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U.S.S. HONOLULU

December 9, 1942

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From: Commander Task Force Sixty Seven.
To : Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet.
Via : Commander South Pacific Force.

Subject: Report on Action off Cape Esperance, Night of
November 30, 1942.

- Reference:
- (a) U.S. Navy Regulations.
 - (b) Pac.Fleet Conf. CL, 24 CL-42.
 - (c) Track Chart.
 - (d) CTF 67 Op. Plan 1-42.
 - (e) CTF 67 Conf. serial 05 - November 27, 1942.
 - (f) CTF 67 Conf. letter November 30, 1942.
 - (g) Action reports CTU 67.2.3 and C.O. HONOLULU.
 - (h) Action report C.O. MINNEAPOLIS.
 - (i) Action report C.O. NEW ORLEANS.
 - (j) Action report C.O. PENSACOLA.
 - (k) Action report C.O. NORTHAMPTON.
 - (l) Action report C.O. FLETCHER.
 - (m) Action report C.O. PERKINS.
 - (n) Action report C.O. MAURY.
 - (o) Action report C.O. DRAYTON.
 - (p) Action report C.O. LAMSON.
 - (q) Action report C.O. LARDNER.
 - (r) Action report ComDesDiv NINE.
 - (s) Brief of available information.
 - (t) Tabulation of signals and paraphrases of despatches.

[ADDITIONAL INFORMATION, SUPPLEMENT TO - PAGE 19]

- Enclosure:
- ✓(A) Reference (s).
 - ✓(B) Reference (t).
 - ✓(C) Reference (c).
 - ✓(D) Copy of reference (d).
 - ✓(E) Copy of reference (e).
 - ✓(F) Copy of reference (f).
 - ✓(G) Reference (g).
 - ✓(H) Reference (h).
 - ✓(I) Reference (i).
 - ✓(J) Reference (j).
 - ✓(K) Reference (k).
 - ✓(L) Reference (l).
 - ✓(M) Reference (m).
 - ✓(N) Reference (n).
 - ✓(O) Reference (o).
 - ✓(P) Reference (p).
 - ✓(Q) Reference (q).
 - ✓(R) Copy of War Diary.
 - ✓(S) Recommendations for Awards.
 - ✓(T) Comments of members of staff of Rear Admiral GOOD
who were embarked in U.S.S. NORTHAMPTON.
 - ✓(U) Reference (r)

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1. In compliance with references (a) and (b), I submit report on a night action in which a Task Force under my command attacked Japanese forces, near the northwestern end of Guadalcanal Island on November 30, 1942. Zone time minus eleven is used throughout this report.

2. Vessels which participated in the action were:

Task Unit 67.2.2	MINNEAPOLIS (Flagship)	
	NEW ORLEANS	
	PENSACOLA	
Task Unit 67.2.3	HONOLULU (Flagship)	Rear Admiral TISDALE.
	NORTHAMPTON	
Task Group 67.4	FLETCHER	Comdr. COLE
	PERKINS	
	MAURY	
	DRAYTON	

and LAMSON, LARDNER under the command of Commander ABERCROMBIE. These two destroyers joined the formation too late to be assigned a task unit designation.

Preliminary.

3. On November 29, 1942, Task Force Sixty Seven, less HELENA, GRAYSON, O'BANNON, LAMSON, NICHOLAS, which were absent on detached duty, was at anchor in Second Channel, Espiritu Santo Island, New Hebrides. The Task Force was on twelve hours notice. I had assumed command the previous day. Enclosure (D), which had been prepared by my predecessor, and which was in process of distribution when I assumed command, was briefly discussed in one conference attended by the Second in Command, Rear Admiral TISDALE, and by the Commanding officers of the five cruisers and four destroyers then present. The Destroyer Squadron Commander and the Destroyer Division Commander who were attached to the Task Force were absent with the vessels which were on detached duty.

4. At 1940, 29 November, despatch was received from the Commander South Pacific Force to prepare to depart with available cruisers and destroyers at earliest time and to proceed at best speed to intercept an enemy force consisting of eight destroyers and six transports which were expected to arrive at Guadalcanal

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on the night of December 30th. Ships present were directed to prepare to get underway as soon as possible and the Commander South Pacific Force was informed that MINNEAPOLIS, NEW ORLEANS, PENSACOLA, HONOLULU, NORTHAMPTON, FLETCHER, PERKINS, MAURY and DRAYTON would be ready to Sortie at midnight.

5. At 2240 I received despatch orders from the Commander South Pacific Force to proceed with available units to pass through Lengo Channel, to arrive Tassafaronga by 23 hours, 30 November, and intercept and destroy an enemy force, probably consisting of eight destroyers and six transports, attempting to land on Guadalcanal, probably in the vicinity of Tassafaronga. These instructions were later supplemented by additional information that combatant ships might be substituted for the transports, or that the force might be composed entirely of destroyers, and that the landing might be made at an earlier hour than 2300. Additional instructions, received at about sunset on 30 November specified as primary objective enemy surface forces in or approaching the Guadalcanal area. In the absence of contacts I was directed to search the Guadalcanal - Savo Island area during the night; then bombard enemy shore positions as requested by the Commanding General, Guadalcanal; and after daybreak to retire through Lengo Channel toward Espiritu Santo.

6. Operation Plan 1-42 was placed in effect, with changes promulgated by signal, as indicated in red pencil in Enclosure (D). Sortie was ordered, with zero hour at midnight. Destroyers got underway at 2310 and cruisers at 2335. Sortie out of the unlighted harbor and through the mine fields was made without incident. Small boats, stationed by the Senior Officer Present Afloat to mark turning points with lights, were of great assistance. As soon as clear of the harbor, course was shaped to pass to the eastward and northward of Espiritu Santo and San Cristobal Islands. The formation steamed at the maximum speed of which the group was capable, the average speed made good being 28.2 knots from midnight until arrival at eastern end of Lengo Channel at 2140.

7. Two planes were launched from each cruiser one half hour before sunrise, to return to Second Channel and report to the Commander Aircraft South Pacific Force for temporary duty. The remaining planes were launched at about 1700 to proceed to Tulagi. Enclosure (F) is a copy of instructions under which these planes operated. These instructions supplemented those in Enclosure (E).

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8. Instructions were issued to vessels in company as follows:

(a) "Information: Enemy force estimated eight destroyers six transports probably attempting land reinforcements TASSAFARONGA area twenty three hundred tonight. Will proceed through Lengo Channel and destroy enemy".

(b) "Fighting lights all night are green white white in this Force".

(c) "During night engagement burn screened wake lights."

(d) "Present intention: Destroyers concentrate two miles ahead of guide before entering channel. Upon clearing channel and until contact is made destroyers on bearing three hundred true from guide distance two miles. Cruisers in line of bearing one four zero. Maneuver by turn movements to pass about six miles from coast. Expect to direct commence gun fire at range about twelve thousand. Situation will probably not permit withholding gun fire to complete torpedo attack. Any vessel having known enemy within six thousand yards is authorized open fire."

9. As our force approached Lengo Channel we met successively the following units which had transitted that channel eastbound:

Task Unit 62.4.6 (3 transports and 3 destroyers)
LAMSON, LARDNER

✓ Although information had been received by despatch concerning probable movements of these vessels, dangerous situations were created by their presence. Collisions were narrowly avoided and this force was compelled to slow, first to 20 knots and then to 15. In addition, the presence of friendly vessels in the path of vessels on a striking mission at night involves grave risk that friends will be mistaken for enemies, or enemies for friends.

10. The LAMSON (ComDesDiv 9) and LARDNER joined the force under my command in accordance with despatch orders of the Commander South Pacific Force at about 2100. The Commander Destroyer Division NINE thus became the senior destroyer officer present, but it was not possible to transmit to these vessels the Operation Plan, Communication Plan, and special instructions under which the Force was operating. The LAMSON and LARDNER were therefore directed to join as the rear unit in the formation.

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11. In proceeding through Lengo Channel the order of vessels in formation was FLETCHER, PERKINS, MAURY, DRAYTON, MINNEAPOLIS (Flagship), NEW ORLEANS, PENSACOLA, HONOLULU (Flagship Rear Admiral TISDALE), NORTHAMPTON, LAMSON, LARDNER. This order was maintained until after the gun action opened.

12. Upon clearing Lengo Channel at 2225 the force was making 20 knots, cruisers were in column, at 1000 yards distance. Destroyers in the van bore 300° true distant 4000 yards from Flagship. The night was very dark, with sky completely overcast. Maximum surface visibility was about two miles.

13. At 2225 cruisers changed course by head of column movement to 320°, destroyers taking up parallel courses. At 2238 all ships turned to 280°. Search of the Guadalcanal shore line and intervening waters was made with S.G. radars, but no contact was made until 2306 at which time the MINNEAPOLIS picked up two objects off Cape Esperance bearing 284°, distant 23000 yards. The force was informed of this contact and radar condition one (no restrictions on use of radars) was placed in effect.

14. At 2308 simultaneous turn was made to place cruisers and destroyers in columns, and at 2314 change of course to 300° was made by head of column movement. Speed continued to be 20 knots.

15. The number of targets distinguishable in the group first contacted increased to eight. The targets were moving in a southeasterly direction at a speed of about 15 knots. It was evident that the action about to develop would be a reverse action. It is now known, from a cruiser plane pilot who was scouting in the vicinity Cape Esperance - Tassafaronga, that another group of six enemy vessels were nearing Tassafaronga, close in to the coast, and about four miles from the group under observation.

The Action.

16. At 2317 the Commander of the Destroyers in the van, who reported that he was in good position for torpedo firing, was directed to attack with torpedoes. The FLETCHER fired ten torpedoes and the PERKINS eight. The MAURY had no S.G. radar, could not identify the targets, and did not fire. The DRAYTON which had plotted target speed as zero, fired only two torpedoes at this

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time because it was realized that the plot was inaccurate. Destroyers turned away after firing and proceeded to west of Savo Island. While on northwesterly course the DRAYTON detected and plotted 3 vessels to the westward steaming on an approximately parallel course and fired four torpedoes at them. No torpedoes are known to have hit, but it is possible that some did so. By the time they should have arrived at the targets, heavy gun fire was in progress.

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17. At 2320, after receipt of report that our destroyers in the van had fired torpedoes, and when range from MINNEAPOLIS to right hand target was ten thousand yards, I ordered commence firing with guns. The MINNEAPOLIS fired first salvo at about 2020 $\frac{1}{2}$ and the other cruisers joined in. A brief but furious gun action followed. The flash of gun fire from various Japanese vessels could be seen, but their rate of fire appeared low and few salvos landed in the vicinity of our vessels. Some star shell were used by both sides, but illumination was poor. Smoke from the Japanese vessels and walls of splashes from the great numbers of our salvos landing on and near them completely obscured the targets from view most of the time. Many enemy vessels were seen to be hit and some suddenly disappeared from the radar screens. Some were set on fire and others were seen to explode.

18. Some van destroyers joined in the gun fire while on their retirement course. Some enemy salvos landed in the vicinity of the destroyers. Three destroyers reported torpedoes crossed their track a few minutes after they fired torpedoes. The van destroyers took no further part in the action.

19. At about 2329 I noted that three enemy ships had reached a position about abeam of our cruiser formation, distant about six thousand yards. Before I could reach the TBS transmitter, the MINNEAPOLIS was struck by two torpedoes which came from port (South). Almost simultaneously the NEW ORLEANS (second in column) was struck by at least one torpedo which also came from port. Both ships had their bows blown off and the two ships and the surrounding ocean were a mass of flame from the gasoline in their forward storage tanks which were ruptured by the explosions. MINNEAPOLIS, although apparently sinking, continued to fire all turret guns until power failed at about 2333. At that time when it was evident that communication would soon no longer be possible I directed Rear Admiral TISDALE to take charge.

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20. Other cruisers continued to fire until compelled to change course to clear our disabled and burning ships. When they again cleared the smoke no targets could be found by radars.

21. At about 2339 the PENSACOLA was struck on the port side aft by a torpedo which came from the westward. PENSACOLA stopped, on fire heavily aft.

22. HONOLULU and NORTHAMPTON maneuvered violently to avoid our torpedoed and burning ships. At about 2349, as the NORTHAMPTON was turning back to a northwesterly course, two torpedoes were seen coming from the westward. Efforts to avoid were unsuccessful. Two torpedoes struck on the port quarter rupturing the fuel tank which contained diesel oil and spraying that oil over the after end of the ship. Fire followed.

23. The LAMSON and LARDNER at first saw no enemy ships, and had no recognizable radar targets. They fired a few star shell, followed by a few service projectiles, then attempted to follow NORTHAMPTON but lost her and retired toward Sealark Channel.

24. The action had now ended. After 2340 no Japanese vessel was seen, other than those which were burning and later seen to sink, and none were visible on any of the radar screens.

Movements of our vessels after the action.

25. The movements of our vessels are described in their individual reports. Rear Admiral TISDALE in our only undamaged cruiser thoroughly searched the entire area but found no Japanese ships. He then allocated our destroyers to the tasks of guarding and assisting our crippled cruisers, before retiring to the Southwestward at 0230. He returned soon after daylight and again searched the area. At about 0800 I directed him by visual signal to proceed to Espiritu Santo with LAMSON and LARDNER. At that time FLETCHER and DRAYTON were enroute Espiritu Santo with survivors from NORTHAMPTON; PENSACOLA and NEW ORLEANS were in Tulagi Harbor where PERKINS and MAURY were assisting them; and MINNEAPOLIS was entering that harbor with the BOBOLINK alongside pumping to assist in keeping her afloat.

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Damage to own ships.

26. No damage by gun fire. Fragments of projectiles of undetermined caliber were found in MINNEAPOLIS and PERKINS after the battle. Four heavy cruisers hit by torpedoes and each set on fire. NORTHAMPTON capsized and sank at about 0300. Extensive damage to MINNEAPOLIS, NEW ORLEANS and PENSACOLA. Complete reports of damage not yet available. Will be covered in separate correspondence.

Enemy force - Composition and movements.

27. All attempts to determine with certainty the composition of the Japanese forces participating in the action, or the tactics employed by those forces, or the damage sustained by the enemy, are defeated by conditions preventing accurate observation. The night was very dark, with sky completely overcast. Surface visibility was less than 4000 yards, and the range to enemy surface vessels was at no time less than 6000 yards. During the approach, the firing of our torpedoes, and the opening stages of the gun action no enemy ships were seen. Thereafter individual ships were seen, for brief intervals only, when illuminated by star shells or the loom of burning ships. In addition, no individual who did see anything could also note and record the time of the occurrence. As a result the recordings of times in all the reports are subject to suspicion.

28. In attempting to visualize the action, and to comprehend the difficulties in the way of any observer's following the developments of the battle, it will be helpful to recall that the S.G. radars are capable of giving either a general view of objects in the vicinity of the observing ship, or an accurate bearing and distance of any one object, but that the two functions cannot be performed simultaneously. Since the S.G. radars were necessarily concentrated for considerable intervals on obtaining bearing and range of own ship's target, there was no continuity in the observation of the very rapidly changing situations.

29. Attempts to analyze the torpedo attack which disabled the MINNEAPOLIS and NEW ORLEANS have proven particularly baffling. The number of torpedoes involved (at least three struck the two cruisers and at least three passed through our van destroyer formation at about the same time) and the wide spread (two cruisers one thousand yards apart struck simultaneously, and other torpedo

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wakes crossing three or four thousand ahead of cruiser positions) seem to rule out the possibility of attack by a single submarine at this time; the observed positions of the enemy surface vessels before and during the gun action makes it seem improbable that torpedoes with speed-distance characteristics similar to our own could have reached the cruisers at the time they did if launched from any of the enemy destroyers or cruisers which were observed to be present.

30. An inspection of Enclosure (A) will show how little is really known about the enemy forces participating in the action, or what their movements were, or what damage they suffered.

31. About the best we can do under the circumstances is to make those assumptions which seem most logical and which are not in conflict with such evidence as is available. Upon that basis the following opinions are ventured:

(a) That at about 2315 Japanese surface units were under way between Cape Esperance and Tassafaronga on southeasterly courses at about 17 knots, approaching enemy-held parts of Guadalcanal Island for the purpose of landing supplies and/or troops.

(b) That Japanese submarines may have been present, - stationed approximately on the line Tassafaronga - Savo Island.

(c) That the Japanese surface force was operating in at least two groups, the leading, or easternmost group, consisting of five or six destroyers and the rear group of about four cruisers and about four or five destroyers.

(d) That noncombatant Japanese ships were probably not present.

(e) That the presence of our task force was probably not known, at least until shortly before we opened fire.

(f) That at about the time we opened fire the cruisers turned to the northward, and that when two were heavily hit the others escaped to the northwestward.

(g) That most, if not all of the destroyers stood in to make a torpedo attack on our cruisers and that at least three survived to reach torpedo firing position.

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(h) That the MINNEAPOLIS and NEW ORLEANS were disabled by torpedoes, probably fired by destroyers.

(i) That undetermined vessels to the westward of our position, perhaps cruisers trying to escape, or perhaps a submarine or submarines fortunately placed, fired long range torpedo shots which hit the PENSACOLA and NORTHAMPTON merely through luck, since the maneuvers performed by those vessels in clearing our damaged ships could not have been predicted when the torpedoes were fired.

(j) That no supplies or troops were landed on the northern shore of Guadalcanal, although some personnel probably reached there by swimming.

(k) That probable Japanese losses are two light cruisers and seven destroyers.

Performance of own forces.

32. Our destroyer torpedoes were fired at such ranges that it is improbable that they were very effective. I fully approve the action of the Commanding Officers of MAURY, LAMSON, and LARDNER in not firing torpedoes when target had not been identified and tracked by radar. (These ships have no SG radars.) I also approve the action of the Commanding Officer DRAYTON in firing only two torpedoes at one target and four at another, since results of his radar tracking failed to demonstrate that suitable targets were within effective range.

33. The gunnery performance of our cruisers was excellent. The volume of fire was very impressive and great havoc was raised with the enemy ships. I doubt that any of the groups taken under fire escaped, with the exception of two cruisers which apparently made an undetected turn to the northwestward when other cruisers were being hit. A very high standard of gunnery proficiency was necessary to get results under the conditions obtaining, since it was necessary to depend largely upon radar information for ranging, pointing and spotting. Star shell appeared to function fairly well, but smoke caused great interference with vision even when star shells were advantageously placed.

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Performance of Personnel.

34. So far as I am aware, the performance of our officer and enlisted personnel left nothing to be desired. My opportunity for personal observation was limited to the MINNEAPOLIS where there was no confusion nor evidence of high tension or alarm during the gun action or following the torpedoing. It was particularly inspiring to have that vessel continue to fire turret guns effectively while the forward end of the ship was heavily on fire and while the ship was rapidly settling and apparently about to founder.

35. I approve without reservation all the actions of Rear Admiral TISDALE from the time that immobilization of my flagship, and failing communications, necessitated transfer of command to him. He acted with boldness and determination investigating the enemy's probable avenues of escape, until it was established that no enemy ships remained in the vicinity; assembled our scattered destroyers and allocated them to the tasks of screening and assisting our damaged ships; retired in a direction where it seemed most probable that enemy vessels might be found at daylight; and then returned to the battle area to ascertain by personal inspection what needed to be done.

36. I specifically absolve the Commanding Officers of the four heavy cruisers from any blame for the torpedoing of their ships. Two ships were torpedoed while in a formation which I had prescribed and in a position to which I had conducted them. A third was struck upon completion of a maneuver to avoid damaged ships and while returning to a course which would permit further gun fire at the enemy. The fourth was hit after maneuvers to clear disabled ships and while turning to follow the officer who had succeeded to tactical command. It is my opinion that none of these commanding officers could properly have placed their vessels elsewhere than where they did.

37. The performance of the commanding officers, officers, and enlisted personnel of the MINNEAPOLIS, NEW ORLEANS, and PENSACOLA in bringing their very seriously damaged ships into port demonstrated great determination, ability, and resourcefulness.

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38. The Commanding Officer, officers and crew of the NORTHAMPTON fought resolutely to save their ship against hopeless odds. Although the ship was furiously on fire, efforts to restore stability were not abandoned until it was certain that the ship was about to capsize. The relatively small loss of life testifies both to the efficiency of the organization of the NORTHAMPTON and to the skill with which the commanding officers of the FLETCHER and DRAYTON handled their vessels during rescue of NORTHAMPTON's crew from the water.

39. Few recommendations for awards have reached me. These have been forwarded separately. I submit this action report at this time without prejudice to recommendations which may subsequently be made by those who served under me in this action. I append herewith, as Enclosure (S) recommendations originated by myself.

Communications.

40. Primary reliance was placed upon TBS which gave very satisfactory service except where battle damage disabled circuits, or vessels became so widely separated as to be beyond the normal range of this circuit. THM was used as a secondary voice circuit and in some cases it was found possible to communicate by this means when TBS equipment was inoperative. I fully concur in the remarks of the Commander Task Unit 67.2.3 (paragraph 13 of reference (g), Enclosure (G), concerning the utility of the old fashioned "bridge radio", once battle is joined. There should not have been such difficulty as was actually experienced in communicating with our destroyers after the gun action, if full use had been made of the key circuit provided in the communication plan. In the future I believe it would be better to use frequencies in the 200 - 1000 kc band as a task force combined frequency for battle.

Recognition lights.

41. Recognition lights were used for only brief intervals and they served their purpose well. However, disabled or crippled ships, which are particularly subject to suspicion because their movements do not conform to those expected by our other vessels, are frequently unable to operate the installed recognition lights because of power failure. A portable, battery operated box, in

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which the various light combinations could be set up, would be of great value under these circumstances. Such a box would also have the advantage of permitting display of light in only a limited arc, which is certainly desirable under these circumstances.

Communications - material.

42. Too many material failures occurred from the shock of torpedo explosions, or of our own main battery salvos. Wide separation of component parts of transmission systems made location and repair of damage particularly difficult.

(a) For example, in the MINNEAPOLIS the TBS transmitter and receiver unit was in Radio I but the motor generator was in Radio III. The receiver continued to operate but transmitter power supply failed. Intra ship communication circuits (phone and buzzer) were inoperative. The difficulty in getting power back on the transmitter circuit may be imagined.

(b) A self contained, crystal controlled, battery operated unit, similar to TBS, with its own antenna system would be of great value to maintain communication after a ship is damaged.

(c) Battery auxiliary power supplies for radio equipment are not satisfactory. The shock of main battery firings and torpedo hits caused short circuits and fires in battery lockers, in addition to fracturing battery jars and spilling acid. These battery power supplies require a great deal of routine upkeep and are a constant source of danger from electrical fires and hydrogen explosions. Small diesel driven motor generators should be installed to replace them. An overall saving of weight would probably result from this substitution.

(d) The failure of brittle porcelain and pyrex antennae insulators, and rigid antennae construction was a source of much difficulty. Transmitting and receiving antennae fell, with resulting communication failures, in addition to hampering the operation of secondary batteries and topside personnel. It is recommended that plastic strain insulators be substituted for porcelain or pyrex insulators. The dielectric constant of such plastics as

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amphenol or quartz "B" is higher than that of porcelain or pyrex, and insulators constructed of these materials are not nearly so subject to breakage. A shock absorber such as a heavy spring should be installed between the cold side of antennae insulators and the supporting structure.

(e) In general, insufficient provision has been made in the construction of radio material, and in the mounting of such apparatus, for the shocks which must be withstood in service.

Radar.

43. Sail George type radars are an absolute necessity for night fighting, particularly if there is land in the near background. These radars are so important that I recommend a minimum of one on every destroyer and two on every larger combatant ship. Where there is only one, it cannot keep up with the demands of Navigation, Gunnery, and searching. So long as there is only one Sail George radar, there must be positive officer control to insure that searching be done at least half of every minute. Repeaters for the screen should be available for the gunnery officer, captain, and navigator, and in the flag plotting room. They are urgently needed now.

44. Results with the Fox Cast gunnery radars varied among ships. Some ships found them of no use, due to the land background. Others, notably those who had no other radars available, used them more effectively, but with difficulty. A scanning ray, to sweep a few degrees each side of the target, is needed on this radar, as it will greatly simplify the spotting problem, particularly in deflection.

45. All ships need separate recognition-type radar equipments. This is another "must" for night fighting.

46. In land locked areas ships not equipped with radars of the Sail George type cannot fight at night with full efficiency.

Cruiser planes.

47. Planes were unable to take off at time specified due to glassy sea in Tulagi harbor and the difficulty of taking off on a very dark night from an unlighted harbor with which pilots were not familiar. A few planes got off and reached the scene at about

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the time the gunfire started. One plane sighted some of the enemy ships but did not get a report through. At about 0045 a cruiser plane requested permission to illuminate enemy ships landing troops near Cape Esperance. I heard this request and could see that there were no enemy ships there, but I had no means of transmitting. The Commander Task Unit 67.2.3, who was at that time in tactical command of the force, approved the request and stood down toward Cape Esperance to take the enemy under fire. The plane dropped flares near Tassafaronga and then reported that he had been mistaken, - what he had seen was two abandoned hulks on the beach. The flares worked well, and brilliantly illuminated our own crippled ships which were struggling against a strong current to get away from the hostile shore.

48. Our planes in this case had no influence upon the course of the action, but the presence of gasoline in MINNEAPOLIS and NEW ORLEANS seriously endangered those vessels. I am still of the opinion that, for the types of operations that our 10,000 ton cruisers have thus far experienced in the South Pacific area, the price we pay for planes, in fire hazard, excess weights, and loss of desirable positions for AA weapons, is very greatly in excess of the value received.

Mines.

49. The waters which will be used by Japanese vessels discharging supplies or reinforcements for their troops now in the western section of the north coast of Guadalcanal can be mined. We have mine anchors suitable to the depth of waters involved. Mine fields in the areas close to the coast would constitute little handicap to our naval forces operating in the area, provided such forces are informed of the location of the fields. I recommend that mines be planted.

Method of approach to Savo Island Area.

50. In this case there was no option as to the direction from which our force should approach, since the time factor necessitated taking the most direct route. I agree with the opinion of Rear Admiral TISDALE that it is necessary to vary our pattern, and that when circumstances permit it is better to approach from the westward. It is my understanding that our forces passed to the westward of Guadalcanal in entering the battle area for the night

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actions of 11-12 October and 14-15 November. Another possible variation which has attractive features is an approach through Indispensable Strait and north of the Nggela group.

✓ 51. In any study of possible actions with the enemy in the Solomons area the lack of adequate information concerning navigational dangers is keenly felt. It is, for example, quite possible that after an action a commander may have information that crippled enemy vessels are to the northward or to the north westward, within such distance that their destruction is possible. Such information as we have concerning routes which our ships would have to take is given on H.O. Chart 2896. To the northward of the Nggela group we find a few scattered soundings and a notation, as to the area between Santa Isabel and Malaita Islands, : "Reported Shoal ground in this channel." To the northwest of Savo Island we find a very few scattered soundings (practically none between New Georgia Group and Santa Isabel) and eventually we find another note, between Choiseul and Vella Lavella Islands, : "Coral Patches in this locality (E.D.)".

52. We know that the Japanese use these routes, but our own operating forces have insufficient information to permit us to proceed at high speed with reasonable assurance. It seems very probable that some citizens of our allies, who have navigated these waters, have information which we greatly need. This information should be sought out, consolidated, and furnished to our ships. Pending acquisition and dissemination of such information I believe that very valuable data could be obtained by aerial observation and photographs. In flights in the Solomons area I have noted that the coral heads are distinctly visible and that the difference in appearance of the deep water channels and of the shoal areas is very marked. Under favorable light conditions it should be possible to record these differences by photography, and to furnish to ships the information as to probably safe passages thus obtained.

Suitability of cruiser types for night action.

✓ 53. The volume and accuracy of fire of the HONOLULU was tremendously impressive. For the types of night action in which our cruisers have engaged in the various battles near Savo Island I consider one 10,000 ton 6" cruiser to be the equivalent of at

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least two of our 10,000 8" ships. In paragraph 12 of reference (g) (Enclosure (G) the Commander Task Unit 67.2.3 raises an interesting question as to the reason or reasons for our 6" cruisers having suffered materially less damage in several night actions than the accompanying 8" cruisers. I do not know the answer.

Training and Organization.

54. The success which has been attained in recent encounters with Japanese surface vessels at night testifies to the basic soundness of our past training. Our ships are excellent, and our officers and men are skillful, enthusiastic, and entirely willing to accept any necessary risks in order to sink the enemy. We have reached the stage, however, where time must be devoted to training, including gunnery exercises, or efficiency will drop off rapidly. Our increasingly large proportion of inexperienced officers and green enlisted personnel must be given a chance to learn to handle our offensive weapons before we go into battle.

55. The very rapid changes in commanders of the various task forces, task units, and individual vessels, in combination with the repeated shifting of vessels between task units has resulted in a complete lack of "team" feeling. A commander rarely has an opportunity to become thoroughly acquainted with his subordinate commanders, to learn their strong points and weaknesses, their reactions to various situations. He has insufficient opportunity to impress his personality upon them and to inform them adequately concerning the action he expects in various possible contingencies. The commanding officers of individual ships do not have the comforting feeling of knowing what the fellow next to them will do when the unexpected happens. All of this feeling, - the "band of brothers" spirit, - is particularly necessary in the handling of high speed vessels in action at night.

56. I realize the difficulties that have stood, and continue to stand, in the way of anything approaching permanency of assignment. We have been living from hand to mouth, with far more to do than the tools at hand permitted doing. The shortage

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of vessels of suitable types, and particularly destroyers, has been continuously acute. Nevertheless, I urge that it is essential that destroyer squadron and division organizations be respected and that destroyers be held together in the same groups, since I consider this absolutely necessary to get the decisive results of which the type is capable. With great reluctance I would agree to the reduction of destroyers employed in escorting noncombatant vessels, although the escorts now assigned are realized to be less than adequate, if the integrity of destroyer squadrons and divisions cannot be preserved by other measures.

C. H. Wright
C. H. WRIGHT

Copy to:
CTU 67.2.3

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DECLASSIFIED

19 December 1942

Memorandum

Subject: Action Report 30 November 1942.

1. The following additional information is furnished to supplement my report on the night action of 30 November 1942:

(a) Searchlights were not used by any of our vessels.

(b) Believe no searchlights were used by Japanese. The few Jap star shells seen had the same greenish tinge that has been commented upon before.

(c) The only searchlight that I saw at any time was the one on shore at Lunga Point. It was a very good light visible for many miles. I believe that this searchlight was the one sighted by HONOLULU when she was to the northeast of Savo Island at about 0015.

(d) I believe that the supposed destroyer attack on the NEW ORLEANS, made some time after she was torpedoed (at about 2335?), was not an actual attack, but that she sighted and fired at the LARDNER. I personally saw one of our ships, which I believed to be the NEW ORLEANS, firing 40mm to the northeastward at this time. The LARDNER reports that 40mm were fired at her (tracers of 40mm are easily recognized).

(e) Although the torpedoes caused fires on each of our heavy cruisers, I believe that practically the only material which burned was gasoline, fuel oil and deisel oil. Ammunition exploded in PENSACOLA and NORTHAMPTON from the heat of the intense oil fires. The types of fires which have been so disastrous in the past, - paint, bedding, clothing, and miscellaneous combustibles, did not occur in any ship. I have no doubt that the measures prescribed in Pacific Fleet Letter 35CL-42 are largely responsible for this result, and I emphatically do not recommend any relaxation in the enforcement of the provisions of that letter.

C. H. WRIGHT

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Brief of Available Information.

Items listed below, some of which are not included in the action reports of individual ships, have been considered in attempting to determine (1) what Japanese ships were present during the night action on November 30, 1942, (2) What the probable movements of these ships were, and (3) what losses were sustained by the enemy.

Source

Information

Coastwatcher	Ten destroyers departed in a southeasterly direction from the Buin-Faisi area before noon November 30.
Coastwatcher	Two cruisers and three destroyers arrived Buin Faisi area from the southeast, Dec. 1.
Guadalcanal air	Evening search 30 November - no sightings. Morning search 1 December 1 CA 1 CL at 0820 250 miles from Guadalcanal course 300 speed 25.
S.G. Radars	At least eight vessels in the group which was originally picked up at 2306. Some large and some small vessels in the group.
Pilot of cruiser plane	Several large and some small vessels in the group at which our cruisers first fired. At the same time there was an additional group of five or six destroyers about four or five miles distant from first group and closer to Tassafaronga. When first sighted these destroyers were on southeasterly course but when firing started they took up northwesterly course and radically increased speed.
FLETCHER, DRAYTON	Reports of bearings and distances of targets when torpedoes were fired indicates that these two destroyers fired at targets four or five miles apart.
PERKINS	Saw gun fire flashes from three or four enemy vessels farther to the left (east) than the group of five at which we fired torpedoes.

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Subject: Report on Action off Cape Esperance, Night of
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Source

Information

Cruiser reports	Our two rear (eastern) cruisers definitely identify their targets as destroyers. PENSACOLA and NEW ORLEANS identified cruisers as MOGAMI or YUBARI. MINNEAPOLIS identified one target as destroyer.
MINNEAPOLIS Observer	At about 2328 three enemy ships had reached a position about on port beam of our cruisers and about 6000 yards away. At this time targets at which MINNEAPOLIS was shooting were at least three miles to westward of these ships.
Various	At about 2328 at least three torpedoes struck MINNEAPOLIS and NEW ORLEANS. These came from port (South). At about the same time three torpedoes were seen to cross through destroyer formation from port to starboard. Our destroyers were then about three miles ahead of our cruisers. After NEW ORLEANS was hit and had turned to port another torpedo came from ahead and passed close alongside.
PENSACOLA, NORTHAMPTON	The torpedoes which struck the PENSACOLA and NORTHAMPTON came from the west. These ships were hit about 10 and 20 minutes, respectively, later than the MINNEAPOLIS.
DRAYTON	The DRAYTON at 2346 observed and tracked three enemy ships near Cape Esperance.
Cruiser plane pilot	At about midnight there were two large ships well to the westward of the battle scene. One of these was standing to the Northwest at very high speed. The other was following a few miles astern at lower speed and smoking heavily.
Various	After 2345, when gunfire had ceased, no Japanese vessels could be found on any radar screen, although all radars were then being used for searching.

SECRET

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November 30, 1942.

Source

Information

MINNEAPOLIS

Enemy light cruiser on fire and burning vigorously a few miles to the Southwestward. Heavy tripod structure distinctly seen. Probably YUEARI or SENDAI. Vessel sank. Two other Japanese vessels seen to be burning after gunfire ceased. One exploded. One sank. Later passed close alongside capsized Japanese vessel with broken back. Visible part of keel variously estimated as 300 to 500 feet. Enemy held section of shore was clearly seen after moon rose and there were no ships in vicinity and no activity on the beach.

NORTHAMPTON

A reliable and experienced chief petty officer, while in a life raft southeast of Savo Island saw submarine emerge a short distance to the westward, turn on identification lights (one green over one white) and then submerge.

Intelligence Report

One submarine arrived at Kakimbo at 1230 on 30 November.

PERKINS

Saw ship at a distance of 4000 yards explode when hit by one of our torpedoes.

Various

The target at which we were shooting suddenly disappeared from radar screen.

MINNEAPOLIS

Sank first target taken under fire; shifted fire to second target. Damaged this vessel.

NEW ORLEANS

First target, a destroyer, fired on by NEW ORLEANS and others. Target sank. Second target. Light cruiser, possibly a heavy. Two other ships had been firing on this target but had stopped. Target seen to sink while NEW ORLEANS was firing at it. Third target was a large ship, probably an AK. Fired on by NEW ORLEANS and several others. Blew up violently. Saw two other destroyers sunk by fire of other vessels.

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Source

Information

PENSACOLA

Early in the action saw a MOGAMI or YUBARI class cruiser very heavily hit - sure it sank. Saw one other cruiser badly damaged.

NORTHAMPTON

Saw a destroyer on fire shortly after our other cruisers opened fire. Our third salvo landed directly on a destroyer and sank it. Shifted to another destroyer and it caught fire and vanished.

HONOLULU

Fired on two destroyers and saw them sink.

MAURY

Saw one Japanese ship burning during gun action. Saw Honolulu hitting one ship heavily. Saw one ship break in two and sink.

LARDNER

A few minutes after our cruisers started firing, saw three Japanese ships somewhat to the eastward of ships at which our first cruisers fired. These three ships seemed to be still heading to the Eastward, but the others had stopped or turned west.

SECRET

Compilation of despatches and TBS transmissions sent and received, from November 28 to December 1, 1942 relating to the Fifth action off Savo Island.

<u>NUMBER</u>	<u>FROM</u>	<u>TO</u>	<u>Pertinent paraphrased extracts or quotations where permissible.</u>
280735	COMSOPAC	TF 67 & others	Resume status of twelve hours notice.
290652	COMSOPAC	CTF 67	Be prepared to get underway as soon as possible with all of your force present and intercept enemy destroyers and transports at Cactus night of 30-1. Report your force and readiness.
290845	CTF 67	COMAIR SOPAC	Request light be placed on white rock by midnight tonight to assist departure.
290846	CTF 67	TF 67	Prepare to get underway without delay
290855	INDEF	COMSOPAC	From CTF 67, MINNEAPOLIS, NEW ORLEANS, PENSACOLA, HONOLULU, NORTHAMPTON, FLETCHER, MAURY, PERKINS, DRAYTON, ready midnight 29th.
290935	CTF 67	TF 67	Set watch on TBS. At 2400, prepare to sortie in accordance plan number 1. Oplan 1-42 effective.
291042	COMSOPAC	CTF 67	Get underway with available units for Cactus via Lengo Channel and east and north of San Cris. to arrive off TASSAFARONGA by 2300 L Nov 30 intercept etc.
291014	CTF 67	TF 67	Natural order is MINNEAPOLIS, NEW ORLEANS, PENSACOLA, HONOLULU, NORTHAMPTON.
291030	CTF 67	TF 67	Prepare for fleet speed 25 knots. Change para. three Baker from 2 hours to 1/2 hour. Change in line 8 of para. 3 X 2 of annex Baker word 6 should read 2.
290955	CTF 67	TF 67	Launch 2 planes one half hour prior sunrise return Button reporting to ComAirSoPac temp additional duty.
291000	CTF 67	COMAIR	Request northern end of net be marked preferably by net tender.
291213	CTF 67	COMSOPAC	Departing midnight. Arriving Tassafaronga 0131 Love, one December.
291225	CTF 67	TF 67	At 0100, all boilers required.
291537			Executed speed 27.

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<u>NUMBER</u>	<u>FROM</u>	<u>TO</u>	<u>Pertinent paraphrased extracts or quotations where permissible.</u>
291909	CTF 67	TF 67	(Zeal information given to the TaskForce.)
291943	CTF 67	TF 67	During night engagement burn screened wake lights. Test out lights before dark.
292040	CTF 67	TF 67	Present intention destroyers concentrate two miles ahead of guide before entering Lengo Channel. Upon clearing channel and until contact is made destroyers on bearing 300 true from guide distance 2 miles. Cruisers in line of bearing 320. Maneuver by turn movements to pass about 6 miles from coast. Expect to direct commence gun fire at range about 12000 yards. Situation will probably not permit withholding gunfire to complete torpedo attacks. Any vessel having known enemy within six thousand yards is authorized open fire.
292114	CTF 67	TF 67	Navigation reference points South and East. Cast 10-30, 160 X Dog 11, 161 X Easy 1130, 162 X Fox 10, 162.
292212	COMSOPAC	CTF 67	Enemy may arrive sooner than expected may consist only of DD's. Hurry arrival.
292225	CTF 67	CTU 6723	Your advice concerning changes of course you may think necessary is particularly desired if we steam in inverted order since I will be unable to determine position of head of column accurately.
292257	ComNavTulagi	CTF 67	PT's to stay Ringbolt tonight as striking group.
300125	CTF 67	TF 67	On signal about 2 hours sunset launch remaining planes at arrive Tulagi prior sunset. Arm with 4 flares fuel to 160 gallons. Insure pilots know location nav reference points my serial 292114. MINNEAPOLIS pilots have detailed instructions night operations all planes.

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<u>NUMBER</u>	<u>FROM</u>	<u>TO</u>	<u>Pertinent paraphrased extracts or quotations where permissible.</u>
300219	CTF 67	TF 67	Fighting lights all night are green white white in this force.
300312	COMSOPAC	CDD9,CTF67, LAMSON, LARDNER.	ComDesDiv 9 in LAMSON, LARDNER, join CTF 67 at 2100 Love, November 30, two miles due east Nura Island.
300416	CTF 67	TF 67	Correct my 292040 cruiser line of bearing is 140.
300456	CTF 67	TF 67	At 2000 go to general quarters.
300542	CTF 67	TF 67	New ETA for TF 67 is 2330 Love, off Tassafaronga.
300608	CTF 67	TF 67	296 Corpen
300618	CTF 67	TF 67	Speed 25
300632	COMSOPAC	CTF 67	First objective is surface forces. In case none of these, sweep the area and bombard beach as directed by ComGen. Withdraw to Button via Lengo after sunrise.
300815	CTF 67	TF 67	At approximately 0400, be prepared bombard beach if directed.
300905	RDO Tulagi	All Hands	TF 67 will be off Lunga point 2230 and off Tassafaronga 2330 Love. MINNEAPOLIS plane originates.
300908	CTF 67	TF 67	Execute speed four. (20 Knots)
300910	35	CTF 67	Possible 5000---274 (Nura Island as it turned out).
300910	CTF 67	TF 67	Someone closing us from ahead. (Was Nura Island).
300932	NORTHAMPTON CTF 67	CTF 67 NORTHAMPTON	Shall we assume radar condition one. Affirmative.
300937	CTF 67	DesDiv9	Form astern of last unit of this formation. My speed 20.
300950	HONOLULU	CTF 67	Three possibles 276-----15000-18000 (Our SG Radar on MINNEAPOLIS was Temporarily out).
	CTF 67	HONOLULU	Assume this is 49 (One of the DD's with TU62.46)
301003	CTF 67	TF 67	Execute 270 Corpen (Turning in to Lengo Channel.)
301057	CTF 67	LAMSON & LARDNER	Set watch on 6540 Kcs.
301116	CTF67	TF 67	Set Radar Condition three.
301122	CTF 67	TF 67	Executed Corpen 5.
301134	NEW ORLEANS	CTF 67	We think we have about 4 contacts on the port bow in column. (Was our DD's ahead.)

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<u>NUMBER</u>	<u>FROM</u>	<u>TO</u>	<u>Pertinent paraphrased extracts or quotations where permissible.</u>
301140	45 CTF 67	NEW ORLEANS TF 67	Is that us. Execute 4 turn.
301140	66	CTF 67	Plane in the air close to the water. 15000 yds. on your stb'd beam.
301206	CTF 67	TF 67	Two Bogies very close to reference point Baker.
301209	CTF 67	TF 67	Execute turn 4.
301214	CTF 67	TF 67	Execute 2 corpen. Set radar condition one.
301216	45 CTF 67	CTF 67 45	Request permission fire torpedoes. Range on our bogey is excessive, 14,600 yds.
	NORTHAMPTON CTF 67	CTF 67 45	Flashing signal from Tassafaronga. Do you have them located.
	45	CTF 67	Affirmative. Range is all right for us.
301220	CTF 67	45	Suspect bogies are DD's. We now have 4.
	CTF 67	45	Go ahead and fire torpedoes.
	45	DD's	Fire torpedoes.
301221	CTF 67	TF 67	Standby to Roger. Commence firing.
301130	CTF 67	COMSOPAC	Am engaging enemy surface forces. (Sent in plain language. Time of origin about 1 hour out).
301145	COMNAV Tulagi	CTF 67	Direction finder indicates minimum four Jap ships bearing 300 to 303 from cactus. Strength 5.
301224	COMNAV Tulagi	CTF 67	Radar contact bearing 330 distance 16 miles from cactus. Moving left. Several contacts. Another at 274 bearing 27 miles distance. At 027 distance 75 miles. All at 0015 love. (This arrived too late).

1221 zed we commenced firing. About 6 minutes later torpedoes hit and all radios went out. TBS receiver came back in two or three minutes. Because of communication failure we attempted to tell Admiral TISDALE to take charge, by TBS and TEM, which were now on auxiliary power. TEM results not good because of tuning troubles.

NOTE: Transmitter and a receiver on Task Force Commanders circuit now in commission. Tested out and RDO Guadalcanal answered. 8410 kcs.

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<u>NUMBER</u>	<u>FROM</u>	<u>TO</u>	<u>Pertinent paraphrased extracts or quotations where permissible.</u>
301330	MINNEAPOLIS	Guadalcanal	MINNEAPOLIS torpedoed heading for Lunga. Half knot.
301420	PENSACOLA	CTU 67.2.3	My posit one half way between point afirm and ringbolt, my speed eight.
301450	CTF 67	Guadalcanal	Can you send boats toward Savo.
301500	CTU 67.2.3	Guadalcanal	Dog dog's stand by MINNEAPOLIS and NORTHAMPTON northwest of Lunga, dist --.
	Guadalcanal	CTF 67	Your 301450 affirmative. BOBOLINK, and four prep tares ordered from Tulagi. Prep Tares on voice circuit 3785 kcs.
301509	Indef.	Tulagi	Dispatch BOBOLINK, PC, and 4 PT's assist MINNEAPOLIS bearing 310 true 10 miles from Tulagi.
301534	MINNEAPOLIS	Guadalcanal	Wright sends request Ringbolt send PT's screen and assist MINNEAPOLIS and NEW ORLEANS half way from Cape Esperance to Tulagi. MINNEAPOLIS half way Savo to Lunga.
301540	Indef.	Guadalcanal	MINNEAPOLIS now heading for Tulagi.
301557		Tulagi	Request permission direct PC's proceed daylight to search survivors.
301620	CTF 67	RDO Guadal	Relay to ComSoPac MINNEAPOLIS 2 Torpedo hits one amidships flooding all but number 4 fireroom, one hit forward tearing off bow to turret one, now using salt water boiler. NORTHAMPTON on fire aft looks like total loss. NEW ORLEANS torpedoed 5 knots toward Tulagi.
301622	COMSOPAC CTU 67.2.3 CTU 67.2.3	Ortolan Tulagi LAMSON, LARDNER	My 301512 proceed Cactus etc. Request send boats to our ships. Stand by MINNEAPOLIS at Lunga.
301730	CTF 67	COMSOPAC	ComTaskFor 67 reports opened fire on 4 ships believed transports at Cape Esperance. Hits and fires were seen. Six minutes later 3 and perhaps 4 heavy cruisers struck by torpedoes believed fired by destroyers and submarines. Since then have been unable to communicate with other ships. NORTHAMPTON burned total loss. Believe PENSACOLA same.

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<u>NUMBER</u>	<u>FROM</u>	<u>TO</u>	<u>Pertinent paraphrased extracts or quotations where permissible.</u>
301851	ComNavTulagi	CDD 9	NEW ORLEANS proceeding to Tulagi 5 knots. MINNEAPOLIS same with bow blown off three firerooms flooded, believe HONOLULU all right. No information of destroyers. Proceed assist MINNEAPOLIS northwest of Lunga.
301900	FLETCHER	CTF 67	FLETCHER originator and DRAYTON standing eastward at 25 knots to pass north of San Cristobal. Both have large numbers survivors. Unless rendezvous ordered will proceed Button ETA forenoon second.
302350	CTF 67	COMSOPAC	At Tulagi are following; PENSACOLA torpedo hit and severe fire aft. NEW ORLEANS bow blown off back to number two turret. PERKINS, MAURY assisting above ships undamaged. MINNEAPOLIS as previously reported. LARDNER and LAMSON are with TISDALE and undamaged. No further word of NORTHAMPTON. FLETCHER and DRAYTON reported separately by FLETCHER. One Jap cruiser seen to blow up and it is known additional Jap ships were destroyed as well as others damaged. Am collecting data. Last NPM number received was 604. Am unable decode messages in crypto channels 7 and 19 and can guard task force coms circuit only.
	CTF 67	COMSOPAC	Believe damage to enemy as follows: 4 destroyers two cruisers two affirm prep one affirm king sunk. Two affirm prep damaged. One cruiser and five destroyers escaped undamaged. Estimate enemy force consisted of nine destroyers five transports or cargo ships three cruisers. Enemy gunfire unimpressive. Sail george radars of great benefit.

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
GUADALCANAL AND FLORIDA IS.

TRACK CHART, NIGHT ACTION

30 NOVEMBER, 1942

SUBMITTED BY COMDR TASK FORCE 67
ZONE TIMES MINUS ELEVEN
TO SCALE OF H.O. CHART 2916

- ① U.S.S. MINNEAPOLIS AND U.S.S. NEW ORLEANS TORPEDOED AT 2327
- ② U.S.S. PENSACOLA TORPEDOED AT 2339
- ③ U.S.S. NORTHAMPTON TORPEDOED AT 2348
- ④ POSSIBLE ENEMY (7 SHIPS) EAST OF MAIN BODY



UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET

A16-3 TASK UNIT SIXTY-SEVEN POINT TWO POINT THREE
 Serial 042

December 6, 1942

S E C R E T

From: Commander Task Unit SIXTY-SEVEN POINT TWO POINT THREE.
 To: Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.
 Via: (1) Commander Task Force SIXTY-SEVEN.
 (2) Commander South Pacific Force.
 Subject: Report of Action - Night of November 30-December 1, 1942.
 Reference: (a) U.S. Navy Regulations, 1920, Articles 712(2), (3), and 874(6).
 Enclosure: (A) Copy of War Diary covering period November 30-December 1, 1942.
 (B) Action Report - U.S.S. HONOLULU.

1. In compliance with orders of Commander South Pacific Force, Task Force SIXTY-SEVEN (Rear Admiral C. H. Wright, U.S. Navy, Commanding) got underway from Second Channel, Espiritu Santo, at midnight of November 29, 1942, for the purpose of intercepting and destroying any enemy force that might arrive off Tassafaronga during the night of November 30, 1942. Task Unit SIXTY-SEVEN POINT TWO POINT THREE, under the command of Rear Admiral M. S. Tisdale, U.S. Navy, consisted of the U.S.S. HONOLULU (flagship) and the U.S.S. NORTHAMPTON. The greater part of the run was made at high speed in accordance with orders to expedite arrival. Lengo Channel, some 580 miles distant, was reached in about 22 hours.

2. Upon clearing Lengo Channel at 2145 November 30 the cruisers were formed on a line of bearing 140° True, distance 1,000 yards, with four destroyers in column bearing 300° True, distance four thousand yards. The order of cruisers was: MINNEAPOLIS, NEW ORLEANS, PENSACOLA, HONOLULU, NORTHAMPTON, followed by the LAMSON and LARDNER which had joined us enroute.

3. At 2315 vessels at the head of the column began making radar contacts on an unknown force bearing about 270° True, distance 15,000 yards. At about 2320 the O.T.C. ordered the destroyer attack group in the van to attack with torpedoes. At 2321 the O.T.C. gave the order to commence firing. At 2323 the cruisers ahead commenced firing and by 2325 all cruisers were firing. The destroyers, having completed their torpedo attack, cleared toward the southwest end of Savo Island. The enemy returned our fire with guns and torpedoes.

44807

Encl (C) Comtaskfor 67 Secret letter Serial 06, 9 Dec 1942

December 6, 1942

S E C R E T

Subject: Report of Action - Night of November 30-December 1, 1942.

4. Within a very few minutes after their guns commenced firing, the MINNEAPOLIS and NEW ORLEANS were torpedoed. The PENSACOLA was torpedoed a short time later. The HONOLULU sheered out to the right to pass on disengaged side of the damaged ships ahead, the NORTHAMPTON next astern conforming by turn movement. At about 2340, just after both ships swung back to the left the NORTHAMPTON was hit on the port quarter by one, possibly two, torpedoes which, according to the Commanding Officer, U.S.S. NORTHAMPTON, must have passed the HONOLULU close aboard. Thus in a period of about 16 minutes after the first gun was fired four of the five heavy ships in the column had received one or more torpedo hits and were out of action.

5. At 0001 the Commander Task Unit SIXTY-SEVEN POINT TWO POINT THREE received a message from Commander Task Force SIXTY-SEVEN via TBS directing him to take charge. The MINNEAPOLIS, Force flagship, with two torpedo hits, was virtually immobilized. She was attempting to reach Lunga Point at a reported one-half knot. The NORTHAMPTON was south of Savo Island burning. The NEW ORLEANS and PENSACOLA were attempting to reach Tulagi Harbor at five and eight knots respectively.

6. Commander Task Unit SIXTY-SEVEN POINT TWO POINT THREE directed the destroyers to stand by the crippled ships (which was done) and asked the forces ashore to send boats to assist. The subsequent actions of the destroyers are not related here as these presumably will be included in the report of the Task Force Commander.

7. The HONOLULU continued to the westward and stood around Savo Island in a clockwise direction to the northeast tip; then returned in a counterclockwise direction. No enemy ships were found.

8. While returning down the west side of Savo Island, our cruiser aircraft illuminated what the pilot at first reported to be an enemy ship on the beach landing troops. The HONOLULU was directed to stand down to bombard but the order was cancelled when the pilot identified the vessel as a completely wrecked enemy merchantman; an AK destroyed on a previous occasion. The HONOLULU then, by order, proceeded towards Lunga Point and Lengo Channel. No enemy ships were sighted. At 0135 the HONOLULU reversed course and proceeded to westward along the north coast of Guadalcanal Island. At this time the FLETCHER and DRAYTON joined. A short time later when the group reached the NORTHAMPTON area the two

December 6, 1942

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destroyers were directed to leave the HONOLULU and stand by the NORTHAMPTON. Rescue tug and screening Motor Torpedo Boats from Tulagi were enroute to vicinity of our crippled ships. The HONOLULU then, at about 0230, proceeded on westerly courses to clear the area until daylight due in about three hours. During the return trip the HONOLULU searched the area from Russell Islands to north of Savo and the area between Guadalcanal and Florida Island with negative results. East of Savo the HONOLULU was joined by the LAMSON and LARDNER which were waiting there for her. Off Tulagi at about 0800 visual contact was made with Commander Task Force SIXTY-SEVEN in the MINNEAPOLIS. It was learned that the MINNEAPOLIS, NEW ORLEANS and PENSACOLA were in Tulagi Harbor not capable of being escorted to any other port. The MAURY and PERKINS were screening these vessels. Later information indicated that the DRAYTON and FLETCHER were proceeding to Espiritu Santo with survivors from the NORTHAMPTON. Upon receiving information that no other cruisers were able to proceed, the HONOLULU, screened by the LAMSON and LARDNER, was directed to proceed through Lengo Channel and Indispensable Strait towards Espiritu Santo.

9. At the time the NORTHAMPTON reported by TBS that she had been hit and was making headway on one engine she was told, also by TBS, to retire at discretion. No order for the destroyers to retire was given.

10. Of the vessels in Task Unit SIXTY-SEVEN POINT TWO POINT THREE, the NORTHAMPTON was sunk, the HONOLULU suffered an engineering casualty (since repaired) which limited her speed to 28 knots. The HONOLULU believes she sank one enemy vessel and quite possibly one other. She ceased firing for lack of more targets. Damage inflicted on the enemy by the NORTHAMPTON is not known. It is believed that the enemy combat force consisted of destroyers and perhaps submarines which inflicted virtually all of the damage to our ships by means of torpedoes.

11. Fighting lights (triple array) were flashed upon occasion by various ships for purposes of identification during the period of and subsequent to the firing and were found to be extremely useful. The special triple array was specified by the Task Force Commander presumably because the Japanese were reported to have used a twin array in the action of November 12, 1942.

12. The fact that the HONOLULU, the only 10,000 ton 6" gun cruiser in the column was the only cruiser not torpedoed might at first thought be ascribed to the fortunes of war. But the fact that the HELENA received only minor damage in two previous night engagements indicates that the type of ship may have some bearing

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on its value at night in comparison with heavy cruisers. That the BOISE was damaged during the second Savo might appear to explode this theory. It is understood that the BOISE used search lights, that the HELENA used no illumination; that the HONOLULU used stars. These ships are veritably ablaze when their main battery is firing so the Commander Task Unit SIXTY-SEVEN POINT TWO POINT THREE doubts that the damage or non-damage can be based too heavily upon the method of illumination used during actual firing. It also is doubtful if the results can be called all luck or coincidence. Nor can it be assumed that the light cruiser Captains are necessarily better seamen than the heavy cruiser Captains or the crews better trained. But there are two factors that will bear careful analysis in the cases mentioned: first, the built-in ability of this type to fire accurately while maneuvering; second, fire power. The reports of the BOISE and HELENA are not available to me for study. The thought is offered for what it may be worth.

13. TBS cannot be counted on after the main battery starts firing. It may or may not stay in commission. This thought must be kept in mind because we in the advanced combat areas have come to depend on the TBS so much at night, darkened and with radio silence in effect, that there may be a tendency to forget that once the battle is joined and radio silence lifted the old fashioned "bridge radio" can be as useful as it always has been.

14. (a) This action emphasizes again that the prewar idea that the Japanese would change a plan only when absolutely compelled to do so by force is exploded; or that if still adhering to this same psychology their plans now provide for escape tactics under certain conditions. To profit from this, future actions in the Savo Area should, at least occasionally, provide for our approaching from the west; or from north of Florida Island when the time factor is sufficiently favorable (which it was not in subject action). An approach by our forces from westward would permit the Motor Torpedo Boats to continue to operate east of a pre-assigned longitude instead of securing in Tulagi Harbor.

(b) Should our approach from Savo way drive the enemy eastward the Motor Torpedo Boats could form an effective guard at Sealark Channel. Our mining of Lengo Channel would decrease the size of the bottleneck to be guarded. Our standard entrance from eastward leaves the enemy's rear wide open to him for escape, and places our forces under the eyes of enemy coast watchers for many hours during the approach to Sealark or Lengo Channels.

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
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(c) There are times of course when the reports of the enemy coast watchers may be helpful to us; but such occasions are rare. Perhaps one of the reasons the enemy was caught with bombardment ammunition in the trains of some ships at the Third Savo was because Task Force SIXTY-SEVEN after bombarding the enemy positions - a perfectly reasonable excuse for having entered the Savo Area - was seen to retire toward Espiritu Santo in daylight and not seen returning after dark.

(d) From a glance at the post-action track of the HONOLULU and the van destroyers during night of November 30-December 1 it seems reasonable to assume that any enemy ships which may have escaped did so by slipping initially to southward around Cape Esperance.

15. At the time this report is submitted the Commander Task Unit SIXTY-SEVEN POINT TWO POINT THREE has no information regarding actions by personnel of his unit which merit special credit or discredit. This report is forwarded without prejudice to any recommendations which the Commanding Officers, or the Commander Task Unit SIXTY-SEVEN POINT TWO POINT THREE, may make in the future.


M. S. TISDALE

Enclosure (G) to CTF 67 secret letter serial 06 of 9 Dec.
1942

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30 November 1942

G.C.T. L.C.T.

1300 0000 Task Force SIXTY-SEVEN including U.S.S. MINNEAPOLIS (Rear Admiral Wright, Commander), HONOLULU (Rear Admiral Tisdale, Second in Command), PENSACOLA, NORTHAMPTON, NEW ORLEANS, DRAYTON, MAURY, PERKINS and FLETCHER sortieing from Espiritu Santo Harbor. to intercept Japanese landing group at Guadalcanal.

1415 0115 Cruisers formed column and took fleet speed 25 knots. Natural order MINNEAPOLIS, NEW ORLEANS, PENSACOLA, HONOLULU and NORTHAMPTON. Destroyers screening. MINNEAPOLIS assigned as fleet guide.

1525 0225 Took fleet course 335° T. Sighted merchant ship bearing 000° T., distance five miles going on opposite course.

1540 0240 Changed course to 315° T. Sighted friendly plane overhead.

1550 0250 Changed speed to 27 knots.

1613 0313 Cruisers formed column open order.

1800 0500 All cruisers launched two planes each to return to Espiritu Santo for duty.

1930 0630 Dispatch from CTF 67 "Information enemy force estimated 8 destroyers, 6 transports probably attempting land reinforcements Tassaforango area 2300 tonight X Will proceed through Lengo Channel and destroy enemy".

2100 0800 Position of flagship: 13-08 S., 165-25.06 E.

2238 0938 NORTHAMPTON made radar contact on aircraft bearing 254° T., distance 34 miles.

2310 1010 MINNEAPOLIS made radar contact on aircraft bearing 201° T., distance 32 miles.

2321 1021 HONOLULU test fired automatic weapons.

2326 1026 NEW ORLEANS and PENSACOLA tested automatic weapons.

2335 1035 NEW ORLEANS made radar contact on aircraft bearing 216° T., distance 62 miles.

2352 1052 DRAYTON test fired A.A. guns.

0100 1200 Position of flagship: 11-52 S., 164-08.54 E. Course and speed made good since 2400/29 321.5° T., 23 knots.

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30 November 1942 (Continued)

G.C.T. L.C.T.

0139 1239 NORTHAMPTON reported radar aircraft contact bearing 315° T., distance 24 miles.

0145 1245 Sighted Bl7 bearing 245° T.

0223 1323 NORTHAMPTON made radar contact on aircraft bearing 262° T., distance 22 miles.

0232 1332 NORTHAMPTON made radar contact on aircraft bearing 250° T., distance 73 miles.

Weather: Seas smooth, sky dark and overcast, visibility limited. Intermittent light rain squalls.

0338 1438 NORTHAMPTON reported radar contact bearing 284° T., distance 33 miles.

0355 1455 Entered heavy rain squall. Visibility limited to 1,000 yards with frequent lightening flashes and thunder.

0410 1510 HONOLULU reported radar land contact bearing 244° T., distance 38 miles, believed to be small island off San Cristobal Island.

0445 1545 Rain squall not as heavy; visibility better.

0515 1615 All cruisers launched two planes each to proceed to Tulagi Harbor.

0525 1625 Ten SOC's left for Tulagi Harbor.

0558 1658 HONOLULU made radar surface contact bearing 250° T., distance 27,000 yards.

0607 1707 Changed course to 296° T.

0618 1718 Sighted land off starboard bow bearing 340° T. Changed speed to 25 knots.

0630 1730 Rain ceased.

0900 2000 Position of flagship: 09-31.5 S., 161-03.2 E.

0901 2001 General Quarters.

0907 2007 HONOLULU reported surface contact bearing 274° T., 16,800 yards, coming in.

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0939 2039 HONOLULU reported "Possibility bearing 306° T.,
11,000 yards".

1034 2134 HONOLULU reported lights bearing 185° T., identified
as Aola Bay.

1043 2143 HONOLULU reported one plane on port bow.

1118 2218 Set Radar condition THREE.

1130 2230 Changed course by column movement to 320° T.

1137 2237 NEW ORLEANS reported, "Think we have four contacts
on port bow".

1140 2240 Ships left to course 280° T.

1141 2241 Contacts reported by NEW ORLEANS identified as
friendly - Own destroyers in column on 306° T.

Weather: Clearing, clouds broken, visibility improving
rapidly.

1207 2307 CTF 67 reported "Two bogies bearing close to Cape
Esperance".

1210 2310 Ships right to course 320° T.

1214 2314 DRAYTON reported two bogies bearing 280° T., 13,300
yards and 278° T., 12,800 yards.

1215 2315 From Fletcher to CTF 67, "INTERROGATORY WILLIAM".
1216 2316 Changed course to 300° T. by column movement.
CTF 67 directed setting of Radar condition ONE.
Bogie reported bearing 282° T., distance 16,000
clear of Island coming in.

1217 2317 From CTF 67, "Range on bogies is excessive at
present". HONOLULU reported range 14,600 yards.

1220 2320 Destroyers directed to make torpedo attack.

1221 2321 CTF 67 directed, "Stand by" followed almost immediately
by "Commence firing".

1222 2322 HONOLULU reported range as 11,100.

1223 2323 Ships forward in column commenced firing. Enemy
returning fire.

1224 2325 HONOLULU opened fire - Range 9,200 yards.

1227 2327 Range 7,900 yards - closing rapidly.

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1228 2328 Range 7,260 yards, bearing 243° T. Changing course to right to pass around PENSACOLA which was damaged.

1229 2329 Enemy ship reported hit - burning.

1230 2330 HONOLULU ceased fire. No more targets.

1231 2331 Course 350° T., coming left.

1232 2332 Proceeding around Savo Island in clockwise direction.

1233 2333 PENSACOLA reported her course 300° T.

1234 2334 FLETCHER reported proceeding around Savo Island. Changing course to left. Contact bearing 225° T., distance 3,350 yards.

1235 2335 Course 300° T. Explosion seen on ship that may have been MINNEAPOLIS. LARDNER reported being fired on by own ships.

1236 2336 HONOLULU making flank speed.

1239 2339 LARDNER reported ship still firing. LARDNER reported, "We are last ship in column and we are still being fired at by friend." Changing course to left.

1244 2344 To CTF 67 from CTU 67.2.3 "Our course 280° T., request instructions."

1247 2347 Changed course to 345° T.

1250 2350 Savo Island on starboard beam. Information received that NORTHAMPTON was badly damaged at about 2329.

1253 2353 To PENSACOLA from CTU 67.2.3, "CAN YOU MOVE".

1257 2357 HONOLULU ordered to circle Savo Island and head back in easterly direction.

1259 2359 General signal from MINNEAPOLIS, "We need assistance". HONOLULU course 080° T., speed 25 knots (north of Savo Island).

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G.C.T. L.C.T.

1300 0000 Task Force SIXTY-SEVEN engaged in combat operations against enemy force off Tassafronga and between Cape Esperance and Savo Island. Minneapolis, NORTHAMPTON, NEW ORLEANS, PENSACOLA, believed damaged.

1301 0001 CTF 67 directed CTU 67.2.3 to take charge.

1311 0011 Changed course to 145° T.

1314 0014 FLETCHER directed to join HONOLULU.

1316 0016 Four ships on starboard bow. Searchlights on stern. Changed course to left to get out of light.

1317 0017 FLETCHER to HONOLULU "WHAT IS YOUR BEARING FROM POINT AFIRM (Savo Island)". DRAYTON to FLETCHER "BEARING IS 45 FROM POINT AFIRM". From CTU 67.2.3 "BEARING IS CHANGING RAPIDLY. JOIN US LATER".

1318 0018 Changed course to 330° T.

1320 0020 From CTU 67.2.3 "MY COURSE 310, POINT AFIRM ON PORT BOW".

1329 0029 From DRAYTON "FLETCHER ASKS WHERE ARE OTHER UNITS". From CTU 67.2.3 "DO NOT KNOW POSITION OF OTHER UNITS".

1330 0030 Relayed by DRAYTON "FLETCHER REPORTS THAT OTHER UNITS ARE SOUTHEAST OF POINT AFIRM". CTU 67.2.3 directed FLETCHER and DRAYTON to join the other units.

1332 0032 Changed course to 255° T.

1333 0033 Flashing lights reported on port beam.

1334 0034 Two ships burning southeast of Savo; believe our ships.

1337 0037 Plane requests permission to illuminate destroyer landing troops on Guadalcanal.

1340 0040 From CTU 67.2.3 "WE ARE SWINGING LEFT TO FIRE ON DESTROYER LANDING TROOPS ON GUADALCANAL".

1341 0041 Flare on port beam.

1342 0042 Course 200° T., swinging left. NORTHAMPTON on fire, battery out of commission, making headway on one engine, ordered to retire at discretion.

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1 December 1942 (Continued)

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1345 0045 NORTHAMPTON is unable to retire, position just northward of beach.

1346 0046 To plane "WHAT IS PRESENT ESTIMATE OF SITUATION LANDING TROOPS ON BEACH."

1347 0047 To plane "HAVE YOU ILLUMINATED ENEMY CRAFT. ARE YOU SURE OF ENEMY CRAFT".

1348 0048 From plane "IT APPEAR TO HAVE ITS BOW ON BEACH OR VERY NEARLY ON BEACH." Plane ordered to investigate and report further.

1349 0049 Course 165° T., swinging left. Ship reported bearing 145° T., distance 26,000 yards, coming from behind Savo Island.

1350 0050 Searchlight on port beam. Savo Island.

1353 0053 Coming to course 195° T.,

1355 0055 HONOLULU directed to head about southeast until on a line 15,000 yards north of Tassaronga and then east.

1356 0056 Flares on port bow.
From NEW ORLEANS "WE ARE TEN MILES WEST OF TULAGI. CAN YOU STAND BY".

1357 0057 Enemy craft illuminated; a wrecked merchantman.

1359 0059 Two ships bearing 146° T., distance 17,000 yards.

1400 0100 FLETCHER directed to send two destroyers to stand by.

1401 0101 Ships bearing 100° T., coming from behind Savo Island.

1402 0102 MAURY and PERKINS directed to stand by NEW ORLEANS.

1403 0103 NORTHAMPTON reported destroyer closing on port bow, not identified.

1405 0105 Planes ordered to secure.

1406 0106 All ships directed to flash fighting lights momentarily.

1407 0107 NORTHAMPTON preparing to abandon ship.

1409 0109 PENSACOLA reports speed 8, two miles southeast of Savo Island. MAURY and PERKINS ordered to stand by.

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1411 0111 Three ships bearing 078° T.

1415 0115 HONOLULU directed to retire out Lengo Channel.

1417 0117 Changed course to 075° T. Sent despatch to Tulagi "SEND OUT BOATS FOR SURVIVORS".

1421 0121 MINNEAPOLIS torpedoed, heading for Lunga Point.

1423 0123 Changed course to 105° T.

1425 0125 To NEW ORLEANS, "AM SENDING YOU TWO DESTROYERS".

1428 0128 LAMSON AND LARDNER directed to stand by MINNEAPOLIS.

1430 0130 Eight ships on Radar Screen.

1431 0131 Submarine reported on starboard quarter, NEW ORLEANS, surfaced.

1435 0135 From NEW ORLEANS "THERE ARE TWO DESTROYERS WITH ME". DISPATCH TO COMSOUPAC: "APPARENTLY ALL OTHER CRUISERS ARE DAMAGED X DESTROYERS STANDING BY X HONOLULU RETIRING TO SOUTHWEST OF SAVO X WILL REJOIN CRIPPLED SHIPS AT DAYLIGHT", from CTU 67.2.3.

1439 0139 HONOLULU directed to stand well clear of Guadalcanal and then head south.

1442 0142 Changed course to 280° T.

1444 0144 Two destroyers (MAURY and PERKINS) standing by NEW ORLEANS.

1445 0145 NEW ORLEANS directed to send one destroyer to NORTHAMPTON.

1447 0147 MINNEAPOLIS has two torpedoes, making one-half of one knot.

1449 0149 PENSACOLA halfway between Savo and Tulagi.

1452 0152 FLETCHER approaching HONOLULU from astern. FLETCHER directed to stand by crippled ships with destroyers.

1454 0154 HONOLULU sighted life rafts dead ahead; changed course to right.

1458 0158 FLETCHER and DRAYTON stopped to pick up survivors.

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1 December 1942. (Continued)

G.C.T. L.C.T.

1520	0220	Many surface contacts - all friendly.
1531	0231	Tulagi reports all clear.
1600	0300	Changed course to 230° T., speed 25 knots.
1700	0400	Changed course to 180° T.
1705	0405	Changed course to 245° T.
1710	0410	Changed course to 042° T.
1811	0511	Changed course to 180° T.
1820	0520	Changed course to 266° T.
1829	0529	Changed course to 050° T., speed 28 knots.
1845	0545	Changed course to 030° T. Many aircraft contacts, all friendly.
1933	0633	Changed course to 067° T.
1935	0635	Sighted smoke bearing 130° T. (ALCHIBA afire off Lunga Point).
1936	0636	Changed course to 090° T.
1941	0641	Changed course to 040° T. Weather: Broken clouds, light haze, good visibility.
1945	0645	Changed course to 065° T.
1950	0650	Changed course to 040° T.
1959	0659	Sighted two destroyers bearing 130° T.
2000	0700	Changed course to 090° T. Challenged destroyers - answered correctly, identified as LARDNER and LAMSON.
2008	0708	Small boat sighted bearing 200° T.

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1 December 1942 (Continued)

G.C.T. L.C.T.

2012 0712 Destroyers reported receipt of orders to search for survivors until return of CTU 67.2.3 then join him. Changed course to 130° T.

2020 0720 LAMSON and LARDNER joined formation on bows of HONOLULU. Base course 130° T., speed 28, zig-zagging; CTU 67.2.3 signalled "FOLLOW MOTIONS OF THIS SHIP".

2035 0735 MAURY, PERKINS, and LANSDOWN bearing 110° T.

2036 0736 Sighted MINNEAPOLIS bearing 080° T. Sighted 2 PT boats bearing 075° T. Challenged and answered correctly.

2040 0740 Changed speed to 20 knots.

2050 0750 Reversed course.

2055 0755 Reversed course. (Trying to send message to MINNEAPOLIS)

2100 0800 Position of flagship: 09-11-48 S. 160-01-12 E.

2105 0805 Changed course to 140° T. Cloud of smoke from MINNEAPOLIS which appeared to be a boiler explosion.

2108 0808 Challenged destroyer bearing 150° T. Identified as LANSDOWN escorting FOMALHAUT with the Shaw and PC 476.

2122 0822 Changed speed to 25 knots.

2130 0831 Signalled to Task Unit "Boiler power not to exceed maximum of 27 knots is required.

2139 0839 Changed course to 090° T.

2141 0841 Ceased zig-zagging.

2145 0845 Changed course to 095° T.

2210 0910 Condition RED at Cactus. General Quarters.

2213 0913 Radar aircraft bearing 330° T., distance 13 miles.

2215 0915 Changed speed to 28 knots.

2216 0916 Changed speed to 27 knots.

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1 December 1942 (Continued)

G.C.T. L.C.T.

2220 0920 Radar aircraft bearing 290° T., 60 miles.

2230 0930 Condition GREEN at Cactus.

2232 0932 Radar screen clear. Secured from General Quarters.

2235 0935 Changed course to 115° T.

2240 0940 Changed speed to 25 knots, zig-zag plan 8.

2345 1045 Condition RED in Cactus. General Quarters.

0015 1115 Condition GREEN. Secured from General Quarters.

0140 1240 Radar contact on aircraft bearing 190° T. Tracked across bow on course 070° but not able to sight due to haze. Speed 105 knots, nearest approach 7 miles.

0100 1200 Position of flagship: 09-47 S., 161-29 E. course and speed made good since 1200/30 November, 310° T., 13.3 knots.

0400 1500 LARDNER tested automatic weapons.

0502 1602 LARDNER made radar contact on aircraft bearing 320° T., distance 22 miles.

0520 1620 Ceased Zig-Zagging on course 164° T. Changed speed to 27 knots.

0720 1820 Changed course to 142° T., changed speed to 25 knots.

0730 1830 Contacted FLETCHER and DRAYTON on TBS.

0800 1900 Set Radar condition THREE.

0900 2000 Position of flagship: 11-55-06 S., 163-49-18 E.

1030 2130 LAMSON left formation to proceed as previously directed (rejoin CTF 67).