. C301M was whole and dry. See enclosure (B). The after engine room was flooding through the stern tubes but these were packed with oakum and wedges and brought under control with fire and bilge pumps. At the break, an original freeboard of 6" had been increased to 2' by the pumping in the after engine room and C201L. Soundings in other parts of the ship revealed no flooding. Soundings by lead around the stern showed 31' of water. The gyro had withstood the shock and was being cut in. All radio and radar except the SCR 608 (SFCP circuits) were operative. Attempts at repair to SCR 608 were unsuccessful. Guns #1 and #2 were operative except some difficulty was experienced with the hoist in gun #2. Gun #3 was operative, but the foundation showed signs of weakness and a wrinkle portside main deck at frame 124 would definitely throw that gun out of alignment. No damage to the engineering plant, forward of the stern tube bearings was apparent. Forward thrust had occurred at the time of the explosion, breaking the turbine rotor axial clearance indicators. Damage to the turbine rotors and to the reduction gears was suspected. Breakage and minor damage was spread throughout the ship. Two degrees port list was noted. The stern had apparently sat down on the port quarter, as quite a list was noted in the section which had broken off.

By 0900, it had been determined that the STAFF (AM14) could not stir the GLENNON. The broken after section had settled on the bottom with at least the sternboard propeller firmly anchoring the ship. CTG 125.8 was informed and asked for a salvage tug. It was decided to remove the wounded and a total of about 1/2 of the ship's complement. The remainder would stay aboard to proceed with salvage efforts and ran a portion of the gun battery. The STAFF took in her tow line and came alongside. A party of 12 officers and 155 men,
23 June 1944.

Subject: Combined Action and Loss of the USS CLEMMON in Operation "Huntper" - report on -

32 wounded, were transferred to the STAFF in charge of Lieutenant(jg) G.R. IDE, USNR. Ten sacks of registered publications were transferred for safekeeping. The disbursing officer was ordered to go, taking all of his money, records, and accounts. The STAFF showed off about 0930, having been ordered to close the USS BAYFIELD to obtain orders for the disposition of survivors aboard STAFF from CTF 125. This was done and survivors were ordered to IST 509 for return to U.K. On 9 June the wounded were turned over to the Army Medical Unit at Portland, the remaining survivors sent to Viezoga Barracks, Plymouth, to await further orders.

9. The commanding officer was anxious to have the salvage tug arrive in time to commence tow by high tide, about 1130. This was passed to CTF 125.8 by TBS or visual. A tug could be seen out in the shore bombardment area, standing by apparently awaiting sweepers. Salvage operations were continuing with every effort being made to lighten the stern and shift weight to the bow. Oil was pumped forward. Shells and powder from #3 handling room were moved to #1 and #2 handling rooms. Depth charges were jettisoned from the racks, after removing detonators. 40MM ammunition in topside racks, the loading machine, and all loose topside gear was jettisoned. All pumps available were placed in operation pummpin' out C20LL. By 1100 this water level was reduced to 3 feet, being originally been 6 feet.

10. About 1100, the USS KIOWA (AT170) with a junior salvage officer, Lieutenant(jg) PATTERSON, USNR, came alongside the port side. They had been swept in by two sweepers. One acoustic and one magnetic mine had been detonated in their path. The two sweepers were ordered to sweep the immediate area and when the tow was under way to sweep us out.

11. Lieutenant(jg) PATTERSON and the commanding officer of the KIOWA inspected the damaged stern and, after conference with the commanding officer of the CLEMMON, the decision was made to try to tow her off at high tide. The towline was secured and by 1130 towing operations were underway. A straight pull was tried first with all hands on the forecastle of the CLEMMON salving ship. The tug then worked back and forth across the bow. Not the slightest movement was obtained. The tug then turned the ship through 720 degrees, trying to sheer off the broker section. No results were obtained although considerable working was apparent from the rending vibrations from the damaged area. At 1430, all efforts at being towed were ceased, the towline was slipped and the KIOWA anchored off the port bow. Lieutenant(jg) PATTERSON had sent a message to CTF 125 asking that Lieutenant Commander McQUANG, USNR (CTF 122.3.2 - Salvage Officer, Control Force Serving U.T.A.U.) be sent to the scene.
Subject: Combined Action and Loss of USS GLENNON in Operation "Neptune" - report on for conference. CTG 125.8 was called by TBS and asked to aid in obtaining the services of Lieutenant Commander McClung.

12. About 1530, the ATR 3 arrived and anchored off port bow. The salvage officers aboard there plus Lieutenant Patterson were called aboard for conference. Due danger to divers from exploding mines, 24 were detonated in that immediate vicinity that day, Lieutenant Patterson would not commence underwater investigation until CTG 122.3.2 approved. The ATR 3 salvage officers concurred in this. The ATR salvage officer was then asked to return to the Bayfield and try and bring Lieutenant Commander McClung off, which he said he would do. The commanding officer of the USS Glennon and Lieutenant Patterson then went off for further investigation of damage. The first necessary step was to send a diver down to inspect what had to be cut away to free the ship, then send divers down to systematically do it. If pontoons could be made available it would be possible to raise the stern and tow it away with the ship.

3. At 1630, the following message was received from GTF 125, addressed to the KOWA, info GCWT, "Abandon attempt to heave ship off. Lay out Bow anchors in such a way that bow section if ship breaks in two will not drift ashore. Commanding officer USS Glennon see that all secret and confidential papers are removed off destroyer. Both tugs return and transfer survivors to LST 539 near Bayfield 081630B". This dispatch took the commanding officer somewhat aback as it was known that once the engineering plant was secured both the after engine room and C201L would flood. Orders were given to carry out the provisions of the despatch. All secret and confidential registered publications, correspondence, etc., were packed and transferred to the KOWA, which had been brought alongside port bow. Man aboard who had gone in the forward living spaces were told to pack up. The ATR 3 was recalled and brought alongside the starboard bow to carry out the starboard anchor. All personnel records were transferred. All ship's service, wardroom mess, and welfare records and funds were transferred. All machinery except #1 boiler, forward generator, and pumps were secured. Material condition after was set and thoroughly checked. When it came to the order to secure the boiler the commanding officer could not do it. The decision was then made that the executive officer, the damage control officer (engineering officer), and 8 men should remain aboard as security watch and to keep the boiler and pumps in operation at least until the commanding officer could confer with GTF 125. The executive officer was given orders to carry out this plan, but if no word was forthcoming from the commanding officer by 2100 to secure and proceed in the KGB to LST 539 in accordance with directives. He was cautioned of the possibility the enemy might
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attempt to board "E" boats. Also if the enemy shore battery opened fire on the ship, to abandon immediately to the MWS, informing CTF 125.8 if practicable.

14. By 1800, all above work had been accomplished. The port anchor was underfoot and the starboard anchor had been carried out to 50 fathoms. The KIOWA with 6 officers and 83 enlisted survivors, and the AKR 3 shoved off from alongside and proceeded away from scene, being swept out of area by 2 sweeps. Some delay was encountered awaiting sweeps, but the KIOWA arrived alongside the LST 539 about 1930. Lieutenant Commander McCLUNG (CTU 122.3.2) came aboard the KIOWA on arrival to receive a report of the damage to the GLENNON. In conference with the commanding officer GLENNON, and Lieutenant PATTERSON, he was given a complete picture, including the mine menace and enemy shore batteries. The importance of early salvage due probable loss from shellfire was stressed. The commanding officer and Lieutenant Commander McCLUNG then proceeded to the USS BAYFIELD to confer with CTF 125. Lieutenant (jg) ROBINSON was left in charge of the survivor detail aboard the LST 539, which it was learned was awaiting convoy to U.K.

15. On arrival aboard the USS BAYFIELD, Rear Admiral MOON, USN (CTF 125) was informed of the situation aboard the GLENNON, and in the surrounding area. The commanding officer recommended that power should be kept on the ship and a message was drafted and delivered about 2110 to the detail aboard to remain there. Arrangements were made with Captain RICHARDSON, USN (Chief of Staff, CTF 125) to retain a salvage detail of 50 men and 5 officers of the group aboard LST 539. Orders would be issued for them to transfer from the LST 539 to the SS ROBERTSON in the morning. The commanding officer and a staff radar officer would return to the GLENNON that night. The staff radar officer would bring off the secret parts of all radar equipment. By the time these arrangements had been completed and a boat obtained, dusk had set in. Darkness was complete by the time the heavy shore bombardment area had been reached. As it was overcast, there was no moonlight. Due to the restrictions against entering mountain area during darkness, the boat returned to the LST 539 and the BAYFIELD with the request that it pick the commanding officer up at 0530 in the morning. The commanding officer spent the night aboard the LST 539. About 0530/9 June, the boat came alongside, was ordered to the BAYFIELD to pick up the staff radar officer. The commanding officer went aboard and contacted Lieutenant Commander McCLUNG, urging him to start salvage operation as soon as practicable. The boat then proceeded to the USS GLENNON, arriving about 0645. The staff radar officer proceeded to lay out all secret radar and ARQ.
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equipment on the air plot table in GIC for quick disposition in case of enemy shellfire.

16. After the HLD and ATR 3 had shoved off from along-side the night before, the volunteer detail on the GLENNON was furnished with Thompson Sub-machine guns, 45 caliber automatic pistols and split into night engineering and gun watches by the executive officer. Two 20MM guns were manned. These precautions were taken against possibility of an enemy boarding party. At 2100, the plant was secured and preparations completed to leave the ship in accordance with the commanding officer's instructions. The message to remain aboard was then received and the fires were lighted under #1 boiler. At 0130, numerous flares were noted in the direction of COTETITI PENINSULA. No aircraft or surface craft were observed. At 0530, the executive officer noted what looked like two mines drifting by the port bow. CTF 125 and CTG 125,8 were notified of this by visual despatch.

17. About 0830, the executive officer was directed to proceed in the BAYFIELD boat with the staff radar officer. He was to go to the LST 539, take off 5 officers and 50 men in accordance with the arrangements of the previous night, taking then to the SS ROBERTSON (accomodation ship), anchored near the beach. The remaining 33 men and records were to be put in charge of Lieutenant (jg) E.N. BACON, USNR, for return to U.S. He was also to check with Lieutenant Commander McGUING as to when he could be expected at the GLENNON with the salvage party.

18. The commanding officer and Lieutenant J. PEARCE, E-W(G) USNR, (damage control officer) conferred on possible salvage. During the last 14 hours there had been little apparent change in the condition of the break although there had been many rending vibrations felt aft. It was believed that the ship had torn away some more at the break, particularly down the starboard side. The ship's position was unchanged. A plan was developed whereby we would nut the shafts, fitting a plug into the hollow section and driving the shaft out the stern tube with screw jacks, the plug plugging the stern tube. The ship's force could do this with additional acetylene and large wooden plugs. The starboard shaft would be tried first because it was believed that the port shaft was ruptured already and that all that held the ship to the stern was the starboard shaft. Lieutenant PEARCE was sent with GLENNON GARBER in the LWM to the BAYFIELD to pick up the necessary equipment. There were no further developments during the day. It was known that the enemy battery in the Quinville area had not been silenced because it shelled beaches that afternoon.
being quickly brought under fire by heavy shore bombardment ships and again temporarily silenced. The situation ashore was not known. The sweeps had been busy all day sweeping the Mountain area. They detonated 3 mines in the immediate area. Two sweeps were fired on while quite close inshore by enemy battery but not hit.

19. About 1730, the executive officer returned to the GLENNON in an LCM with 5 officers and 20 men to augment our crew. Lieutenant PERE returned in this boat with additional acetylene, the plugs were being made to plan by the AH 5, CH 2205 GARDNER waiting for them. The LCM had been loaned to the ship for 3 days. Although Lieutenant Commander McCLUNG had definitely told Lieutenant PERE to warn the commanding officer against any attempt at salvage by the ship's force, the decision was made to go ahead, in the belief that if it was not done soon enemy shellfire or a drifting mine would soon finish the work the mine had started. It would now be possible to return the entire crew to the ship, for, in case of emergency, the LCM would be available to take them off. The men particularly desired to return because of highly overcrowded condition on the SS ROBERTSON. The executive officer went after them, returning about 2300. In the meantime, salvage work was being done. C201L was being cleaned and dried out. A steel box was being made to fit around the starboard shaft. There now were 8 officers and 58 men aboard, plus a 3 man boat crew from the LCM. Two separate details were made up, a watch detail and a salvage detail. The salvage detail under Lieutenant PERE were to work continuously to complete the break out. The watch detail was to protect the ship against attack and to aid the Area Screen with information that could be supplied from our advance position, also to provide two 5" guns against enemy "E" boats. At general quarters the two forward 5"/38 guns would be manned with director control in full automatic, plus 7-20MM guns. The condition watch included OOD on bridge, one forward 20MM, 2-20MM art, security watch, fire room and generator watch. The SG with remote PPI on the bridge was cut in. The gyro was started and cut in about 2300. The Area Screen Commander was notified of the GLENNON's position by TBS in code and that we would man the circuit and give such information as we could detect. About 2200, before our men returned from the SS ROBERTSON, enemy activity was noted off SHIRE POINT. What appeared to be one tug or minelayer and two "E" boats were seen. This information was passed to the Area Screen Commander but before gunfire could be arranged they disappeared behind the Point.

20. By 2400, the condition watch was set, sub-machine guns, rifles, 45 caliber pistols distributed throughout crew and ship.
One PT boat from the picket line made a reconnaissance trip up off SALTIRE POINT, returning close inshore. The radar scope followed him clearly. It was noted that our isolated position left us free of all interference from adjacent ships, the coastline appearing clearly and distinctly.

21. The night passed without incident except for distant air raids and one erroneous report of approaching "L" boats by a lookout aft.

22. At 0655, a 4 gun splash landed about 200 yards on the port quarter, apparently coming from the enemy shore battery in the Quinville area. General quarters was sounded. The commanding officer from the port wing of the bridge made every effort to locate the battery. The second salvo straddled with one or two hits aft, one entering the after engine room. The third salvo straddled with a hit in the forecastle deck and a near miss on the starboard side which wounded two men, one seriously. All power was lost as a result of the first hits, the TBS went before a message could get through to CTG 125.8. Attempt was made to raise the TUSCALOOSA by signal lamp without success. The word was given out to abandon ship. As the commanding officer reached the bottom of the inside ladder leading from the superstructure deck to the bridge he noted a terrific explosion in the vicinity of the bridge. On arriving on deck to go into the LCM, the information was that all hands were in the boat, the coxswain was ordered to shove off, keeping between the ship and shore to avoid being detected, also to go slowly in order to avoid setting off an acoustic mine. Shellfire was hitting all around, bursting on impact with the surface. Two fragments penetrated the sides, causing 5" holes. Three men had been wounded during the shellfire aboard, none in the boat. When about 1000 yards from the GLENNON and a muster had been taken, it was found that 3 men were missing and presumable were aboard the GLENNON. The nearest PT boat (PT 590) in the picket line was closed, where the commanding officer, 3 officers and 10 men disembarked to return to the ship for the remaining 3 men. The enemy shellfire ceased as we pulled up alongside the PT due a smoke screen and counter battery fire from the heavy bombardment units. The executive officer was ordered to take the LCM, close the BAYFIELD, and request instructions. There was an urgent need of getting medical aid for most seriously wounded man according to the chief pharmacist's mate, PT 519 (Compton J4 - Lieutenant Commander BUCKLEY) came alongside shortly, took the commanding officer, 2 officers and 10 men back to the GLENNON. The 3 men were found aboard. They had received the word to abandon but thought it was later countermanded. The commanding officer went to the bridge.
23 June 1944.

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and found that a shell had entered the port side, exploding shortly after causing extensive damage. Fragments holes through the port side of the CIC room were noted and all radar gear layed out was found damaged. The secret radar gear was thrown overboard. A small weighted bag containing secret op-orders and four registered publications (needed when the ship was returned to the previous day) were thrown overboard prior to leaving the ship during the shellfire. Extensive damage was noted throughout the ship from both direct hits and near misses. However there were no direct indications the ship would sink unless underwater damage from fragments was causing slow flooding. As it was not desired to endanger the PT boat any longer, all hands were ordered aboard and we proceeded to the USS BAYFIELD where the commanding officer disembarked for conference with CTF 125. The remaining officers and 13 men were placed in charge of Lieutenant (jg) McConlogue and ordered to proceed to the SS ROBERTSON, report to the executive officer GLENNON and await orders.

23.

The commanding officer informed Admiral MOON of the shelling and abandonent, informing him that there had been 5 direct hits and extensive damage. After conferring with the Chief of Staff, despatch orders were to be made up transferring the remaining survivors to the LST 381 for transportation to the U.K. The commanding officer left the BAYFIELD, went to the SS ROBERTSON, collected his officers and crew, and took then aboard the LST 381, arriving about 1230. It was found that the LST 381 expected to be completely loaded by 1700 and to sail for U.K. that night. Her cargo back was to be 275 wounded soldiers. As this was 125 more than the ship was prepared to handle, the commanding officer of the GLENNON offered the services of the GLENNON crew in giving all aid possible. This was accepted with gratification and the men later did excellent work in loading, caring for, and discharging the wounded.

24.

The executive officer, the gunnery officer, the damage control officer and the CHT were sent back to the GLENNON to inspect the damage, seal the ship, and to check for any secret or confidential gear that might be left aboard. The commanding officer could not leave the LST because no confirmation of orders had been received. At 1400, having received no confirmation, a despatch (GLENNON 101400B) was sent to CTF 125, into NCCWF, CTH 125.8, CDS 17 "Unless otherwise directed and in accordance with verbal instructions abandoning immediate salvage of GLENNON and proceeding with remaining survivors in LST 381 to U.K." About 1600, the executive officer returned with the report that there were at least 11 direct hits and numerous near misses fragment holes extending from the after break to the bow and the waterline to the bridge. There were no fires aboard.
23 June 1944.


but there had been one in the CPO quarters, which was still
shuddering. This compartment was sealed and could be expected to
go out. The damage was extensive throughout the ship, particularly
to equipment in the after engineering, #2 fireroom, #1 fireroom, the
radio room, CIC, and bridge. All radar and radio equipment was
damaged. The ship was holed twice near the waterline, portside frame
140-145, through main deck in to after engineering at frame 123, into
the blower room, main deck, frame 132, through portside main deck
into the after fireroom at frame 108, through #1 stack six feet
from top, after side, through the portside of the bridge at frame 56,
4 hits through forecastle deck, portside frame 36, frame 31, frame 12,
frame 8 and either a hit or large fragment hole from 9' - 15' water-
line at stem. See enclosure (B). The ship had settled to a point 6
inches from the main deck aft, but the bow had risen to a draft of
6'. There were extensive fragmentation holes in #1 and #2 gun mounts,
captain's stateroom, executive officer's stateroom, radio room, div-
ision commander's stateroom, after 20MM, clipping room, and throughout
the port skin of ship, extending from waterline upward to the deckedge.
There was a definite evidence that the ship had been shelled again
from 0830, when the ship was abandoned, until the executive officer's
party inspected it. Ship's force salvage was out of the question be-
cause as soon as the stern was cut the bow would go down flooding
through the extensive fragment holes. The commanding officer did not
believe the ship would sink in its reported state at that time but
further shelling, or if the stern broke loose, the ship was almost
certain to sink.

25. About 1630, a despatch was received cancelling GLENN-
ON's 101400B to CTF 125, ordering the survivors back to the SS ROB-
ERTSON. As the commanding officer believed some misunderstanding had
arisen, he obtained a boat from LST 381 and proceeded to the BAYFIELD
to confer with CTF 125. CTF 125 said that he had forwarded GLENNON
101400B to NOWTF for action, recommending approval. In view of the
very crowded conditions on the SS ROBERTSON and the unlikely salvage
of the GLENNON for several days, the commanding officer recommended
that his crew proceed as planned. Further, that a 50 man salvage
crew under the commanding officer, be assembled at Plymouth, Eng-
land, vacate Barracks, from where they could arrive on the scene
with 12 hours notice of commencement of salvage operations. Admiral
MOON gave permission to proceed in LST 381 in accordance with the
commanding officer's recommendation, if no change was instituted by
NOWTF. The commanding officer rejoined his officers and crew on the
LST 381.
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26. At 2145, 10 June 1944, the USS GLENNON commenced to list heavily and sank shortly thereafter. Whether there had been additional shelling or whether the ship had sufficient underwater fragmentation to cause her to sink, is not known. At 2300, the remainder of the survivors sailed in the USS LST J81 for U.K.

VI. COMMENTS.

1. A close check of personnel was kept from the very outset of officers and men being evacuated. Enclosure (A) is therefore considered by the commanding officer to be an accurate account of personnel. The missing therein named are believed to have been lost in the stern section of the ship. As there were no other ships in the vicinity who could have evacuated men picked up from the sea, there is practically no chance that any of the missing will be recovered alive. No bodies were recovered. All wounded listed in paragraph C to enclosure (A) have since recovered and are being held together as a unit, including all non-casualties listed in Paragraph E, enclosure (A), under command of the commanding officer, awaiting further instructions from Commander U.S. Naval Forces, Europe.

2. Recommendations for awards are being made in separate correspondence. The conduct of the officers and the crew of the GLENNON throughout the campaign and loss of ship was commendable and in accord with the high standard set by U.S. Naval personnel throughout the present war. SPILLER, Frank Arthur, Cox, #614-68-66, USNR, is being recommended for the award of the Navy Cross. The mine explosion occurred while he was asleep in his bunk. The force of it threw him out the break in the deck. He fell back into the break. Being wounded, with great presence of mind, he aided three other wounded men out of the rapidly sinking stern section, through the break, onto the deck of the forward section, thereby saving their lives. Lieutenant Commander J.B. FERRETER, USN, executive officer, Lieutenant John PERE, E-V(G), USNR, damage control officer, OLSON, Eugene Ivar, CQM(A.), #216-72-61, USNR, BUDNICK, Harry (n), CM1A(Pa.), #385-20-61, USN, GARDNER, Donald Gordon, CM1MM(A.), #654-06-32, USNR, VERNON, William Roscoe, CW2(Pa.) #265-39-28, USN, GARRATT, Cyril John, CM1(A.), #632-08-92, USNR, MANNING, Francis John WT1c, #228-27-80, USNR, VAEHART, Michael Paul MM1c, #289-27-88, USN, are being recommended for the award of letters of commendation by the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet, for volunteering to remain aboard the USS GLENNON after the order had been received to abandon the ship.
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from CTF 125. All personnel full well knew there was danger in their exposed position from shellfire from the enemy battery which finally sank the ship, from the mines being detonated in the immediate area, from torpedoes launched by nearby based enemy "Z" boats, and from ever present enemy aircraft. The most they could use to defend themselves were 20mm machine guns (2), and small arms. They kept light and power on the ship which prevented the flooding of certainly the after engine room and possibly GZ01L. They continued essential damage control measures. Their actions were in accord with the highest tradition of the U.S. Naval Service. The following men are being commended by the commanding officer for their devotion to duty and their splendid damage control work in making GZ01L watertight and jettisoning topside weights: Lieutenant (jg) J.D. GILMOUR, USNR, Ensign T.J. GILLISPIE, USNR, CLOUGH, W. A. Jr., M1c #201-66-61, USN, SMITH, F. J. M2c #817-93-23, USNR, VALKENBURG, John Jr., Ftc, #708-12-44, USNR.

3. Future salvage of the USS GLENNON will be difficult due to the tidal current conditions in that area, the extensive hoiling by shellfire and fragments, and the fact that the ship rests on her side. The decision to salvage will have to be made by a salvage officer experienced in such work.

4. It is the opinion of the commanding officer that the mine which detonated near the port propeller was an acoustic mine. The sound gear was manned and operating. There is no indication or possibility of torpedo. For the two previous days the GLENNON and other units and sweeps had repeatedly been over the same spot, being in the swept channel. Either the mine was a delayed action mine, or had been drifted in on the tide, or had been planted by aircraft. How they were being armed is questionable. On 3 June there were 24 mines detonated in the immediate area, on 9 June, three, and on 10 June, six.

5. The size of the shells fired at the GLENNON cannot be accurately determined from the information at hand. The extent of fragmentation made it believed that the shells were either 88MM or 105MM, but the angle of fall was very large, about 75° - 80°, which does not fit the trajectories of 88MM or 105MM. There was a 155MM howitzer battery listed in the Quinville Area which may have been responsible as it fits the trajectory much more closely. Being HE shells, they detonated on impact with ship's structure or water, just penetrating the thin shell plating and causing extensive...
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fragmentation. Had they been AP shells they would have penetrated much deeper into the ship and certainly gone out through the bottom in several instances. This would have been much more damaging to the watertight integrity but less damaging to ship's personnel and equipment.

6. The commanding officer was gratified by the excellent results obtained against shore targets. The excellent performance again shows this class of DD to be well equipped for the job. Communications generally over the Army SCR equipment was very good, better than obtained in the Sicilian Campaign. Just as in Sicily, it took 24 hours for the SFCP's to become organized with their units to make the maximum use of the naval bombardment units waiting to support them. Once our troops were ashore, fire against other than predetermined targets was dangerous to our own troops without shore based observers. Targets of opportunity could be fired at only if clearly recognized as hostile, or in self defense. Even then a commanding officer does not know whether or not he may be endangering our own troops who might be assaulting that point. The difficulties which confront the SFCP's in landing, joining up with their units, assembling their communication equipment under enemy fire is fully realized. However, it is most important that in future operations of this nature, we strive to devise and put into early operation some system of shore observation. This is not in any way meant to be an adverse criticism of the SFCP's in this operation who undoubtedly were doing the best they could under the most trying conditions, many of whom probably gave their lives trying to give us just what is recommended.

7. The commanding officer accepts full responsibility for all decisions and subsequent actions during the subject action and subsequent loss of the USS GLENNON. The GLENNON, its officers and crew, gave the best they had to give until the commanding officer felt further running of the ship would not compensate the large loss of life involved, nor would it serve any useful offensive action against the enemy.

8. In closing, the commanding officer wishes to express his appreciation in being chosen to command one of the destroyers in the greatest action of its kind ever attempted in the history of the world.

9. The executive officer has read and concurs in the above report and no separate report will be submitted.

Advance copies to: Gomineh (4) Condeslant (1) Cinclant (1) Conserfor (CTF127)

[Signature]
Commander, U.S. Navy.

1. Forwarded.

2. The Squadron Commander notes the persistence and determination shown by the Commanding Officer GLENNON in exercising every possible effort to save his ship. Eye-witness accounts have confirmed the coolness and effectiveness of his leadership. Recommendation for suitable award has been initiated by separate correspondence.

3. The writer observed the final shelling of GLENNON from a position in Fire Support Station Number 1, and is of the opinion that the source of fire was a mobile battery, possibly emplaced during the night for the purpose. The bursting of projectiles on impact and fragmentation were similar to that experienced by JEFFERS.

4. The difficulty in knowing location of own troops, reported in paragraph 6 of Comments, was a general experience. It would appear that the knowledge of the STCP is limited to its own battalion, or at best own RCT, and that a separate liaison should be set up to broadcast more extensive information to all fire-support ships.
SECRET

CDS-17/A16/A9
Serial: 0056

15 July 1944.

SECRET


5. The GLENNON was a highly effective ship; her officers and crew, a well-trained unit with a strong espirit. It is therefore recommended that the group be retained as nearly intact as possible and with Commander Johnson be assigned a new-construction destroyer.

6. Only an original and 6 copies of this report were received by this command. As it is not clear whether or not distribution of the required advance copies has been effected, one copy is being forwarded to Cominch, and one to Cinclant via Comdeslant, with copies of this endorsement.

A. C. MURDAUGH

Copy to:
C.O. GLENNON (Administration)
Cominch
Cinclant via Comdeslant
At 0740 Thursday, June 8, 1944 I relieved Lt.(jg) H. R. Bacon USNR, as officer of the deck of the U.S.S. Gleann ID620 with the following conditions in effect: cruising in fire support area off Utah Beach awaiting call from the shore fire control party, boilers 1 and 2 in use for steering purposes, on course 160° (T), speed approximately 4 knots (5 ahead on the port engine, 130 revolutions standard speed), condition 2ES met, all X, all I, and all 2 fittings below platform deck closed, all depth charges on safe. Captain in the sea cabin, navigator in his quarters. At 0742, in order to stay in the vicinity of Buoy "QB", I commenced making a turn to starboard, using full rudder, coming to course 340° (T). At 0757, on course 340° (T), I took a bearing on Buoy "QB", now on my beam bow, and found it to be 340° (T). At 0800 I came to course 030° (T). At about 0805 I felt a series of rapid and violent vibrations, felt the ship settle immediately, and heard the gyro buzzer sound, indicating loss of gyro. At this time I was in the center of the pilothouse, directly behind the compass, and going from the starboard to the port wing of the bridge. My first impression was that we had struck a mine as I did not believe that a shell fired from a shore battery could exert such a force or cause such vibrations. I immediately sounded General Quarters and heard the quartermaster call the Captain. I then went to the port wing of the bridge and saw activity astern and a long thick pool of fuel oil along the port side. Also, the sound appeared to be well down in the water. I then went to the starboard wing of the bridge and saw numerous men in the water. There appeared to be a much greater area of oil on the starboard side. I called to CPO Freda, who was on the main deck by the ladder leading down from the boat deck, and told him to have the gig lowered and manned, and to have them pick up the men in the water. I turned to go into the pilothouse and met the Captain coming from the port wing of the bridge. I told him I believed we had struck a mine; damage appears to be limited to the after third of the ship; as having the boat put in the water to pick up the men, have sounded General Quarters; am sure the ship is in the swept channel (pointed out the position to him on the bridge chart); and have not notified our "boss" by TBS as yet.

The Captain made a report of our condition by TBS and expressed high hopes of saving the undamaged forward part of the ship. Immediate action was taken to lighten the after part of the ship by jettisoning the depth charges, 5 inch loading machine, ammunition, and empty powder cases and cases. A sounding with a lead line showed that there was a depth of water of 31 feet at the No. 3 depth charge projectors, and with the tide still rising, it appeared to be little doubt that the ship could be towed clear of the area. At about 0820 the ship's gig returned to the ship, discharged its survivors, and left to search for more.
At 0830 the USS Rich, and two mine sweeps stood into the area to give aid; also one British motor launch who was directed to search for men on our starboard beam. The USS Rich passed down our starboard side, turned, and came up our port side, at which time she was told that we had sufficient help and to return to her former station. One mine sweep, the USS Staff (AM 114) came along the starboard side of our forecastle, starboard side to, and the other mine sweep, (unidentified) commenced taking position for tow ing us, using our cable.

At about 0840, the USS Rich, now on our port bow, distance 1,000 yards hit a mine and was severely at her 125 battery. At about 0845 the USS Rich (forward half) struck a second mine causing considerable additional damage.

At 0900, with the unidentified mine sweep unable to move us, we dropped our port anchor so that the tide would not swing our bow towards the beach and more shallow water. The Captain then requested by TBS that a tug be sent to us as soon as possible, hoping to get clear at high water; about 1130, the mine sweep that had tried to take us under tow, commenced sweeping a path for the tug to come in through. At the same time splashes were observed both forward and aft of us, the results of salvos fired by enemy shore batteries. The Captain immediately requested by TBS that target No. 4 (the assumed firing installation) be taken under fire by larger ships in the fire support area. The results proved satisfactory, as no further splashes were observed during my stay aboard.

At about 0930 the Captain ordered that half of the officers and men leave the ship as a safety measure. The USS Staff (AM 114) came along the port side of our forecastle, port side to, and made preparations to receive survivors, casualties first. Also ten bags of secret and confidential publications and material, and the pay accounts and money were removed from the ship. At about 1100, having been relieved as C.O.O by Lt. (jg) E. L. McCollough, I reported aboard the USS Staff (AM 114), Lt. J.R. Keppler, USNR Commanding, in charge of the following officers and men, with verbal orders from Cdr. O.A. Johnson, Commanding Officer of the USS Glennon to "Keep in touch with the ship as well as possible." (The men whose names are preceded by an asterisk were stretcher cases.)
(7) At 1300 the USS Staff (AM 114) stood into the transport area of Utah Beach, and tied up alongside LST-509, port side to. At 1330 L2, with the aforementioned officers and men reported aboard LST-509, Lcmt. J.B. Reuben, USNR, Commanding. During the course of the afternoon three mines were seen to explode in our immediate vicinity; one completely demolishing a British tug. At 1530 ninety-eight German prisoners and French snipers were received aboard LST-509 and put under the charge of the officers of the U.S.S. Glencon. A "two on - eight off" watch of two officers and two petty officers was set up to guard the prisoners.

(8) At 1100 Friday, June 9, 1944, LST-509 tied up to a hawser in Portland Harbor, Portland, England. At this time the prisoners were turned over to U.S. Army authorities and the casualties (marked with asterisks in the preceding list) were transferred to the U.S. Army Evacuation Unit, Portland, England. At 1700 the remainder of our group (now 12 officers and 158 men) were taken by British authorities to Queen's Barracks, Portland, England; a survivor's overnight camp where we were issued clothes, fed, and given quarters for the night. The ten bags of publications and the pay accounts and money were left under armed guard at C.O.S.M.A.E., Portland, England.

(9) At 1100 Saturday, June 10, 1944, having gotten the pay accounts from C.O.S.M.A.E., the Glencon detachment left Queen's Barracks in an eleven-truck convoy for Plymouth, England via Exeter. We arrived at Exeter at 1300, ate lunch, were issued canal and cigarettes from the American Red Cross there, and left for Plymouth at 1430.

(10) At about 1800, the Glencon detachment in my charge arrived at Vickerman Barracks, Plymouth, England, and reported to Officer in Charge, Lt. (jg) Keesee. Here all officers and men were fed and given quarters.

(11) At 0900 Sunday, June 11, 1944, I went to U.S. Naval Office, Hanover House, Plymouth, England but could obtain no information concerning the location or condition of the U.S.S. Glencon from the duty operations officer, Lt. (jg) Jordan, so returned to Vickerman Barracks. At 1500 a second detachment from the U.S.S. Glencon arrived at Vickerman Barracks in the charge of Lt. (jg) Harold N. Bacon.

(12) On Monday morning, June 12, 1944, I could still get no information from Hanover House concerning the U.S.S. Glencon, so returned once again to Vickerman Barracks. However, at 1730 that afternoon, Commander C. A. Johnson, U.S.N., Commanding Officer of the U.S.S. Glencon arrived with the remaining survivors of that ship with the news that she had been mined, shelled, and abandoned; and he immediately took charge of all Glencon survivors at Vickerman Barracks, Plymouth, England.

Gustavus E. Mac, Jr.
U.S.S. GLENNON (DD-620)

Published Remarks by Cdr. John B. Ferriter, USN*
(Lt. Cdr. Ferriter was the Executive Officer in 1944.)

The destroyer GLENNON, sunk during the invasion of France, gave a good account of herself in a slugging match with the enemy before being knocked out of action; relates Lt. John Ferriter, "The old girl was a good ship and all of us hated to leave her, but there was nothing else to do when we finally got it."

Cmdr. Ferriter said he had just gone to his quarters after 36 hours on duty when the first violent explosion rocked the plucky little ship. A black patch of fur which turned out to be the ship's canine mascot, Drydock, sailed past his head and went yelping through the door. The officer himself was hurled against the bulkhead. Up on deck the crew was still fighting back with everything it had although it was obvious the ship was doomed. Damage Control Officer Jere D. Gilmour and his men went to work as the GLENNON settled by the stern but the tin can was doomed.

It fought to the bitter end, he said, even after the order to abandon ship was passed. The chief gunner's mate lagging behind to give the enemy a couple of parting shots from the forward gun. He loaded and fired the weapon alone. But the old girl got in some good licks. Fire control parties on the beach had reported the ship's guns had knocked out a couple of 155-mm guns, a 205-mm piece, wiped out an artillery headquarters and assisted in stopping a major enemy counter offense. Some of the crew performed heroically, the Commander recounted; a Coxswain remained behind in a flooded compartment even though wounded himself to see that other men got out before him. A water tender and two assistants remained at their posts almost to the end, coming up from below only after all but the officers had left the ship. The skipper, Cmdr. Clifford A. Johnson, was the last to leave the vessel; it was this officer's keen eyesight which saved the ship on the eve of the invasion as she steamed out to her position in the bay and he spotted a floating mine dead ahead, quick maneuvering put the ship just 20 feet away from the deadly instrument as she passed.

At one stage of the battle, Cmdr. Ferriter said, he felt a tugging at his sleeve and looked around to find the sleeve shot off. That, he declared was not an unusual experience, but it was miraculous how many men escaped injury or death by the narrowest of margins. One water tender getting relief at his post decided it wouldn't be worth the trouble to go to his berth and he lay down on the engine room places for a catnap. He found later that a shell hit his berth about the time he would have been there. A yeoman yielded to a shipmate's request to stand a trick for him while the latter got some needed rest. He came through unscathed, but his buddy was never seen again. Casualties as a whole were unusually light.

A story about the GLENNON from another source relates how three sailors failed to hear an order to abandon ship, and when they were rescued they had 600 pounds of steam up for an attempt to take the ship out of danger. The GLENNON was damaged by an explosion while patrolling off the Normandy beaches in the early morning darkness; her propellers slid into shallow water and anchored her so firmly that tugs couldn't pull her out. As Nazi shore batteries began taking pot shots at her, Bill Venable, CWO and his helpers, Francis Dauber, WT2C, and John Valkenberg, FIC, were instructed to keep the steam up. German guns laid accurate fire on the ship, so the order to abandon ship was passed along. Venable, Dauber and Valkenberg failed to hear it for they were fighting a fire in the after section. They put out the blaze and began building up steam pressure thinking the Nazi shells were the GLENNON's guns in action. Venable was slightly wounded by shell splinters. Lt. Cmdr. John Bulkeley finally came to their rescue.

* * * * * * * * * * * *

These crew members of the USS Glennon (DD-620) remained aboard the vessel after she was mined on June 8, 1944, fighting fires and maintaining steam pressure: (L to R) John Valkenberg, Jr., F1c; William Venable, CWT; Francis Daubner, WT2c.

(Real War Photos)
U.S.S. Glennon (DD-620)

Letters of Commendation (with Ribbon)*

AWARDED TO:
FRANCIS JOHN DAUBNER, WATER TENDER FIRST CLASS
UNITED STATES NAVAL RESERVE

WILLIAM ROSCOE VENABLE, CHIEF WATER TENDER
UNITED STATES NAVAL RESERVE

CITATION:
"For devotion and outstanding performance of duty in
the USS GLENNON during operation "Neptune," Bay of Seine,
Coast of France, 8-9 June 1944. The Commanding Officer
U.S.S. GLENNON having received orders to abandon ship
from higher authority after the ship had been grounded
astern by a German mine detonating under the port quar-
ter, partially breaking the after section off, this man
did volunteer to remain aboard to prevent further flood-
ing and possible sinking. The U.S.S. GLENNON's position
was an isolated one, two miles outside of a U.S. Navy
picket line. It was within range of German batteries
located at Quineville, France, which had previously
tried to shell the ship. The ship was gravely endan-
ergized from the many drifting mines in the area. The
ship was under constant threat of enemy aircraft and
possible boarding from German "E"-boats based nearby.
This man did remain aboard doing outstanding work for a
period of 37 hours until enemy shellfire, which subse-
quently caused her to sink, made the ship untenable and
was ordered to abandon ship. The initiative, unselfish
devotion to duty on this occasion reflects credit on the
Naval Service."

* Typed from identical draft citations for these men on index
cards at Operational Archives, Naval Historical Center, Wash-
ington Navy Yard. The wording on the final citations by the
Secretary of the Navy may have been changed. I did not find
a citation for the other man who remained at his post while
the ship was under fire by enemy shore batteries: John Val-
kenburg, Jr., F1c, USNR.

E. A. Wilde, Jr.
January, 1999
THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
WASHINGTON

The President of the United States takes pleasure in presenting the NAVY & MARINE CORPS MEDAL to

FRANK ARTHUR SPILLER, COXSWAIN,
UNITED STATES NAVAL RESERVE

for services as set forth in the following

CITATION:

"For extraordinary heroism and outstanding performance of duty in rescuing three shipmates from the sinking portion of the U.S.S. GLENNON when that vessel struck a mine.

"When the mine was struck, Coxswain Spiller, who was below in a living compartment, was thrown up and out through a break in the deck and then fell back inside. He saw immediately that there were many men still in the compartment, and with great presence of mind, he remained to assist the wounded to safety. He was the last to leave and left just as the compartment became submerged. He succeeded in removing three wounded men, although wounded himself.

"The courage, initiative, judgement, and prompt actions displayed by Coxswain Spiller on this occasion were in keeping with the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service."

For the President,

Secretary of the Navy.

Typed from a draft citation on an index card at the NHC/Washington Navy Yard. This medal was awarded by Com12thFli on 26 October 1944.

E. A. Wilde, Jr.
October, 1998
Johnson Gets Silver Star

[Special to The Evening Sun]

Norfolk, Va., Jan. 3—Commander Clifford A. Johnson, USN, of Baltimore, Md., has been presented the Silver Star Medal at a United States Navy base in England.

He was decorated "for meritorious achievement as commanding officer of the U.S.S. Glennon in action against enemy positions on the coast of Normandy from last June 6 to 9," says the accompanying citation, which adds:

"Commander Johnson fought his ship with great courage and determination under extremely hazardous conditions, rendering important fire support to the landings. When his vessel was hit, he directed removal of personnel and destruction of secret equipment with coolness and skill, while subject to enemy gunfire, and remained on board for about 24 hours until finally driven off by intense and accurate gunfire. His leadership, courage, skill and determination were in keeping with the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service."

His wife, Mrs. Josephine Johnson, lives at 615 Lakewood avenue, Baltimore. He was presented the medal by the commanding officer of the naval base for Admiral Harold R. Stark, USN, commander of United States Naval Forces in Europe.
JUNE 6, 1944: Served with credit on board the U.S.S. GLENNON (DD620) during the initial assault and invasion of Fortress Europe and the establishment of the 7th Army on Continent Peninsula, Bay of the Seine, France. During the period of June 6-10 the U.S.S. GLENNON aided the American Forces with fire support against enemy gun emplacements, troop and tank concentrations. For this work, the U.S.S. GLENNON received commendatory praise from shore fire control parties for fire against German shore batteries and completely routing a German counter-attack. The U.S.S. GLENNON also aided in the anti-E-boat and anti-submarine screen of the bombardment group. On the morning of June 8th the U.S.S. GLENNON struck an enemy mine, causing her to be grounded by the stern. On June 10th the U.S.S. GLENNON was shall ed by heavy enemy gun emplacements ashore and sunk, bringing to an end her enviable war record of North Atlantic escort of seventeen crossings without the loss of a single ship, and Mediterranean operations, including the invasion of Sicily on July 10, 1943.

C. A. JOHNSON
Commander, U.S. Navy
Commanding Officer, U.S.S. GLENNON

* Courtesy of Gustavus R. Ide, Jr.*
From: Naval Commander Western Task Force.
To: Western Naval Task Force.
Subject: Message from Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force.

1. The following message from the Supreme Commander Allied Expedition
   Force is to be published in morning orders and placed on bulletin boards
   of vessels and units attached to this command.

   "TO THE SOLDIERS, AIRMEN, SAILORS AND MERCHANT SEAMEN, AND
   ALL OTHERS OF THE ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCES:

   ONE WEEK AGO THIS MORNING THERE WAS ESTABLISHED THROUGH
   YOUR COORDINATE EFFORTS OUR FIRST FOOT HOLD IN NORTHWEST
   ERN EUROPE. HIGH AS WAS MY PRE-INVASION CONFIDENCE IN YOUR
   COURAGE, SKILL AND EFFECTIVENESS IN WORKING TOGETHER AS A
   UNIT, YOUR ACCOMPLISHMENTS ON THE FIRST SEVEN DAYS OF THIS
   CAMPAIGN HAVE EXCEEDED MY BRIGHTEST HOPES. YOU ARE A
   TRULY GREAT ALLIED TEAM, A TEAM IN WHICH EACH PART GAINS ITS
   GREATEST SATISFACTION IN RENDERING MAXIMUM ASSISTANCE TO
   THE ENTIRE BODY, AND IN WHICH EACH INDIVIDUAL MEMBER BE
   JUSTIFIABLY CONFIDENT IN ALL OTHERS.

   NO MATTER HOW PROLONGED OR BITTER THE STRUGGLE THAT LIES
   AHEAD, YOU WILL DO YOUR FULL PART TOWARD THE RESTORATION
   OF ALL FRANCE, THE LIBERATION OF ALL EUROPE AND NATIONS
   UNDER AXIS DOMINATION, AND THE DESTRUCTION OF THE NAZI MILI-
   TARY MACHINE.

   I TRULY CONGRATULATE YOU UPON A BRILLIANTLY SUCCESSFUL BE
   GINNING TO THIS GREAT UNDERTAKING. LIBERTY LOVING PEOPLE
   EVERYWHERE WOULD TODAY LIKE TO JOIN ME IN SAYING TO YOU:
   'I AM PROUD OF YOU'.

   /s/ GENERAL EISENHOWER"

   A.G. Kirk.
U.S.S. Glennon (DD-620); List of Officers, 6/8/44

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Service</th>
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<tr>
<td>JOHNSON, Clifford Arthur</td>
<td>CDR</td>
<td>USN</td>
<td>Commanding Officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>FERRITER, John Baker</td>
<td>LCDR</td>
<td>USN</td>
<td>Executive Officer/Navigator</td>
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<td>GILMOUR, Jere D.</td>
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<td>BACON, Harold N.</td>
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<td>WOODWARD, Arthur P.</td>
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<td>*PARKER, Milton C.</td>
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<td>HILL, James Wilson</td>
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* * * * * * * * * *

1 Courtesy of Gustavus R. Ide, Jr., from memory and personal records, in October, 1998.

* Wounded on 6/8/44 when the ship was mined off the Normandy beachhead according to a casualty report prepared by BuPers after the war.

E. A. Wilde, Jr.
October, 1998
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DOLIN, Earl Edward 664-30-57 WT2c
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ELLISON, William Arthur 951-72-84 S2c
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*ROHLER, David Ruby  650-80-38    S2c
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SCHACK, Frederick Evald  643-03-99    F1c
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SEARLES, George Theodore  801-22-22    FC3c
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SMITH, James Henry  245-82-06    S1c
SMITH, Robert Hughes  822-51-22    S1c
SMITH, Stanley John  601-41-56    F1c
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**WRIGHT, Ralph Albert**
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861-45-40   S2c

**ZEISMANN, John Herman**
868-50-09   S1c

**ZOLOTAS, Nicholas (n)**
708-12-51   F2c

**ZROWKA, John (n)**
623-21-45   BM2c

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1 **Source:** The ship's personnel diary on microfilm at the National Archives. DOYTEK, John Paul, 653-87-11, S2c, may also have been aboard on June 8, 1944. He was, according to the personnel diary ("Received" on 5/5/44), but he was not included in the list of casualties and non-casualties reported in Enclosure (A) to the ship's action report dated 6/23/44. However, this Enclosure indicated that there were 229 "Non-Casualties," and only 228 names were listed.

* Wounded (**Killed**) when the ship was mined off the Normandy Beachhead on 6/8/44 according to a machine-generated casualty report at the National Archives prepared by the Bureau of Naval Personnel after the war.

**Summary of Casualties:**

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E. A. Wilde, Jr.
July, 2000
U.S.S. Glennon (DD-620)

Cemetery Where Crew Members Killed on 8 June 1944
Are Interred or Memorialized* (Total: 25)

Remains Interred:  Rate    Location
BRANDT, Gerald Dale    GM3c    A    Plot 1, Row 2, Grave 28
BURNS, George William  PhM2c   A    Plot D, Row 19, Grave 17
EVANS, George Alban    TM1c    B
RYDER, Raymond Keith   SM3c    Private cemetery, Michigan
WELLMAN, Donald Davidson S1c    A    Plot E, Row 13, Grave 19

Memorialized:  Rate    Location
ALEXANDER, Harley Edwin Cox    C
BALAZ, Methodius (n)   SF2c    D
Baldwin, Theodore (n)  TM3c    D
BELMONT, Charles (n)   GM3c    D
BURNS, William Robert  CM2c    D
CUDA, Merle James     SM2c    C
DEATHRIDGE, James Lawrence Y2c    D
DIERSCH, Charles Martin WT1c    D

DIXON, Billy Harrison  S2c    D
GATES, Freeman Edwin   TM1c    C
GREER, Glen Woodrow   S1c    C
IDDINS, Harold Kenneth Y2c    C
KAUFENBERG, Kenneth Sergius TM3c    C
KENDNEY, William Raymond S1c    C
LAUSTED, John James   QM3c    C
LEMNERMAN, Robert Caudle RM3c    C

MULLANEY, Jerome Martin Cox    C
PERRIN, Robert Daniel    RM3c    C
TURNER, Frederick Wade  S1c    C
VINEY, Vincent Russell  S2c    C

* * * * * * * * *

Location Key:  A Normandy American Cemetery
Colleville-sur-Mer/St. Laurent-sur-Mer (Calvados), France
B Baltimore National Cemetery, Baltimore, Maryland
C Cambridge American Cemetery and Memorial
Cambridge, England
D Ardennes American Cemetery and Memorial
Neupre (Neuville-en-Condroz), Belgium

dated 4 May 1995.

E. A. Wilde, Jr.
January, 1999
"They fought together as brothers in arms; they died together and now they sleep side by side. To them we have a solemn obligation — the obligation to insure that their sacrifice will help make this a better and safer world in which to live."

— Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, USN, at The Surrender on board the U.S.S. Missouri (BB-63) in Tokyo Bay, 2 September 1945.
Narrative by: Commander Clifford A. Johnson
USS GLENNON
In Normandy Invasion

Commander Johnson was skipper of the USS GLENNON when that destroyer was sunk in the invasion of Normandy. The GLENNON was one of the many victims of acoustic mines off the Normandy coast. The explosion of the mine and subsequent valiant efforts to save the GLENNON are described in considerable detail by Commander Johnson.
Narrative by: Commander Clifford A. Johnson  
USS GLENNON  
In Normandy Invasion

Commander Johnson:

Today is the 13th of July 1944. I'm Commander C.A. Johnson, United States Navy, former commanding officer of the USS GLENNON, DD620.

It was my privilege to be commanding officer of that ship during its last nine months. I placed the ship in commission under Commander F.C. Camp, then commanding officer, myself being executive officer, in October 1942. The ship since then had completed seventeen successful convoy crossings of the Atlantic. By successful I mean that these crossings were made without the loss of a single ship in the convoy.

This ship was engaged in the Sicilian invasion in July 1943 and its splendid shore fire control worked at that time. The only previous time that the ship had been hit in any manner or form was at Palermo on the 31st of July 1943, when the Germans made a large determined attack on the ships in the harbor. The GLENNON was strafed at that time, wounding sixteen men on the starboard side of the bridge. The plane that strafed the ship at that time had just bombed a British light cruiser anchored on our starboard beam where they scored a near miss. I was on the port side of the ship at the time, saw the plane. Before we could get to the plane, she came up out of her dive at about 150 feet, crossed over the ship and fired with her after machine guns.

By the time I arrived on the starboard side of the bridge, the wounded were laying both inside and outside on the bridge. There were only two men who were seriously wounded and the others had minor shell fragment wounds. The plane apparently got away scot-free, although out of fifty planes making the raid that night, nine were shot down by both aircraft and AA battery fire.

From the 1st of August, 1943, when we started to leave the Mediterranean until the invasion of France in the Bay of the Seine, in June 1944, the GLENNON was occupied in transporting troop convoys to Scotland for the forthcoming invasion. These convoys in the North Atlantic, undoubtedly many of our troops who are now fighting in France will remember the weather of the North Atlantic during these crossings. It was typical North Atlantic winter weather.

About the end of April we began to wonder whether our ship was going to actually take part in the forthcoming invasion which had been played up very strongly in the newspapers but which we had heard nothing official about as yet. However, the orders began to come in with indications that we were going across with an entirely combatant convoy which looked to me very much like the beginning of the invasion to come.

On the sixth of May, we left New York proceeded to England with the Destroyer Squadron Seventeen plus the PLUNKETT, convoying the USS QUINCY, a new United States cruiser.

On arrival Destroyer Squadron Seventeen reported to Commander of the Twelfth Fleet for duty. From that time on, until the invasion, time was taken up in actual practices for shore fire control and for action against German E-boats. All of this training was taken by all hands in a serious mood and excellent results were obtained. By this time, it was absolutely apparent to all hands that the ship was ultimately destined to take part in the invasion. Both the officers and men seemed
very happy and keyed up to the situation.

Shortly after arrival in the United Kingdom the commanding officer started to receive voluminous reports and operation orders for the forthcoming invasion. He was unable to disclose at any time to anyone the nature of the orders that had been received. However, on the 25th of May, the order came through to release the information to those people that were required to know in order to get them thoroughly acquainted with their job.

PORTS JAMMED WITH SHIPPING

The plans were so well made and it was evident in our travels around the United Kingdom at this time that this invasion was going to be larger than anything that we had seen before this time. The ports of the United Kingdom were jammed with shipping. It seemed miraculous to myself and to most of the other people present at that time that the Germans were not taking advantage of this apparent tremendous shipping in these ports by making air attacks on them. Weak raids were made but at no time did I see a determined air attack during this period.

The actual place where the ships of the bombardment group were assembled was at Belfast in the Bangor Lough. There, the same situation existed as existed throughout the whole of the United Kingdom, the anchorage had to be set down very carefully in order to get all the ships in the harbor. These were most all of them combatant ships including battleships, cruisers and a large number of destroyers.

Finally the word came setting D-day as of the 5th of June 1944, 0600, being H-hour. That meant that we were going to have to get underway from Belfast on the 3rd in order to bring the heavy bombardment ships on station at H-hour. On the morning of the fourth, we received word that the invasion had been delayed 24 hours making H-hour on our beach, 6:30 on the morning of the sixth. This delay was taken in stride without any undue difficulties by any of the forces involved. A turn-around was made and another turn-around made twelve hours later.

The actual approach on the afternoon of the fifth was really remarkable in the large number of ships traveling down their specific lanes all over the southern coast of England. There was every type of ship known by both the British and American Navies in those formations. These ships had to make schedules and they were adjusting their speeds from time to time in very fast tidal waters in order to make the proper time at their destination. These ships did very well.

In the approach the GLENNON was leading the shore bombardment group assigned to Utah Beach.

The approach was made without incident, sighting no German aircraft or no German surface craft. There was periodic firing to the eastward of us and also to the westward of us in the vicinity of Cherbourg. This was taken to be E-boats trying to make an attack on the forces but being definitely stopped by our own forces who were patrolling that area.

ARRIVED ON SCHEDULE

We arrived in the transport area and the shore bombardment area on schedule and from that time on everything clicked off in accordance with previous plan. The paratroopers apparently had landed as their large number of planes were
seen coming out. A very heavy barrage and bombardment was laid down by antiaircraft on the beaches about H minus 4. This barrage was something that I have never experienced before.

We were approximately 15,000 yards off the beach and the ship shook very violently during this entire barrage. There was an immense amount of dust blown to seaward, and it came almost as a cloud. When the aircraft had finished their job, the shore bombardment ships opened up heavy fire on predetermined targets on the beach. Targets were machine gun nests, batteries of all types, and shocked the Germans just before the arrival of the first wave of troops on Utah Beach. Apparently the first wave was very successful because shortly after H-hour, we heard the announcement that our troops had breached the seawall just behind Utah Beach and were going ahead on into the country beyond.

Shortly after H-hour the GLENNON received orders to proceed into this near shore fire support area and to contact its shore fire control party ashore and give them support that they would ask for. We proceeded into the beach by way of the central boat lane and I was amazed at the quietness of the inshore area.

Invasion was not yet four hours old but the beaches were being worked thoroughly, the ships were going in apparently according to schedule and everything was quiet, there didn't seem to be any sign of confusion at that time. I arrived on my shore fire control station and was unable to get any targets from my shore fire control party ashore apparently due to the fact that they were moving so fast that they didn't require support from me.

That day proceeded without incident as far as the ship was concerned except for the firing of a few rounds at a battery which fired very short of us. It was also noted later in the afternoon that very heavy fire was laid down on the beaches causing the beaches to be closed for some three to four hours while this battery that was laying down the fire could be located and silenced.

That night was spent in the shore fire control, shore bombardment area, screening our heavy shore bombardment ships. There was a light air raid during the night. Some bombs landed fairly close, nothing serious. There was a low cloud formation, no planes were seen definitely enough to fire upon them. Our own Allied aircraft were able to chase them out of the area very shortly after they arrived.

The next morning the ship was ordered to a new shore fire control station off Quinville about two miles. This day was very much more satisfying to myself and to the officers and crew. We fired at numerous targets that were designated by the shore fire control party, were able to dodge a few shells from the beach German batteries and were able to help our own Army stop a counter-attack late that afternoon.

SCRENNED BOMBARDMENT SHIP

This was rather interesting for us. We received a very hurried call for support and were told to be very careful as our troops were being counter-attacked and if the fire should be off very much why we'd fire on our two troops. However we went ahead and fired about 200 rounds as directed by our shore fire control party, receiving very enthusiastic reports from them on completion of the fire that the enemy had been turned back completely as a result of the fire we laid down, and had retreated beyond the immediate sight of their positions.
That night we went back to screen our heavy shore bombardment ships again. Again that night there were numerous air attacks with some bombs and mines falling in the area.

The next morning, the 8th of June, D plus 2, we were back on station, on previous day's station by sunrise. At 8:03 there was a terrible explosion in the vicinity of our port quarter. Immediate information was that we had struck or detonated an acoustic mine. The after section of the ship immediately started to part about fifty feet from the stern. The stern settled rapidly, and it was found that the ship was anchored fast by the stern.

There were numerous men who were able to get clear of the compartments below and they were in the water with no ships in the immediate vicinity. We immediately put our own motor whale boat in the water to pick these men up. We were very fortunate in being able to get to all except one of these men, all of whom had been quite badly wounded.

It was a very short time before two minesweepers closed the ship and attempted to tow the ship off the beach. This was unsuccessful. They decided to evacuate as many personnel as we could, including the wounded, only keeping those personnel that it would require to salvage the ship and to man our guns that remained.

A tug was asked for to pull the ship off the beach and was sent in later that morning.

The first thing I noticed, the first one off the ship in this instance was our dog by the name of Gismo. He came to us just before we left New York. We had him alongside the dock and we put him off three times but just as we shoved off, he made one leap and managed to grab the ship. We thought at that time if he was so anxious to make the trip, why we would let him come along but I noticed that he was the first one to get off. I had been a little bit worried up to this moment as to whether he actually was still on board, but he seemed happy with his tail wagging.

The next few hours was spent mostly in trying to reduce the flooding in the after engine room and in the after living spaces still remaining with the ship. This was comparatively easy work and was brought quickly under control and it was thought perhaps that we could pull the ship off on high tide. The tug arrived just before high tide and made every effort to pull us off without success. The ship was turned through some 720 degrees finally in attempting to shear off the stern without any results.

It was then determined that we would attempt to cut the shafts, particularly the starboard shaft in order to push it out and probably that was what was holding us. This would free the ship and permit it to be towed away. While preparations to do this were going on, I received a dispatch from Commander Task Force Utah to abandon all further attempts at salvage, remove the crew and put them on an LST bound for the United Kingdom. It was known by the commanding officer that if this order was carried out, the after engine room would flood, the after living space would flood and while the ship would remain afloat, salvage operations would be definitely hampered.

We decided to take off all except enough men to keep the boiler in operation who could ride the motor whale boat out later and for myself to go to
Admiral Moon, the Task Force Commander, and attempt to have the order changed in order to permit our boilers to remain in under fire to keep our pumps on the flooding spaces.

This was obtained that night and our crew was returned to the ship late the next afternoon and we expected that on the eighth or rather the tenth we would be able to get the ship clear and be towed out.

GLENNON BADLY HOLED

However on the morning of the tenth at 0700, the same German battery which had been giving a great deal of trouble both on the beaches and to the shore bombardment ships opened fire with extremely accurate fire. Their first salvo was short, their second salvo was a straddle hitting us in the after engine room. I tried to locate the battery at that time but was unable to do so. The battery was apparently hidden or well camouflaged. There was no smoke or flash visible from the ship.

After the third salvo had landed and hit forward, we decided to abandon ship in an LCM that we had close aboard. Already three men had been wounded on deck, the shells being anti-personnel shells, high explosive, bursting both on impact with the ship and in the water. Evacuation was carried out quickly, and while the LCM was hauling away from the ship there were numerous shell bursts close aboard, three holes being put in the side of the LCM.

After being some distance away from the ship it was found that three men had been left on board. We had to get the wounded men we had there already to some medical aid so we put through the picket line about a mile away, went close aboard a PT boat there, took off some men and sent the LCM on to obtain medical assistance for those men that had been wounded.

I took ten men and got a PT boat to return to the ship. The heavy shore bombardment ships by this time had opened up on the shore battery which had been shelling the ship and succeeded in silencing it, for the moment anyway. When we arrived back on the ship, it was found that the GLENNON was badly holed all the way from the water line to its tops and from the after part to the stem. It was figured that there was at least five hits in the ship at that time and that question of salvage was no longer possible, at least by the ship's force, so we decided to put the fires out from under the boilers and to proceed to the transport area and obtain instructions from the Task Force Commander.

The three men were found, only one of which had been wounded after the former people had left the ship. They had done an excellent job in keeping the fires going in the boiler and also putting out a small fire aft.

The ship had been hit on the bridge, destroying most of the bridge equipment and hit in the sound room, also in the radar room, radio room, the forward fire room and two hits through the deck into officer's country and the CPQ quarters forward. These hits were known at that time.

After leaving the ship, we received instructions from the Task Force Commander to put the people on LST 381 return to United Kingdom there to have a salvage party of 50 men and one officer, the commanding officer, to return when salvage operations became possible. As the LST was not getting underway immediately, the executive officer went back later that afternoon to inspect the damage and to get
a few of his own clothes from the ship. The gunnery officer and damage control officer and a Chief Radar Technician went along with them. They found out that we had not counted all the hits earlier or there had been more shelling between the time we left and the time he returned, because now there were 11 full shell hits in the ship and numerous near misses causing fragment holes throughout the ship.

It was thought that the ship would remain afloat as long as she was anchored by the stern but once she cast loose there, why, the numerous fragment holes throughout the full length of the ship would undoubtedly flood practically all compartments forward and aft. The ship started to list heavily that night about 2200 and sank shortly thereafter.

END

Note: A copy of this narrative was obtained from Operational Archives at the Naval Historical Center, Washington Navy Yard, D.C. Retyped, unedited.

E. A. Wilde, Jr.
November, 1998
The U.S.S. Glennon (DD-620) in World War II

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<td>Sponsor, Miss Jeanne Lejeune Glennon</td>
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<td>&quot;Black gang&quot; crewmembers</td>
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E. A. Wilde, Jr.
May, 1999
The U.S.S. Glennon (DD-620) in World War II

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E. A. Wilde, Jr.
May, 1999
About The Editor

E. Andrew Wilde, Jr., Commander, USNR (Ret.), received his commission through the NROTC Program at Dartmouth College in 1950. Following graduation he saw action off Korea aboard the USS Douglas H. Fox (DD-779) when this destroyer duelled with numerous North Korean shore batteries in the Sea of Japan. Many of the photographs he took during this period have been donated to the Naval Historical Foundation, and two of them appeared in the coffee-table book, The Navy, published by the Foundation in 2000. After completing three years of active duty he began a civilian career in public accounting and later in management positions at Raytheon Company in Waltham, Massachusetts.

In 1993 he developed a strong interest in naval history and began editing a series of illustrated ships' histories primarily of U.S. destroyers sunk in World War II. Primary source documents such as action reports, ships' war diaries, medal citations and muster rolls are included in these histories as well as many firsthand accounts. His booklets are not for sale, but he sends complimentary copies to the survivors and to the families of crewmembers killed on these vessels.

Commander Wilde is a life member of the Naval Historical Foundation and the U.S. Naval Institute.
### Historical Compilations by the Editor:

(Destroyer/Destroyer Escort Hulls in World War II)

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**Notes:**

* Total for two engagements with the enemy

¹ Including those presumed dead more than a year subsequent to the date they were reported missing either due to enemy action or by drowning.

_E. Andrew Wilde, Jr._
Commander, USNR (Ret.)
June, 2005
Record 12 of 25  
Record:  Prev Next

Call #     JFF 05-2329
Author     Wilde, E. Andrew.
Title      The U.S.S. Glennon (DD-620) in World War II : documents and photographs / E. Andrew Wilde, Jr., editor.

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World War, 1939-1945 -- Campaigns -- France -- Normandy.
World War, 1939-1945 -- Naval operations, American.
World War, 1939-1945 -- Personal narratives, American.
Alt title     USS Glennon (DD-620) in World War Two
Locations Where Historical Compilations by the Editor Are Available For Researchers

1 Air Zoo, Guadalcanal Campaign Collection, Potage, Michigan
   ECU Manuscript Collection, Joyner Library, Greenville, NC
   Louisiana Naval War Memorial Library, Baton Rouge, Louisiana

2 Maine Maritime Museum Library, Bath, Maine
   Mariners' Museum Research Library, Newport News, Virginia
   Mystic Seaport's G. W. Blunt White Library, Mystic, Connecticut

3 National Archives II Library, College Park, Maryland
   National D-Day Museum Library Collection, New Orleans, LA
   National Museum of Pacific War, War Studies, Fredericksberg, TX
   Naval Historical Center, Navy Dept. Library, Washington Navy Yard
   Operational Archives Branch, Washington Navy Yard
   Ships' Histories Branch, Washington Navy Yard

4 Naval War College, Naval Historical Collection, Newport, RI
   N.Y. Public Library, 42nd & 5th Ave., Room 315, New York, N.Y.
   Portland Public Library, Portland Room, Portland, Maine

Tin Can Sailors, Inc., Research Library, Somerset, Massachusetts
US Naval Academy, Nimitz Library Special Collections, Annapolis
U.S. Naval Institute, History Division, Beach Hall, Annapolis, MD

U.S. Navy Memorial's Research Library, Washington, D.C.
USS Slater (DE-766) Library, Albany, New York

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Notes:
1 Only ships which participated in the Guadalcanal Campaign:
   Aaron Ward, Barton, Colhoun, Cushing, DeHaven, Duncan, Laffey,
   McFarland, Monsen, Preston, Walke.

2 Only Bath-built ships: DeHaven, Drexler, Emmons, Meredith,
   Spence, Strong

3 Only ships sunk off the Normandy Beachhead: Corry, Glennon,
   Meredith

4 By appointment only: (508) 677-0515

E. A. Wilde, Jr.
June, 2006
Date: 30 August 1999

E. Andrew Wilde, Jr.
Commander, USNR (Ret.)
1210 Greendale Avenue, Apt E3
Needham, MA 02492-4522

Dear Commander,

You were very kind to give a copy of your book "the U.S.S. GLENNON (DD-620) to the library of this cemetery. I have read the book. It does present some of the events of the invasion in Normandy from the Navy point of view. Most people think the Navy just transported troops to the beach and brought in their supplies. Complex operation to say the least with all branches of our armed forces involved. The planners were military geniuses. I just wonder what if, Hitler had planted a couple million mines rather than building all those useless V1 rockets, just what language we would be speaking now. Oh, I have confidence we would have eventually won the war, no matter all the "what ifs". It could have cost a lot more lives.

Thanks for the book Commander, cheers

Horace E. Thompson EMCM (USN Ret.)
Superintendent
1210 Greendale Ave., Apt. E3  
Needham, MA 02492-4622  
August 16, 2003

Marty Morgan, Historian  
The National D-Day Museum  
945 Magazine Street  
New Orleans, LA 70130

Dear Sir:

I'm sending you four historical compilations on destroyers which participated in OPERATION NEPTUNE. Three of these ships were sunk off the Normandy Beachhead in shallow water: USS Corry (DD-463), USS Glennon (DD-620) and USS Meredith (DD-726).

The USS Emmons (as DD-457, before she was converted to a minesweeper and redesignated DMS-22) provided effective gunfire support (841 rounds of 5-inch shells on June 6th) of the landings at OMAHA BEACH. After firing on assigned targets this destroyer closed to within 1500 yards of the shore to engage enemy batteries and fire at targets of opportunity. Although she was bracketed by enemy fire she was not hit and had no personnel casualties.

The three destroyers which were sunk had a total of 84 killed/missing and 125 wounded. My booklets identify these men and list both the grave sites for those interred overseas and the cemeteries where the missing are memorialized.

My Corry booklet contains several very moving personal accounts of the hardships these survivors endured before they were rescued.

I hope your museum makes visitors aware of the important role destroyers played at Normandy on D-Day, June 6th, 1944.

Yours truly,

E. Andrew Wilde, Jr.
Commander, USNR (Ret.)
(781) 449-0392
April 12, 2004

E. Andrew Wilde, Jr.
1210 Greendale Ave., Apt. E3
Needham, MA 02492-4622

RE: Library Donation

Commander Wilde,

The purpose of this letter is to acknowledge receipt of the material you forwarded to this office on August 16, 2003. These booklets are certainly of great interest to this institution and I am confident that future researchers will benefit from their content as well.

As you well know, US Navy destroyers played a very important role during Operation Neptune. Had it not been for the direct fire support of the USS Emmons (DD-457), the battle at Omaha beach would definitely have turned out much differently than it did. Also, the loss of USS Corry (DD-463), USS Glennon (DD-620) and USS Meredith (DD-726) proves that naval combat on D-Day was every bit as ferocious as combat on the beaches and drop zones.

Your donation of these pieces of source material has made a meaningful contribution to the collection of historical literature held by The National D-Day Museum. This library collection is open to researchers and consequently available for future historians who wish to continue the development of human understanding of this historic event.

Thank you very much for contributing to this institution’s library collection. We are deeply appreciative of your support.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

Martin K.A. Morgan
Research Historian
Commander E. Andrew Wilde, USNR, Ret
1210 Greendale Ave., Apt E3
Needham, MA 02492-4622

Dear Commander Wilde:

We were pleased to receive the USS Glennon (DD-620), another of your generous contributions to the Navy Department Library. Your documentation efforts continue to provide a consolidated source of information to many scholars, veterans, etc.

We are enclosing a Deed of Gift form for this material; this document is the legal record of your donation and our acceptance of the gift. Please sign and return the form as soon as possible. We will complete our portion and return a copy to you.

Thank you for your support of the Navy and the Navy Department Library.

Sincerely,

Jean L. HORT
Director, Navy Department Library

Enclosure