The U.S.S. Borie (DD-215) in World War II:
Documents and Photographs

Needham, Massachusetts
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Revised 2001
Any man who may be asked what he did to make his life worthwhile can respond with a good deal of pride and satisfaction, "I served in the United States Navy."

- President John F. Kennedy, addressing the new class of midshipmen at the United States Naval Academy on August 1, 1963.
The U.S.S. Borie (DD-215) in World War II

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101 112 TOTALS

E. A. Wilde, Jr.
July, 2000
The Clemson-class destroyer U.S.S. Boris (DD-215) on the ways at the William Cramp and Sons yard, Philadelphia, Penn., on October 3, 1919. Of the 273 Wicks and Clemson-class “four pipers” completed by eleven different builders from 1917 to 1920, forty-eight of them were built at Cramps’ shipyard. The pointed sterns on these ships left the propeller shafts outboard of the hull, so large guards were provided to protect the propellers when docking or going alongside another vessel. Shaped like fans, these propeller guards led to the term “fantail” for the aftermost area topside. (Official U.S. Navy Photograph.)
The destroyer U.S.S. Borie (DD-215) as she was launched on October 4, 1919, at Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. She was christened by Miss Patty Borie, the great-grandniece of the late ex-Secretary of the Navy, Adolph Edward Borie, 1809-1880. The Borie hoisted her commission pennant on March 24, 1920, Lt. Comdr. Emory F. Clement, USN, in command. (Official U.S. Navy Photograph.)
The USS Borie (DD-215), a 1,190-ton "flush-decker" destroyer commissioned in 1920, as she appeared before her escort duty conversion in August, 1942. Her crow's nest was removed after an SL radar was installed, but it proved useful on June 15, 1942, when the horizon lookout sighted rafts from the U.S.A.T. Merrimack (an Army transport), sunk by a U-boat in the Gulf of Mexico. The nine survivors rescued by the Borie had been adrift for a week and could not have survived much longer. (Official U.S. Navy Photograph.)
History of the U.S.S. Borie (DD-215)*

Borie

Adolph Edward Borie was born in Philadelphia, Pa., 25 November 1860. He was a successful merchant and served as Secretary of the Navy (5 March–22 June 1869) in the cabinet of President U. S. Grant. Mr. Borie died in Philadelphia 5 February 1880.

I

(DD-215: dp. 1215; l. 314’4”; b. 31’9”; dr. 9’10”; s. 35
k.; cpl. 122; a. 4 4”, 1 8”, 12 21” TT.; cl. Clemson)

The first Borie (DD-215) was launched 4 October 1919
by William Cramp and Sons Ship and Engine Building
Co., Philadelphia, Pa.; sponsored by Miss Patty Borie,
great-grandniece of Secretary Borie; and commissioned
24 March 1920, Lieutenant Commander E. F. Clement in
command.

In April 1920 Borie joined the United States Naval
Detachment in Turkish Waters for service in the Black
Sea. The following year she reported to Destroyer Di-
vision 35, Asiatic Fleet, and for the next four years alter-
nated between the Philippine Islands, during the winter,
and Chefoo and Shanghai, China, during the summer. She
then returned home and patrolled in the Caribbean until
the spring of 1927 when she made a cruise to Europe.
Borie remained with the Atlantic Fleet until 1929 when
she began a three-year tour with the Asiatic Fleet.

Following conversion to a Squadron Leader at San
Diego (1932–33) she joined Destroyer Squadron 2, Battle
Force. She remained in the Pacific on normal destroyer
duty until late 1939 and then transited the Panama Canal
to join the Neutrality Patrol. She served on the Inshore
Patrol, 15th Naval District, in Panama Bay, and later
on patrol and escort in the Caribbean. The destroyer
departed the Caribbean 26 June 1943 and on 30 July put
to sea as a member of the hunter-killer group built around
Card (CVE-11). Borie made four patrols with the Card
group. On 1 November 1943, during the last patrol, she
rammed and sank the surfaced German submarine U-405
in 49°00’ N., 31°14’ W. With 27 men lost and too badly
damaged by the collision to be towed to port, Borie was
sunk by Barry (DD-248) 2 November 1943.

Borie (DD-215) received three battle stars for her
World War II service as well as the Presidential Unit
Citation for her operations in the Card group.

* Dictionary of American Naval Fighting Ships, Volume 1. Wash-
ington: U.S. Naval Historical Center, 1959.
Excerpt from *Destroyers in Action* by Richard A. Shafter.*

"A Lovely Ship"

Destroyers! Mention the word and the layman's mind will conjure up a picture of a little ship streaming death-defying, head-on into the fire from an enemy battlewagon's heavy guns. In the heavy seasway the little ship is tossing like a cork, with the white water breaking high over her bows. Then suddenly she swerves hard to starboard. There are a couple of splashes on her ports and a moment later appear the bubbling wakes of the tin fish she has sent on their voyage of destruction. And a short while later there is a terrific crash. The enemy's sides and decks are clothed in sheets of smoke and flame from the explosions that tear her inwards apart. And another naval battle is won.

It is an inspiring picture that has adorned many a calendar sent by solicitous ship's chandlers and seed stores to their customers, to be remembered by for the rest of the year. The practice looks different. Whether it's even more romantic than the calendar artist envisioned, or just a drab, humdrum existence, depends very largely on the point of view of the individual man who crews a "tincan." One thing, however, can be said for it: it's most versatile. If Kipling's crack about the liner has of late found an officially sanctioned variation to describe the glamour girl of the Navy, "The Carrier, she's a Lady," then it can safely be varied once again: "The destroyer, she's a workhorse."

Pulling binder, hay rig, threshing machine or the "democrat" for the family on its way to church, it's all one to a farmer's workhorse. A Navy workhorse may be on antisubmarine patrol today: dropping depth charges in their prescribed pattern all over the spot where the cooperating Navy flyer believes he has seen the underwater raider; tomorrow, she may be riding herd on a convoy of merchantmen: running breathlessly and tongue-lolling around her flock, shooing stragglers into line, and then tackling, in the manner of good and faithful sheepdogs anywhere, all enemies regardless of size and number, whether aircraft, surface squadron, or wolf pack. Or they might install a pair of steel ovaries on her decks and give her a load of ugly horned eggs to drop in waters the enemy's fleet is certain to traverse. Then again, they might give her a pair of paravanes to tow and send her out to sweep the channels leading to a new invasion beach clear of the mines which the enemy himself has sown there, and then the next day convert her into a fast transport and send her in with a deckload of Marine Raiders who are to establish the first beachhead foothold. And while weird landing craft are yet on their way with reenforcements, supplies, tanks and artillery, the destroyer that has landed them will stand by to give the Leathernecks who are digging themselves in on the narrow coral strip whatever fire support her 4- or 5-inch guns are capable of.

Then again, on duty with a task force, the destroyer is in the van and on the flanks of the capital ships, scouting, protecting, running interference and when the actual engagement begins, throwing a smoke screen around the carrier or battlewagon to spoil the enemy's gunnery. When disaster comes, when carrier, battleship or cruiser has received the deadly wound that causes the decks to buckle and burst with the explosion of magazines and fuel tanks, it's the destroyer that rushes in close, though the heat may blister what patches of paint are still left on her sea-bitten plates, and takes off the men still left alive after the unsuccessful battle to save their doomed ship. As the hull of the big capital ship slowly drifts down with the tide, a roaring inferno, yet still floating, it is the destroyer's job to come in and send the once proud craft to the bottom with a torpedo, to save her from the last ignominy of having her dead body defiled by the enemy's hands.

Rescue missions generally are hardly more than mere routine assignments among the manifold jobs that are a destroyer's lot. Many a flyer, shot down by ack-ack, or forced down in a gale, later got back in the fight simply because some indefatigable DD would not give up the search. A quart of whiskey for her skipper and ten gallons of ice cream for her wardroom became the traditional price that any carrier gladly paid to a DD for each of its fliers delivered back aboard or safely landed in port.

"Let the DD's do it!" has almost become axiomatic with the Navy whenever there is a particularly unpleasant or difficult job under discussion. Their speed, their maneuverability, their relatively high firepower...
for their size, and their comparatively low building price, have made destroyers not merely the most versatile, but ton for ton the most efficient, naval craft ever devised. They are the Navy's true "expendables."

The spirit of the little ships reflects itself in that of their crews. Destroyermen are a bit apart from the rest of our man-of-war men. On their small ships they have to do without many of the comforts the crews of carriers, battleships or even cruisers enjoy. They live in cramped quarters. There is no canteen or ship's service booth where a man might get a coke, an ice cream or western story pulp magazine. Yet the destroyerman, though he bents about it all and swears it's a dog's life, in his innermost heart glories in the hardships his particular trade imposes upon him. He's inclined to look down on the men from the big ships as "softies." His walk is a "destroyer roll." His hat sits precariously on one eyebrow. He is the bane of the Shore Patrol.

He'll abuse his ship roundly as the most uncomfortable, leakingest, buckingest crate that ever went to sea. But let somebody else pass unfavorable comment on her and he's up in arms. Asked why he wasn't applying for a transfer after he had given a lengthy and extremely critical recital of his ship's famed action, a survivor of the Borie put it all in a nutshell. "Me? No, thanks! There's too much red tape on a big ship for me. On a destroyer you know everybody with their good sides and their faults. And everybody knows you. You can't sham on a DD. You gotta be a sailor, mister."

Destroyers get into the blood not merely of the men that serve in them, but of anybody who has been given a chance to get acquainted with them. Even a master of the hard-boiled school of writing like John Steinbeck can wax dithyrambic over a little ship. After spending part of his correspondent's tour of duty aboard a DD he wrote:

"A destroyer is a lovely ship, probably the nicest fighting ship of all. Battleships are a little like steel cities or great factories of destruction. Aircraft carriers are floating flying fields.

"Even cruisers are big pieces of machinery, but a destroyer is all boat. In the beautiful clean lines of her, in her speed and roughness, in her curious gallantry."
**U.S.S. Borie (DD-215)**

**Commanding Officers in World War II:**

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<th>Lt. Cdr. Harry F. Miller, USN</th>
<th>9/30/40 – 5/16/42</th>
<th>Retired Rank</th>
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**Notes:**

1 **Sources:** The Borie's deck logs at the National Archives and the transcript of Lt. Cdr. Hutchins' oral history recorded on November 15, 1943.

2 The date he reported for duty aboard the Borie. Rear Admiral Miller died on April 1, 1952, but there is no obituary for him on file at the U.S. Naval Academy. He graduated in the Class of 1925.

3 Captain Osborn, USN (Ret.) graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy, Class of 1929. He currently resides in Annapolis, Maryland.

4 Lt. Hutchins graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy, Class of 1936. He was USNR because he had resigned his commission prior to the war.

E. A. Wilde, Jr.
May, 1998
CHARLES HARRIS HUTCHINS '36

Cdr. Charles H. Hutchins USNR (Ret.) died on 30 August 1992 at his home in Hilton Head, S.C., after an extended four-month illness. Funeral services were held on 1 September in Hilton Head.

Born on 28 January 1913 in Rhode Island, "Hutch," as he was known to Classmates and friends, was appointed to the Naval Academy from Indiana in 1932, subsequently graduating with the Class of 1936.

Following graduation, Hutch served two years in NEVADA, followed by a short tour in the destroyer DORSEY before resigning his commission as ensign in September 1938. He had married Ann Hubbard in June of that year, and after leaving the Navy they settled in Terre Haute, Ind., where Hutch began learning the box industry.

In December 1941, Hutch was commissioned a Lieutenant (jg) USNR and ordered to active duty in Panama where he served as an ordnance officer. A year later, he was assigned as Executive Officer of BORIE engaged in anti-submarine patrol in the North and South Atlantic fleets, up to command in 1943. While on carrier escort duty, BORIE attacked, rammed and sank a German submarine, but the BORIE was lost as well. Hutch next took command of J. FEED TALBOTT for more North Atlantic duty. This was followed by orders to the destroyer DORAN which was later converted into a high-speed minesweeper and transferred to the Pacific Ocean in 1945.

For his WWII service in the Navy, he was the recipient of the Navy Cross, Presidential Unit Commendation, Navy Unit Commendation and several citations from foreign governments.

With the end of the war, Hutch was released to inactive duty and returned to Terre Haute and the box industry. He became sales manager and earned progressive assignments as the company expanded. He retired in 1964, becoming involved in other activities, including public service, until Ann's death in 1976.

In 1978, Hutch married Margaret Fee, widow of Jack Fee '35, and they left Indiana, moving south to enjoy retired life in Naples, Fla., and Linville, N.C. In March 1990, they moved again and took up residence in Hilton Head, S.C., their home at the time of Hutch's death.

Besides his wife, Margaret Fee Hutchins, he is survived by a daughter, Melissa A. Hutchins, two grandchildren, and his stepson, Capt. Jerome J. Fee USN (Ret.) '60.

* Shipmate magazine, November 1992
## LIST OF OFFICERS

Attached to and on board of the U.S.S. **PORTER** (215), commanded by H. F. MILLER, Lt. Commander, U.S.N., during the period covered by this Log Book, with date of reporting for duty, detachment, transfer, or death, from December 1, 1941, to December 31, 1941.

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<tr>
<th>NAME</th>
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<th>DETACHED DUTY</th>
<th>DUTY</th>
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<tr>
<td>H. F. MILLER</td>
<td>Lieut. Commander</td>
<td>9/30/40</td>
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<td>Commanding, Morale, Navigator (Acting)</td>
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<tr>
<td>R. T. MC DANIEL</td>
<td>Lieut. Commander</td>
<td>10/19/41</td>
<td></td>
<td>Executive, Navigator, First Lt. Damage Control, Engineering, Auditor (Acting)</td>
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<tr>
<td>W. A. PEOPLES</td>
<td>Lieutenant</td>
<td>10/19/41</td>
<td>12/26/41</td>
<td>Torpedo, Asst. Damage Control, Chemical Warfare</td>
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<td>S. J. ARNOLD</td>
<td>Ensign D-V(G), U.S.N.R.</td>
<td>2/9/41</td>
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<td>Communications, Censor, Athletics, Intelligence</td>
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<td>F. M. GILLESPIE, Jr.</td>
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<td>2/9/41</td>
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<td>P. B. BROWN</td>
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<td>9/20/41</td>
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<td>W. H. DIETZ, Jr.</td>
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<td>12/22/41</td>
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<td>R. C. YOUNG</td>
<td>Ensign D-V(F), U.S.N.R.</td>
<td>12/14/40</td>
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<td>Gunnery, Asst. First Lieutenant</td>
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Signed and found to be correct:

H. F. MILLER, Lieutenant Commander, U.S.N., Commanding.


(This page to be sent to Bureau of Navigation monthly with Log sheets.)
**U.S.S. Borie (DD-215)**

*Muster Roll of the Crew; 31 December 1941*

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<td>Anania, Edwardo (none)</td>
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<td>Ault, Forrest M.</td>
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<td>Bartholomew, Harry S.</td>
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<td>Behrens, John Willy</td>
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* * * * * * * * * *

1 Source: The ship's Personnel Diary on microfilm at the National Archives (Archives II/College Park, MD)

Enlisted complement on 31 December 1941: 123

E. A. Wilde, Jr.
June 1998
U.S.S. Borie (DD-215)
Rescue of Survivors of the U.S.A.T. Merrimack
(Deck Log entry, 15 June 1942)

16-20 Steaming as before on course 066° - 067°. 16-7-0
07-0° 06-3° 07-6° 06-7° - 06-8° 16-5° 07-6° to fuel. 20 Kts.
11-7° Plane PBY-8N (USN) aircraft. 16-8° on various columns and
at various speeds to pick up survivors or ship sinking.
16-24 Horizon_detect object right. Object sized judged to be
sunk. 16-34 Maneuver to pick up survivors 16-42 Riff to
alongside 16-45 a.p. allowed. 16-46 rescued allowed alive.

Survivors picked up by the USAT Merrimack from life rafts as
follows: 1st Lt. 20-48 P.Y. Rome 85°-22° W.: 1 (W.); 2nd Diary
Capt. James L. Russell 36° 24′ 26″ N.; Nominal Commander, A.B.
Fred B. Cahn 41° 45′ 40″. 4 B.: Master.

To rank rafte: 7 hrs - 172 23 (AA)
SP 24-3° 7.5 cm 3 - 16 hds 172 35 (20) SPA 24-4 92
Gun # 2 12 cm 36 (AP) and

Survivors rescued. - rescued condition. 17-01

Editor's Notes:
1. The U.S. Army Transport Merrimack was torpedoed by a U-boat in
   the Gulf of Mexico about a week earlier. She was 251 feet long
   and weighed 2,606 tons (gross).
2. The life rafts were sunk by Gun #2, the 4-in. 50 gun on the
   port side of the galley deckhouse, and Gun #5, a 3-in. 23 anti-
   aircraft gun mounted on the fantail. The latter was landed,
   probably in August, 1942, when the Borie was converted for es-
   cort duty.

E. A. Wilde, Jr.
July, 1998
The destroyer USS Borie (DD-215) at Balboa, C.Z., in August, 1942, when she was being converted for convoy escort duty. During this refit her four stacks were shortened, and two of her four triple-tube torpedo mounts were removed. Added, were six "K"-guns and 20-mm antiaircraft guns. Many of her hull ports were plated over, and her bridge was enclosed for splinter protection. (Official U.S. Navy photograph.)
The USS Borie (DD-215), a 1920-vintage "flush-decker" destroyer, during her refit for escort duty at Balboa, C.Z., in August, 1942. A new platform for two single 20-mm Oerlikon antiaircraft guns can be seen abaft of the motor whaleboat. Later, the crow's nest on her foremast was replaced by a surface search radar. These "four-pipers" gave a good account of themselves in WWII, and fifteen of them (including the Borie) were awarded the Presidential Unit Citation. (U.S. Navy photo)
(Balboa, C.Z., 8/42) Looking aft from the Borie's mast, showing the two triple torpedo tube mounts (center) which remained after her escort duty conversion. In her final battle, with a surfaced U-boat, the port mount (at right) launched a torpedo which missed the enemy vessel by only ten feet. This view shows main battery Gun #4, on the after deckhouse (at top). (U.S.N. Photo)
ACTION REPORT

USS BORIE

NO SERIAL

DD-215

17 JUNE 1943

ANTI-SUBMARINE ACTION BY SURFACE SHIP, REPORT OF.

FIVE ASW-1 FORM REPORTS OF ACTION IN LAT. 06.41 N, LONG. 53.03 W, COVERING ATTACK ON ENEMY SUBMARINE WHILE ESCORTING CONVOY TB-17 WITH TASK GROUP 42.2. PC-575 DELIVERED ONE ATTACK ON 17 JUNE 1943.
ADDENDUM: ANTI-SUBMARINE ACTION BY SURFACE SHIP

I. Situation.

1. This vessel patrolling starboard bow of convoy TB - 17 in company with Task Group 42.2. Sound search sector 340° - 120° relative to Convoy course (116T). Echo ranging in use. Escorts patrolling in phase. Speed of patrol eleven (11) knots. Course of this vessel approximately 155° (T).

2. Two bow lookouts assigned sectors from 100° across bow to own beam. Sixteen (16) ships in convoy. Five (5) columns, five cable interval, two cable distance. Column five with four ships, others three. Five escorts.

II. Action.

1. Starboard lookout observed unusual disturbance in water approximately 300 yards bearing 355° relative. Port lookout likewise saw disturbance, described as object moving on reciprocal course of this vessel. Report made to bridge and speed increased to 20 knots on starboard engine, rudder put hard left, sound gear trained on port quarter. Immediately gained excellent contact including propeller noises identified as submarine. The attempt was to intercept submarine as it moved toward convoy.

2. Upon reaching course 270°, which placed this vessel between submarine and convoy, target was observed on port bow at close range. Course was altered hard left to 235T for attack and propeller noises were observed to be on end of target toward convoy, indicating sub had turned away.

3. By the time the ship's head swung to new course, the advance had carried passed the target, sub passing over 200 yards on port beam.

4. After running out to get sufficient sea room, maintaining contact throughout, course was altered to heading cut on, 030° T. At range 700 yards, course was altered to 000° and ten charges dropped 1 minute and 24 seconds later. Contact was lost at about 200 yards.

5. The Chemical Recorder was not used during this attack because of its lack of range on short scale (1000 yards), permitting only 300 yards tracking between cutting in and turn to attack course at 700 yards.

6. After attack, maneuvered to regain contact which was done on bearing 110° T. On reattack, target remained on steady bearing, relative speed 15 knots (own speed 15 knots). Chemical recorder was used on this attack since initial range was just under 1000 yards. Excellent traces were obtained and target speed established as zero, indicating target stopped.

(ENCLOSURE A)
II. Action – (continued)

7. Four charges were dropped and it was noted that center of pattern was approximately 150 yards bearing about 255° from center of first attack. This would indicate that submarine proceeded that distance along its calculated course and then stopped.

8. It was further noted that contact was lost at 300 yards indicating submarine deeper in water.

9. A third attack of four charges was delivered under circumstances similar to the second and in the same area.

10. Upon attempting to regain contact after this attack, no definite target could be established through the disturbances caused by the explosions.

11. Therefore, a search was instituted in the surrounding area to prevent possible escape. It should be noted at this time that PC-575 searched surrounding area during second attack and subsequently.

   At the beginning of the search an Army bomber joined and joined the search.

12. After approximately 30 minutes of searching, plane dove and dropped markers bearing 275°, this vessel on course 205°.

13. Course was altered to 275° and speed increased to 20 knots. At range 1200 yards bearing 278° contact was regained, speed reduced to 15 knots. Contact was excellent and bearing remained steady, relative speed 15 knots, recorder in use.

14. Eight charges were dropped, the center being within 50-75 yards of second attack. It will be noted that depth of water was about 180-200 feet. All charges in last four attacks were set for 150 feet. Contact was again lost at about 300 yards.

15. Three minutes after attack water was observed to boil up within 100 yards of marker, similar to the appearance of a water slug fired by a submarine, except in this case it was about 30 feet in diameter.

16. The 20mm guns were used to indicate to the PC-575 the spot and she was instructed to attack while this vessel gained sea room for reattack. That vessel dropped two depth charges, evidently having oily mushy contact because of general disturbances. At this time the sound operator was having extreme difficulty in the area.

(ENCLOSURE A)
Addendum: ANTI-SUBMARINE ACTION BY SURFACE SHIP.

II. Action - (continued).

17. However, upon again closing the point of attack the operator did obtain a solid echo surrounded by others of less value.

18. Another pattern using 5 charges was dropped using recorder. Again the center was within a few yards of the marker from previous attack and within 50 - 75 yards of water slug.

19. As this ship gained room for reattack another large water slug was seen within a few yards of the attack, again three minutes after explosions. During search of the area and attempt to regain contact other similar disturbances were seen, but of lesser magnitude, but all within a radius of 100 yards. After about five minutes search, a small oil slick appeared measuring 300 yards by 30. No further contacts were obtained.

20. Attacks were delivered at times:

   First  1207  10 charges
   Second 1213  4 charges
   Third  1226  4 charges
   Fourth 1302  8 charges
       PC - 575 followed with 2 charges
   Fifth  1311  5 charges

21. Search of the area was continued until 1430 with no further evidence being obtained. In view of the value of the convoy and the serious depletion of escort strength, and since planes were searching the area, it was considered advisable to return to the convoy.

III. Comments.

1. Material functioning was excellent throughout, except as previously noted in regard to use of the Recorder. There were no casualties other than new leaks in oil tanks and one broken gauge glass in the lube oil system.

2. The recorder paper used during these attacks is submitted. Immediately after securing from General Quarters the Sound Officer removed the paper and dried it in the galley. It will be noted that all traces have completely disappeared, although currently instructions for handling such were strictly adhered to.

3. The coordination, spirit, and effectiveness of personnel cannot be too highly commended. To single out any one person or few persons for special mention is difficult.

(ENCLOSURE A)
Addendum:  ANTI-SUBMARINE ACTION BY SURFACE SHIP.

III. Comments - (continued).

4. However, the ability of CUXK, F.J., HT1/c, to obtain and hold contact under adverse conditions and radical maneuvering were particularly worthy of note. He kept a continuous flow of pertinent information from the 'stack' to the Commanding Officer during this operation and aided materially in the possible destruction of an enemy submarine.

5. Under the able leadership of CUXK, F.G., CT3, the ammunition party, repair party, and other available personnel brought 20 depth charges up from the magazine, armed and attached arbors, and loaded them in a matter of minutes. At no time was the ship delayed for lack of ready charges.

6. All hands handled their assignments efficiently and with initiative.

(ENCLOSURE A)
This view of the Baltimore is reproduced after her reconstruction at the New York Navy Yard. (Gun 47.)

This weapon was a 5-inch/38 gun (Gun No. 47). It was designed for a maximum range of 12,000 yards, and its maximum elevation was 30 degrees. Its rate of fire was about 6 rounds per minute. It was mounted on the deck, just forward of the bridge and the superstructure.
(New York Navy Yard, 7/9/43) Looking aft down the Borie's starboard side at the guns mounted atop the galley deckhouse: the #1 20-mm machine gun and the #3 4-inch/50 main battery gun. These guns were balanced on the port side of the deckhouse by the #2 20-mm and the #2 4-inch guns. Fortunately, the main battery guns could be depressed 15 degrees, so they were able to bear during much of the Borie's final battle, when she duelled at short range with a surfaced German submarine in rough seas.  (Official U.S. Navy Photograph.)
(New York Navy Yard, 7/9/43) The Borie's main deck, midships, looking aft from the No. 4 stack over the forward engine room hatches towards the elevated gun platform with #3 and #4 20-mm machine guns. The 20-mm clipping room which had been located between these hatches and the gun platform was removed during this yard availability. The starboard triple torpedo tube mount can be seen at the far left. (Official U.S. Navy Photograph.)
(New York Navy Yard, 7/9/43) This view of the Borie's main deck, looking forward from the after deckhouse, shows the depth charge projectors ("K"-guns) and 20-mm antiaircraft guns which replaced her after set of torpedo tube mounts in 1942 when she was refitted for escort duty. Shortly after her yard availability in July, 1943, the Borie made her first of four patrols with a hunter-killer group in the Atlantic. The 20-mm mount at the left (#5) and those in the raised platform (#3 & #4) played a key role in her final battle, when she engaged a surfaced German submarine, by sweeping the U-boat's deck clear of gunners. (Official U.S. Navy Photograph.)
BORIE USS  

DD 215  

SERIAL 067  

12 AUGUST 1943  

ANTI-SUBMARINE ACTION BY SURFACE SHIP - REPORT OF-  

FORWARDS FORM REPORT ASW-1 - COVERS ACTION  
WHILE OPERATING AS ANTI-SUBMARINE SCREEN  
FOR USS CARD, COMPOSING TASK GROUP 21-14.
CONFIDENTIAL

From: Commanding Officer.
To: Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet.
(2) Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet.

Subject: Anti-Submarine Action 8 August 1943 - report of.

Reference: (a) Atlantic Fleet Confidential Letter 4CL-43.
Enclosure: (A) Form report of Anti-Submarine Action by Surface Vessel.
(B) Executive Officer’s Report of Conduct of personnel.

1. Enclosures (A) and (B) are forwarded herewith. Advance copies as prescribed by reference (a) are forwarded direct under other cover.

2. This vessel was, at time of attack, operating with U.S.S. BARRY and U.S.S. GUFF as Anti-Submarine Screen for U.S.S. CARD, composing Task Group 21.14.

G. H. HUTCHINS

Advance Copy to:
ComInch.
ASW Unit.
Copy to: CTG 21.14
Second Attack

ANTI-SUBMARINE ATTACK ON SURFACE SHIP

U.S.S. BOREE (215) Date 8/8/43 1942 Time 1st Contact 1909 GCT
Lat. 41° N Long. 38° W Course 140° Speed 15 kts.
Convoy Designation Task Group 21.14 Convoy Course -----

INSTRUCTIONS

(a) ATTACK FIRST - Then collect data for this report!
(b) Do not "gun deck" this report - if data cannot be estimated with accuracy enter a dash in the space for which no data is available.
(c) Draw a circle around the appropriate entry in this report where-over suitable.
(d) Ships equipped with DRT submit pencil tracing of ship's track from time of first contact to termination of operation.
(e) If more than one attack was made on same submarine, submit a separate form for each attack.
(f) If Chemical Recorder used submit trace.

1. CIRCUMSTANCES AT TIME OF CONTACT

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<td>Smooth</td>
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<td>BY See Note 1*</td>
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<td>Whitesides</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
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If in company other ships, position relative to others:

Estimated sound range of the day_________ Yds.

Sound gear in use when contact made:

- Echo ranging

Prop Noises

Type of Echo Good

Doppler: High - Low - None 2**

SIGHT

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Remarks:

Note 1 - MANNING, R.E., 662-26-58, Son3/c., V-6, USNR.

2** Doppler effect, if any, was not obtained by operator.
2. ATTACK

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Assumed sub speed | 6
Assumed sub course | 260°

Estimated Sub Depth
Shallow-Medium-Deep

Note 1***
Was marker buoy dropped?

Yes

Charge No.: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14

(Indicate Duds):

Time of Drop: 

From 1st Chrg.: 0 2 4 5 7 7 10 15

Depth Setting:

Size Impulse: 

Charge:

Evidence of Damage to Sub. (Note: Do not confuse the brown residue from depth charge explosion with oil on water.)

Lookouts reported that a black object broke the surface momentarily.

Time between first contact on this target and this attack 14 minutes

If no further attacks made, time between last attack and abandonment of search

Reason search abandoned:

No. charges remaining 42

3. GENERAL REMARKS (USE ADDITIONAL SHEET IF NECESSARY):

(Show evasive tactics if possible)

1*** - Pattern had been set for a deep attack. Contact was held until range was 160 yards. This indicated a shallow target, but as there was very little time to change the settings, this deep pattern was dropped.
CONTELAL

ADDENDUM TO ENCLOSURE (A):

1. Tactical situation - Base course 340° T, zigzag plan 24 in use, BORLE on port bow, speed 17 knots. At 1755 stopped starboard engine to plug leaky tube in condenser, believed due to urgent attack delivered previous day on possible contact. At 1831 while swinging from heading 036° T to 025° T, sound operator obtained echo bearing 010° T. Turn was accelerated to that heading to investigate contact. Chemical recorder was placed in readiness and depth charge battery set up with an eight charge pattern medium depth.

2. Contact was lost, to be regained again at 1832 bearing 350° T, range 430 yards. These echoes were particularly sharp. Rudder was put hard left and contact held to 160 yards. Charges were fired 22 seconds later, with last contact slightly on starboard bow. No results were observed.

3. Second pattern was set up as ship moved out for sea room on course 330° T. This pattern was set deep in belief submarine, if such it were, would seek depth.

4. Course was altered to 140° T for reattack and at 1600 yards contact was regained bearing 150° T. After two or three sharp echoes, contact was lost, not to be regained until picked up again at range 350 yards, bearing 165° T. Course had been altered to 160° T prior to last regaining contact, since motion in that direction had been indicated throughout previous attack and in reattack. Rudder was put hard right and contact again held to 160 yards. Echoes were very sharp, target width about 15 - 20 degrees and motion of target determined. Again eight charges were fired 22 seconds after contact lost.

5. It was noted that center of pattern bore about 245° T from first, distance about 300 yards.

6. About one and one half minutes after this second attack, as BORLE stood out for sea room, and object was seen to rise to the surface within the pattern area and immediately submerge. This was reported from three different parts of the ship.
7. This spot was immediately closed again for reattack, but no satisfactory sound contact could be obtained in the disturbance. An attack on the general area itself was not made, since to do so would have reduced the number of charges available for possible firm contact as this vessel emerged from the disturbance.

8. Further search of the vicinity produced negative results. No evidence of damage was found, nor were any fish observed.

9. Descriptions obtained of the object which broke surface strongly suggest the bow of a submarine. In view of the fair sound conditions existing and the similarity of the echoes of these contacts with trial echoes made on other ships of the Task Group each day, it is believed the target was definitely submarine. Further, the location of the surfacing with relation to pattern center precludes the possibility of its escaping without some damage.

10. If this second attack had been delivered with charges set at a lesser depth, it is believed the results would have been far more promising.

11. The work of the after engine room crew during this attack is particularly worthy of note. By 1934 they had located and plugged leaky tube and had starboard engine again in operation. This work carried on during depth charge firing.
Executive Officer's Report - Conduct of Personnel:

1. The performance of all personnel during the attack was excellent. All Hands manned their Battle Stations quickly and throughout the attack executed all duties quietly and efficiently.

2. Prior to the first depth charge attack a condensor tube was ruptured in the after main condensor. The after engine room was necessarily secured. The crew took this casualty in stride and did not allow it to interfere with the prosecution of the attack in anyway.

3. The men in the after engine room deserve special mention for their action in repairing the ruptured condensor tube during the attack. The following men were chiefly responsible for repairing the condensor which required only one hour and thirty-eight minutes: LUCAS, Kenneth Miles, 250-36-28, CLM(Aa), U.S.N., CALDWELL, John Daniel, 201-60-32, H.M.1/c., U.S.N., TRENZ, Edward (none), 403-03-54, M.M.1/c., 0-1, U.S.N.R., PAGNOTTA, Mario James, 403-64-81, H.M.2/c., U.S.N.

(Enclosure B)
From: Commander Task Group 21.14  
(Strike Commander, U.S.S. CARD).  
To: Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet.  
Via: Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet.

1. Forwarded.

2. Position of attack is calculated by this ship as: 
Latitude: 41°38' N., Longitude: 36°22' W.

3. Attack was well executed and delivered.

4. The positive nature of the contact; the appearance of an object that was probably the submarine's bow; and the lack of any further sound contact in the area suggest that this submarine was probably sunk.

Signed: [Signature]

Copy to: 
U.S.S. BORIE
The USS Borie (DD-215) (Lt. C. H. Hutchins, USNR) sank the German submarine U-405 on 1 November 1943 in the Central Atlantic, halfway between Newfoundland and Ireland (see map). The Borie had been detached from the hunter-killer Task Group 21.14 (Captain A. J. Isbell, USN, aboard the escort carrier USS Card (CVE-11)) to search for a submarine sighted by one of the carrier's planes the previous day. Prior to her epic battle with U-405 the Borie attacked and apparently sank another U-boat, but this vessel was able to limp back to her base at Brest, France.

The U-405 was a 220-foot Type VII-C boat displacing 712 tons.
All of the drama and intensity of the prolonged battle between the USS Borie (DD-215) and the German submarine U-405 on 1 November 1943, is conveyed by this painting. It was an epic duel fought mostly on the surface at night in high seas. One hour and twelve minutes after the initial contact was made the U-boat was finally sunk by gunfire and depth charges. The Borie, abandoned after a long struggle, was sunk by U.S. planes. (Painting by Combat Artist Warrant Boatswain Hunter Wood, USCG.)
From: Commanding Officer.
To: Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet.
Via: Commander Task Group 21.14,
      (Commanding Officer, U.S.S. CARD).
Reference: (a) Cinclant Conf. Ltr. 13CL-43.
           (b) Cinclant Conf. Ltr. 12CL-43.
Enclosures: (A) Report of Action, 31 October 1943.
             (B) Report of Action, 1 November 1943.
1. Enclosures (A) and (B) are forwarded herewith.
2. BORIE encountered first submarine at 2010, 31 October 1943, ship time (zone description plus one hour and fifty-four minutes) and sank it in three depth charge attacks.
3. Second sub was contacted at 0153, 1 November 1943, and after one hour and four minutes of action was sunk.
4. Damage sustained by BORIE during this second action necessitated abandoning ship just prior to sunset, 1 November, and scuttling her the next morning, 2 November, by gunfire of U.S.S. BARRY and bombs of plane flown from U.S.S. CARD.
5. All classified material was destroyed and was not compromised.
6. No serious casualties to personnel were sustained during action, but because of adverse weather conditions three officers and twenty-four men were lost when ship was abandoned.
7. The Commanding Officer invites attention to the difficulties of a night gun action with submarines and strongly

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recommends that ships equipped with radar controlled guns be made available for offensive action in submarine concentrations.

C. H. HUTCHINS

SECRET-SECURITY
CVE-11/A15-3
9 November 1943.

From: Commanding Officer.
To: Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet.

Enclosure: (C) Extract from Task Group 21.14 Narrative.

1. Forwarded, strongly concurring in the recommendation that "ships equipped with radar controlled guns be made available for offensive action in submarine concentrations".

2. The length of the second submarine, as estimated by BORIE's Commanding Officer, is closely corroborated by answers to a questionnaire circulated by this ship to all BORIE personnel top-side during the action.

3. The BORIE's final two actions exemplify the finest fighting traditions of the Naval Service. Only the loss of the three officers and twenty-four men after the BORIE was abandoned mars the joy in these two splendid victories.

4. Enclosure (C) is forwarded herewith for ready reference and immediate information.

A. J. ISBELL.
ADDITION TO REPORT OF ACTION BY U.S.S. BORIE WITH SUBMARINE

31 OCTOBER 1943.

It is to be noted that with exception of recorder traces all data, logs, and records covering this action were lost when ship later sank. All information was collected immediately following action and those data given are considered accurate. Any doubtful data are either omitted or indicated as such.

At sunset, 31 October, BORIE was ordered by Commander Task Group 21.14 to proceed to position, Latitude 49-03 N., Longitude 31-55 W., where planes of the Task Group had sighted two subs on surface cruising in echelon, and had sunk one, the larger of the two escaping.

Arriving on station BORIE conducted search getting radar contact bearing 095 T, distance 6500 yards while on course 090 T. Changing course to 095, speed 22-1/2 knots, target was closed, radar contact being maintained throughout and target tracked on course 275, speed about 15 knots.

At range 1700 yards, BORIE changed course to 135 to expose battery and permit ramming from broad on bow. Starshells were fired, followed immediately by obtaining sound contact on same bearing. About 10 seconds after firing, radar contact was lost.

Changed course left and slowed to 15 knots to conduct depth charge attack. Sub tracked on 306 T, speed 4 knots. Held good contact in to 150 yards. Sub apparently used no evasive tactics and no counter measures by sub were noted.

Following immediately after attack, heavy under water explosion was heard and felt. This blew out all QCL fuzes and knocked some brickwork out of one boiler.

Repairs were effected and area again closed within 10 minutes. During second approach sound contact was again obtained about 300-400 yards, bearing 075 from float light marking first attack. As contact was closed at 15 knots, heavy odor of diesel oil was observed by personnel in many parts of the ship. Second attack delivered and procedure to regain contact instituted.

ENCLOSURE (A)
As BORIE turned to reattack, sub was seen to rise to surface, silhouetted by float light. Radar contact was simultaneously obtained. Sub appeared to lift out of water, bow high, then after three appearances on SL radar screen, sub was observed to submerge, stern first, and radar contact disappeared.

Regained sound contact and delivered third attack at 15 knots, range rate 15 knots, bearing steady. Point of contact, as marked by float light, was about 150 yards, bearing 075 from second attack.

Further efforts to regain contact were without success. Area was searched three and one-half hours for target or any evidence of destruction thereof.

No target was found, but upon returning to point of attacks, the surface of the water was observed to be profusely covered with diesel oil, the extent of the slick being estimated at 1000 yards.

Original radar contact was obtained by POTTER, Earl Jerome, soundman second class, 316-79-58, U. S. Navy.

ENCLOSURE (A)
From: Executive Officer.
To: Commanding Officer.


1. The entire personnel of the ship acted in a very creditable manner. There were no outstanding acts above and beyond the call of duty but all hands performed their duty in excellent fashion.

2. The torpedo department deserves special mention for the efficient operation of the depth charge battery after the hydraulic release mechanism from the bridge failed. The Sugar Love radar operator, POTTER, Earl Jerome, 316-79-58, soundman second class, U.S. Navy, is to be commended for a very alert watch in that he obtained a contact on the submarine at eight miles. The sound operator, KENT, Lerten "V", 618-11-57, soundman second class, U.S. Naval Reserve, is to be commended for his excellent operation of the sound stack which contributed materially to the successful destruction of the enemy submarine.

P. E. BROWN
ADDENDUM TO REPORT OF ACTION BY U.S.S. BORIE WITH SUBMARINE

1 NOVEMBER 1943.

Subsequent to action of 31 October 1943, by BORIE, covered by separate report, and at position, Latitude 49-00 N., Longitude 31-14 W., about 26 miles east of that action, while conducting search, course 180 T, speed 17-1/2 knots, radar contact was obtained at 0153 ship time (0344 GCT) bearing 170 T, range 8000 yards. Increased speed to 27 knots, holding radar contact until lost at 2800 yards.

Slowed to 15 knots and gained sound contact at 2000 yards bearing 170 T. Conducted depth charge attack, bearing drawing left, range rate 10 knots. At range 500 yards, bearings drew rapidly right. BORIE changed course to 210, range rate dropped to 6 knots. Fired 5 seconds late using 10 knot range rate on recorder for firing purposes.

As BORIE drew away from point of attack during procedure for regaining sound contact, sub was seen to emerge from depth charge disturbance. Radar contact was simultaneously obtained, range 400 yards.

The 24 inch searchlight was trained to the sub using SL radar bearings transmitted by voice over JB phone circuit. Then, assisted by this radar, the searchlight was used continuously until the sub was sunk, except for short period when shut off for tactical reasons.

Changed course to close and increased speed to 25 knots. Range opened to about 1400 yards before turn was completed. BORIE opened fire with all main battery guns and 20MM machine guns as they came to bear during turn.

Sub opened fire with six 20MM guns shortly thereafter and scored hits in forward engine room, as well as scattered and harmless hits near bridge area. However, BORIE's 20MM battery was extremely effective and in a matter of seconds had wiped out every exposed member of sub's crew top side. The effectiveness of this battery was an outstanding feature of the next hours running battle. The submarine made continuous effort to man their deck guns, but as each man emerged from the coming tower hatch to the bridge, he was immediately met by a hail of 20MM projectiles.

ENCLOSURE (B) -1-
As BORIE completed turn to close and all the port main battery could bear, control was shifted from local to centralized control, pointer fire. Thence, depending on situation, this method and director control were used almost entirely. A very early salvo, either the second or third, saw all three shells strike the sub's forecastle apparently under forward deck gun. When smoke and fire subsided, deck gun was gone without having fired a shot.

Sub maneuvered on extremely evasive courses at about 15-16 knots trying to escape on surface as BORIE came in firing all guns, closing to ram.

Coming up on sub's starboard quarter at 25 knots range closed rapidly and BORIE turned in to ram. Just a few seconds before the crash, with course about 295° relative to sub's, the sub turned hard left attempting to parallel BORIE, however, BORIE struck about 30 feet abaft sub's stem and rode up and over sub's forecastle, pinning it under.

The two ships remained in this position for about 10 minutes, with angle between centerlines about 25 to 30 degrees from parallel headings.

During this part of the action main battery guns #2 and #4, and 20mm machine guns #3, #4, and #6 kept up a continual fire, battering the conning tower, machine guns, and after end of sub to a flaming wreck.

Several attempts were made by the sub to man its guns but no one got near them, being met by four inch, 20mm, Tommy Gun, pistol, rifle, and shot gun fire. One man was killed by a sheath knife thrown from BORIE's deck and which buried itself in the man's stomach, another was knocked overboard by an empty four inch shell case thrown by the gun captain of gun #2 which could not then bear.

At this time it was possible to examine the sub fairly thoroughly. She was about 300 feet long, painted a very light gray with a polar bear device on conning tower. Three numbers had been painted on conning tower but the space they occupied had been too badly shot up to distinguish them. Forecastle deck faired back its full length with no flare in sheer line where gun had been. Six machine guns were mounted on after end of bridge structure, one centerline quadruple open mount, and two single mounts on each side and forward of quad.
In 1941 the 20-mm Oerlikon air-cooled machine gun began to replace the .50-cal. water-cooled machine gun as the Navy's standard light antiaircraft weapon. (It was also called a machine cannon, because it fired explosive shells.) This early Mark 4 version with an open-ring sight required a four-man crew: the gunner, a trunnion operator (to adjust the height of the gun carriage) and two loaders. When fitted with the Mark 14 gyroscopic sight, introduced in 1943, a range setter was also required to enter range data. The Oerlikon had an effective range of 1,600 yards and fired at a rate of 450 rounds/minute. (Official USN photo.)
The sub's bow had been badly battered, apparently by the depth charge attack.

It was during this period that BORIE received severe underwater damage along entire port side, including both engine rooms, as ships pounded together in sea, before separating.

Sub got underway again with BORIE in pursuit, firing main and 20mm battery effectively, one four inch shell exploding in sub's starboard diesel exhaust. Sub took advantage of its short turning circle to open range to about 400 to 500 yards. At this time BORIE brought port torpedo battery on target, but as first torpedo of salvo was fired sub turned radically. Balance of spread was not fired. No hit was made.

Sub then went into tight circle to port and because of large turning circle, BORIE could not close. Forward engine room was seriously flooded by this time, thus hampering movements.

However, sub was held under continuous fire, hits being registered in good fashion. By this time, about 35 of the sub's crew had been killed.

At this point the searchlight was intentionally doused and sub, trying to escape in darkness, turned right. Radar was used to follow sub until position was advantageous to again use light. Sub was then picked up in light.

Sub now came on to starboard bow under fire of starboard battery. BORIE closed to ram again, but just before contact, sub slowed and turned into BORIE's starboard quarter. BORIE immediately turned hard left, backing full on port engine throwing stern toward sub, to bring it in range of projectors and fired starboard depth charge projector battery. Three charges, set at 30 feet, with #1 and #5 projectors loaded with #1 impulse charge, #3 loaded with #2 charge. Result was a perfect straddle grouped around conning tower, one over and two short. All exploded, lifting sub bodily and stopping it before it touched BORIE. Being nearly dead in water, BORIE was well shaken by depth charges.

During this entire time all bearing guns were firing and hitting well.

Sub then turned astern of BORIE, at reduced speed. BORIE turned left to close again, range opened out to about 600-700 yards. Remaining two torpedoes in port battery were readied, tubes ordered trained to match pointers, and the stand-by given.
as pointers neared matching. Just prior to firing, with tubes
10 degrees from bearing, the main battery fired a full salvo
which knocked an engine room hatch open, catching the under side
of the tube, jamming it. One torpedo was fired and seen to pass
within 10 feet of the sub's bow, but did not hit.

However, a main battery salvo struck the sub's starboard
diesel exhaust (the second hit in this spot) and sub immediately
slowed, stopped, and surrendered, firing white Very's stars.
Several of these were fired with a few red and green, apparently
in a shower.

About 15 members of the crew, with yellow rubber rafts,
abandoned ship. Within two or three minutes the sub sank stern
first at steep angle and exploded, possibly from scuttling
charges set by officer who was last person seen to leave sub.

As BORIE maneuvered to pick up first of survivors, the
personnel in rafts continued to fire Very's stars, apparently
signalling to another sub, since the entire group of survivors
was only 50-60 yards from BORIE, held in beam of searchlight.
An answering white star was seen bearing about 220 T.

At this time, with survivors just off port bow, and
BORIE heading 240 T, the sound operator heard torpedo bearing
220. BORIE immediately went ahead with all available speed
coming hard left to 220. Torpedo was followed down port side
by sound gear and slightly phosphorescent wake was apparent.

Unfortunately, these evasive tactics forced the ship to
run directly over group of survivors. They were not seen again
as BORIE cleared area, using radical zigzag gaining room to
northwest.

The entire action, from the initial contact until the
sub sank, lasted one hour and four minutes.

The ramming resulted in serious damage to BORIE. The
entire port side, from bow to after end of "P" tanks was badly
crushed and holed. The forward engine room flooded completely
in spite of all efforts to prevent it.

Only minor casualties to personnel occurred during action.
Of particular note was the effectiveness of the 20MM battery. "Murderous" is the only word which adequately describes it. That battery prevented any successful use of the sub's guns. Only two stoppages were experienced and these were quickly cleared. Ranges varied from about 1200-1400 yards down to 40 feet.

Having no radar control of the main battery, use of the searchlight was mandatory. It was entirely successful, but furnished the sub with information as to BORIE's location.

The inability of the 1200 ton destroyer to turn sharply was a severe handicap, resulting in prolonging the action and making possible the sub's evasion of a direct blow in ramming tactics.

Ship's doctrine for the use of shallow set depth charges against a surfaced sub was amply justified by the results obtained.

Throughout the action, the initiative of all personnel and their quick estimate of the situation were gratifying. One example was that period of the engagement when the sub was pinned alongside. On 27 October, during the routine battle drills, the situation was presented by the Executive Officer, wherein a submarine rammed the ship in the port side of the forward engine room. When this action, then, presented almost exactly that situation, every man acted immediately without orders.

Although the facilities for a CIC of any great import in a ship of the BORIE's type are extremely limited, every effort was made to utilize what did exist. It functioned exactly as planned, furnishing all possible information without a hitch, under the direction of the Executive Officer, who remained there except when sub was alongside. During that phase of the action he used a Tommy Gun from the bridge with telling effectiveness.

Sound operator, KENT, Lerten V., soundman second class, 618-11-57, U. S. Naval Reserve.

ENCLOSURE (B)
To: Commanding Officer USS BORIE.
From: Executive Officer USS BORIE.

Subject: Second Enemy Attack, Night of October 31, November 1, 1943 - personnel report of.

1. As in the first encounter of this night the conduct of the entire crew was uniformly excellent. "All Hands" executed their duties in above average fashion. The Executive Officer feels that he cannot adequately express in words his pride in the way that the officers and crew of the ship met the task of battle. They manned their stations and obtained the maximum efficiency from the equipment at hand. The complete disregard for personal safety, and the initiative shown by "All Hands" was an inspiring sight. All of these men knew what they were going to do and did it, coordinating their efforts into a single efficient fighting unit; very few commands being necessary.

2. "All Hands" performed individual feats which demonstrated their initiative, courage and intelligence showing that they had a complete understanding of the situation. Some of the outstanding ones were as follows:

(a) Lt. M. R. Brown, DE-V(G), USNR, who with GREEN, W. J., 161-81-21, CVM, USNR, and PAGNOTTA, Mario James, 403-64-81 USN, manned a flooding engine room operating the turbines sometimes at 25 knots until the water was over their heads. Lt. M.R. Brown manned the throttles with water up to his neck and deck plates drifting about his feet.

(b) The after engine-room crew and the engine repair party accomplished excellent results in operating their plant at high speeds and at the same time repairing two holes in the ship's hull. The engine-room was in charge of LUCAS, Kenneth Miles, 250-36-28, CVM, USN. The men who were outstanding in repairing the holes and shoring the bulkhead between engine-rooms were SAUM, Irving Randolph, 414-61-56, MM2/c, USNR and SHOCKLEY, Edd Monohan, 256-30-60, MM2/c, USN.

(c) The bulkhead between the forward engine-room and after fire-room was well shored by men in a repair party under ROBERTSON, Edgar Tell, 402-76-15, CML/c, USNR who was back of a hot boiler for sometime seeing that the shores were well placed.

(d) The crews of all guns were uniformly accurate and handled all casualties excellently. The gun Captain of gun one, REYNOLDS, Kenneth Joseph, 403-03-61, CML/c, USNR, fired his gun by pulling the firing latch manually when all other
methods failed early in the action. His whole hand and wrist were badly swollen when the action which lasted 1 hour and 4 minutes, was over due to the recoil from the gun. The gun Captain of guns number two and three, KURZ, Walter Charles, 402-76-78, CBN, USNR immediately ejected six shells which misfired throwing them over the side without thought for the personal danger entailed, and when the enemy was alongside where his gun would not bear they threw empty shell cases at them with the result that one German was hit in the head and knocked overboard from the submarine. The first loader of gun four SHEPHARD, Christopher Columbus, 265-79-01, CK1/c, USN, took over the pointer duties when the pointer was temporarily blinded by the flash from the gun and kept the gun hitting. The gun crews of machine guns number 3 and 4, when the spray shield interfered with their line of fire, fired through the shield. Minor wounds were inflicted on several members of the gun crew but the men continued operating the guns until the action was over.

(e) The torpedomen under CROWNIN, Frank J., 504-03-64, CTM, USN kept the depth charge battery fully manned hauling additional depth charges out of the warhead locker and assembling them in record time during the gun action.

(f) As in the first attack KENT, Lerten "Y", 618-11-57, SM2/c and DUKE, Frank J., RT1/c, USNR, sound and surface radar operators respectively handled their equipment efficiently and effectively.

(g) SOUTHWICK, David Francis, 607-04-69, FL/c, USNR when the submarine was alongside threw his knife from his battle station on the depth charge battery burying it in the stomach of one of the Germans trying to man one of their machine guns.

(h) CBN, Walter Kurz mentioned above is again to be commended for his excellent work in stripping ship after the action thereby helping to increase the stability of the ship, then badly damaged.

(i) Machinist Mate, Irving Saum (mentioned above), as a volunteer, is especially to be commended for descending under ten feet of water into the flooded forward engine-room and securing the secondary drain cut out valve, which enabled the securing of the after main drain and increasing the speed and security of the ship. It is recommended that this man be given an award for action above and beyond the call of duty.

[Signature]

F. W. BROWN
From: Commanding Officer.
To: Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet.
Via: (1) Commander Task Group 21.14,
(2) Commander, Destroyer Squadron 21.
(3) Commander Destroyers, Atlantic Fleet.
(4) Commander in Chief, U. S. Atlantic Fleet.

Subject: Report of Damage Sustained by U.S.S. BORIE in Action with Enemy Submarine, 1 November 1943.


1. Minor damage was received by BORIE by machine gunfire of sub, scattered hits taking effect below waterline, port side of engine room, as ship rolled in sea. They were inconsequential.

2. Major damage was received when BORIE rammed sub and two ships pounded together in sea. The entire port side, from bow to after end of "D" tanks, was crushed and holed below waterline, the worst damage being inflicted in the forward engine room. Here there were several holes about one foot in area in addition to widely opened seams.

3. Similar damage was experienced in after engine room, but on a smaller scale. Although water reached nearly to the floor plates, effective measures brought the leakage within the capacity of the main circulator during the next few hours.

4. However, this success was not attained in the forward engine room even with all available pumps, and the water increased rapidly. The latter part of the action was fought with the turbines running under water.

5. The forward and after bulkheads of this engine room were shored to prevent their rupture.

6. Since the speeds required by BORIE to press the battle were too great to maintain vacuum using the circulators, it was necessary to exhaust to the atmosphere.
Subject: Report of Damage Sustained by U.S.S. BORIE in Action with Enemy Submarine, 1 November 1943.

7. The make up feed tank, C-101, was badly contaminated with salt water.

8. All fuel tanks were holed, resulting in contaminated fuel.

9. At the conclusion of this action, a torpedo from another submarine was dodged and BORIE withdrew to rendezvous with balance of Task Group at best speed, 17 knots on starboard engine, with the port engine useless.

10. It was still necessary to exhaust to the atmosphere and since all fresh water was lost or used up, boilers #3 and #4 were secured to prevent their contamination. Their water was used in #1 and #2. All water was gone before dawn and sea water admitted.

11. It was soon impossible to operate starboard turbine and boiler #2 was secured, #1 steaming for evaporators and pumps. Flooding of forward engine room resulted in loss of generators and all electric power.

12. The main deck was broken across about four feet forward of after bulkhead of #2 fireroom. The port side was severely weakened in forward engine room, port side. Forward engine room was completely flooded to waterline and bounding bulkheads began to evidence weakness. There was no electric power on ship. Seas were high and weather showed no signs of moderating.

13. Therefore, the chances of getting BORIE back to port were remote. The tactical situation was not favorable. Enemy submarines were in concentration in the area.

14. The Commanding Officer decided to abandon ship and scuttle her. At the direction of Commander Task Group 21.14, BORIE was not scuttled at that time, but was screened throughout the night. The next morning, 2 November 1943, in position
Subject: Report of Damage Sustained by U.S.S. BORIE in Action with Enemy Submarine, 1 November 1943.

Latitude 50-12 N, Longitude 30-48 W, she was sunk by gunfire of U.S.S. BARRY and bombs of U.S.S. CARD planes.

C. H. HUTCHINS.

SECRET-SECURITY U.S.S. CARD 9 November 1943.
CVE-11/A16-3 1st Endorsement
( 0046 )

From: Commanding Officer.
To: Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet.
Via: (1) Commander, Destroyer Squadron 31.
(2) Commander Destroyers, Atlantic Fleet.
(3) Commander in Chief, U. S. Atlantic Fleet.

1. Forwarded, concurring in decision of BORIE's Commanding Officer as to necessity of abandoning ship.

A. J. ISBELL.

Advance Copy to: COMINCH.
SECRET


1. Forwarded concurred in first endorsement.

2. The gallant conduct of Lieutenant Hutchins and the Ship's Company of the BOREA during the successful action with two enemy submarines has already received recognition from the Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet.

H. L. DEYOE

Copy to:
CO BOREA
CO CAND
Consection 31
SECRET

FOURTH ACKNOWLEDGMENT: to
CO FORIE Secret Ltr.
A16-3 of 7 Nov. 1943.

FROM: Commander in Chief, United States Atlantic Fleet.

To: Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.


1. Forwarded.

2. In view of the severe damage received and the attendant circumstances, the Commanding Officer of the U.S.S. FORIE was entirely justified in his decision to abandon ship.

3. The report of this action has been covered in separate correspondence.

4. Transmission of this letter by registered mail within the continental limits of the United States is authorized.

R. E. INGERSOLL

Copy to:
ComDeSLeant
C.O. EV-BORIE
C.O. CARD
The President of the United States takes pleasure in presenting the NAVY CROSS to

LIEUTENANT MORRISON R. BROWN, UNITED STATES NAVAL RESERVE

for service as set forth in the following

CITATION:

"For extraordinary heroism as Engineer Officer of the U.S.S. BORIE when that vessel attacked and sank an enemy submarine on the morning of November 17, 1943. Grimly determined to keep the engines of the BORIE operative and with sufficient power to complete her mission, despite serious damage sustained during the prolonged battle, Lieutenant Brown remained steadfastly at his post, buffeted by debris in the heavy rolling of the vessel and with water pouring into the forward engine room. As the flooding increased and the compartment became untenable, he calmly ordered his men to safety while he stayed below, standing neck-deep in water at the throttle until the BORIE had completely destroyed the submarine. Lieutenant Brown's courageous and unswerving devotion to duty in the face of grave peril was in keeping with the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service."

For the President,

FRANK KNOX
Secretary of the Navy.

Copy to:
Pers 328
Pers 18
Pers 182
Public Relations, Navy Dept.

Ref: CinClant - Ser 337
26 January 1944 - Special

Born: 12 October 1916
Swampscott, Mass.
H. Add: 4615 Alton Road
Miami Beach, Florida
N. of kin: Frances G. Brown
(wife) 4615 Alton Road
Miami Beach, Florida
Cass. status: Missing in action
(101070)
THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
WASHINGTON

The President of the United States takes pleasure in presenting the NAVY CROSS to

IRVING RANDOLPH SAUM, MACHINIST'S MATE SECOND CLASS
UNITED STATES NAVAL RESERVE

for service as set forth in the following

CITATION:

"At 0200, 1 November 1943, while engaged in action against an enemy submarine, BORIE was severely holed in the forward engine room, which resulted in flooding that space to the vessel's waterline and the eventual disabling of the port engine and the abandonement of that room. In order that all available pumps might be placed on the suction of the after engine room to prevent its flooding, it was necessary to close the secondary drain suction in the forward engine room, located about ten feet below the level of the water. Because of the heavy rolling of the ship, it was extremely dangerous to enter the debris-filled water. SAUM volunteered to descend into the water in the engine room to secure the suction valve. He accomplished his task, permitting all remaining pumps to be used to control the water in the after engine room."

For the President,

(Frank Knox)

Secretary of the Navy.

Typed from a draft citation on an index card filed at the U.S. Naval Historical Center. Awarded by a CinClant ltr. dated 28 November 1943.

E. A. Wilde, Jr.
September, 1996
THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
WASHINGTON

The President of the United States takes pleasure in presenting the SILVER STAR MEDAL to

WILLIAM J. GREEN, CHIEF MACHINIST'S MATE
UNITED STATES NAVAL RESERVE

for service as set forth in the following

CITATION:

"For gallant and intrepid conduct as a member of the crew of the forward engine room of the USS BORIE during the action against an enemy submarine on 1 November 1943. When the forward engine room of the BORIE was holed and took water so rapidly as to endanger both the engine room and the ship, Chief Machinist's Mate WILLIAM J. GREEN remained faithfully at his post and endeavored to reduce the flow of water into the ship while keeping his damaged engine in operation. Despite all efforts, the inflow of water was too great for the capacity of the pumps, and the water level rose in spite of all attempts to neutralize the damage. Only on the practical completion of the battle, after the water had risen neck deep, and when specifically ordered by the Engineering Officer to abandon the engine room did he leave his station and cease his outstanding efforts to keep the ship afloat and maneuverable. By his unyielding loyalty in the face of imminent, ever increasing danger, and his complete disregard of his personal safety, he materially assisted his ship in its victory over an enemy submarine."

For the President,

Secretary of the Navy.

Typed from a draft citation on an index card filed at the U.S. Naval Historical Center. Awarded by CinCLant ltr. dated 26 January 1944.

E. A. Wilde, Jr.
September, 1996
THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
WASHINGTON

The President of the United States takes pleasure in presenting the SILVER STAR MEDAL to

MARIO JAMES PAGNOTTA, MACHINIST'S MATE, FIRST CLASS
UNITED STATES NAVY

for service as set forth in the following

CITATION:

"For gallant and intrepid conduct as a member of the crew of the forward engine room of the USS BORIE during the action against an enemy submarine on 1 November 1943.

"When the forward engine room of the USS BORIE was holed and took water so rapidly as to endanger both the engine room and the ship, Mario James Pagnotta, Machinist's Mate, Second Class, remained faithfully at his post and endeavored to reduce the flow of water into the ship while keeping his damaged engine in operation. Despite all efforts, the inflow of water was too great for the capacity of the pumps, and the water level rose in spite of all attempts to neutralize the damage. Only on the practical completion of the battle, after the water had risen neck deep, and when specifically ordered by the Engineering Officer to abandon the engine room did he leave his station and cease his outstanding efforts to keep the ship afloat and maneuverable.

"By his unyielding loyalty in the face of imminent, ever increasing danger, and his complete disregard of his personal safety, he materially assisted his ship in its victory over an enemy submarine."

For the President,

Secretary of the Navy.

Typed from a draft citation on an index card filed at the U.S. Naval Historical Center. Awarded by CinClant ltr. dated 26 January 1944.

E. A. Wilde, Jr.
March, 1998
The U.S.S. Goff (DD-247) (Lt. Cdr. H. I. Smith, USNR) and a sister ship, the U.S.S. Barry (DD-248) (Lt. Cdr. H. D. Hill, USNR), were detached by CTG 21.14 (Capt. A. J. Isbell, USN) to assist the Borie in the afternoon of 1 November 1943. The Goff (shown above) arrived first and was standing by when the Borie began to abandon ship at 1644, just before sunset. In darkness and rough seas she recovered 107 survivors from life rafts and floater nets. The Barry commenced her rescue operation at 1747 and rescued 23 survivors. Unfortunately, 3 officers and 24 men were lost after they abandoned ship. Some were unable to climb aboard the rescue destroyers after being in the frigid water (44 degrees); others were crushed or knocked from their rafts by the propeller guards of the pitching ships. (U.S. Navy Photograph.)
12 - 16

Steaming as before. 1210 Carrier changed speed to fifteen (15) knots.COMMENCED zigzagging as before. 1222 Carrier and escorts heading into wind for plane exercises. BARRY at plane guard. 1248 Completed plane exercises. Carrier changed course to 210°T, 213°G, 236° FSC. 1250 Carrier and escorts heading into wind for plane exercises. 1253 Carrier completed exercises and steadied on base course. GOFF at starboard bow position. 1300 Carrier changed course to 250° T, 253°G, 276° FSC. 1400 proceeding to take position on carrier's starboard quarter preparatory to coming alongside to receive length of hose. Stationed all special fueling details. 1410 Carrier steamed on 180°T, 183°G, 206° FSC. Changed speed to ten (10) knots. 1421 Received hose. Proceeding independently to go alongside BORIE to deliver hose. 1459 Carrier changed course to 020°T, 028°G, 045° FSC. Carrier changed speed to fifteen (15) knots. GOFF close aboard BORIE. 1543 Sent hose across to BORIE and transferred gasoline. 1547 Carrier made 30° turn to port and steadied on base course 350°T, 353°G, 060° FSC. 1553Cast off line from BORIE. 

R. A. KERR, 
Lieutenant (jg), USNR.

16 - 20

Lying, close aboard USS BORIE. USS BARRY escorting USS CARD on approximate course 350°T. 1510 USS BORIE preparing to abandon ship. GOFF standing by to pick up survivors. BARRY approaching to aid in rescue. 1644 Commenced launching life rafts from BORIE. 1647 Darkened ship. 1700 Commenced rescue of survivors. 1720 USS BARRY reached area. Began patrol and rescue operations. 1819 Ceased rescue operations, having taken aboard 104 survivors, including 6 officers and 98 enlisted men. Commenced patrol and search of surrounding area at various courses and speeds.

R. L. BARBER
Lieutenant (jg), USNR.

20 - 24

Patrolling as before, continuing search for survivors of USS BORIE. 2105 Sighted life raft on port bow. 2106 Commenced maneuvering to come close aboard raft. 2120 Came alongside raft, picked up three men. 2145 Resumed searching as before. 2200 BARY reported sighting life raft and proceeding to pick up survivors. 2255 BARY reported picking up four men and leaving one dead man in raft. See additional page for list of U.S.S. BORIE SURVIVORS J. E. MARKS

Lieutenant (jg), USNR.

To be forwarded direct to the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet, either at end of an operation or at the end of the calendar month.
**OPERATIONAL REMARKS (WAR DIARY)**

12-14 A steaming on leeward. 1215 Pawd Greene changed course to 170°T.
1244 Carnival received 35 plants, launched 3 oil tanks. 1247 Pawd 8 was
changed course to 270°T. 2010 PBC, 303 PSC, changed speed to 2
knots. 1249 Pawd Greene changed course to 170°T. 1255
Pawd Greene changed course to 260°T. 2050 PBC, 341 PSC, 1352
Pawd Greene changed course to 180°T, 160°PBC, 113°PSC, Barry
proceeding called Dewi going alongside. Dewi dead in 15
knots. 1420 Dewi received 1st from carriers, proceeding to Orak to
deliver line. 1435 2 47-pounder field guns fired Boiler #1 and #2, and cut in
on main steam line. 1431 Carnival changed course to 150°T to
launch planes. 1500 Pawd Greene changed course to 020°T, 020°PBC, 0430 PBC, 1514 Changed speed to 15 knots. 1547 Carnival changed
course to 350°T, 350°PBC.

**Av. st. 250**

**Av. RPM 129-8.**

O. H. Pollard

---

16-18 Steaming at Orak. 1628 Dewi overboard to proceed to Orak to assist
her in abandoning ship. Cargi steering indiscriminately, 1648 on course 150°T.
1700 260 3 knots. 1632 Steaming eastbound. All 18° Pilot, Barry
Aberdeen 170°T, Distance 800.

**Av. st. 215**

**Av. RPM 49-0**

O. H. Pollard

---

17-20 Steaming as before on various courses and speeding picking up survivors from U.S. Bore.

**Av. st. 250**

**Av. RPM 109.**

E. B. Greaves

---

20-24 Steaming as before. 2028 Lt. Commander, Eastman Office.

2300 Completed picking up survivors - survivors list as follows:

- Dietz, Wh., 6th U.S.N.A.
- Green, W., C.M.
- West, W., C.M.
- Madsen, R., C.M.
- Kaier, F.C.
- Hoek, J.C.
- mugcoke, B.C.
- Smith, E.C., D.C.
- Moulthrop, C.L., 50%
- Neary, T.
- Thomas, F.B.
- Coles, F.W.
- Schipe, E.C.
- Strickland, B.G.
- Johnson, W.W.
- Johnson, E.M.
- Johnson, E.C.
- Johnson, C.C.
- Johnson, C.M.
- Latkovich, R.
- Sund, B.
- Sund, S.
- Sund, J.
- Sund, T.
- Sund, N.
- Sund, S.
- Sund, G.
- Sund, E.
- Sund, F.
- Sund, N.

**Av. st. 250**

**Av. RPM 70-5**

E. D. Howard

---

To be forwarded direct to the Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, either at end of an operation or at the end of the calendar month.
UNITED STATES SHIP COFF (DD247)  

Zone description: Zone plus 1 hour 54 minutes.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th>0800</th>
<th>1200</th>
<th>2000</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lat.</td>
<td>50° 30' North</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Long.</td>
<td>30° 35' West</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

OPERATIONAL REMARKS
(WAR DIARY)

0 - 4

In company with USS BARRY, patrolling area to windward of USS BORIE, abandoned. Steaming on boilers 1 & 2 with boiler No. 3 ready for emergency use. Making various courses and speeds, standard speed fifteen (15) knots (170 RPM). Ship darkened, crew in condition of readiness III, material condition BAKER set, SL radar searching all around.

S. E. Rule
Lieutenant, USNR

4 - 8

Patrolling as before. 0410 USS CARD reported radar contact dead astern. Heading at various courses to join CARD. 0435 Took port bow screening station on CARD. BARRY on starboard bow. Base course 080°T, 083°C, 104° FSC. Commenced zigzagging on base course as in Plan No. 12, Zigzag Diagrams at fifteen (15) knots. 0510 Carrier and escorts turned 180° to 260°T, 263°C, 265° FSC. 0513 Steadied on new base course 220°T, 234°C, 260° FSC. 0640 Carrier and escorts changed speed to twelve (12) knots. 0640 Carrier and escorts proceeding into wind for plane exercises. 0656 Completed plane exercises. Came to new base course 050°T, 053°, 074°FSC. 0725 Carrier and escorts proceeding into wind to take formation for plane exercises. Passed four bodies floating on surface. Identified as attached to USS BORIE. 0730 Passed 1 life raft with body in it. Proceeding at various courses and speeds to investigate body. Man in raft dead. 0738 Proceeding at various courses and speeds to rejoin CARD. 0730 USS CARD resumed base course. Plane exercises completed. CARD changed speed to ten (10) knots. 0750 Took port bow screening station on USS CARD.

R. A. Kerr
Lieutenant (jg), USNR

8 - 12

Patrolling as before. 0820 Commenced patrolling ahead of CARD at various courses and speeds, circling position of USS BORIE, while USS BARRY proceeding to sink BORIE, with gun and torpedo fire. 0939 BARRY ceased firing. CARD sent planes to bomb and sink BORIE. 0945 BARRY took position on starboard bow of CARD. COFF took port bow station. 0954 USS BORIE sank stern first, having received three direct bomb hits, in approximate position 50° 28' North, 30° 35' West. Carrier and escorts changed course to 207°T, 210°C, 233° FSC. 1010 Commenced zigzagging in accordance with Plan No. 12. 1020 Changed speed to ten (10) knots (110 RPM). 1023 Changed speed to 220° (137) knots (133 RPM). 1051 Took formation for plane exercises, course 220°T. 1112 Exercises completed, resumed regular patrol.

R. L. Barber
Lieutenant (jg), USNR

Approved:  
R. L. Smith, LT-CDR., USNR,  
Commanding Officer.
OPERATIONAL REMARKS
(WAR DIARY)

00-04 of steaming in company with U.S.S. Pack conducting search for survivors of U.S.S. B 35. As directed by U.S.S. Card, Commander Pack, B 35, operating under CINCPAC, 21-14. Steaming independently waiting for location to complete search. On course 040°, 0800 P.M. standard speed 15 knots, steaming at 10 knots. 6 planes #1, #2, #3, and #4 in use for steaming purposes. Ship is in condition II, condition 8, darkened. Sound ship and 3 S. radio silence. 0827 of steaming to various courses and U.S.S. B 35. 0035 Changed course to 10 knots. 0150 Changed course to 14 knots. 0140 M.P.M. U.S.S. B 35, changed course to 160°, 160° P.S.C., 107° P.S.C., commenced zig-zagging toward plane #12. 0214 Changed course to 345°, 360° P.S.C., 0230 Changed course to 160°, 160° P.S.C., 107° P.S.C.

04-08 Steaming on after maneuvering on various courses at various speeds for survivors. 0450 Afforded U.S.S. Card, maneuvering on various courses at various speeds to assist German abandoned B 35. 0500 2nd Group changed course to 250°, 250° P.S.C., 0700 2nd Group changed course to 350°, to launch planes. 0750 Commanded to zig-zag by 114°, to the course of 315°, 023° P.S.C.

At 250 m.p.h. 13. 12, head

08-12 of steaming on after. 0850 2nd Group changed course to 17 knots. 0810 Lighted M.O. light, bearing 340°, distance 3 miles. 0815 Steaming on various courses at various speeds for survivors. 0845 Afforded U.S.S. Card, 0855 Commanded to zig-zag by 9°. 0915 Headed for 207° T., 207° T., 207° T., 10 knots. 1021 2nd Group changed course to 207° T., 207° T., 207° T., 10 knots. 1054 2nd Group changed course to 207° T., 207° T., 207° T., 207° T., 10 knots. 1104 2nd Group changed course to 207° T., 207° T., 207° T., 207° T., 10 knots.

Approved:  

[Signature]
Commanding Officer.

Examined:  

[Signature]

To be forwarded direct to the Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, either at end of an operation or at the end of the calendar month.
The USS Borie (DD-215), abandoned and sinking, before she was sunk on 2 November 1943 by TF "Avengers" from the escort carrier USS Card (CVE-11). Gunfire from the 5-inch battery of the USS Barry (DD-248) has set her on fire, but her sister ship's torpedoes missed. Note the Borie's Measure 22 camouflage: lower hull in Navy Blue and oil above in Haze Gray. (Official U.S. Navy Photograph)
This view of the *Borie* on 2 November 1943, just before the abandoned vessel was sunk by U.S. planes, reveals the effort made to keep the ship afloat by reducing topside weight. Note the base rings for the two jettisoned torpedo tube mounts aft of the stacks, as well as those for the two 20-mm Oerlikon machine guns which had been mounted on the galley deckhouse (forward of the 4-inch guns, between stacks Nos. 1 and 2). (U.S. Navy Photograph.)
A TBF Avenger finally sank the Boris with three depth bombs which exploded close aboard and crushed her damaged hull. She sank quickly, stern first, at 0955 on November 2, 1943. In commission continuously for twenty-three years, she served her country well— in the Black Sea, in the Philippines, in the Caribbean and in her final resting place, the North Atlantic. The Boris received three battle stars for her World War II service, as well as the Presidential Unit Citation (with the Gold star). (U.S. Navy Photo.)
The Grumman TBF-1 "Avenger" torpedo bomber which sank the Boria was attached to Composite Squadron VC-9, embarked on the USS Card (CVE-11). The Avenger had a crew of three (pilot, gunner, bombardier), internal bays for a torpedo or a 2,000-lb. bomb and a power-operated turret with a .50-cal. gun. Alternative loads were four 500-lb. bombs or four 325-lb. depth bombs. The TBF-1 was also armed with a fixed .30-cal. gun on the cow's right side and a .30-cal. ventral gun behind the bomb bay. Dimensions and other data:

- Wingspan: 54' 12"
- Engine: Wright R-2600-8 (1700 hp take-off, 1450 hp at 12,000 ft.)
- Length: 40'
- Height: 16' 5"
- Top Speed: 271 mph at 12,000 ft.
- Wing Area: 490 sq. ft.
- Landing Speed: 76 mph
- Gross Weight: 13,667 lbs.
- Range: 1,215 miles w. torpedo

(Photograph: U.S. Naval Institute Collection)
Some of the 130 Borie survivors, shown here on the galley deckhouse of one of the rescue destroyers, being transferred by highline in a canvas bag on 5 November 1943, while refueling under way from the escort carrier USS Card (CVE-11). Even though the Goff transferred two survivors at a time, it took about 1½ hours to transfer all of her 107 survivors.  (U.S. Navy Photograph.)
Torpedo bombers from the escort carrier U.S.S. Card (CVE-11) (Capt. A. J. Isbell) finally sank the Borie on 2 November 1943, after she had been abandoned. A converted merchantman (C3 cargo ship), the Card was commissioned in 1942. Displacing 7,800 tons and 492 feet long, she normally carried a 21-plane composite squadron made up of Wildcat fighters (F4F's) and Avenger torpedo bombers (TBF's). The Card was the first CVE to receive a Presidential Unit Citation, for ASW hunter-killer operations in the Atlantic with the Borie and two other flush-deckers from 27 July to 25 October 1943. (Official U.S. Navy photograph.)
Survivors of the USS Borie (DD-215), sunk in the mid-Atlantic on 2 November 1943, assembled aboard the USS Card (CVE-11) en route Norfolk, Virginia. Rescued at night in rough seas by the destroyers USS Barry (DD-248) (Lcdr. H. D. Hill, USNR) and the USS Goff (DD-247) (Lcdr. H. I. Smith, USNR), they were then transferred to this escort carrier by highline while under way. Captain A. J. Isbell, USN, CTG 21.14 and the Commanding Officer of the Card, saved their lives by detaching his two remaining escorts to search for the Borie, even though he knew there were enemy submarines nearby. Twenty-seven of their shipmates died in the cold water before they could be rescued. (Official U.S. Navy photograph.)
"In looking back over the action at this particular time, the complete pleasure of the crew in having accomplished the sinking was visible all over the ship. When the submarine sank there was a yell that went up from all hands—probably could be heard in Berlin! The men were clasping each other and patting each other on the back, . . . during the action there were times when it was actually comical to observe the situation, particularly with the submarine underneath. Bearing in mind that this crew has been together a long time . . ., and the fact that heretofore their one dream had been to catch a submarine, depth-charge him, bring him to the surface and then to sink him with gunfire, this particular action more than justified their hopes.

"I can only say that their hope is to be held together as a crew on some other ship. That was their one request after being picked up when the ship was later lost."

* * * * * * * *

* The entire transcript of his oral history, recorded on November 15, 1943, is included at the back of this booklet.

E. A. Wilde, Jr.
March, 1998
Part I

Stand By For a Ram

By William Maher with Captain James E. Wise, Jr., U.S. Navy (Retired)

Hollywood would be hard-pressed to devise a more dramatic sequence than the sea-borne chase scene recounted here, 50 years later, by a veteran of this North Atlantic action against German U-boats in World War II.

In late October 1943, Task Group 21.14—the carrier Card (CVE-11) and the destroyers Borie (DD-215), Barry (DD-248), and Goff (DD-247)—received location reports of a U-boat fueling concentration. The task group commander, Captain Arnold J. Isbell—also the commanding officer of the Card—immediately ordered the group to proceed to the reported position.

The report was the result of a triangulation of bearings taken with high-frequency radio direction finders (nicknamed “huff duff”) carried on board ship and also positioned ashore on both sides of the Atlantic. The U-boats surfaced day and night and conversed with each other and Admiral Karl Dönitz’s headquarters in Germany. We had learned on three previous Atlantic patrols that reports of U-boat concentrations were amazingly accurate. I learned after the war that the reason for the accuracy was the use of the direction finders and the breaking of the German code by the British after the capture of the U-110 in May 1941. Their complete coding machine, the Enigma, made the Germans’ cipher system unbreakable—or so they thought. Their code system more than likely would have remained secure, had it not been for this stroke of luck.

During the war the Germans continued to believe that their codes were safe from enemy codebreakers. The capture of the U-110 and her cryptanalytical treasure was a secret for many years following the war.

We arrived in the area about midway between the Azores Islands and Iceland, and our aircraft started hunting. On the afternoon of 30 October, they spotted a U-boat, and one of our aviators launched an attack. But his bomb missed, and the U-boat dove. We knew that we were in a U-boat operating area.

On 31 October at about 1600, we heard the excited cry of another pilot: “Two bogies on the surface!” After the report, he descended to 500 feet and stayed behind the boats, U-91 and U-584, until more of the Card’s aircraft could arrive. We then heard a sudden, “They’re shooting at me!” And indeed they were, both boats cruising about a mile apart were firing at him, but their attack was ineffective.

The U-91 wisely submerged and escaped just before the arrival of two more Avenger aircraft. As these planes closed in, they each dropped a Fido, one on each side of the U-584. The Fido was an acoustic, homing torpedo just introduced in the spring of 1943; it had proved very effective. In this case, it was deadly, as the U-584 went down in 2,000 fathoms of water a few minutes later.

Because of reports from the pilots, Captain Isbell thought that the escaping sub was a “milch [milk] cow,” a U-boat used to refuel and provision other U-boats. Sinking a milch cow would shorten the war patrols of other submarines—an obvious benefit. With this thought in mind we, the crew of the Borie, were ordered to search for her.

Lieutenant Commander Charles H. Hutchins, U.S. Naval Reserve, our commanding officer, informed us of the sound system that we had “volunteered” to search for the escaping U-boat. From my battle station just above the bridge I could hear the steady pinging of the sound gear as the outgoing sound pulses dissipated in the vastness of the distant water. At 1010 I suddenly heard the cry, “Radar contact, bearing 095°, range 6,500 yards!” Earl Potter had detected something on the surface. Of course no one could see anything that far away in the dark, but we all started to look anyway. With a hard turn to a heading of 095°, the Borie crashed through the waves toward the enemy at 22 ½ knots.

We maintained radar contact, and at 1,700 yards we opened up with star shells. The sky came alive with bright flares. In the meantime, the sonar kept up its monotonous pinging. Nothing was seen. I heard, “Radar contact lost!” Then almost at once we heard, “ping-boing, ping-boing, ping-boing.” The sound of returning echoes, followed instantly by the report, “Sound contact!” by our sound operator, Bob Manning. The sub had submerged.

Naval History / Summer 1993
we lost radar contact, and on exactly the same bearing we obtained sound contact.

Slowing to 15 knots, we made a depth-charge run after losing underwater contact at 150 yards. We dropped the charges, along with a light marker float. Suddenly, one hell of an explosion rattled our ship and blew out fuses.

Very few of the crew were aware of what happened next. The underwater explosion had caused our sound gear to fail, thus losing our contact with the sub. Manning and Radio Technician Duke headed for the lower sound room, where they located the faulty fuses, replaced them, and headed back to their battle stations. The sound gear was up and operating once again.

Below us a steady hand entered notations in the log book of our undersea enemy:

2330—Surfaced, Course 240-D.
2330—Destroyer 270-D, bow left, location 80-D, approx. 3,000 meters.
2332—Destroyer shoots flares over boat, boat recognized.
2333—Submerged.
2335—At 110 meter take 6 to 8 depth charges on starboard side, silent speed, stopped all auxiliary engines, no more propeller noise heard.

Within minutes we were heading for the light marker, and again I heard the return sound echo. Along with Manning’s cry, “Sound contact!” followed by a range and bearing. We detected the odor of oil as we approached for the second attack, which we made.

As we turned to attack again, one report indicated that the sub could be seen on the surface, but no one on the flying bridge saw it. We made sound contact again, however, and ordered another depth-charge attack. We lost sound contact again.

Another entry in the U-boat’s log book described damage inflicted by our attack:

01-Nov.
0000—Depth 170 meters destroyer propeller noises audible from port side, 10 close depth charges, taking water at bow-room, boat falls through to 210 meter. Only by blowing diving tank #3 able to hold boat. Run Away at North/West, ASDIC [sonar] detection, torpedo tube #2 floods and empties into boat through leaking torpedo tube door.

We searched three hours for evidence of destruction but found nothing. Captain Hutchins radioed back to the Card, “Scratch one pig boat.” We all thought that we had destroyed the milch cow. The U-91, however, was long gone. In fact, she was not a milch cow at all. We had been battling an attack submarine, the U-256, and she, too, was not sunk. After the war we found out that the U-256, under command of Oberleutnant Wilhelm Braul, had managed to make it home to Germany in spite of suffering severe damage. This had been one of those strange twists of fate; because the U-91 had escaped, we had found and damaged the U-256. And because the U-91 had escaped, fate was about to deal us an even bigger hand.

Knowing that we were in an active U-boat area, we continued hunting and—bingo! “Radar contact, bearing 170, range 8,000 yards,” called Manning, who was also operating the radar gear. Captain Hutchins immediately ordered, “All ahead full, come left to course 170.” Our helmsman responded, “Left to 170, sir.”
The sea was moderate, it was about 0200, and the
ship’s speed increased to 27 knots. Everyone in the
crew felt the excitement building. At about 2,000
yards we lost radar contact, but again we heard the
returning echoes.

We got the order to release depth charges. Be-
cause of a malfunction, all the depth charges in the
two racks rolled into the ocean at once. The result-
ing explosions lifted our stern and caused the ship
to surge forward. But the job was done. Nothing could
survive that, right? Wrong.

Looking back toward the marker flare, I was the first
to see it: The conning tower of the U-405. I cried out, not
in true Navy fashion, “There it is—about 40 feet to the
right of the flare.”

We made radar contact and with that we turned on our
24-inch searchlight. Using radar bearings, we were able to
keep the U-405 (not one of the two “escaping” subs) illu-
minated for the entire one-hour battle that was to follow.

The conning tower appeared just off the port quarter,
and we could see the image of a large, white polar bear.
Only gun number four could bear on the target. As I re-
member it, we got the order to fire as we moved away to
regain sound contact. When we turned and moved in at
25 knots, the range was more
than 1,000 yards. As leading
fire-controlman, my battle sta-
tion was director pointer, and
Jim Allegra was director. In di-
crto-controlled fire, the di-
ector aimed and fired all of
the main battery in unison with
the pointer (me) pressing the
firing key. As all the guns
came to bear, the order came:
“Commence firing!”

I pressed the key, and three
four-inch projectiles exploded
as one in the vicinity of the
U-405’s main deck gun, obliterating it before its crew
could man it. Depending on the range, the main battery
gun fire control switched from director control to local
control throughout the battle. As the main battery con-
tinued, the 20-mm. guns opened up with devastating
power, made even more spectacular by the one in five
tracer bullets that made it possible to follow all the streams
from the machine guns.

Watching the results of the converging streams of 20-
mm. bullets was both horrifying and fascinating. While
the four-inch projectiles yielded terrific explosions, I re-
ally believe that the machine-gun fire sweeping across the
deck is what finally doomed the U-boat.

Apparently, the U-405 could not submerge, as she tried
to escape into the darkness, with men manning their ma-
chine guns. In the first few moments, our machine-gun
fire wiped them off the platform. For some reason men
started to come out of the forward hatch, about five at a
time, and make an impossible dash of about 30 feet to get
to their guns. No one ever made it, as they were knocked
over the side, arms and legs flailing. They kept trying,
however.

The speed and evasive tactics of the U-405 were im-
pressive, as we tried to maintain a parallel course to
keep all guns bearing on target. The sub’s turning circle
was smaller than ours, and I learned later that she could
do 17½ knots on the surface. The U-405 made good use of
both features.

When I was not busy, I watched the sub as she tried
to point her torpedo tubes in our direction or perhaps
just to escape, as she twisted and turned first in one di-
rection, then the other. Captain Hutchins managed to keep
the guns bearing most of the time in spite of our larger
turning circle.

At one time, I was sure that we were going to collide,
not ram. I don’t know if we attempted to ram this time,
but I could see that we were on a collision, almost paral-
lel course. I realized then the surface speed of the
U-405. Just as we were about to collide, the U-boat ap-
ppeared to turn on all her power, picking up enough speed
to pass us. Looking down, I could see clearly the faces of
the Germans still on the bridge.

We kept up a continuous fire with all guns that could
bear, giving the U-405 a monstrous hammering. Many
of her men were dead, and damage was extensive, espe-
cially to the conning tower. I wondered how long they could endure this savage beating.

At one time, a number of pistol rounds appeared to come from the conning tower, which was a recognition signal unknown to any of us. It seemed also that the U-405 either stopped or at least slowed, almost dead in the water. A man appeared on the bridge in the bright shining beam of our searchlight and started to wave his arms in a crossing movement. Fate again interceded. Shortly before this, a gun captain’s telephone lines had become entangled in the empty shell cases that were rolling all about the deck. Frustrated, he had torn off the phones and thrown them to the deck.

Seeing the man on the deck of the U-405 waving, Captain Hutchins commanded, “Cease fire!” But the galley deck house four-inch gun continued to fire. Hutchins then tried to shout directly across to the gun crew, and we on the firing bridge could hear plainly, “Cease fire! Cease fire!” Unfortunately, no gunmen could hear above the noise on the galley deck house, and the big gun continued to boom out its deadly fire.

Watching this one man stand alone amidst all the destruction, with big guns firing, was awesome. It was not to last. Within a few moments his body stood there momentarily, arms extended over his head, then his head just disappeared. It was a sight that gave me nightmares for months. Had the tangled phone lines caused this man’s death? Had he been the bravest of the brave in volunteering to expose himself so that he could give a signal of surrender? We shall never know, for the U-405 picked up speed again and started evasive maneuvers.

The battle continued much as before, with the U-boat attempting to get away, or train a torpedo tube at us, or both. Meanwhile, we were trying to close range either to ram or to drop depth charges.

“Stand by for a ram!” Our gunnery officer, Lieutenant Walter Dietz, gave the order to me to relay to the rest of the gunnery division over the fire-control phone system. The last five minutes or so had been a frustrating but exciting period. Because the range had closed to almost point blank, we were unable to use the gun director. For a short time we were only spectators.

I watched at first as if it were a game, the beautiful arcing tracers of the 20-mm. guns and the smashing four-inch projectiles hitting the sub or careening off the rounded hull into the darkness as a dull wobbling glow. I saw the German sailors being knocked over the side as they tried to man their machine guns. As one went over, another would take his place.

“Stand by for a ram!” suddenly brought me back to reality, as I passed the word on to the men at their battle stations. Instant chatter on the system from all stations stopped at once, as I anticipated more urgent orders.

Looking over the wind screen—only about three feet high—I could see our bow crashing up and down, rapidly closing on the U-boat still in our searchlight beam. I started to think that if we hit her at this speed I was going to sail right over the screen and on down to the forecastle. I got behind the range finder and placed my hands on it in front of me. Then I thought, “Hell no, this way I’ll get my face smashed.” I moved in front and put my arms over the range finder behind my back and prepared for the crash.

As we got closer and closer, with as many of our guns firing as we could bear on the target, I watched and waited for the inevitable sudden stop.

From my vantage point I could see everything, I could see the number one gun crew (bow gun) and wondered what they were thinking, as they would be the closest to the sub when we collided, bow on, and the most likely to be fired on just before ramming. I could see the Germans in the bright light still trying to muster some kind of defense, scurrying about in and near the conning tower. No one could deny their great courage.

Closer and closer we came, and I watched the sub get larger and larger. I held my breath, waiting for the crash. Almost at the moment of impact, the U-405 made a sudden turn to the port side, trying to run parallel to our course and make us miss. The move was too late. We went at the U-boat at about a 30° angle. I closed my eyes, held my breath, and prayed. Sneaking a peek with one eye, I saw our bow about to crash into the U-boat and the fear in the eyes of one German as he tried to get out of the way. Holding tighter, I waited—nothing. I looked up and saw that we were astride the sub with our bow just forward of her conning tower. Just before impact a large wave had caused us to rise above and over the U-boat’s deck.

For a moment there was a stunned lull in everyone’s actions and thoughts. Then all hell broke loose on both sides. To our regret, the flying bridge had no small arms, so except for phone messages, we were only spectators. In fact, from our vantage point directly below the large searchlight and looking straight down on the conning tower encircled by the bright beam, it looked more like a Hollywood epic than an actual battle.

I could see the polar bear symbol clearly and also the machine guns they had been trying to keep manned. One quadruple mount and four single mounts all were firing sporadically.

Ed Johnson started in with his 20-mm. mount, depressing it so that first he had to shoot away the wind screen before firing into the men on the deck of the U-boat. Although the action report of the battle says otherwise, my recollection was that no four-inch gun could be depressed far enough to bear, so all firing came from the 20-mm. guns and small arms. Upon hearing the ram order, Dick Wenz had broken open the steel small arms locker and passed the weapons out to the men on deck. The story in some newspapers that he broke open the locker with his bare hands was a bit exaggerated. He did, however, break it open with a fire ax.

I saw Johnson open up and watched the first shots explode through the wind screen. I saw Walter Kurz throw a four-inch shell case into the group of men standing in the conning tower. From below on the bridge, I saw a flash from a Very pistol and watched a bright ball of fire are across into a man’s chest. He went down and rolled over with his chest still burning.

Dietz called to me from the bridge, “We will not board, we will not board!” I then got a call from the fire controlman at the fire-control switchboard, which was iso-
lated by dogged down hatches.
“What the hell is going on up there?” He didn’t even know that we had rammed the U-boat.
I saw one German reach out with his hand as if he wanted help to board the Borie. No one offered to help. Small wonder, as they were still firing their machine guns.

Two gallant crews were engaged in fierce battle using every kind of weapon at their disposal. There was no sign of fear or disorder anywhere in the Borie. Everyone went about his duty with the utmost confidence. I felt great pride in being a member of the crew. I was to be even more proud by the time the entire action was over.

We on the flying bridge did not know it yet, but the Borie had sustained serious underwater damage to both engine rooms. In fact, the forward engine room was already flooded by the time we separated.

The U-boat made a mad dash into the night, with us firing whatever guns we could bring to bear. We saw a four-inch shell explode in the sub’s starboard diesel exhaust, but it did not seem to slow the boat, as she took advantage of her smaller turning circle and opened her range to about 500 yards. We fired one torpedo but missed because of one of her fast, tight turns.

The U-405 continued circling in a turn that our ship could not match. The Borie’s movements were also hampered by the flooded engine room. We did, however, manage to maintain our murderous shelling, having killed between 20 and 30 of the sub’s crew as they tried to man their deck guns.

Unable to close our range because of the U-boat’s circling maneuvers, Captain Hutchins used a clever ruse. He ordered the searchlight turned off. Of course, the U-boat immediately tried to escape into the dark. We tracked her by radar until she reached a position to our advantage. With our entire starboard battery bearing on the fleeing boat, Captain Hutchins ordered, “On searchlight. Commence firing!” The U-405 once again came under heavy, damaging gunfire.

We started to close to ram again, but before we hit, the U-405 turned into our starboard quarter. Seeing an advantage, Hutchins swung our ship hard to port, using both rudder and engines. This move brought us to a parallel course with the U-boat and within range of our depth-charge projectors. Three charges were fired, one over and two short, a perfect straddle. All three exploded at 30 feet. We not only heard the explosions; since we were dead in the water, they almost knocked us over. What we felt was nothing compared to what it must have been like in the mission, and we watched in fascination as another tableau emerged. This time fate was on the side of the U-405. The torpedo slithered by her bow, missing by about ten feet.

In the meantime, we were still firing all guns. Shortly after the torpedo miss, we again hit the sub’s starboard diesel exhaust, which finally brought her to a standstill. Out of the conning tower came a shower of Very stars, splashing the night with white, red, and green lights indicating that the Germans were at last ready to surrender. This time we all heeded Captain Hutchins’ order to cease fire, and the night was silent after more than an hour of mayhem.

One or two U-boat crewmen appeared and started to throw yellow, two-man, rubber life rafts into the water. They were tied together and gave the appearance of a string of very large hot dogs. The U-405 was settling fast by the stern. What was left of the crew, about 20, managed to get off and over to their the rafts just before she went down. An underwater explosion rumbled soon after.

With her engine rooms flooded after having rammed the German U-405, the Borie was dead in the water. But the destroyer’s crew ignored their tense situation and continued shelling the hapless U-boat until the German vessel went down.

In the next issue, we rejoin the crew of the Borie, as they cope with the damage sustained after the ship rammed the U-405. Look for the dramatic conclusion to this story in the September/October Naval History.
Stand By for a Ram!

PART II

By ROBERT A. MAHER with CAPTAIN JAMES E. WISE, JR., U.S. Navy (Retired)

The German survivors in their rafts continued to fire as we moved slowly toward them, still illuminating them with our searchlight. We thought they were signalling another sub, as a white star shone in the distance.

With the survivors just off our port bow—so close we could see their faces—our sound man, Earl Potter, reported suddenly, "Torpedoes, bearing 220." Lieutenant Charles H. Hutchins, our commanding officer, ordered, "Hard to port, heading 220, all available speed." Unfortunately, this heading caused us to cut through the group of survivors. I vividly remember seeing the face of one young boy straight below me. His eyes were wide and his mouth open in a silent scream, as he extended both arms, hoping we would pick him up. It was not to be, however, as someone reported seeing the torpedo travelling along our port side.

All of us were troubled at leaving them and hoped that the other sub would come to their rescue. Once this October 1943 battle was over, they no longer would be the enemy, but brave fellow seamen. In light of what was to follow, they would not have been much better off and prob-
With her forward engine room flooded and billowing steam, the destroyer Borie paid a heavy price for ramming the U-405. Leaving 30 shipmates behind, survivors gathered on deck (left) when their ship, disabled and abandoned, started to sink. At 6:10 A.M. she still remained afloat, but the captain ordered the hatches to be opened and sent her to the bottom of the Atlantic, joining the countless others lost at sea.
ably would have caused the Borie to lose more men, whether or not torpedoes had really been fired at us.

We had been without sleep for 21 hours, but our ordeal was not even close to being over. We left the battle area making ten knots at best and turned in evasive zigzags to get away from a possible sub attack while we assessed our damage, which was considerable.

Only then did we on deck learn about the courage and ingenuity of the men who had been struggling below during the battle. When we rammed the U-405 we did not realize the havoc being wreaked below. A large hole in the forward engine room started to flood immediately. While the guns boomed above, the men below, in water up to their necks, had to maintain the ship's speed as they tried to repair the damage. The men in the after engine room also did an outstanding job in operating their plant while they repaired two holes in the ship's hull. At the same time, other men in the damage-control party, with their backs to the hot boilers, shored up the bulkhead between the forward and after engine rooms, which were in danger of collapse as the forward engine room flooded rapidly.

The courage, intelligence, and ingenuity of those men was so widespread that day that it would be difficult to name all involved. But the executive officer's statement in the post-battle action report said it all. "They, the crew, manned their stations and obtained the maximum efficiency from the equipment at hand. The complete disregard for personal safety, and the initiative shown by all hands was an inspiring sight."

No sleep was in store for our tired crew, as we tried to make our way back to the Card (CVE-11) carrier group on a course of 000° true and a speed of ten knots. We radioed this information to the Card at 0452, still not knowing the severity of the damage. With the forward engine room completely flooded, we had lost all but emergency radio power, which we used to send our message to the Card. This, too, did not last very long. The loss of all electrical power would make it extremely difficult to run the ship and make repairs. We could not recover feed water for the boilers, so we began to relate to each other that we "might be in a bit of trouble."

At dawn, we found ourselves in a lot of trouble. Emergency radio power was gone, a heavy fog was hemming us in, and we were taking on water rapidly. We had to use all available gasoline to keep the pumps running so we could try to stay ahead of the incoming water; none was available for our radio generator.

To help keep the ship afloat, Hutchins gave the order to lighten ship. All hands turned to. Bucket brigades worked at a furious pace. Specific pieces of equipment were ordered jettisoned. We dumped our boats. Saving ten rounds per gun, the gunner's mates threw over all the rest of the four-inch shells. They also threw several machine guns overboard. The torpedo men dumped their torpedo mounts—quite a feat. The boatswain department let go all our anchor chain, which went to the bottom with a long, rattling roar.

Captain Hutchins called me to the bridge and gave me the order, "I want you to dump the gun director over the side, and I don't want it to come down on my bridge." I really had no idea what the gun director weighed, but considering its size and the fact that the base was made of bronze, a fair estimate would be between 1,000 and 2,000 pounds. The navigational bridge, below, extended about five feet out on both sides of the flying bridge. I could see no way to swing it out from above. In spite of serious doubts, I replied, "Aye, aye sir."

I cannot remember who helped us, but Jimmy Allegri and I could not handle the task alone. I disconnected all the wires coming out of the base into the junction box on the bridge overhead. We then started to lift the director with pry bars, inserting wedges wherever possible. Gradually, the director started to lean to starboard until finally it was almost balanced on edge. For once the large waves were an advantage. As we rolled to starboard, we all pushed; it dropped neatly into the sea—without coming close to Hutchins's bridge.

By mid-morning, still in fog, our headway dropping slowly but steadily because we were using sea water in our boilers, abandoning ship became a distinct possibility. Hutchins ordered Chief Torpedoman Cronin to drop depth charges off the stern racks. I remembered once meeting a sailor who had abandoned a destroyer going down, only to be injured seriously when the depth charges exploded.

Two charges were dropped. They exploded at a shallow depth, lifting our stern and shoving us forward. Our already stricken ship rattled and groaned. Hutchins roared, "Set them on safe." We felt the concussion and surged forward again. Hutchins screamed, "God damn it. I said set them on safe!" Chief Cronin yelled back, "God damn it, they are on safe!" As I remember, they had to remove the detonators to keep them from exploding.

At least once we thought we heard the sound of an aircraft above the fog. It well could have been, because at 0850 the Card had catapulted four aircraft on antisubmarine patrol with orders to be on the lookout for the Borie. They could not see the Borie, nor anything else. So at 0950 the aircraft still in the air were directed to look for DD-215. Because of the bad weather all airplanes were back on board the carrier by 1000 with negative results.

By that time we were practically stopped and for the most part standing around, wondering when and if we
would be found or whether another sub might get us first. After all, we were still in an area reported to have a heavy U-boat concentration. Waiting, listening, and hoping for the best, the whole crew finally had time to realize what a hell of a predicament it was in.

Sometime before 1100, Lieutenant Bob Lord thought of collecting all the lighter fluid, kerosene, and alcohol on board the ship and using the whole mess to run the emergency radio generator. It worked!

At 1110 the Card received our message sent out by Cameron Gresh, "Commenced sinking." The high-frequency radio direction finders did it again, and two Avenger aircraft set out to search the area along the bearing. Despite the limited visibility, they found us 14 miles away from the Card at 1130.

Upon receiving the report of our sighting, the Card group changed course to our bearing and sped toward us at 18 knots. By the time they arrived, we were wallowing in the troughs of huge waves. We were happy to see our fellow warrior, the USS Goff (DD-247), coming close at about noon. At last we were no longer alone in sub-infested waters.

We saw the Card launch four aircraft, which headed off into four quadrants of the compass, presumably to sweep the whole area surrounding our task force, which was in a precarious position. We were dead in the water, the Goff was nearly so, and the Card was moving slowly with only one escort, the USS Barry (DD-248). The Goff came alongside, bow to bow, and attempted to pass over suction hose and handy billies. Someone finally decided that this would be no help, since we had no fresh water for our boilers, and the seas were too heavy for us to transfer water from other ships. We abandoned the possibility of towing, because we had no towing engine, and we already had dumped our anchor chains.

At 1630, with the weather getting worse and darkness setting in, Hutchins had no choice but to abandon ship—even though we appeared not to be in danger of immediate sinking. With the bulkheads bulging and the waves getting larger, the danger of capsizing was always there.

Then began a most harrowing experience. At about 1630 Hutchins gave the order to abandon ship, with the seas running about 20 feet or greater. I was on the flying bridge, just above the navigational bridge, and I heard the order before it was passed on to the crew. My first reaction was anger, as I was wearing a brand new red Kearny High School warmup coat my brother had given to me. Everyone on the ship, including the captain, had admired it.

Knowing I had no choice, I dropped the coat on the deck and went to my abandon-ship station. We had thrown away our boats trying to save the ship. The life rafts on the starboard side would not move because of the high winds and towering waves. This was to become a serious problem later, when all hands were finally off the ship. I picked up an old kapok life jacket from the deck and slipped it on over a rubber one I had already inflated. A few minutes later Ed Malaney came up to me and told me that his life jacket had broken. I gave him the kapok, acknowledging that I did not need two. As events later unfolded, I was wrong again. Regardless of my plight, however, Ed had a life jacket, and we both survived.

When I reached the port rail I found that men had already put out lines. I crawled over the side, holding onto a line, while the ship rolled to starboard about 30°. In crawling down the side of the ship, I had to climb over a beading of armor about a foot thick. I had just cleared the armor when the ship rolled back to port, causing the armor to hit me on top of the head, driving me deep into the water.

I came to the surface, spotted two life rafts about ten yards ahead, swam to the closest one, and hung on. The raft was overflowing, so I swam to the other one, which was almost empty. I had just reached it, when I found myself being crushed between the two rafts. When it felt like my chest was about to burst, I screamed, "Jesus Christ," and the two rafts just drifted apart.

Dusk had set in, and although none of the rescue ships was in sight, we began to take the situation in stride. A petty officer holding onto the rail next to me told me that
my life jacket was broken. As I was being crushed between the rafts, the pressure must have broken the holding clamps. The jacket was useless, and it soon drifted away.

There I was, life-jacketless, and darkness meant that we would not be able to see rescue ships, even if one were to come along—nor could they see us. What was worse, our raft was so full of men that we had to hold onto each other like a bunch of grapes while the raft rode up and down in the huge waves. No one seemed to realize the trouble we were in; we even joked about it and occasionally broke into song.

Suddenly, someone saw the silhouette of a destroyer bearing down on us. We all started to cheer. But we soon stopped when we realized that no one in the ship had seen us. She was going to hit us with her bow, dead center. About 30 men were in our raft, with about four sitting in the middle, one of whom was Tom Neary. Tom was one of those nice, quiet guys who never appeared to be around but always got his work done. Fortunately for all of us, he was around this time. He reached into his jacket and calmly pulled out one of those cheap flashlights (that never worked) and flashed it toward the destroyer. It worked. The ship was the Barry, and we saw it veer to port, but not soon enough. The starboard side of its bow hit our raft on the side opposite me. It was a terrible sight. Some men scrambled up the side of the ship—many were killed between the ship and the raft. I attempted nothing. Without a life jacket, I knew I would get only one chance, and not a very good one at that.

After that pass, we remained alone in darkness again. The singing and horseing around had stopped; this was no longer a game. The Barry showed up again. This time, the ship's crew saw us, or at least it appeared they were not going to hit us head on. To the best of my recollection, about a dozen men were still on, or holding onto, the raft, and we were all very weary.

In the cold, angry seas, the Barry looked foreboding, as its dark form approached us, crashing against the swells. The ship hit us again; but this time we were all on the far side of the raft, and no one was hurt. It became a mad scramble, as we all tried to climb aboard. As far as I know, most made it by climbing on the raft and jumping to the rail. I was afraid to try at first. Another problem was the officer who had been alongside me for a while and was in bad shape. He had been fine before the Barry whacked us, but at the moment he was hysterical, and nothing I said or did helped. I hit him on the shoulder as the raft slid down the side of the ship to alert him but he didn't respond. I now saw a screw guard approaching and I knew that this was my best chance and I had to go. I climbed up on the raft and crouched down, waiting. The Barry was in a roll away from us as the raft went under the guard. I stood up to grab it just as the ship started its roll back. It hit me on the back of the head. I was conscious long enough to see the guard crush the officer's head against the raft. Then I was out cold.

Underwater, I came to, feeling the beat of the screws under my feet, my arms folded over one of the bars of the screw guard. Whether it was instinct or my stiff heavy jacket that kept me stuck to the screw guard, I do not know. The worst thing was that no one was there to help me.

I hung on and shouted, but to no avail. I remember thinking, "Only married three months, and I'm going to die." Suddenly, I felt tugs at my neck and looked up to see two brave men trying to save me. One was on deck holding onto the other, who had climbed out on the guard. He had me by the back of the neck, holding onto my jacket and pulling as hard as he could—all the while shouting, "Let go!" I was afraid that if his hands slipped, I was a goner. I shouted back, "Bullshit. If you let go, I'm dead!" I was soon convinced that he was my only chance for survival so I let go, and they hauled me aboard.

I had been in the water for about seven-and-a-half hours, and I was stiff as a board and totally helpless. I could not move a muscle so they dragged me by the neck across the deck, bouncing me over pipes and everything else on deck. They began to look for a place to leave me so that they could get back to their rescue work. Other men out there needed their help. I was just thankful to be alive.

The head in a four-stack destroyer was a small deck house on the fantail. That is where they put me for safe keeping. Lying flat on my back on the deck would have been all right except that I could not move and I was pressed against the port side bulkhead, under the urinal trough. Water was on the deck, and every time the Barry rolled to port, I had to hold my breath to keep from drowning.

During a lull two men finally carried me down to the crew's compartment and put me on a lower bunk below the mess table. Just above me on the table was a huge dish pan filled with old soapy water and garbage. The rescue attempt had started at about evening mess time, and all hands went topside looking for survivors. Lying there still immobile, I thought about all that had happened, when suddenly, the ship rolled hard to port and I found myself covered with dish water and potato peelings.

Sometime later, the ship's doctor and a medic came to see me, cleaned me up, and moved me to another bunk. Best of all, they fed me a large shot of "legal" brandy. This was the first time I ever had a legal drink on board a ship. No time could have been better. I went off to sleep and never woke until after daylight.

I found that I was in pretty good shape and able to get around. The sea was still quite heavy, and we were surprised
to see that the Borie was still afloat. But the ship was down by the stern and wallowing heavily in the troughs.

Orders were given to sink her. Torpedoes and shell fire hurtled toward the ship, but the heavy seas rendered both methods inaccurate. Bombs from the Card's planes finally sank her. Although badly mauled by the previous battle and the heavy seas, she still went down as a valiant lady. It took three depth charges close aboard before she went down swiftly by the stern at 0955.

On our previous trip we had rescued 44 German survivors of the sunken U-664. Since they crowded our ship, we decided to transfer them to the Card by pulley line. We placed them inside a canvas bag and, on signal, men on board the Card ran down the deck and pulled the bag across the water between the two ships. We thought this was great fun, but the Germans did not like it at all.

We found ourselves in a similar predicament. There were 22 Borie men on the Barry, 107 Borie men on the Goff. Destroyers were designed to hold only just enough men. Thus, we were to transfer to the Card by pulley line, an idea I did not fancy one bit. The transfer was to take place during regular refueling.

With the bag hanging on the block and tackle, rigged between the Barry and the Card, we prepared to give it a go. We on the Barry at least travelled first class—one man at a time. The men on the Goff went two at a time. I climbed into the bag without a life jacket, and they closed the bag over my head with the draw string. I took off like a shot as the large group of men on the Card ran down the deck. My "friends," who almost died laughing, later told me some of what happened next. At the midpoint, I came to a sudden stop. There I was, hanging in a mail sack about 50 feet above the ocean, midway between two ships about 50 yards apart. When the ships rolled together I dropped like a rock. When they rolled away from each other, I went up like a rocket.

Just as suddenly, I moved forward swiftly, only to be stopped again my hands, knees, and face against the deck. My patience had begun to wear thin by then, so when the bag came open, I emerged from it screaming, "Jesus Christ, it isn't one damn thing, it's another!" In reply, the Card's chaplain greeted me with, "Glad to have you aboard, son."

We spent another week at sea, and it was fascinating to watch and be part of a carrier's operations. More important, it was a time for the survivors to try and find out all we could about the men we had lost. During this time Ed Maloney took me to Captain Hutchins and reminded him that he had promised to give five dollars to the first man who spotted a sub on the surface. I expected him to hit me on the head, since he had lost his ship, but he reached into his pocket and gave me a five dollar bill. All the survivors from my life raft signed it, and then Ed Robertson framed it for me while we were homeward bound. It now hangs on the wall of my office.

The stories about those who did not make it are compelling. One man, who had not heeded the warning about drinking the water in Casablanca, contracted dysentery and presumably went down with the ship in sick bay. A hospital corpsman, who had not turned in all his alcohol, had invited men for a drink or two of pineapple and alcohol. He was last seen drunk as a skunk, and no one saw him leave the ship. A "sailor's sailor," fearing that he was not going to make it, gave his money belt to another sailor, with instructions to give it to his wife. The friend died, but the sailor made it. An Ensign St. John helped men aboard the heaving Goff while holding on to the screw guard until he, himself, was lost.

When we were near Norfolk and I presumed out of danger, we held memorial services for our missing shipmates. Only then did the true impact of our loss sink in. We had lost 27 shipmates, friends of three years.

The task force arrived in Norfolk, Virginia, on or about 9 November 1943 and received the Presidential Unit Citation. Captain Hutchins, who in true Navy tradition made one last inspection and seized the ship's colors before abandoning ship, won the Navy Cross. Also awarded were two more Navy Crosses, two Silver Stars, and one Legion of Merit. I got a new chap stick; I had lost mine when the ship went down.

Mr. Maher, who was erroneously identified as William (his name is Robert) in the Summer 1993 issue of Naval History, is retired and living in Florida. After his discharge from the U.S. Navy in 1945, he served for 38 years as a member of the technical staff for research and development at Bell Telephone Laboratories. He is president of the USS Borie (DD-215) Association.

Captain Wise is a frequent contributor to Naval History, Proceedings, and other military journals. A graduate of Northwestern University, he served as an aviator and intelligence specialist in the U.S. Navy.
31 October 1943 - Z.D. +1:54

Foul weather prevented flight operations until shortly after noon.

1235 Point OBOE - course 192°, speed 13 knots, 50-12 N, 31-34 W. Catapulted 5 VT, 4 on A/S patrol plan #1-A, 1 to 190° T - 65 miles to fly expanding square. Aboard at 1640.

1314 Catapulted T-2 to take after port sector from T-3 (compass out), latter taking up visibility patrol. T-2 aboard at 1547.

1608 Lt. (jg) Fowler (T-7) reported two surfaced subs on course 180°, bearing 200°T., distance 27 miles. All planes on patrol were immediately vectored to scene, two planes with bad compasses being given sun bearings. Both U-boats opened fire, the 750 tonner diving promptly. When Lt. (jg) Balliett and McAuslan arrived 12 minutes later, the 500 tonner dove and was immediately attacked with mines by both Lt. (jg) Fowler and Balliett at 15 second interval. Two distinct explosions were observed, 29 seconds apart; also oil slick, miscellaneous debris, and metal cylinder.

1640 Pilot reported sighting Swedish ship, NACRA at 1530, bearing 300° T - 50 miles; course 030 T., estimated speed 6 knots.

1734 U.S.S. BORIE directed to proceed to area of contact and conduct night search for remaining sub. BORIE destroyed 2 U/Es, as described in diary of 1 November 1943.

1 November 1943 - Z.D. +1:54

0001 Dispatch from BORIE: "Scratch one pig boat eleven miles south of your contact. Am searching for more." Estimated position: 49-03 N, 31-55 W. BORIE's Commanding Officer made following amplifying report on 2 November: "Radar contact and sound. Sub submerged. Delivered three D/C attacks first accompanied by heavy underwater explosion. Came to surface after second attack and then submerged stern first. Third attack dead in water. No further contact. Surface of water profusely covered with diesel oil. Lack of evasive tactics and gunfire, together with oil slick of 1000 yards diameter, indicate that this sub was a "milchcow."
WAR DIARY
USS CARD (CVE-11)

1 November (Cont.)

0305 Dispatch from BORIE: "Just sank number two in depth charge attack gun battle and (garble)." Position not known. Amplifying report on this attack, also made by BORIE's Commanding Officer on 2 November: "Second sub. Radar and sound contact. Sub submersed. Attacked onco with D/C's. Sub surfaced. Running gun battle with ramming demolished sub which sank stern first and exploded leaving about fifteen survivors who were run under as BORIE cleared area because of torpedo fired by a third sub. Lasted one hour four minutes. Sub long and narrow, probably 1,200 tonner." Throughout remainder of day communications with BORIE were poor and only spasmodically successful. Extent of BORIE's damage incurred in battle was not known until Task Group joined up with BORIE at 1148, when it developed that sub had turned as BORIE rammed, putting latter across sub's forecastle. Heavy guns of BORIE blazed at 40 foot range. One shot completely demolished conning tower and several men therein. Men were knocked overboard by knifes and empty cartridge cases thrown by BORIE's crew. U-boat eventually sunk. As a result of extensive hoiling throughout ship from this ramming, BORIE's forward engine room was flooded, all electric power was lost (except emergency radio which failed later), no feed water could be recovered for boilers, and the possibility of sinking soon became a real threat. As indicated above, these facts did not become apparent until later in the day. Consequently, when the following message was received at 0452, there was only a hint of the difficulties eventually to be encountered.

0452 Dispatch from BORIE: "49-08 N, 31-26 1/4, course 000° T., speed 10 knots. Lay have to abandon (garble). Steering present course and speed rendezvous at track then course 45."

0650 Point OBGE - course 210° T., speed 12 knots, 50-12 N, 30-59 W. Catapulted 4 VT on A/S patrol, plan #1-A. T-8 and T-6 aboard at 0935 with compass and Z.B. out, respectively. At 0826, T-11 was catapulted to relieve T-8. BORIE not having been sighted during regular search, at 0950 all three planes in air were directed on special searches for her, but with negative results. Planes aboard at 1030 due to bad weather.

1040 Changed course to 040° T., speed 15 knots, on assumption that BORIE had passed astern of group.

1110 Directed GOFF and BARRY to light off all boilers and be ready for any emergency, having received message from BORIE that she had "commenced sinking".
1 November (Cont.)

1120 Catapulted 2 VT to search for BORIE along HF/DF bearings varying from 020° T., to 138° T. Plane located her at 1130, bearing 052° T., 14 miles. Changed course to 052° T., speed 18 knots. Visibility limited. Planes aboard at 1245.

1148 Sighted BORIE at 15,000 yards, bearing 052° T., steaming with salt water in boilers, making little headway, but reporting no immediate danger of sinking. However, BORIE soon lost all power and fell off into trough.

1230 Catapulted 4 VT for intensive A/S patrol around task group while attempting salvage of BORIE, each plane covering 90° sector to distance of 30 miles, until recalled at 1440 due to bad weather. All planes aboard at 1455. Until BORIE began abandoning ship at 1630, all efforts were directed toward helping her both to prevent further flooding and to get steam up again. The possibility of successfully towing BORIE had of necessity already been abandoned, inasmuch as BORIE had jettisoned her anchor chains, no towing engine was available on this ship, and the tactical situation precluded delaying until arrival of a tug. Handy billies and 130 feet of suction hose were passed to GOFF for further transfer to BORIE, but latter finally advised that she had no use for same inasmuch as the water in her cofferdam was heavily contaminated with oil, and she had no other fresh water available for her boilers. Heavy wallowing in the trough prevented passing water to her from other ships of the group.

1630 With bad weather and darkness closing in, and no prospect of improving his situation during the night, BORIE's Commanding Officer finally decided to abandon ship lest she capsize before dawn. The abandonment was accomplished in an orderly manner, with men passing over windward side and fantail into floats and nets secured to windward. However, many men attempted to swim to the GOFF or BARRY when close aboard, and others were knocked from the rafts by the propeller guards of the rescue ships, which were pitching heavily in the rough sea. GOFF and BARRY picked up survivors from the rafts and nets, and eventually succeeded in rescuing a total of eight (8) officers and one hundred twenty two (122) men out of original complement of 11 officers and one hundred forty-six (146) men. Many rescues were made in darkness, with rafts spotted by their flares and other occasional lights. Many individuals were picked up singly. The last raft was contacted at 2254,
bearing three living and one dead, the latter secured to the raft but unfortunately face down in the water. The three survivors were transferred with difficulty and the rough water left no alternative than to abandon the raft with its unidentified dead. Although all rafts and nets had now been contacted, search was continued throughout the night for any other surviving individuals who had either left or been knocked from the rafts and were attempting to swim independently to GOFF or BARRY.

During rescue operations the CARD steamed around the DD's in a circle of 10 miles radius. Speed was limited to 10 knots due to high seas. About 0400 the CARD picked up a radar blip on port quarter and turned away from it. Shortly thereafter the CARD picked up a second radar blip close aboard on starboard beam and turned away from it at maximum speed (15 knots down wind). The bogey followed and closed to 2800 yards astern, then opened up to 3200 yards. CARD coaxed BARRY and GOFF over TBS to intercept, and BARRY picked up blip while 6000 yards on starboard beam. Bogey then disappeared from screen of both ships as BARRY passed astern.

2 November 1943 - 01:54

GOFF and BARRY rejoined CARD at dawn, and an upwind search from BORIE was begun. Numberous rafts and nets were sighted, but all were empty, and the several bodies seen were only too obviously dead.

0758 Sighted BORIE, bearing 355° T., distance 16,000 yards. BORIE was still afloat, though somewhat down by the stern, but the heavy seas had not abated and she was still rolling wildly in the trough.

The tactical situation at this time is summarized as follows:

(a) BORIE was holed, all fuel and water tanks ruptured, forward engine room flooded, main deck cracked thwartships over #2 fireroom, all movable gear jettisoned, no radio, no electric power, no feed water or fresh water, boilers and turbines bad from salt water, no anchor chains for towing, ship wallowing in trough, unable to get underway to come alongside for fresh water, and sea too rough to transfer personnel to man her.
WAR DIARY

USS CARD (CVE-11)

2 November (Cont.)

(b) Scene of action approximately center and touching several reported heavy submarine concentrations. Cominrich reported refueling group bearing 213° T., distance 86 miles, at least 20 submarines patrolling approximately 200 miles to westward, and an additional concentration to southwest. Admiralty reported concentration bearing 212° T., distance 15 miles, about five submarines patrolling 100 miles north, and several submarines approaching from southeast.

(c) Nearest port Horta, approximately 690 miles. Ireland, Iceland, Newfoundland all about 800 to 900 miles. Any salvage tug would have to be escorted, and salvage group would have to operate in heavy seas and very dangerous waters.

(d) The weather was bad with a new front approaching and no signs of improvement thereafter. Seas were heavy, limiting speed to 10 knots. Destroyers were getting low on fuel.

(e) The third sub (which fired the torpedo) may have followed BORIE, inasmuch as BORIE's speed had been 10 knots or less. Radio silence had been completely broken on several frequencies during past 24 hours. Several radar and sound contacts had been reported during night.

(f) Personnel were jittery and without sleep. The cold water, heavy seas, overcrowded destroyers, and distances to nearest land indicated that the entire Task Group might be wiped out if one of the remaining ships were torpedoes.

It was accordingly decided that any further attempt at salvage was not only impracticable, but tactically unsound.

0905 Orders were therefore given BARRY to sink BORIE with gun fire and torpedoes, but the heavy seas made both methods inaccurate. At 0940 these attempts were abandoned, after several shell hits which did no major damage and three torpedo shots which missed, and the TBF circling the area was directed to attack with its four depth bombs, one at a time. At 0955, after receiving the third depth bomb aloft aboard, BORIE sank swiftly by the stern.
Lieutenant Charles H. Hutchins, USNR, receives the Navy Cross from Commander-in-Chief Atlantic Fleet Admiral Royal E. Ingersoll, USN, at a ceremony aboard the USS Card (CVE-11) in November, 1943. Lt. Hutchins was the Commanding Officer of the USS Borie (DD-215) when she rammed and then sank a German U-boat in the mid-Atlantic on 1 November 1943. (Official U.S. Navy photograph.)
The Secretary of the Navy

Washington

The President of the United States takes pleasure in presenting the NAVY CROSS to

Lieutenant Commander Charles H. Hutchins
United States Naval Reserve

for service as set forth in the following

CITATION:

"For extraordinary heroism as Commanding Officer of the U.S.S. BORIE during action against two enemy submarines in the Atlantic. While engaged in escort operations, Lieutenant Hutchins made sound contact with a hostile submarine and immediately maneuvered to attack with depth charges which forced the enemy vessel to the surface and caused her subsequently to sink stern first. Contacting a second large submersible three hours later, the BORIE again launched a fierce attack, her well-placed depth charges bringing the enemy to the surface and her four-inch guns blazing as she forged full speed ahead, rammed her foe forward of the conning tower and held fast. In the ensuing battle, Lieutenant Hutchins's command waged a gallant fight at close quarters using every available weapon against a desperately determined enemy until the two vessels drifted apart. After more than one hour of continuous gunfire on both sides, the BORIE, although un­navigable and badly holed the entire length of her port side, brought the submarine to a dead stop by exploding three depth charges almost directly under her and ending all resistance with the surrender and eventual sinking of the enemy vessel."

For the President,

Secretary of the Navy

Retyped from a draft citation, approved 2 February 1944, on file at the Naval Historical Center, Washington, D.C.
E. A. Wilde, Jr.
July, 1996
The Presidential Unit Citation pennant awarded to Task Group 21.14 (Capt. A. J. Isbell) for its success against German submarines in the Atlantic from 27 July to 25 October 1943 is examined by the Commanders of the participating Task Units: (L to R) Lt. Cdr. H. D. Hill, C.O. of the USS Barry (DD-248); Lt. Cdr. Howard M. Avery, C.O. of aircraft squadron VC-9; Lt. C. H. Hutchins, C.O. of USS Borie (DD-215) and Lt. Cdr. H. I. Smith, C.O. of USS Goff (DD-247). Lt. Hutchins was awarded the Navy Cross, while the others were awarded the Legion of Merit at a ceremony aboard the escort carrier USS Card (CVE-11) (Capt. A. J. Isbell) at Norfolk, Virginia, on 10 November 1943. (Official U.S. Navy Photograph.)
THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

Washington

The President of the United States takes pleasure in presenting the PRESIDENTIAL UNIT CITATION* to

TASK GROUP TWENTY-ONE FOURTEEN

Consisting of the

USS CARD, USS BARRY, USS BORIE, USS GOFF
and VC Squadrons ONE and NINE

for service as set forth in the following

CITATION:

"For outstanding performance during antisubmarine operations in mid-Atlantic from July 27 to October 25, 1943. At a time when continual flow of supplies along the United States-North Africa convoy route was essential to the maintenance of our established military supremacy and to the accumulations of reserves, the CARD, her embarked aircraft and her escorts pressed home a vigorous offensive which was largely responsible for the complete withdrawal of hostile U-boats from this vital supply area. Later, when submarines returned with deadlier weapons and augmented antiaircraft defenses, this heroic Task Group, by striking damaging blows at the onset of renewed campaigns, wrested the initiative from the enemy before actual inception of projected large-scale attacks. Its distinctive fulfillment of difficult and hazardous missions contributed materially to victorious achievements by our land forces."

For the President,

Secretary of the Navy.

The President of the United States takes pleasure in presenting the Legion of Merit to

COMMANDE R HERBERT DUDLEY HILL
UNITED STATES NAVAL RESERVE

for service as set forth in the following Citation:

"For exceptionally meritorious conduct in the performance of outstanding services to the Government of the United States as Commanding Officer of the U.S.S. BURNT, during operations against enemy forces in the Atlantic Ocean, from July 27 to November 9, 1943. Skillfully directing his escorting destroyer as part of an Atlantic Fleet Anti-Submarine Task Group, Commander (then Lieutenant Commander) Hill repeatedly located and attacked U-boats which were in favorable position to attack the Group's carrier. Aggressive and resourceful, he provided effective protection for the highly vulnerable carrier, enabling it to enter into the center of enemy submarine concentrations and, through the combined actions of escorts and embarked aircraft, inflict exceedingly heavy losses on the enemy. His professional skill, initiative, and unyielding devotion to duty reflect the highest credit upon Commander Hill and the United States Naval Service."

For the President,
The President of the United States takes pleasure in presenting the LEGION OF MERIT to

COMMANDER HINCH IRA SMITH
UNITED STATES NAVAL RESERVE

for service as set forth in the following

CITATION:

"For exceptionally meritorious conduct in the performance of outstanding services to the Government of the United States as Commanding Officer of the U.S.S. COFF, during operations against enemy forces in Atlantic Ocean Area, from July 27 to November 9, 1943. Determined and aggressive in the fulfillment of his assigned duties as Commander of an Escort Destroyer assigned to an Anti-submarine Task Group, Commander (then Lieutenant Commander) Smith repeatedly located and attacked U-boats which were in favorable positions to attack the Group's carrier and, when not engaged in positive offensive action, either individually or in cooperation with other attacking units of the task group, assisted in screening the highly vulnerable Task Group carrier. Under his skilled direction, the COFF provided effective protection for the carrier, enabling it to enter the center of concentrations of enemy submarines and, through combined action of escorts and embarked aircraft, inflict exceedingly heavy losses on the enemy. Commander Smith's professional ability, resourcefulness and untiring devotion to duty upheld the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service."

Commander Smith is authorized to wear the Combat "V"

Files Cofy
Ref: CINCJANT P15/2909 dtd 22 Aug 1944
Misc. 13 - N

For the President,

JAMES FORRESTAL
Secretary of the Navy
**U.S.S. Borie (DD-215)**

List of Officers, 1 November 1943

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hutchins, Charles H.</td>
<td>Lieut.</td>
<td>USNR</td>
<td>Commanding Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brown, Philip B.</td>
<td>Lieut.</td>
<td>USNR</td>
<td>Executive Officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>*Brown, Morrison R.</td>
<td>Lieut.</td>
<td>USNR</td>
<td>Engineering Officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dietz, Walter H., Jr.</td>
<td>Lieut.</td>
<td>USNR</td>
<td>Gunnery Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Lord, Robert H.</td>
<td>Lt.j.g.</td>
<td>USNR</td>
<td>Communications Officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>Quinn, Lawrence S.</td>
<td>Ensign</td>
<td>USNR</td>
<td>Torpedo Officer</td>
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<td>Jefferis, Robert W.</td>
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<td>USNR</td>
<td>Ass't. Eng. Officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>Haidt, Louis A., Jr.</td>
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<td>USNR</td>
<td>Ass't. Gunnery Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*St. John, Richard E.</td>
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<td>USNR</td>
<td>Ass't. First Lieutenant</td>
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<td>Platt, James C., Jr.</td>
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<td>USNR</td>
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<tr>
<td>Merscher, Walter F.</td>
<td>Lt.j.g.</td>
<td>USNR</td>
<td>Medical Officer</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>(MC)</td>
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* Compiled from a list of officers' next of kin dated July 31, 1943, and the lists of survivors included in the deck logs of the rescue destroyers U.S.S. Barry (DD-248) and U.S.S. Goff (DD-247). The Borie's Torpedo Officer, Lawrence S. Quinn, assisted with the officers' primary duty assignments.

* Died before he could be rescued after abandoning ship on 1 November 1943 according to a machine-generated casualty report at the National Archives prepared by the Bureau of Naval Personnel in 1946.

E. A. Wilde, Jr.
February, 1998
**U.S.S. Borie (DD-215)**

*Muster Roll of the Crew, 1 November 1943*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>ODD</th>
<th>Rank</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>ADAMS, Harley H.</td>
<td>551-12-12</td>
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<td>AIKENHEAD, James M.</td>
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<td><em>ALFORD, Opal (n)</em></td>
<td>604-73-93</td>
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<tr>
<td>ALLEGRI, James (n)</td>
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<td>ANGELSON, George P.</td>
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<td>BANKS, Carl W.</td>
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<td>BEAULIER, Gordon J.</td>
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<td>BIRD, Donald M.</td>
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<td>BLASKO, Joseph G.</td>
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<td>BLASZCZAK, John R.</td>
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<td><em>BONFIGLIO, Charles T.</em></td>
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<td>BORTE, Donald &quot;M&quot;</td>
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<td>BRADSHAW, Robert D.</td>
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<td>BRANCH, Richard B.</td>
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<td>BREWSTER, James K.</td>
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<td>CLUBB, James F. M.</td>
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<td>FLEWEN, Charlie (n)</td>
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USS Borie (DD-215): Muster Roll, 11/1/43

*TULL, Richard E. 381-56-36  S2c
*TYREE, "D" "Lu" 656-67-79  S2c
*WALLACE, Andrew (n) 664-72-11  F1c
WELCH, F. P. 606-12-18  S1c
WENZ, Richard W. 403-48-38  CGM

WILLIAMS, Oswald (n) 857-81-81  StM2c
*WINN, James H. 658-77-92  S1c
WUNDER, Albert E. 245-04-70  S2c
YAEGER, Walter W., Jr. 405-01-21  MNc
ZENDZIAN, Frank S. 403-73-67  MM2c
ZIEMBA, Joseph (n) 817-15-95  F2c

* * * * * * *

1 Source: The ship's final muster roll on microfilm at the National Archives showing the disposition of the entire crew as of 9 November 1943.

2 WELCH, F. P., S1c, is not included on the final muster roll, but he is included in the list of Borie survivors rescued by the USS Barry (DD-248). (Ref: Barry's deck log for 11/1/43.)

* Died before he could be rescued after abandoning ship on 1 November 1943 according to a machine-generated casualty report at the National Archives prepared by the Bureau of Naval Personnel after the war.

Summary of Casualties:

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<th>Officer</th>
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<th>Survived</th>
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E. A. Wilde, Jr.
July, 2000
U.S.S. Borie (DD-215)

Honor Roll

Died before they could be rescued after abandoning ship in the mid-Atlantic on 1 November 1943*

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* * * * * * * *

* Source: A machine-generated casualty report at the National Archives prepared by the Bureau of Naval Personnel in 1946.

E. A. Wilde, Jr.
June, 1998
"They fought together as brothers in arms; they died together and now they sleep side by side. To them we have a solemn obligation — the obligation to insure that their sacrifice will help make this a better and safer world in which to live."

- Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, USN, at The Surrender on board the U.S.S. Missouri (BB-63) in Tokyo Bay, 2 September 1945.
Narrative by: Lt. Comdr. Charles H. Hutchins, USS BORIE
Sinking of submarine in North Atlantic Convoy.

Lieutenant Commander Hutchins recounts his engagement with a submarine while operating with Task Unit 21.14 which consisted of the escort carrier USS CARD and the destroyers COFF and BARAY. At the time of the attack, the BORIE, commanded by Hutchins was alone and carried on a protracted duel with the submarine which was finally sunk.

Lieutenant Commander Charles H. Hutchins was born at Pawtucket, R.I. in 1913 and graduated from Annapolis in 1936. He resigned with the rank of Ensign in December 1938 and came back into the Navy on January 14, 1942 with the reserve rank of Lieutenant (j.g.). He served as Ordnance Officer in the Canal Zone until December 19, 1942 when he became Executive Officer of the BORIE. He took over command of that vessel on June 6, 1943 and was promoted from Lieutenant to Lieutenant Commander on November 11, 1943 following the engagement with the sub.
Narrative by: Lieutenant Commander Hutchins  
USS BORIE

DECLASSIFIED - DOD DRG. 5200.9  
of 27 SEP 53

BY __________ DATE: __________

Lieutenant Porter:

This is Lieutenant Porter. We are in room 3450, Main Navy Building,  
Washington, D. C., 15 November 1943. We are about to obtain a narrative  
from Lieutenant Commander Hutchins of the USS BORIE.

Commander Hutchins, I understand that when you were first on this ship  
you were doing some patrolling down the South Atlantic and were anxious for  
a little more active duty. Would you mind telling us about that before we  
go into the more active duty that you eventually obtained.

Commander Hutchins:

In February of 1943 we were assigned to the Fourth Fleet in escort duties. This consisted of escorting Trinidad to Recife or Bahia convoys, going from Trinidad to Recife where we were relieved by the Brazilian escorts who took the convoy to Bahia. This particular type of duty lasted until the latter part of June when we were detailed to report to New York Navy Yard and thence were assigned after a short period of training, to Task Group 21.14, Task Group Commander, Captain A. J. Isbell.

This Group consisted of the baby flat top CARD, the BORIE, the GOFF, and the BARRY.

We left the latter part of July on our first trip with the convoy out of Norfolk with destination Gibraltar. As soon as the convoy was within range of the shore-based aircraft, we would be relieved from that duty and would proceed to known concentrations of submarines for offensive action. The purpose of the BORIE, of course, as well as the other destroyers with the carrier, was merely the role of protector for the carrier. We formed the screen as she and her planes accomplished all the killing.

Upon completion of our duty in this area, we proceeded to Casablanca for logistic reasons and returned to the United States in the same type of duty with convoys bound for Norfolk. The latter part of September we left with another UGS convoy headed east. When relieved, we proceeded north of the Azores for offensive action and from that point went on farther north, slightly above the fifty-first parallel. During this part of the trip the planes of the carrier accomplished some sinkings, and then, for logistic purposes, again we turned to Casablanca. At Casablanca, after fueling and provisioning ship, we left with another convoy out of Gibraltar headed west. Again after the convoy was out of the danger area we started north. It was in this particular time that the BORIE and its action took place.

(1943)

On the night in question, October 31st, just prior to sunset, one of the planes of the carrier contacted two submarines on the surface, apparently fueling. One was tentatively identified as a refueler or "sea cow". The
planes attacked and sank one of the submarines, the other escaping. This action occurred about 13 miles from the point at which the CARD and its group was then located. We steamed on a reciprocal course for a short period at which time the BORIE was detached and ordered back to the point of contact to conduct a night search alone.

Arriving on station we commenced our search and at about 2000 or a very few minutes thereafter, made our first contact on radar. The zone description at the time was 154 plus. Running down the radar contact we made sure that we had a submarine and commenced to attack. The submarine, however, submerged at this time and it was necessary to conduct depth charge attacks rather than surface engagements.

After three attacks, during which time we had seen the submarine rise to the surface with its bow high and appear to settle by the stern, we considered the submarine sunk. Also, a heavy underwater explosion further confirmed this in our minds. However, we conducted a search for about three to three and a half hours in the area to make sure they had no chance to escape. Then upon returning to the point at which we had made that attack, this was marked by the float lights we had dropped, we noted a heavy oil on the water, the diesel oil fumes were very rank, and we obtained no further contact in this area. In an effort to further track down any possibility of his escape we continued the search to the east. However, after running out of what we considered his possible location we got another contact, this time also by radar, at 6500, 8000 yards, bearing 150 and we were on course 180. We immediately put on all available speed, having four boilers lit, steaming split plant and steamed toward the contact. At about range 2800 yards the submarine submerged and we conducted a sound attack picking him up at 2200 yards, tracked him into about 500 yards during which time he appeared to be on an easterly course. But at the 500 yard point the bearing suddenly started to draw right. We, of course, came hard right and steadied up on course 210 and dropped our depth charges on that course.

As we steamed on through the point of contact to institute proceedings for regaining contact, the radar picked up the contact at 400 yards in that same area where the depth charge attack had been made. At almost the same time, one of the lookouts spotted the sub on the surface. We came hard around to the right and started in to pursue him using the searchlight during this time. The range opened up to about 1200 to 1400 yards and each of our four inch main battery guns commenced firing, local control, as soon as it could bear. At this time, the submarine also fired back at us with his anti-aircraft machine guns. He did not fire his deck gun, which was forward of the conning tower. Our second or third full salvo of the main battery struck this submarine just under this gun and, when the smoke cleared away, the gun was gone without having fired a shot.

During this pursuit the submarine turned and went on a northwesterly course and we closed to ram with our 20 mm. guns sweeping their decks completely clear, the four-inch scoring some effective hits during this time. As soon as the situation was favorable we came in from his starboard quarter to ram and, just a few seconds before contact was made, the submarine turned hard left with the result that we struck a glancing blow on his forecastle, rather than
a good straight hit. The BORIE rode up and over the forecastle of the submarine. Realizing the situation, we stopped the engines and pinned him there for about the next ten minutes. During this part of the action, all guns that could be brought to bear were used at ranges of anywhere from ten feet to forty feet. Number two main battery four-inch concentrated on the after part of the submarine. The two ships were in almost parallel positions now, about 30 degrees being the angle between them. Number four main battery gun was able to bear on the main deck of the sub just aft the conning tower. Machine guns two, three, four and six were able to bear to the port side, but machine gun number two was blanked off by the main battery gun which was just aft of it on the galley deck-house, therefore, it fired very few shots during this part of the action. Machine gun number six, located on the main deck aft, port side, was able to sweep the submarine decks continuously. Machine guns three and four were in the raised platform aft amidships. Considering their height, they had difficulty depressing sufficiently to shoot at the sub without shooting through the shield—that's the weather screen of light metal around that platform. Therefore, the gunners depressed the guns maximum and fired right through the screen. They blew holes right through the metal screen so they could fire on the sub.

All available small arms were broken out and used. The Executive Officer and a Signalman manned Tommy guns from the bridge. We had shot-guns, which were kept on board as riot guns, those were broken out and used, rifles and pistols, one person even firing a very pistol down into the conning tower of the sub from the bridge. Others, not otherwise engaged, threw whatever was at hand. Kurtz, the gun Captain of Number two main battery picked up empty shell cases and heaved those over onto the sub's deck striking one man and knocking him overboard. Another member of the crew pulled his pocket knife threw that and was able to stick it in the stomach of one German, knocking him overboard. The Germans, during this time, attempted to man their gun—their machine gun. However, none of them could get close. It is estimated up to this time that there had been about 30 to 35 casualties in the crew of the submarine. None of the bodies were left lying on deck—all fell overboard and were never seen again.

After about ten minutes of this hammering, during which time the BORIE, of course, had taken severe damage along the port side, the two ships broke apart. It was then we realized aboard ship that we were severely damaged ourselves. The submarine's hull had cut a serious hole along our entire port side. The forward engine room was flooding badly where plates were opened up at the joints and frames crushed in. The after engine room was flooding but we were able to control that water. However, the damage in the forward engine room was beyond control and it was later necessary to abandon the engine room. The crew of that particular engine room maintained flank speed on that engine, even though they were standing in water up to their necks with the turbines operating under water. After the two ships broke apart, the submarine got under way at a speed of about 15 knots and, just as we fired a torpedo at him, he turned left to avoid the torpedo and then went into a tight left hand circle. The BORIE, of course, all this time was pursuing

- 3 -
and firing every gun available. As the submarine went into this tight left-hand circle the BORIE's turning circle was a handicap in that we couldn't turn as sharply. The result was that the submarine went in a small circle with the BORIE in a larger circle outside and attempting to close to ram again.

It is to be noted, during this time, that the submarine was always in such a position in that circle that her stern was pointed directly at the BORIE. In view of the stinger tubes carried in the stern of these submarines, and since we couldn't close the submarine with his short turning circle, if we were to continue in this present maneuver the BORIE's searchlight was doused. We had the submarine well on radar. The radar kept him in the screen at all times, therefore, we figured the submarine could not submerge if he had not done so up until now, and by dousing the searchlight it was hoped that the submarine would try to escape in the darkness.

As it turned out this is what the submarine did, but having got him in a favorable position again, as noted by radar, we again turned the searchlight on and continued the action. This time we brought him up on the starboard bow and closed at 27 knots to attempt to ram again. However, as we made contact, or rather just prior to making contact, the submarine turned hard left which put his bow headed directly for our after engine room. We backed hard on the port engine, threw the rudder hard left and stopped the starboard engine. The result was that the BORIE's stern was thrown toward the submarine on a nearly parallel course. The purpose of this was to enable our depth charge battery to fire the depth charges from the projectors. These had been set at 30 foot depth with 50 yard impulse charges in the forward and after guns and 75 yard impulse charge in the center gun. We have three of these projectors on each side of the ship aft. When the submarine was within range these projectors were fired, resulting in a perfect straddle around his conning tower. One depth charge landed just over the conning tower, the other two landed just short. This explosion stopped the submarine dead in the water with his bow about 6 feet from the side of the BORIE.

Considering the possibility of the damage to the screws, we wanted the submarine in a position so close to our stern, the BORIE went ahead to gain a more favorable position for sinking the submarine and the submarine again got underway going in under the BORIE's stern. The ensuing chase lasted several more minutes during which time we again tried to fire torpedoes but, just as the torpedo tubes were being brought to bear, a full salvo of the main battery caused one of the engine room hatches to fly open. These are spring-loaded hatches. This hatch flying open caught the torpedo underneath and jammed it just as it was coming on bearing. One "fish" was fired which missed the submarine's bow about ten feet. The trainer on the tube did not fire the other torpedo.

Subsequent to this torpedo attack, we continued to close the submarine scoring a very, very effective hit in his starboard diesel exhaust. This
was the second such hit that had been noted and the submarine immediately slowed down almost to a stop. However, the crew of the submarine were still coming up on deck and, although they had their hands up as though in surrender, they were continuing to run toward the guns, therefore we continued to fire until they did yell "Kamarade". We were so close we could hear them trying to surrender.

We then ordered "cease firing". All guns ceased with the exception of gun one which scored a hit in the conning tower which had several men in it. When the flash subsided and the smoke cleared away, most of the conning tower was gone. The submarine, too, was still underway and still on evasive courses. Finally the submarine fired several white stars interspersed with green and red. We assumed that the white star indicated that they were attempting to surrender but could possibly be a signal to any submarine which might be in the area. Keeping a sharp lookout for any answering signals, we saw a very star fired on bearing 220. The distance to that star was indeterminable, but it appeared to short of the horizon. The submarine's crew then abandoned ship. The submarine was dead in the water, about 15 men went over the side, five of whom, it is estimated, were lowered in yellow inflated rafts. They were obviously injured and had to be strapped to the raft and then lowered. The balance of the ten or twelve men got into the water in their rafts and were very quick in doing so. The submarine submerged stern first, at a very sharp angle, and exploded just under the surface as the last man got off the sub.

We, at that time, were on a heading of 240 true with the survivors about 50 to 60 yards on our port bow. With the hope of picking up a few of them, we were moving in to rescue. However, the sound operator picked up the noise of a torpedo coming from bearing 220, the same bearing of the flare we had seen just previously. Therefore, we put all available steam into the engines, came hard left to parallel the bearing of that torpedo and, unfortunately, had to steam through this group of prisoners.

As we cleared the group of survivors, we saw the torpedo go down our port side about 30 yards away. Maneuvering on zigzag courses, with only one engine now operating, we cleared the area to avoid any further contact since the ship was not in condition to press any further attack. Our hope was to draw the submarine with us and by contacting the Task Group have the other destroyers attack this third submarine.

Commander Wright:

Commander Hutchins, what was the character of this tender submarine? In what way did she differ from the submarine that was destroyed?

Commander Hutchins:

We did not see that particular submarine for sure. The pilots of the planes which had made the attack were the ones that had identified it.

Commander Wright:

Was there any sign during the attack that these two submarines tried
to fire torpedoes at you?

Commander Hutchins:

There was no time, that we definitely know, that the submarines fired. However, during that part of the action with the second submarine wherein he was going in tight left-hand circles with us pursuing in larger circles, we noticed that he kept his stern pointed toward us at all times. However, we did not see any torpedoes from either of these two submarines. Only from the third submarine.

Commander Wright:

After you had made an attack and you were squaring away to get set for another attack, about how long did that take you and what was the procedure? Did you have to pick them up again on the sound and get pointed by the sound?

Commander Hutchins:

After one depth charge attack we used the standard procedure as outlined in current anti-submarine warfare doctrine for regaining sound contact. The operator, as we steamed through, would train the sound gear to the expected bearing where last held and then we would institute the standard procedure.

Commander Wright:

What was the status of the sea at these times and when you were up on the top of the sub how low was she in the water?

Commander Hutchins:

The submarine was obviously trimmed down very low. Most of the time the decks were just awash. The sea was moderately rough. We would estimate the waves were twelve to eighteen feet high during the action and the submarine quite often was exposed to a depth of six feet.

Commander Wright:

From your observation, do you think that that sub or any part of her contained any special armor?

Commander Hutchins:

The observations we made disclosed no special armor, however, we were deeply impressed by the ruggedness and the toughness of those particular boats. She was almost as long as the BORIE, painted a very, very light grey, almost an off white. On her conning tower there was a polar bear device. There were three numbers also painted on the conning tower, but they were illegible since the machine guns had so badly shot the bridge structure away.

Commander Wright:

Did you get identity numbers or letters from either side of the two subs?
Commander Hutchins:

We could make out no definite identifying numbers or letters on either of the subs. Only the polar bear device on the second sub was identified.

Commander Wright:

About what tonnage—light, do you think that each of them were?

Commander Hutchins:

In the case of the first submarine, I can make no estimate. We saw her only silhouetted against the float light. However, the second submarine, after looking at ONI pictures and descriptions, we are of the opinion that the submarine was a 1000 or 1200 tonner. She had no rounded platform on her forecastle for a gun, as is characteristic of a 517 ton class, but she was longer than the descriptions give for the 750 tonner.

Commander Wright:

Was there any prisoners taken from this action later by the other destroyers, or were they all polished off?

Commander Hutchins:

No prisoners were taken on this entire cruise, by this group. However, we do believe that some of the survivors from this second submarine of this night probably were picked up by the third submarine. As we cleared the area we were able to see very stars coming from the group of survivors.

In looking back over the action at this particular time, the complete pleasure of the crew in having accomplished the sinking was visible all over the ship. When the submarine sank there was a yell that went up from all hands—it probably could be heard in Berlin. The men were clapping each other and patting each other on the back and all during the action there were times when it was actually comical to observe the situation, particularly with the submarine pinned underneath. Bearing in mind that this crew has been together a long time and have received many compliments from many different sources as a crew, and the fact that heretofore their one dream had been to catch a submarine, depth charge him, bring him to the surface and then to sink him with gun fire, this particular action more than justified their hopes.

I can only say that their hope is to be held together as a crew on some other ship. That was their one request after being picked up when the ship was later lost.

As we zig zagged away from the third submarine and proceeded to the rendezvous which we were to keep with the balance of the Task Group, shortly after sunrise, we took stock of our damage and found that it was exceedingly serious. The forward engine room was completely out of commission. The generators had been flooded out with the result that we had no electric power on the ship. This handicapped us in our damage control. It was necessary to
do all below decks work by the light of the battle lanterns which have been issued for emergency lighting. The only means of operating the radio was by cutting in the Kohler auxiliary generator. We also had this, by an improvised jumper, piped into the 5L radar. These two pieces of equipment we kept going as long as we had fuel for the engine. However, since the gasoline was scarce and had been used first in the handy billy pumps, in an attempt to control the level of water within the ship, we had only a little available for radio purposes. When this ran out during the night it was necessary to secure the radio and we were then without any communication with the carrier group. As we proceeded toward the rendezvous, all hands turned to in removing topside weight. The balance of the torpedoes were fired. The torpedo tubes were burned off, we threw over all machine guns and saved only enough ammunition for the four-inch battery to fight any last defensive action. Saved ten rounds per gun. The life boat was sunk and any other top hamper not absolutely essential to get the ship back to port was thrown over the side.

This occupied all hands from the conclusion of the action until almost noon of the next day when we were sighted by the carrier group. This rendezvous was brought about by the use of our radio again. Since our engine speed on the one remaining engine was fluctuating and since our draft had increased with our flooding, our speed was not determined very accurately and since all of our navigation had to be by dead reckoning we missed our rendezvous the next morning. The planes were unable to locate us because of the heavy weather. Visibility, the greater part of the time, was zero. The seas had started to run higher and we were trailing oil from all port side tanks and a great many of the starboard side tanks. Seep samples showed that our oil was badly contaminated with salt water, our feed water system, however, was our biggest problem. Since the flooding of the engine rooms had required large pump capacity we had had to use our main drain system. This, of course, involves the use of the main circulating pumps. The capacity of these circulators was not sufficient to maintain a vacuum at the speeds necessary to press the engagement. Therefore, we had to exhaust to the atmosphere. This used up most of our feed water during the action and the early part of our movement away. Our hot-well was contaminated and C-101, the makeup feed tank, was completely holed and was full of salt water and was not usable. We secured boilers three and four in order that they might not be contaminated by this salt water in our system and that we could use them later after we had gotten repairs made. However, before the rendezvous was effected we had used up all fresh water and were still unable to close the system to the atmosphere. Therefore, we were using salt water in the boilers. In spite of the fact that we reduced the pressure in those steaming boilers to about 160 to 175 pounds from their normal 250 pound operating pressure, and, also, in spite of the fact that we reduced the water level in the steam drum until it was just barely visible in the gauge glass, the boilers continued to prime dangerously. The ship was rolling with about an eighteen second period and rolling badly, therefore, water, salt water, was carried across to the turbines. The starboard turbine continued to function until about nine o'clock, at which time the salt in the system blocked it. The ship was then dead in the water with no electric power. The use of lighter fluid, alcohol and kerosene had been made in the Kohler auxiliary generator for the radio system and by the use of this, we were able to send out enough direction finder signals to the Carrier that it was able to get a bearing on us and eventually found us on
these bearings.

Survey of the damage was continued throughout the day, as were repairs but, considering the condition of the ship which was bad—we were badly holed all along the port side, fuel tanks contaminated, fresh water gone, the turbines locked, the main deck was broken across just forward of the forward bulkhead of the forward engine room, she was wallowing heavily and the bulkheads themselves surrounding the flooded engine room showed signs of giving way, the stern was completely underwater and other compartments were flooded. Since the Carrier could not furnish escort for the ship back to port, and New York at that time was 2200 miles distant with submarines surrounding the area, with a bad weather front approaching, it was considered absolutely impossible under the circumstances to run the ship back to port under her own power. The only alternative was to lie to and wait for a tug to come from port. In view of the fact that the radio by this time was absolutely inoperative, the chances of a tug locating the ship at sea were considered very small. With the wind that was blowing at the time, the ship was noticed to have drifted at the rate of about four to six knots.

Therefore, just prior to sunset on the first of November, the commanding officer decided to abandon ship and scuttle her. Upon the direction of the Task Group commander, the ship was not scuttled at this time, but the crew did abandon and was picked up by the destroyers GOFF and BARRY.

This maneuver, this abandoning ship, resulted in the loss of 24 men and 3 officers. The temperature of the water was 44 with very cold air, the seas were very high and, although the abandoning was very orderly, when the rafts got alongside the rescue ships the rolling and pitching of those ships resulted in the loss of men. At times the little keel of the GOFF were visible, and, at other times, the water was clear over her main decks as she rolled. These two ships did a marvelous job of rescuing, the seaman-ship was tops. However, the conditions were such that these men who had had no sleep since the previous night, who had fought the action all night, and had then spent the balance of the night and the day in controlling damage, many of them lost were just unable to get over the side.

Commander Wright:

Thank you Commander Hutchine for this story of the outstanding exploit of the war. Thanks very much.
### Photograph Credits

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**Key to Sources:**

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E. A. Wilde, Jr.  
February, 2001
The U.S.S. Borie (DD-215) in World War II

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E. A. Wilde, Jr.
February, 2001
About The Editor

E. Andrew Wilde, Jr., Commander, USNR (Ret.), received his commission through the NROTC Program at Dartmouth College in 1950. Following graduation he saw action off Korea aboard the USS Douglas H. Fox (DD-779) when this destroyer dueled with numerous North Korean shore batteries in the Sea of Japan. Many of the photographs he took during this period have been donated to the Naval Historical Foundation, and two of them appeared in the coffee-table book, The Navy, published by the Foundation in 2000. After completing three years of active duty he began a civilian career in public accounting and later in management positions at Raytheon Company in Waltham, Massachusetts.

In 1993 he developed a strong interest in naval history and began editing a series of illustrated ships' histories primarily of U.S. destroyers sunk in World War II. Primary source documents such as action reports, ships' war diaries, medal citations and muster rolls are included in these histories as well as many firsthand accounts. His booklets are not for sale, but he sends complimentary copies to the survivors and to the families of crewmembers killed on these vessels.

Commander Wilde is a life member of the Naval Historical Foundation and the U.S. Naval Institute.
### Historical Compilations by the Editors

(Destroyer/Destroyer Escort Hulls in World War II)

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<td>Strong (DD-467)</td>
<td>07/05/43</td>
<td>Cent., Solomons</td>
<td>45/61</td>
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<tr>
<td>Walke (DD-416)</td>
<td>11/15/42</td>
<td>Guadalcanal</td>
<td>82/48</td>
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</table>

**Notes:**

* Total for two engagements with the enemy

1 Including those presumed dead more than a year subsequent to the date they were reported missing either due to enemy action or by drowning.

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E. Andrew Wilde, Jr.
Commander, USNR (Ret.)
June, 2005
Record:  Prev Next

Call #  JFF 05-2054
Title  The U.S.S. Borie (DD-215) in World War II : documents and photographs / E. Andrew Wilde, Jr., editor.

<table>
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<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>CALL NO.</th>
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<td>Humanities- General Research- Rm315</td>
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Location  Humanities- General Research- Rm315
Edition  Rev. ed.
Descriptor  1 v. (various pagings) : ill., ports. ; 29 cm.
Note  Cover title.
Includes bibliographical references.
Subject  Borie (Destroyer : DD215)
World War, 1939-1945 -- Naval operations, American.
Add'l name  Wilde, E. Andrew.
Borie (Destroyer : DD215)
Alt title  USS Borie (DD-215) in World War Two
United States Ship Borie
Locations Where Historical Compilations by the Editor Are Available For Researchers

1. Air Zoo, Guadalcanal Campaign Collection, Potage, Michigan
   ECU Manuscript Collection, Joyner Library, Greenville, NC
   Louisiana Naval War Memorial Library, Baton Rouge, Louisiana

2. Maine Maritime Museum Library, Bath, Maine
   Mariners' Museum Research Library, Newport News, Virginia
   Mystic Seaport's G. W. Blunt White Library, Mystic, Connecticut
   National Archives II Library, College Park, Maryland

   National Museum of Pacific War, War Studies, Fredericksberg, TX
   Naval Historical Center, Navy Dept. Library, Washington Navy Yard
   Operational Archives Branch, Washington Navy Yard
   Ships' Histories Branch, Washington Navy Yard

4. Naval War College, Naval Historical Collection, Newport, RI
   N.Y. Public Library, 42nd & 5th Ave., Room 315, New York, N.Y.
   Portland Public Library, Portland Room, Portland, Maine
   Tin Can Sailors, Inc., Research Library, Somerset, Massachusetts
   US Naval Academy, Nimitz Library Special Collections, Annapolis
   U.S. Naval Institute, History Division, Beach Hall, Annapolis, MD
   U.S. Navy Memorial's Research Library, Washington, D.C.
   USS Slater (DE-766) Library, Albany, New York

* * * * * * * *

Notes:
1. Only ships which participated in the Guadalcanal Campaign:
   Aaron Ward, Barton, Colhoun, Cushing, DeHaven, Duncan, Laffey,
   McFarland, Monsen, Preston, Walke.

2. Only Bath-built ships: DeHaven, Drexler, Emmons, Meredith,
   Spence, Strong

3. Only ships sunk off the Normandy Beachhead: Corry, Glennon,
   Meredith

4. By appointment only: (508) 677-0515

E. A. Wilde, Jr.
June, 2006
1210 Greendale Ave., Apt. E3
Needham, MA 02492-4622
July 24, 1998

ECU Manuscript Collection
East Carolina University
Greenville, NC 27858-4353

Attention: Donald R. Lennon,
Coordinator, Special Collections

RE: E. Andrew Wilde, Jr. Papers

Dear Mr. Lennon,

I've been working on my Borie booklet (off and on) for about five years! I got serious about it recently when I came up with the transcript of the C.O.'s oral history. I think you'll agree that my booklet documents an amazing drama.

I was able to locate — and send a copy of my booklet to — the son of the pilot who sank the Borie after she had been abandoned. His father (LTjg Melvin H. Connley, USNR, of VC-9) died about six years ago, but his son majored in history and already knows a great deal about his father's wartime experiences.

I also found Cdr. Hutchins' stepson, and I have sent him a booklet. He informed me that his son (Hutch's step-grandson) was very strongly influenced by Hutch, so I know that they'll enjoy my booklet.

My warmest regards,

E. Andrew Wilde, Jr.
Commander, USNR (Ret.)

P.S. Please note my new address (Apt.# and ZIP).
October 24, 1998, through March 30, 1999

THE MARINERS' MUSEUM
100 Museum Drive
Newport News, Virginia 23606-3759
(757) 596-2222 • (800) 581-7245
FAX (757) 591-7320
www.mariner.org

July 27, 1998

E. Andrew Wilde, Jr.
1210 Greendale Ave., Apt. E3
Needham, MA 02492-4622

Dear Mr. Wilde,

Once again, I must compliment you on a superb job! Your latest volume, The U.S.S. BORIE (DD-215) in World War II, is as beautifully constructed as all the rest. I agree, it is a thrilling story, and I'm certain that Lt. (jg) Melvin H. Connelly's son will love the book. I can't express to you how grateful I am that you're giving us these volumes. The material is not only important and valuable, but, in our collection, a rare find that will surely help many researchers who don't otherwise have access to this material. To have all this research presented in one source, for vessels about which we would otherwise have limited information, is an incredible asset. Thanks so much!

Sincerely,

Lyn Gardner
Assistant to the Librarian
8/25/98

E. Andrew Wilde, Jr.
1210 Greendale Ave., Apt. E3
Needham, MA  02492-4622

Dear Mr. Wilde:

Many thanks for your latest volume, U.S.S. BORIE (DD-215) in World War II. This is a fine addition to the other works that you recently deposited with us.

I hope to make a mention of all of the histories in an upcoming Log of Mystic Seaport. I intend to label them as “research volumes” and let the public know that they are not for sale, but that they do exist and that they are an important resource covering significant events in our history.

Thanks again.

Sincerely,

Paul J. O'Pecko
Library Director