UNITED STATES SHIP DUNLAP (384) Sunday (Day) 1 (Date) August (Month), 1943

Zone description

Position	0800	1200	2000
Lat.	8-23.6 S.	09-06 S.	8-22 S.
Long.	157-31.7 E.	158-23.3 E.	157-29.5 E.

OPERATIONAL REMARKS
(WAR DIARY)

00-04

Steaming as before as unit of anti-submarine screen of Task Group 31.2 on course 280 T. & pgc 274 psc at 18 knots enroute Onaiavisi Passage. Boilers #1, #2, #3, & #4 in use. Ship darkened; condition of readiness I material condition ABLE set. Commander Destroyer Division TWELVE in DUNLAP, commander screen. 0013 changed course to 250 T. & pgc 244 psc. 0043 changed course to 280 T. & pgc 274 psc. 0148 changed course to 340 T. & pgc 332 psc. 0300 changed course to 320 T. & pgc 310 psc entering Blanche Channel. 0336 maneuvered to dodge torpedo and maneuvered to hunt submarine. 0339 contact believed false; rejoined formation. 0341 changed course to 325 T. & pgc 320 psc.

Average Steam #400 R.P.M. 177.7

Robert L. Gilbert
ROBERT L. GILBERT,
Lt. (jg), USNR.

04-08

Steaming as before. 0447 commenced patrol in assigned sector off Tambatuni Island while transports unloaded off Onaiavisi Entrance. 0613 fighter air cover on station. 0647 landing operations completed set course 145 T. & pgc 135 psc speed 24 knots.

Average Steam #400 R.P.M. 155.8

Wm. O. Freeman, Jr.
WILLIAM O. FREEMAN,
Ensign, USNR.

08-12

Steaming as before. 0820 lighted ship. 0840 changed course to 090 T. & pgc 083 psc. 1006 secured from general quarters and boilers #1 & #2.

Average Steam #400 R.P.M. 228

Vining A. Sherman
VINING A. SHERMAN,
Lt., USNR.

12-16

Steaming as before. 1300 Commander Division TWELVE in DUNLAP received orders to proceed on assigned duty. Left formation: set course 130 T. proceeding to Cape Esperance for rendezvous with two LST's and SC and began patrolling ahead ahead at 15 knots.as anti-submarine screen for assigned units on base course 305 T. & pgc 295 psc. Task Group speed 10 knots with leading LST guide.

Average Steam #400 R.P.M. 184.5

Wm. O. Freeman Jr.
WILLIAM O. FREEMAN,
Ensign, USNR.

16-20

Steaming as before. 1705 changed course to 250 T. & pgc 240 psc. 1718 conducted 20MM gunnery exercises. 1740 completed 20MM gunnery exercises having expended 217 rounds of 20MM ammunition. 1817 darkened ship.

Average Steam #400 R.P.M. 139.4

Robert L. Gilbert
ROBERT L. GILBERT,
Lt.(jg), USNR.

20-24

Steaming as before.

Average Steam #400 R.P.M. 139

Vining A. Sherman
VINING A. SHERMAN,
Lt., USNR.

Approved:

Clifton Iverson
CLIFTON IVERSON, Lt. Cdr., USN,
Commanding Officer.

Examined:

A R Olsen
A. R. OLSEN, Lieutenant, USN,
Navigator.

To be forwarded direct to the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, either at end of an operation or at the end of the calendar month.

☆ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1943 16—33079-1

UNITED STATES SHIP DUNLAP (384) Sunday (Day) 1 (Date) August (Month), 1943

Zone description

Position	0800	1200	2000
Lat.			
Long.			

OPERATIONAL REMARKS
(WAR DIARY)

REMARKS -

DUNLAP operating as a unit of Task Group 31.2 with Commander Destroyer Division FORTY-FOUR (Commander BURKE) in MAURY - Commander Task Group 31.2. Task Group 31.2 composed of DUNLAP, CRAVEN, MAURY, LANG, STACK, STERETT, WILSON, GRIDLEY. Rear Admiral Wilkinson, Commander Task Force THIRTY-ONE with headquarters at Guadalcanal.

Approved: Clifton Sprague F H Bowen.
Commanding Officer.

Examined: A R Olsen
Navigator.

To be forwarded direct to the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, either at end of an operation or at the end of the calendar month.

☆ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1943 16—33079-1

2

UNITED STATES SHIP DUNLAP (384) Monday (Day) 2 (Date) August (Month), 19 43

Zone description

Position	0800	1200	2000
Lat.	08-23 S.	09-16 S.	08-22 S.
Long.	157-32 E.	158-23 E.	157-29 E.

OPERATIONAL REMARKS
(WAR DIARY)

00-04

Patrolling station ahead of LST's #395 & #399 as escort on course 283 T. & pgc 273 psc at 15 knots. Speed of Task Group 10 knots. SC keeping station astern of LST's. 0155 changed course to 321 T. & pgc 311 psc. 0220 manned all battle stations set material condition ABLE. 0312 changed course to 331 T. & pgc 321 psc entered Blanche Channel.

Average Steam #400 R.P.M. 108.4 Wm. O. Freeman Jr.
WILLIAM O. FREEMAN,
Ensign, USNR.

04-08

Steaming as before. 0520 sighted RENDOVA ISLAND bearing 290 T. 0600 changed speed to 7.5 knots. 0620 lighted ship; LST's maneuvering to make landing on beach. Commenced patrolling in area opposite LST's. 0753 LST's on beach; set course 142 T. & pgc 132 psc at 25 knots.

Average Steam #400 R.P.M. 131.7 Robert L. Gilbert
ROBERT L. GILBERT,
Lt.(jg), USNR.

08-12

Steaming as before. 0804 changed speed to 27 knots. 0840 changed course to 149 T. & pgc 145 psc. 0913 changed course to 140 T. & pgc 136 psc and secured from general quarters setting condition of readiness III material condition BAKER. 0937 changed course to 103 T. & pgc 099 psc.

Average Steam #400 R.P.M.153.1 Wm. O. Freeman Jr.
WILLIAM O. FREEMAN,
Ensign, USNR.

12-16

Steaming as before.

Average Steam #400 R.P.M. 150 Vining A. Sherman
VINING A. SHERMAN,
Lt., USNR.

16-20

Steaming as before. 1625 entered Blanche Channel. 1651 manned all battle stations set material condition ABLE. 1705 changed speed to 27 knots. 1750 changed speed to 15 knots patrolling off Onaiavisi Entrance on various courses at various speeds awaiting LST's. 1821 darkened ship. 1822 flight of 12 Flying Fortresses and approximately 20 various types of fighters were observed to make a medium level bombing attack on Munda air-drome. 1830 army artillery on shore off Onaiavisi Entrance opened fire on enemy positions. 1953 LST #399 underway. DUNLAP took screen station ahead of LST and SC took station astern. Steaming on various courses at various speeds to clear Onaiavisi Entrance.

Average Steam #400 R.P.M. 199.3 Robert L. Gilbert
ROBERT L. GILBERT,
Lt.(jg), USNR.

20-24

Steaming as before. 2005 set base course 143 T. & pgc 133 psc at 11 knots. Patrolling station at 15 knots. 2135 secured from general quarters set material condition BAKER condition of readiness III.

Average Steam #400 R.P.M. 134.2 Wm. O. Freeman Jr.
WILLIAM O. FREEMAN,
Ensign, USNR.

Approved: Clifton Iverson
CLIFTON IVERSON, Lt. Cdr., USN,
Commanding Officer.

Examined: A R Olsen
A. R. OLSEN, Lieutenant, USN,
Navigator.

☆ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1943 16—33079-1

3

UNITED STATES SHIP DUNLAP (384) Tuesday (Day) 3 (Date) August (Month), 1943

Zone description

Position	0800	1200	2000
Lat.	08-52 S.	09-11 S.	09-08 S.
Long.	159-10 E.	159-46 E.	160-14 E.

OPERATIONAL REMARKS
(WAR DIARY)

00-04
Patrolling ahead of LST #399 on base course 143 T. & pgc 138 psc at 15 knots. Speed of guide 10 knots. Boilers #3 & #4 in use. Ship darkened. Condition of readiness III material condition BAKER set. ComDesDiv TWELVE-OTC. 0000 changed course to 090 T. & pgc 084 psc.
Average Steam #400 R.P.M. 142.2
Wm. O. Freeman Jr.
WILLIAM O. FREEMAN,
Ensign, USNR.

04-08
Steaming as before. 0540 manned all battle stations set material condition ABLE. 0654 secured from general quarters set material condition BAKER condition of readiness III.
AVerage Steam #400 R.P.M. 144.2
Robert L. Gilbert
ROBERT L. GILBERT,
Lt.(jg), USNR.

08-12
Steaming as before. 0800 changed course to 118 T. & pgc 114 psc. 1057 changed course to 115 T. & pgc 105 psc.
Average Steam #400
Vining A. Sherman
VINING A. SHERMAN,
Lt., USNR.

12-16
Steaming as before. 1252 changed course to 130 T. 1403 duty completed with LST'S, changed course to 028 T., speed 25 knots proceeding to Tulagi Harbor. 1419 changed speed to 27 knots. 1455 maneuvered on various courses at various speeds to enter channel. 1525 moored starboard side to YO144 to fuel.ship. 1539 commenced fueling.
Average Steam #400
Wm. O. Freeman Jr.
WILLIAM O. FREEMAN,
Ensign, USNR.

16-20
Moored as before. 1648 completed fueling. 1700 underway on various courses at various speeds proceeding to Port Purvis. 1749 entered Port Purvis and ComDesDiv 44 came aboard for further transfer. 1802 underway from Port Purvis for Koli Point. 1815 set course 185 T. & pgc 182 psc, speed 27 knots. 1820 darkened ship. 1851 lay to while Division Commander and Commander Destroyer Division FORTY-FOUR took boat to beach. 1930 hoisted boat; set course 013 T., speed 27 knots, proceeding to Purvis Bay.
Average Steam #400
Vining A. Sherman
VINING A. SHERMAN,
Lt., USNR.

20-24
Steaming as before. 2007 maneuvered on various courses at various speeds to enter Port Purvis. 2123 anchored in berth #19 in 25 fathoms of water with 60 fathoms of chain.
Average Steam #400 R.P.M. 15
Robert L. Gilbert
ROBERT L. GILBERT,
Lt. (jg), USNR.

REMARKS -
Commander Frederick Moosbrugger relieved Commander Burke as Commander Task Group 31.2.

Approved:
Clifton Iverson
CLIFTON IVERSON, Lt.Cdr., USN,
Commanding Officer.

Examined:
A R Olsen
A. R. OLSEN, Lieutenant, USN,
Navigator.

To be forwarded direct to the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, either at end of an operation or at the end of the calendar month.

☆ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1943 16—33079-1

4

UNITED STATES SHIP DUNLAP (384) Wednesday (Day) 4 (Date) August (Month), 1943

Zone description

Position	0800	1200	2000
Lat.			
Long.			

OPERATIONAL REMARKS
(WAR DIARY)

00-04
Anchored in Purvis Bay, Florida Island, berth #19 in 25 fathoms of water with 60 fathoms of chain to starboard anchor. Boilers #1 & #2 in use. Ship darkened; condition of readiness III material condition BAKER set. Ships present: various units of Pacific Fleet with SOPA Commander Task Group 31.2 (Commander Frederick Moosbrugger) in DUNLAP.

Paul L. Stephen
PAUL L. STEPHEN,
Ensign, USNR.

04-08
Anchored as before. 0645 sunrise; lighted ship.

E. F. Moody Jr.
EDWARD F. MOODY, Jr.
Ensign, USNR.

08-12
Anchored as before. 0809 underway on various courses at various speeds for Koli Point, Guadalcanal. 0835 set course 190 T. speed 25 knots. 0916 arrived Koli Point; Division Commander left ship. 0919 commenced patrolling awaiting return of Division Commander. 0951 proceeded to Lunga Point for mail. 1051 proceeding to Koli Point, Guadalcanal, to pick up Division Commander. 1128 Division Commander returned aboard; set course 005 T. speed 27 knots to return to Purvis Bay.

Vining A. Sherman
VINING A. SHERMAN,
Lt., USNR.

12-16
Steaming as before. 1217 entered Port Purvis. 1236 anchored in berth #8 in 22 fathoms of water with 60 fathoms of chain to starboard anchor.

Robert L. Gilbert
ROBERT L. GILBERT,
Lt.(jg), USNR.

16-20
Anchored as before.

Wm. O. Freeman Jr
WILLIAM O. FREEMAN,
Ensign, USNR.

20-24
Anchored as before.

John J. O'Donnell
JOHN J. O'DONNELL,
Ensign, USNR.

Approved:
Clifton Iverson
CLIFTON IVERSON, Lt.Cdr., USN,
Commanding Officer.

Examined:
A R Olsen
A. R. OLSEN, Lieutenant, USN,
Navigator.

To be forwarded direct to the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, either at end of an operation or at the end of the calendar month.

☆ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1943 16—33079-1

5

UNITED STATES SHIP DUNLAP (384) Thursday (Day) 5 (Date) August (Month), 1943

Zone description

Position	0800	1200	2000
Lat.			
Long.			

OPERATIONAL REMARKS
(WAR DIARY)

00-04
Anchored in Purvis Bay, Florida Island, berth 8 in 22 fathoms of water with 60 fathoms of chain to starboard anchor. Boilers #1 & #2 in use. Ship darkened; condition of readiness III material condition BAKERset. Ships present: various units of Pacific Fleet with SOPA Commander Task Group 31.2 (Commander Frederick Moosbrugger) in DUNLAP.

Paul L. Stephen
PAUL L. STEPHEN,
Ensign, USNR.

04-08
Anchored as before. 0645 sunrise; lighted ship.

E. F. Moody Jr.
EDWARD F. MOODY, Jr.
Ensign, USNR.

08-12
Anchored as before.

Wm. O. Freeman Jr
WILLIAM O. FREEMAN,
Ensign, USNR.

12-16
Anchored as before.

Donald G Ross
DONALD G. ROSS,
Ensign, USNR.

16-20
Anchored as before. 1723 underway on various courses at various speeds to proceed to Koli Point, Guadalcanal, set course 186 T. & pgc 176 psc speed 27 knots. 1820 arrived Koli Point; Division Commander left ship. 1830 commenced patrolling.

Vining A. Sherman
VINING A. SHERMAN,
Lt., USNR.

20-24
Patrolling as before. 2130 Division Commander returned to ship; set course 002 T. speed 25 knots to return to Purvis Bay. 2238 entered Purvis Bay. 2300 anchored in berth 8 in 25 fathoms of water with 60 fathoms of chain to starboard anchor.

Wm. O. Freeman Jr
WILLIAM O. FREEMAN,
Ensign, USNR.

Approved:
Clifton Iverson
CLIFTON IVERSON, Lt.Cdr., USN,
Commanding Officer.

Examined:
A R Olsen
A. R. OLSEN, Lieutenant, USN,
Navigator.

To be forwarded direct to the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, either at end of an operation or at the end of the calendar month.

☆ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1943 16—33079-1

UNITED STATES SHIP DUNLAP (384) Friday (Day) 6 (Date) August (Month), 1943

Zone description

Position	0800	1200	2000
Lat.			
Long.			

OPERATIONAL REMARKS
(WAR DIARY)

00-04

Anchored in Purvis Bay, Florida Island, berth 8 in 22 fathoms of water with 60 fathoms of chain to starboard anchor. Boilers #1 & #2 in use. Ship darkened ; condition of readiness III material condition BAKER set. Ships present: various units of Pacific Fleet with SOPA Commander Task Group 31.2 (Commander Frederick Moosbrugger) in DUNLAP.

Donald G. Ross
DONALD G. ROSS,
Ensign, USNR.

04-08

Anchored as before. 0640 sunrise; lighted ship. 0730 shifted berth four-hundred yards toward center of channel.

Vining A. Sherman
VINING A. SHERMAN,
Lt., USNR.

08-12

Anchored as before. 1130 underway from Purvis Bay.

Note: See attached Action Report.

REMARKS - Underway in accordance Commander Task Force THIRTY-ONE's 050814 of August.

Approved:
Clifton Iverson
CLIFTON IVERSON, Lt.Cdr., USN,
Commanding Officer.

Examined:
A R Olsen
A. R. OLSEN, Lieutenant, USN,
Navigator.

To be forwarded direct to the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, either at end of an operation or at the end of the calendar month.

☆ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1943 16—33079-1

UNITED STATES SHIP DUNLAP (384) Friday (Day) 6 (Date) August (Month), 19 43

ADMINISTRATIVE REMARKS

0 to 4:
No remarks.

D. G. ROSS,
Ensign, USNR.

4 to 8:
No remarks.

V. A. SHERMAN,
Lieutenant, USNR.

8 to 12:
0800 Mustered crew on stations; no absentees. Made daily inspection of magazines and smokeless powder samples, condition normal. Made weekly inspecti on of magazines sprinkling system, condition satisfactory.

C. O. HOLMQUIST,
Lieutenant (jg), USN.

12 to 16:
No remarks.

R. L. GILBERT,
Lieutenant (jg) USNR.

16 to 20:
No remarks.

V. A. SHERMAN,
Lieutenant, USNR.

20 to 24:
No remarks.

V. A. SHERMAN,
Lieutenant, USNR.

CLIFTON IVERSON,
Lieutenant Commander, USN,
Commanding.

Examined:

A. R. OLSEN, Lieutenant, USN,
Navigator.

To be forwarded direct to the Bureau of Naval Personnel at the end of each month.

☆ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1943 16—33079-1

NAVPERS 134

PART I

COLUMNS

LOG OF THE UNITED STATES SHIP DUNLAP (Name) DD384 (Identification Number)

FRIDAY (Day) 6 (Date) AUGUST (Month), 1943

Zone description -11

CLIFTON IVERSON LT COMDR U. S. Navy, Commanding.

Hour	Fuel Expended By Meter For Each Hour	"All Shaft" Average Revolutions	By Revs. Nautical Miles	By Revs. Tenths	By Log Nautical Miles	By Log Tenths	Course (P. C.) Gyro / Mag. (Indicate which)	Wind Direction	Wind Force	Barometer Height in Inches	Barometer Reading At. Ther.	Temperature Air, Dry Bulb	Temperature Air, Wet Bulb	Temperature Water at Surface	Weather, by Symbols	Clouds Form	Clouds Moving From—	Clouds Amount	Visibility	Sea Condition	Sea Swells From—
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20
A. M. 1	111	—	—	—	—	—	—	SE	2	2980	-	80	78	—	c	Cumb	SE	9	8	0	—
2	48	—	—	—	—	—	—	SE	2	2980	-	80	79	—	c	Cumb	SE	9	8	0	—
3	57	—	—	—	—	—	—	SE	2	2978	-	78	77	—	c	Cumb	SE	9	8	0	—
4	40	—	—	—	—	—	—	SE	2	2978	-	78	77	—	c	Cumb	SE	9	8	0	—
5	30	—	—	—	—	—	—	SE	4	2977	-	78	75	—	c	Cumb	SE	8	4	0	—
6	50	—	—	—	—	—	—	SE	4	2979	-	78	76	-	c	Cumb	SE	7	12	0	—
7	28	—	—	—	—	—	—	SE	3	2980	-	81	77	—	c	Cu	SE	6	30	0	—
8	76	—	—	—	—	—	—	SE	3	2982	-	93	79	—	c	Ft Cu	SE	9	40	0	—
9	31	—	—	—	—	—	—	SE	3	2981	-	84	79	—	c	Ft Cu	SE	9	45	0	—
10	149	—	—	—	—	—	—	SE	3	2982	-	85	81	—	c	Ft Cu	SE	9	50	1	SE
11	147	—	—	—	—	—	—	SE	3	2982	-	83	81	—	c	Ft Cu	SE	10	40	1	SE
12	384	1097	11	9	11	9	260	SE	3	2982	-	84	81	84	pc	Ft Cu	SE	9	35	1	SE
P. M. 13	2450	25	0	25	0	279	E	3	2977	-	86	81	84	c	Ci Cu	E	9	50	2	E
14	2450	25	0	24	9	262	E	3	2976	-	84	83	84	c	Ci Cu	E	8	30	3	E
15	224.6	23	3	23	7	286	E	3	2975	-	83	81	84	c	Ci Cu	E	9	50	3	E
16	222.0	23	0	22	5	286	E	3	2977	-	85	82	85	c	Ci Cu	E	9	50	3	E
17	223.0	23	0	23	5	286	E	3	2977	-	85	82	85	c	Ci Cu	E	9	50	3	E
18	246.1	24	9	24	1	286	E	3	2977	-	83	81	85	c	Ci Cu	E	8	50	5	E
19	2456	25	0	24	9	286	E	3	2978	-	81	80	85	c	St Cu	E	9	40	5	E
20	2450	25	0	25	8	307	E	3	2978	-	82	80	85	c	Cumb	E	8	30	5	E
21	2450	25	0	25	0	307	E	3	2980	-	80	80	86	c	Cumb	E	9	20	5	E
22	222.9	23	1	23	0	000	E	4	2980	-	79	79	86	c	Cumb	E	9	10	5	E
23	139.0	15	0	15	0	000	E	4	2980	-	79	79	85	c	Cumb	E	9	10	5	E
24	204.9	21	5	21	0	000	E	4	2980	-	78	78	86	c	Cumb	E	9	2	5	E

Noon { Latitude 9°-00-00 S / Longitude 160-00-00 E

Current { Set / Drift

Gyrocompass in Use

Error 0°

Standard Mag. Compass

Compass No. 382

S. H. 262°

Error 3°.00W

Variation 7°.15'E

Deviation 30-00W

Fuel { Received / Expended 3840 / On hand 145067

Water { Distilled 7190 / Received / Expended 8438 / On hand 16276

Before Leaving Port

Draft for'd

Draft aft

After Entering Port

Draft for'd

Draft aft

Magazine Temperatures:

Maximum 91°-01 HR.

Minimum 79°-04 NOON HR

CONDITION NORMAL

DRILLS AND EXERCISES

Division	Morning	Afternoon
1		
2		
3		
4		
5		
6		
7		
8		
9		

SUBMERGED RUN DATA—SUBMARINES

	1	2	3	4	5
Run No. (Serial)					
Time to submerge					
Greatest depth					

HYDRO

Navigator.

To be forwarded direct to the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, at the end of each month.

☆ GPO 16—83079-1

UNITED STATES SHIP DUNLAP (384) 7 (Day) Saturday (Date) August (Month), 1943

Zone description

Position	0800	1200	2000
Lat.			
Long.			

OPERATIONAL REMARKS
(WAR DIARY)

08-12
1057 arrived Koli Point, Guadalcanal. 1057 Division Commander, news-reporters and Fighter Director Officers left ship. 1059 commenced patrolling.

Wm. O. Freeman, Jr.
WILLIAM O. FREEMAN,
Ensign, USNR.

12-16
Patrolling as before. 1257 Division Commander returned aboard; set course 000 T. & pgc 354 psc at 25 knots proceeding to Tulagi Harbor, Florida Island. 1330 entered Tulagi Harbor. 1416 moored port side to YO144 for fuel. 1432 commenced fueling. 1547 completed fueling.

Robert L. Gilbert
ROBERT L. GILBERT,
Lt. (jg), USNR.

16-20
Moored as before.

John J. O'Donnell
JOHN J. O'DONNELL,
Ensign, USNR.

20-24
Moored as before.

E. F. Moody Jr.
EDWARD F. MOODY, Jr.
Ensign, USNR.

Approved:
Clifton Iverson
CLIFTON IVERSON, Lt.Cmdr., USN,
Commanding Officer.

Examined:
A R Olsen
A. R. OLSEN, Lieutenant, USN,
Navigator.

To be forwarded direct to the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, either at end of an operation or at the end of the calendar month.

☆ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1943 16—33079-1

8

UNITED STATES SHIP DUNLAP (384) Saturday (Day) 7 (Date) August (Month), 19 43

ADMINISTRATIVE REMARKS

0 to 4:
No remarks.

V. A. SHERMAN,
Lieutenant, USNR.

4 to 8:
No remarks.

V. A. SHERMAN,
Lieutenant, USNR.

8 to 12:
0800 Mustered crew on stations; no absentees. Made daily inspection of magazines and smokeless powder samples, condition normal.

W. O. FREEMAN,
Ensign, USNR.

12 to 16:
No remarks.

R. L. GILBERT,
Lieutenant (jg), USNR.

16 to 20:
No remarks.

J. J. O'DONNELL,
Ensign, USNR.

20 to 24:
No remarks.

E. F. MOODY, Jr.,
Ensign, USNR.

CLIFTON IVERSON,
Lieutenant Commander, USN,
Commanding.

Examined:
A. R. OLSEN, Lieutenant, USN,
Navigator.

To be forwarded direct to the Bureau of Naval Personnel at the end of each month.

☆ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1943 16—33079-1

PART I

COLUMNS

LOG OF THE UNITED STATES SHIP DUNLAP (Name) DD384 (Identification Number)

SATURDAY 7 AUGUST (Day) (Date) (Month), 1943

Zone description -11

CLIFTON TVERSON LT COMDR U. S. Navy, Commanding.

Hour	Fuel Expended By Meter For Each Hour	"All Shaft" Average Revolutions	By Revs. Nautical Miles	By Revs. Tenths	By Log Nautical Miles	By Log Tenths	Course (P. C.) Gyro ✓ Mag. ___ (Indicate which)	Wind Direction	Wind Force	Barometer Height in Inches	Barometer Reading At. Ther.	Temperature Air, Dry Bulb	Temperature Air, Wet Bulb	Temperature Water at Surface	Weather, by Symbols	Clouds Form	Clouds Moving From—	Clouds Amount	Visibility	Sea Condition	Sea Swells From—
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20
A. M. 1	1624	244.1	24	1	24	1	130	E	4	2480	-	79	79	85	⊘	CUMB	E	10	1	5	E
2	1508	242.0	24	8	24	9	130	E	4	2480	-	79	79	85	⊘	CUMB	E	10	1	5	E
3	1315	242.0	24	8	24	9	130	E	4	2482	—	79	77	85	C	CUMB	E	8	4	1	E
4	1293	261.0	25	9	25	9	130	E	4	2480	—	75	74	85	C	CUMB	E	7	4	4	E
5	1210	228.1	23	6	23	5	130	E	4	2480	—	75	74	85	C	ACu	E	8	4	4	E
6	1201	263.3	24	0	24	0	130	E	4	2480	-	77	74	85	C	ACu	E	8	14	4	E
7	1326	233.4	23	9	23	8	100	E	4	2483	-	79	79	85	C	ACu	E	8	30	4	E
8	1159	232.6	24	0	24	0	100	E	3	2483	—	82	80	85	⊘	ACu	E	10	40	4	E
9	1270	228.1	23	6	23	7	115	E	3	2484	—	83	81	85	⊘	ACu	E	10	40	4	E
10	1412	260.0	26	2	26	0	130	E	3	2484	—	83	81	85	C	ACu	E	8	42	4	E
11	1380	215.8	22	5	22	7	110	E	3	2483	—	85	81	85	C	ACu	E	9	44	3	E
12	1313	095.0	10	2	10	3	095	E	3	2480	—	80	83	80	⊘	ACu	E	10	44	3	E
P. M. 13	0995	10	8			000	E	3	2479	-	84	84	85	C	ACu	E	9	40	3	E
14	1683	18	0	18	0	140	E	3	2477	-	84	81	84	⊘	Cu	E	10	35	1	E
15	0450	9	9	9	9	013	E	4	2478	-	80	81	84	⊘	Cu	E	10	35	1	E
16	—	—	—	—	—	—	E	4	2482	-	84	80	—	⊘	CUMB	E	10	35	1	E
17	—	—	—	—	—	—	E	3	2482	-	82	80	—	⊘	CUMB	E	10	25	0	—
18	—	—	—	—	—	—	E	3	2482	-	82	80	—	⊘	CUMB	E	10	20	0	—
19	—	—	—	—	—	—	E	3	2482	-	80	78	—	C	Cu	E	8	10	0	—
20	—	—	—	—	—	—	E	3	2481	-	80	78	—	C	Cu	E	7	8	0	—
21	—	—	—	—	—	—	E	2	2480	-	80	78	—	C	Cu	E	6	8	0	—
22	—	—	—	—	—	—	E	1	2480	-	80	78	—	Sc	Cu	E	4	6	0	—
23	—	—	—	—	—	—	E	1	2480	-	80	78	—	Sc	Cu	E	2	8	0	—
24	—	—	—	—	—	—	E	1	2480	-	80	78	—	Sc	Cu	E	2	8	0	—

Noon: Latitude 9°-00-00 S; Longitude 160°-00-00 E

Current: Set ___; Drift ___

Gyrocompass in Use: Error 0°

Standard Mag. Compass: Compass No. 382; S. H. 095; Error 4°-00 E; Variation 7°-15' E; Deviation 0°-20' W

Fuel: Received ___; Expended 1683; On hand 129032

Water: Distilled 9970; Received ___; Expended 6859; On hand 19387

Before Leaving Port: Fueling; Draft for'd 12'-00"; Draft aft 11'-09"

After Entering Port: Draft for'd ___; Draft aft ___

Magazine Temperatures: Maximum 90° No 1 H.R.; Minimum 80° No 3 H.R.

DRILLS AND EXERCISES

Division	Morning	Afternoon
1		
2		
3		
4		
5		
6		
7		
8		
9		

SUBMERGED RUN DATA—SUBMARINES

	1	2	3	4	5
Run No. (Serial)					
Time to submerge					
Greatest depth					

Navigator.

To be forwarded direct to the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, at the end of each month.

☆ GPO 16—83079-1

SECRET

U.S.S. Dunlap (384),
August 18, 1943.

BATTLE OF VELLA GULF

70

DESTROYERS, PACIFIC FLEET
U.S.S. DUNLAP (384)

SECRET

DD384/A16-3
Serial 012

August 18, 1943.

From: The Commanding Officer.
To : The Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.
Via : (1) The Commander Task Group 31.2.
(2) The Commander Task Force 31.
(3) The Commander Third Fleet.

Subject: Action report of U.S.S. DUNLAP (384), Battle of Vella Gulf 6-7 August 1943.

Reference: (a) Pacific Fleet Conf. Ltr. 24CL-42 of 21 June 1942.

Enclosure: (A) Battle Report.
(B) Navigational Track Chart.
(C) Torpedo Track Chart.

1. In accordance with reference the Action report of the Battle of Vella Gulf fought during night of 6-7 August 1943, is forwarded herewith.

CLIFTON IVERSON.

Advance Copy to:
Cominch
CincPac.

Copy to:
ComDesPac
RepComDesPac
File.
War Diary (2).

54077 FILMED

I. - COMMENT AND SUMMARY OF OUTSTANDING EVENTS -

Task Group 31.2 consisting of six destroyers of which the DUNLAP was the flagship of the Task Group Commander - Commander Frederick Moosbrugger, U. S. Navy, engaged a Japanese Force of one cruiser and three destroyers the night of 6-7 August 1943, in Vella Gulf, Solomon Islands.

During the engagement, which was initiated by a torpedo attack on the Japanese Force by Division "ABLE ONE" (DUNLAP, CRAVEN and MAURY), all Japanese ships were sunk. Division "ABLE TWO" (LANG, STERETT and STACK) opened with gunfire as soon as the first division's torpedoes hit home and they were joined shortly thereafter by Division "ABLE ONE" as it turned from a torpedo retirement course and closed the enemy to open with gunfire. This engagement extended from 2341 Love 6 August (the time of firing torpedoes) to 0027, 7 August 1943, at which time the radar screen was reported clear. An attempt was then made to search for and pick up Japanese survivors but shortly after search was initiated, MAURY reported her main feed pump out of commission and course was changed to retire through the northern entrance of Vella Gulf. Upon clearing Vella Gulf Division "ABLE ONE" proceeded toward Tulagi, with the DUNLAP leaving formation at 0907, at the direction of Commander Task Group 31.2, to proceed to Koli Point. The DUNLAP arrived off Koli Point at 1055, 7 August 1943, where Commander Task Group 31.2 left the ship to visit Headquarters of Commander Task Force 31.

ENCLOSURE (A)

II. - PRELIMINARY OPERATIONS -

In compliance with despatch orders originated by Commander Task Group 31.2, the Commanding Officers of all ships in the engagement less the STERETT met in conference at 0930 Love, 6 August 1943, on board this ship. At this time Commander Task Group 31.2 went over the "Battle Plan" which he had prepared and requested comment and questions. He explained that the "Battle Plan" was in the rough form only and that as soon as it was clear to "All Hands" it would be typed and copies given to each Commanding Officer and to Commander Destroyer Division "ABLE TWO" before they left the ship. He further stressed the idea of torpedo attack and the strong torpedo battery of Division "ABLE ONE" and stated definitely that he intended to attack with torpedoes and that this Division was not to open with gunfire until torpedo attack had been completed. At about 1100 the "Battle Plan" was distributed and the conference was completed. The writer left this conference with a clear idea of what was intended and expected, and with the silent wish that the opportunity to carry out this "real" division torpedo attack would develop.

Task Group 31.2 less the STERETT got underway at 1130, 6 August 1943, and departed Purvis Bay, the STACK leaving the entrance first to deliver mail to STERETT. At 1257 the STACK and STERETT joined the formation which was then a circular disposition with the DUNLAP at center and the other five destroyers on a circular screen, distant 1500 yards. The Task Group proceeded at speeds of twenty-three to twenty-five knots south of the Russell Islands and thence southeast of Tetapari and Hendova Islands. At 1808 shortly before sunset, which was at 1827, ships were formed in column with the DUNLAP leading, the order of ships being DUNLAP, CRAVEN, MAURY, LANG, STERETT and STACK with distance between ships 500 yards. At 1930 went to "General Quarters" and set material condition "ABLE", except for the fresh water and flushing systems which were left in operation.

Course was changed to the northwest as the group proceeded toward Gizo Strait all piloting being by ranges and bearings on nearby islands using "Sugar George" radar. At 2030 word was passed to fill all fresh water containers and at 2100 fresh water and flushing systems were set in accordance with prescribed settings for material condition "ABLE".

The ship was then fully prepared for whatever it might encounter.

The force was at this time making 25 knots heading up between GANONGGA and GIZO Islands with the intention of arriving at Point Option (Lat. 8°-02' S. Long. 158°-42 E.) in Gizo Strait at 2200. At 2159 the DUNLAP passed through Point Option and the course was changed by column movement via "TBS" signal to 050°T and speed was reduced to 15 knots. At 2216, when the LANG passed Liapari Island abeam to port and in accordance with the "Battle Plans", Division "ABLE TWO" took station with the Division guide (LANG) bearing 150°T from the DUNLAP. At 2228 on the execution of a "Div. Corpen" signal over "TBS", course was changed by column movement to 124°T and a sweep toward Blackett Strait was commenced. At 2256, on signal via "TBS", Division changed course to 000°T and commenced a sweep up Vella Gulf.

Shortly after entering Vella Gulf the moon set, the exact time being 2226. The wind was from the southeast estimated at force two with surface visibility approximately 3500 to 4000 yards. The sky was completely overcast and the ship encountered intermittent light rain squalls prior to and during the engagement. At 2318 Combat Information Center reported "Sugar George" surface contact bearing 090°T range 4500 yards. Contact was broadcast over "TBS" and in about two minutes the course and speed of contact was broadcast as course 000°T speed 16 knots. Tracking was continued and in a few seconds a second contact was reported by CIC as being a second ship just astern of the first contact. At this time the Captain requested confirmation of contact by any other ship in the formation; in response to this request the CRAVEN reported she had a slight indication only and Commander Destroyer Division "ABLE TWO" reported, "Ihave no contact". The Captain then asked CIC to confirm contact and suggested that it might be a "Side lobe". CIC replied that the contact was giving a very strong signal and could hardly be considered "side radiation".

At 2323 on signal over "TBS" course was changed by column movement to 030°T and speed was increased to twenty-five knots; shortly thereafter, CIC reported contact was now being tracked on course 030°T, speed 25 knots and the

Commanding Officer who was suspicious about the contact decided and stated it was false. In a few seconds this was confirmed by CIC who reported contact as "side radiation" from ships of Division "ABLE TWO".

- NARRATIVE OF BATTLE -

At 2333 CIC reported "Sugar George" surface contact bearing 359°T, range 23,900 yards. Orders were given by the commanding Officer to check the contact to insure its validity in asmuch as the previous contact had just proven false. CIC replied that the contact was a true contact and they were tracking, given ranges and bearings every thirty seconds.

At 2335-30 the commanding officer broadcast the contact over "TBS" as surface bearing 351°T, range 19,700 yards. This was followed in about another thirty seconds by another broadcast giving another range and bearing and requesting other ships to confirm contact. CRAVEN at this time replied, "I have contact". CIC now reported target course as 180°T, speed 25 knots and further stated that there were now three separate targets in column on the screen. CRAVEN now reported by "TBS" target course 180°T, speed 26 knots and the commanding officer replied over "TBS" - "Castle checks" (Castle being the voice call for DUNLAP).

The Commander Task Group 31.2 had ordered the Division to prepare to fire eight torpedoes to port by general signal and the target course and speed was being set on the torpedo director and the torpedo battery trained out. CIC had reported target changing course to the left to 167°T and that target speed was now thirty knots and that there were now four separate targets on the screen. CRAVEN about this time reported via "TBS" - "I have three targets, looks mighty nice to me", to which the commanding officer replied over "TBS" - "We have four".

Upon request from Commander Task Group 31.2 as to the course to the firing position CIC had given 335°T and course was changed on signal to that course.

II. - PRELIMINARY OPERATIONS (Cont'd) -

During this time CIC had reported several courses and speeds of target ranging from 167°T to 180°T and speeds from 25 to 30 knots. The Commanding Officer directed Torpedo Officer to use target course 176°T, speed 27 knots. As the DUNLAP came around to the new course Commander Task Group 31.2 asked the Torpedo Officer for the track angle and Torpedo Officer replied, "290". Within a few seconds the Group Commander ordered "fire torpedoes" and over the "TBS" gave the general signal execute "Eight William Two". Just at this time, upon request from the Commanding Officer, the Torpedo Officer informed the Commanding Officer that the track angle was 275°T.

During the minute between 2341 to 2342 eight torpedoes were fired from the port battery and then began that long wait that seemed like hours until the explosions began. At 2344 course was changed to the right ninety degrees on signal "Turn 9" given by the Commander Task Group 31.2 and it was while on this leg that the explosions commenced. This was followed in about three or four seconds by a second explosionsto the right of the first explosion and about ten or fifteen seconds later a third explosion occurred to the right of the first and second explosions. There are several observers in this ship who reported four separate explosions, others reported three and a few reported only two, however, the general consensus of opinion is that three separate and distinct explosions were observed and this version is therefore selected as the DUNLAP account.

Immediately with the explosions Division "ABLE TWO" opened with gunfire and the sky appeared to be filled with tracers converging upon the area of the fires. At 2352 course was changed on "TBS" signal from Group Commander and range was closed toward the enemy. CIC had just reported there were now only two targets on the screen and a target the farthest to the South was selected for gunfire as the other target was the fiercely burning cruiser and there was little doubt she was finished. At 2355 opened fire with 5"/38 Cal. battery on target using "Sugar George" Radar ranges and bearings. Gunfire continued with the Gunnery Officer shifting to the burning cruiser shortly before fire was ceased as CIC had reported first target had disappeared

from radar screen. A total of eighty-seven (87) rounds were fired, 58 rounds Common and 29 rounds AA Common.

After the first few salvos of gunfire, CIC had reported Sugar George Radar out of commission and just when it appeared we would have to struggle along with only our human eyes, CIC reported Sugar George was back in operation. There was a definite sigh of relief on the bridge with this report.

Shortly after changing courses to 310°T, gun control reported a splash in the water off the starboard bow. This splash was not seen by any person on the bridge and attempts were made to discover who was shooting at us without any success. The Captain at the time first thought this was gunfire coming from Vella La vella and so remarked to the Group Commander, but then quickly decided that what he saw were tracers burning out upon hitting the water caused by the "overs" of Division "ABLE TWO". However, in fairness, it must be stated that several observers in this ship including the Gunnery Officer maintain these flashes were enemy gunfire.

CIC was during this period reporting only one contact visible and that was identified as the fiercely burning cruiser. This cruiser was a mass of flames and it was about this time that the report came over "TBS" from Commander Division "ABLE TWO" that it was a three stack cruiser. Attempts were made to identify it, the Division Commander asked the Captain "if he could make it out". The Captain looked at it carefully through his glasses but was unable to make out any distinguishing features, and so reported to the Group Commander. About the only thing definte he could make out was a "hell of a lot of fire" and that it was a ship a great deal larger than a destroyer.

While watching the cruiser the "big explosion" occurred. After this the Captain considered that this ship was gone, and that it would be just a matter of minutes now until she would be under.

At 0020 torpedo was reported off starboard bow and course was changed to the right with full rudder and maximum speed rung up. No torpedo was seen and in about 20 seconds the ship was brought back to course and speed reduced to 21 knots to resume station.

II. - PRELIMINARY OPERATIONS (Cont'd) -

Just about this time, a Japanese destroyer was clearly seen from the bridge silhouetted by the still burning cruiser. The battery was being trained out to open fire when this destroyer started getting hit from gunfire of Division "ABLE TWO". There was another big explosion and the destroyer disappeared.

At 0027 course was changed to north and at this time radar reported screen was clear although there was a large area of fire on the water where the cruiser had been.

Just before course was changed to 210°T, a torpedo was reported approaching off the port bow. Rudder was ordered hard left and speed was increased. As the ship's head was swinging rapidly to the left when the signal of execution "corpen 210°T" was given, the rudder was kept hard over and ship was swung left to 210°T. As soon as DUNLAP was on its course, Captain realized that by turning left instead of right DUNLAP had become separated from CRAVEN and MAURY and after requesting range and bearing of CRAVEN from CIC, a report was made to CRAVEN via "TBS" giving CRAVEN "your bearing 034°T, range 3300 yards from me." A second range and bearing was given CRAVEN shortly thereafter and the CRAVEN then stated "I have you in sight."

At 0039 "Sugar George" reported a low flying "Bogie" coming in. As plane approached, full left rudder and maximum speed was ordered. Radar reported plane passed overhead, but no bombs were observed and the DUNLAP came back to the course and speed.

At 0059 another torpedo was reported off the starboard bow and again emergency full ahead was ordered and rudder put hard right, but as nothing happened the ship was brought back to the course, and speed resumed. These torpedo reports were coming from Gun Control and while no individual on the bridge sighted a torpedo or torpedo track, reports could not be discounted and violent evasive action was taken in each case. It was realized that an enemy submarine might be present and while it is now believed that these reports were false, there was no time for

evaluating reports as they were made. The Captain realized that with existing conditions of visibility any torpedo sighted would have to be sighted close aboard; it was therefore most urgent to take any evasive action promptly.

At 0105 Group Commander stated he was going back and try to pick up some survivors. Preparations were made to have nets and lines ready for use, with armed men standing by to haul aboard any located. The DUNLAP was then proceeding toward the fire which by now consisted of various sized patches of burning oil and debris when the MAURY reported her main feed out of commission. Course was then changed on orders of Group Commander to 050°T and he stated Division "ABLE ONE" would retire. Courses were changed as necessary to clear the Gulf and the Division retired. At 0243 Group Commander directed DUNLAP to take position on the port bow of MAURY with CRAVEN taking station on the starboard bow and speed was changed to 23 knots to maintain station on MAURY which was designated as the guide.

At 0359 after a plane contact had proven friendly, secured from General Quarters to give the crew a short rest before dawn.

Our Fighter cover was sighted at 0553 and Fighter Director Officers (three on board) took charge of them and we proceeded toward home, passing north of the Russells.

At 0715 secured from General Quarters. At 0903 upon receipt of despatch directing Commander Task Group 31.2 to report to Headquarters at Koli Point, signal was made for MAURY to "take charge" as DUNLAP hoisted "disregard my movements", and course was set for Koli Point where we arrived at 1055, dead tired but convinced that we had contributed our poart in the sinking of four ships of Japan's rapidly diminishing Navy.

III. - CHRONOLOGICAL RECORD OF EVENTS -

1130 Departed Purvis Bay proceeding at 25 knots as soon as clear of harbor.

1257 STACK and STERETT joined formation.

1330 Changed course to 262°T, speed 25 knots.

1407 Changed speed to 23 knots.

1505 Changed course to 280°T.

1706 Changed speed to 25 knots.

1808 All ships formed column; DUNLAP leading, order of ships: DUNLAP, CRAVEN, MAURY, LANG, STERETT and STACK.

1824 Darkened ship; all boilers cut in and ship ready for maximum speed.

1907 Changed course to 307°T.

1930 General Quarters.

1958 Slowed momentarily. Shot of water in steam tripping out main throttle, speed resumed in about 30 seconds, ship astern being notified over "TBS" that DUNLAP was slowing.

2015 Sighted searchlight bearing 262°T. First believed to be from Simbo Island but navigational check showed it considerably to southward.

2049 Made radar contact on friendly aircraft 286°T, range 28,600 yards

2118 Changed course to 000°T.

2146 Changed speed to 15 knots.

2159 Passed through Point Option. Changed course to 050°T entered Gizo Strait.

2214 Passed Liapari Island abeam to port.

III. - CHRONOLOGICAL RECORD OF EVENTS -

2216 Division "ABLE TWO" formed 150°T in accordance with "Battle Plan".

2228 Changed course to 124°T on signal to conduct sweep of Blackett Strait.

2256 Changed course to 000°T on "TBS" on signal.

2318 "SG" radar contact 090°T, range 4,060 yards.

2318-15 Contact broadcast over "TBS", surface bearing 090°T, range 4,060 yards.

2319 Contact broadcast 091°T, range 4,030, tack 000°, tack 16.

2320 Requested confirmation of contact by other ships in formation.

2320-30 CRAVEN reported she had slight indication of contact Commander Division "ABLE TWO" reported, " I have no contact".

2323 Changed course to 030°T and changed speed to 25 knots.

2326 Contact reported false.

2333 "SG" radar contact bearing 359°T, range 23,900 yards.

2335-30 Contact broadcast over "TBS", surface 351°T, range 19,700 yards.

2336 Target course reported by CIC as 180, speed 25 knots and reported there were now three ships in column on the screen.

@ 2337 Captain requested via "TBS" to other ships in formation, "Do you have contact"?

@ 2337-15 CRAVEN replied over "TBS", "Affirmative, I have contact".

@ 2337-30 CRAVEN reported by "TBS", "Course 180, speed 25 knots."

III. - CHRONOLOGICAL RECORD OF EVENTS (Cont'd) -

@ 2337-45 Captain stated over "TBS", "Castle checks". ("Castle" being voice call for DUNLAP).

2338 Commander Task Group 31.2 order by "TBS" a change of course to port to 335°T and also signalled, "Prepare to fire eight torpedoes to port". Using general signal "Prep 8 William 2".

@ 2338-15 CRAVEN reported over "TBS", "I have three targets".

2338-30 Captain replied over "TBS", "We have four".

2340 Changed course to 350°T, on direction of Commander Task Group 31.2, but ship never reached this course before torpedoes were fired.

2341 Torpedo Officer when asked by Commander Task Group 31.2 stated track angle 290°T. Commander Task Group 31.2 stated, "fire torpedoes" and gave signal over "TBS" "execute 8 William 2".

2341-2342 Fired five Mark XV and three Mark XV-1 torpedoes fitted with Mark XV, 600 lb. warheads.

2344 Changed course to right by "Turn 9" signal over "TBS" from Commander Task Group 31.2.

2346 Noted explosion in enemy ship believed to be leading ship.

@ 2346-03 Noted explosion in enemy ship to right of first explosion.

@ 2346-10 Noted explosion in enemy ship to right of first and second explosions.

2350 Two center ships reported dead in water by CIC.

@ 2351 Last ship in column disappeared from screen.

2352 Changed course by "Turn signal" to 180°T on "TBS" signal from Commander Task Group 31.2.

III. - CHRONOLOGICAL RECORD OF EVENTS (Cont'd) -

2355 Opened fire with 5"/38 batter on orders from Commander Task Group 31.2 on ship to left of burning cruiser using "SG" radar range and bearing.

0000 DUNLAP ceased firing when ship to left of burning cruiser disappeared from screen.

0003 Changed course to 310°T.

0007 Shell believed to be "3 inch" landed off starboard bow.

0010 Terrific explosion in the cruiser, explosion took the form of a large semi-circle with the water as the base, extending 6 to 7 hundred feet in the sky. Loud cheers from the men on the bridge and throughout topside, such as; "Look at her burn", "there goes a cruiser".

© 0020 Changed course to 090°T. Changed speed to 33 knots to dodge torpedo.

0021 Changed speed to 21 knots.

0023 Another explosion on Japanese destroyer silhouetted by the fiercely burning cruiser and again cheers from topside personnel throughout the ship.

0027 Changed course to 000°T; smaller explosions going off every few seconds in the vicinity of the burning cruiser.

0027 Radar screen reported clear.

0032 Changed course to 060°T; changed speed to 27 knots; torpedo reported approaching.

0034 Changed speed to 25 knots.

0035 Changed course to left to 210°T .

0039 Radar screen reported still clear.

III. - CHRONOLOGICAL RECORD OF EVENTS (Cont'd) -

0040 "Bogie" reported on "SG" radar. "Bogie" 54,000 yards.

0046 "Bogie" closed us. Full left rudder; 32 knots to dodge attack. Plane did not drop bombs; apparently confused as to whether we were friend or foe. Resumed course 210°T.

0050 Passed close aboard what was left of fire admiring our handiwork; numerous remarks being made by men like; " a damn good job", "what a fire".

0055 Changed course to 050°T. Entered light rain squall.

@ 0059 Emergency full ahead to dodge a torpedo.

0100 Changed speed to 25 knots.

0105 Changed course to right to 210°T to look for survivors.

0115 MAURY reported bearing in main feed pump burned out.

0118 Changed course to right to 050°T at 25 knots.

0138 Changed course to 110°T.

0243 Changed speed to 20 knots; took station on MAURY port bow at distance 1500 yards.

0255 Changed speed to 23 knots. Keeping station on MAURY.

0257 Changed course to 130°T.

0357 Made radar contact on plane.

0358 Contact reported friendly.

0359 Secured from General Quarters.

III. - CHRONOLOGICAL RECORD OF EVENTS (Cont'd) -

0530 Routine General Quarters.

0640 Changed course to 000°T.

0653 Sighted fighter cover.

0715 Secured from General Quarters.

1055 Arrived off Koli Point, Guadalcanal.

- As Torpedoes were exploding there were loud cheers and exclamation given spontaneously by people on topside.

- Despatch next day reported friendly plane had accidentally discharged a flare to southward of Simbo Island at this time.

@ - These times given may not be exactly correct but from evidence available they are believed to be approximately correct.

IV. - SPECIAL COMMENTS ON ENEMY FORCE -

1. NAMES, TYPES.

The enemy force consisting of four ships, were in column formation, on base course 180°T at a speed of 25 to 30 knots. From the relative size of radar "PIPS" the cruiser was believed to be leading the formation followed by the three destroyers. The second "PIP" on the screen, while not as large as the first one, was considerably larger than the remaining two, and it is probable that this was a larger destroyer than the third and fourth ships in the enemy column. From the Radar Plot it is believed that the enemy was zigzagging about the base course of 180°T using a very shallow zigzag plan.

2. COMMUNICATION.

No signals were observed or heard transmitted between the ships of the enemy prior to ordering the action.

3. USE OF SMOKE CAMOUFLAGE DISRUPTION.

No attempts to make smoke were used by the DUNLAP although "Battle Plans" had stated smoke might be used, and this ship was fully prepared throughout the night to use smoke should it be directed or necessary.

4. EFFECTIVENESS OF GUNNERY AND TORPEDOES.

The torpedoes fired by this ship were five Mark XV and three Mark XV Mod. 1 equipped with Mark XV 600 lb. warheads. It was unfortunate that larger warheads had not been obtained but despite repeated ship efforts neither the Mark XVII warheads nor the warhead extenders could be obtained in Noumea. It might be added that the Naval Base, Tulagi had been requested to furnish the large warheads and that the boat containing the warhead extensions had arrived alongside the DUNLAP at 1115, 6 August 1943. Inasmuch as the Task Group was getting underway at 1130 the extensions were sent back as time did not permit their installation prior sailing.

The torpedoes were fired at four second intervals using director fire and shortly after they had been fired the Chief Torpedoman's Mate came on the bridge

IV. - SPECIAL COMMENTS ON ENEMY FORCE -

4. EFFECTIVENESS OF GUNNERY AND TORPEDOES. (Cont'd)

and reported to the Captain that all torpedoes left the tubes normally and appeared to run hot, straight and true. A plot of the torpedoes fired is appended to this report. Although no attempt is made to definitely assign hits, all DUNLAP Officers and men concerned with torpedo fire feel positive that some of these torpedoes hit.

At firing CIC had asked bridge "are torpedoes fired?" At this time the Torpedo Officer had just said, "Fire Two" and report was made to CIC that second torpedo had just been fired. The Executive Officer noted the time and stated that about four and one half miutes later he felt the first explosion followed by a second explosion. From the bridge these explosions appeared as a huge reddish ball that increased in size and intensity from a small ball to one of about twenty-five to thirty feet in diameter with the ball then breaking up and spreading into fires. While it is estimated that the second explosion followed the first by about two or three seconds, there was approximately an interval of about six to ten seconds between the second and third explosion. This latter explosion appeared as a reddish as a reddish ball not nearly as large as the first or second explosion, but was followed immediately by more severe fires.

It is believed possible that what was sighted was not actually the torpedoes exploding, but rather the explosion of magazines that were set off by the torpedoes. From talks with submarine officers it has been stated that the torpedo explosion is felt as a heavy thud and then usually from close range. In this case the DUNLAP was over 6,000 yards away from the explosions and yet two explosions were noted by the Executive Officer in CIC.

The gunfire as observed from the bridge appeared to be concentrated at a ship to the left of the burning cruiser. There were several other ships

IV. - SPECIAL COMMENTS ON ENEMY FORCE -

4. EFFECTIVENESS OF GUNNERY AND TORPEDOES. (Cont'd)

firing at the target and all shells appeared to be falling in the same general area and it is believed hits were being scored although no definte evidence is available to substantiate this claim except that given by radar which reported target disappeared shortly before cease firing was ordered. Fleshless powder was used throughout and blinding effect was negligible although the smoke was heavy and bothersome.

At 0010 there was a terrific explosion in the burning cruiser. This one explosion stands out in the memory of all observers as the most vivid point in the destruction of the enemy and surely the most impressionable sight during the entire engagement. The Commanding Officer was so impressed by this explosion that he direct CIC to record the time of the "big explosion" when it occurred.

5. ESTIMATED MATERIAL CASUALTIES.

Despite the fact that there was only visual observation of the destruction of two of the Japanese ships, namely, the large ship which was believed to be a cruiser and later the destroyer which was silhouetted by the burning cruiser, it is strongly believed that all four of the Japanese ship's present in this engagement were sunk. The Executive Officer in his comments has given a description of the "PPI" screen at various times during the battle and it is felt that this evidence substantiates the basis of claiming all four ships sunk.

As to the types of ships, one was seen and identified as a destroyer, and the large ship which burned so vividly was believed to be a cruiser. The Gunnery Officer who better than any other observer in this ship furnished the best description of this ship and states that it was a KUMA class light cruiser. His description and remarks are given in his comments.

IV. - SPECIAL COMMENTS ON ENEMY FORCE -

6. ESTIMATED PERSONNEL CASUALTIES.

There is little doubt that the personnel casualties in the two Japanese ship's that were observed exploding were heavy. It is difficult to imagine many people getting off these ship's unless abadon ship was ordered simultaneously with or shortly after the first torpedo hits. In the cruiser especially, the whole ship was a mass of flames and there was a continous series of minor explosions going on from the time she burst in flames until she went under. In addition to this, the entire water area surrounding the ship was aflame with burning fuel oil and debris and those Japs that did get off could only look forward to jumping from the frying pan into the fire.

In the destroyer that exploded while close to the burning cruiser the same is true except that this ship was on the Eastern edge of the burning oil on the water and it is possible that there were a number of survivors.

As for the other two ship's which are believed to have been destroyers, personnel casualties possibly were fairly low. It is believed that as soon as these ship's were hit by torpedoes they were doomed and most probably abandon ship was ordered immediately with the greater majority of the crew getting off; however, a good number of these survivors must have perished in the water as the area surrounding the ship was smothered by gunfire, a lot of it being 5" AA Common.

Summarizing, the following estimates are furnished of personnel casualties:

Ship	percent casualties
Cruiser -	75% of crew and troops on board
Destroyer that was seen to explode -	50% of crew and troops on board
Destroyer sunk to Southward of burning cruiser -	40% of crew and troops on board
Destroyer sunk to Northward of burning cruiser -	30% of crew and troops on board

7. COMMENT BY A. R. OLSEN, Lieut., U.S. Navy - Executive Officer -

The engagement proved decisively the value and importance of a well organized Combat Information Center and the effectiveness of the "Sugar George" radar.

Prior to and during the engagement all navigational data was transmitted from Center to the Division Commander on the bridge who maneuvered his force in narrow imperfectly charted waters with the assistance of Center's information. Visibility was about 3500 yards with frequent rain squalls, hence full reliance had to be placed on data obtained from the "Sugar George" radar.

During the engagement the "Sugar George" radar provided navigational fixes, tracking data for the tracking party, location of our forces, enemy forces, and all data for the torpedo and gunnery control parties. Since no fire-control radar is installed on this ship, Center had a busy hour but no great difficulty was experienced due principally to the fact that every man in center knew his job and did it smoothly, even during the moments of greatest excitement when torpedo wakes were reported approaching the ship.

Radar operation was excellent. The operator followed my requests for ranges and bearings on the various targets without confusion and Center was able at all times to give any information required by the bridge or control parties including a course for the approach to the firing point and all ranges and bearings on the target. It is significant to note that the targets were never seen by anyone until the torpedoes hit and fires illuminated the enemy ships.

The radar "PPI" screen gave a good picture of the engagement. After the torpedoes hit, one of the ships dropped back from the other three who continued on at moderate speed bunched closely together on the "PPI" screen. At 2349 the lagging contact grew noticeably smaller, the range then being about 8000 yards. This contact without apparent movement grew smaller and smaller on the "PPI" screen until at 2351 it disappeared leaving three contacts one of which had drawn out ahead of the other two who remained closely bunched together. The contact out ahead moved about 5000 yards from the other two and began to fade from the "PPI" screen, short scale was in use. Prior to commencement

7. COMMENT BY A.R. OLSEN, Lieut., U.S. Navy - Executive Officer -

of gunfire at 2355 this contact was only a faint "pip", "Sugar George" radar was fully effective at this time with no land interference. On the third or fourth salvo "Sugar George" radar was knocked out of tune by shock. At 2359 it was back in commission fully effective and the third contact was then just barely visible on the screen using short scale. At 0000 this contact disappeared completely leaving two enemy ships close together apparently dead in the water. At 0010 one of these ships made a large blur on the screen simultaneoulsy with much yelling topside which was heard in CIC from machine gunners and over phone circuits. It was reported that a ship had blown up, shooting up a tremendous burst of fire into the sky. The Captain called down to CIC to record the time which was 0010. One contact remained on the screen and it was reported to CIC that this was a burning enemy ship. At 0024 it was noted that this contact grew smaller on the "PPI" screen. At 0027 this contact disappeared although bridge reported a fire still burning on the contacts former bearing "Sugar George" radar was fully effective at this time with no land interference. Course was reversed and the ship passed close aboard the remains of the fire.

Enlisted plotters were used throughout and their performance was excellent. Since this ship is fitted with an old type DRT having a fixed scale of 500 yards per inch it is not practical to track at ranges greater than 16000 yards. Accordingly, an "Aylwin plot" is used for all tracking using cross section paper and readings directly off the counters and the DRT which gives a plot of 2000 yards per inch. Although not entirely satisfactory this method has proved to be the most accurate and fastest of alternate methods tried.

It is interesting to note that a low flying "Bogie" was picked up by the "Sugar George" radar at 0040 at a range of 54,000 yards. It was not until the "Sugar Charlie" radar was coached on to the target by the "Sugar George" that this signal was detected by "Sugar Charlie" radar. No other plane has ever been detected at such a great range on the "Sugar George" radar on this ship.

7. COMMENT BY A.R. OLSEN, Lieut., U.S. Navy.- Executive Officer -

This information is offered as a basis to show that the "Sugar George" radar was highly efficient and that targets which gradually faded from the "PPI" screen at relatively short ranges obviously sank.

MATERIAL CASUALTIES.

At about 2357 after the third or fourth gunfire salvo. "Sugar George" radar was knocked out of operation by shock. Radar repairman states that the McNalley oscillator was knocked out of oscillation. After four or five more salvos had been fired the radar became operative again although at this time its efficiency was not 100%. Radar repairman at this time peaked the tuning of the McNalley oscillator and the "Sugar George" radar was again 100% effective. Total time out of operation was less than two minutes and within three minutes radar had been retuned and and was sending up data to gunnery control station. It is particularly fortunate that gunfire knocked the radar back in commission as all operations and maneuvers of the ship depended to a large extent on the operation of the "Sugar George" radar in CIC.

It is recommended that in future models of this equipment additional precautions be taken to prevent detuning of radar by gunfire shock. This casualty has occurred in the past in spite of every effort to locate radars in most advantageous position, complete isolation of equipment in the chart house, and blocking off all ventilation ducts.

RECOMMENDATIONS.

It is strongly recommended that a "PPI" repeater be installed on the bridge for the use of the Captain and Division Commander so they may better see a picture of the location of own and enemy forces. In action it is difficult for Center to give all the information required in a short time via a bridge talker. Attention of the Captain and the Division Commander is absorbed during crucial moments when it could better be directed toward fighting the ship.

It is further recommended that the layout of CIC be completely rebuilt around a good plotting table, a variable scale DRT, and a navigation desk. Present set-up is efficient only because of skilled personnel

7. COMMENT BY A.R. OLSEN, Lieut., U.S. Navy - Executive Officer -

and leaves much to be desired in getting the ultimate of which Center is possible of supplying. Present DRT should be modified by the addition of a variable scale and a plotting table installed. It is felt the results obtained would be like trading a '26 Ford in on a '42 Buick.

"Sugar Charlie" radar should be moved to former pyrotechnic locker bulkhead and an adequate ventilation system installed. Heat from two radars, Dog George indicators and the "Sugar George" receiver plus several lights made CIC almost untenable at times as there is no air intake to Center and only a small fan to discharge air. This alteration should have high priority.

8. COMMENT BY Lieut.(jg) R.L. GILBERT, U.S.N.R. - Torpedo Officer

The sweep made through Vella Gulf was made with the expectation of encountering and destroying with torpedoes enemy forces consisting of destroyers with the probability that a cruiser might be present.

Torpedoes were set at intermediate speed at alternate depths of five and nine feet the afternoon of 6 August. The magnetic feature of the exploder mechanism had been rendered operative from all warheads. Gyro balance nuts were set for 10° South Latitude. During the late afternoon of 6 August 1943, live primers had been inserted in the impulse charges, firing hammers had been placed in safety position and one degree right intercept offset was set on the torpedo director to correct for calibrated error in "Sugar George" radar bearing. While on course 030°T at 25 knots speed radar contact was made at a range of 23,900 yards bearing 359°T. Firing hammers on the mounts were put in ready position the battery trained to port and pointers matched. Within a minute of the initial contact CIC reported target course 180°T. speed 25 knots. Target course varied from 167°T and 180°T and target speed from 25 to 30 knots as determined by CIC were continuously set on the director. The torpedo mounts kept the torpedo course pointers matched and were ready to fire at any time. Target courses and speeds as

8. COMMENT BY Lieut.(jg) R.L. GILBERT, U.S.N.R. - Torpedo Officer -

determined by other ships in the Task Group were received over the "TBS" and at the Captain's order course 176°T and speed of 27 knots was set on the director. Target ranges decreased very fast and target bearings changed slowly at first and then began to draw rapidly to the left. Just before and during the firing the target bearing changed so rapidly that it was only with the utmost effort that the men on the mounts were able to keep their pointers matched. The Captain ordered a full salvo of 8 torpedoes to be fired shortly after the range had decreased to 5,800 yards. CIC ceased tracking and sent up bearings continuously. Five Mark XV and three Mark XV Mod. 1 torpedoes with Mark XV 600 lb. warheads were fired at a range of about 4,840 yards set on intermediate speed. The following data was used on the director:

# Target course	176°T
Target speed	27 knots
Target bearing	304°T
Torpedo course	266°T
Sight angle	322°T
1° gyro spread, 2° tube offset	
Track angle	272°T

All torpedoes were launched normally running hot. DUNLAP then turned 90° to starboard and about four and one-half minutes after firing three large explosions were seen on the starboard quarter.

Communications throughout the firing were excellent. Rapid continuous bearings from the time the order to fire torpedoes until after the attack was completed enabled the torpedoes to be fired on an accurate bearing. No bearing repeater is installed, bearings being received by the director trainer over phones.

- The figures reported are not known to be absolutely correct. They were recorded shortly after gunfire had ceased and are correct to the best of the memories of the torpedo control party.

RECOMMENDATIONS.

The speed at which the bearings changed in this firing emphasizes the need for the installation of a

8. COMMENT BY Lieut.(jg) R.L. GILBERT, U.S.N.R. - Torpedo Officer -

bearing repeater on the torpedo director, controlled from "Sugar George" radar. This alteration has been approved and preliminary wiring installed but lack of availability and material has prevented completion.

A better illumination system should be provided on the mounts and director. At night the present system is totally inadequate and red filtered flashlights had to be used to see to match pointers. It is recommended that light screens be built over the instruments and increased illumination provided. Unless the men can see to match pointers the best attack can be ruined by inaccurate laying of the tubes and director.

9. COMMENT BY Lieut.(jg) C.O. HOLMQUIST, U.S.N. - Gunnery Officer -

At 2355, after the DUNLAP had reversed course to 180°T, fire was opened by the 5" battery on a target to the left of the burning cruiser. Ranges and bearings on this target were being sent up over the radar phones from the "Sugar George" radar in CIC. A setup was made on the rangekeeper using the plotted target course and speed, "Sugar George" radar ranges and bearings, and an arbitrary ballistic obtained in previous radar calibration practices. This ballistic was "out 500 yards" in range and "plus 1½ degrees" in bearing. A ladder of "on", "out 200","on", "in 900", etc., as prescribed for radar firings was used. Fire was opened at 9610 yards with the target bearing 236°T. When "cease firing" was ordered, the range was 9,520 yards. Target speed on opening fire was 16 knots but was reduced to zero toward the end of the firing in order to make the generated ranges and bearings agree with the radar ranges and bearings. On the third or fourth salvo, "Sugar George" radar was reported out of commission. Fire was maintained on generated ranges and bearings and several moments later, when "Sugar George" radar was reported back in commission and CIC resumed sending up ranges and bearings, the generated range and bearing was found to agree almost perfectly with data from CIC

Flashless powder was used throughout. About 25 salvos were fired with four second buzzers. The following ammunition was expended:

58 rounds 5"/38 Cal. Common projectiles
29 rounds 5"/38 Cal. AA Common projectiles
87 rounds 5"/38 Cal. Flashless powder.

9. COMMENT BY Lieut.(jg) C.O. HOLMQUIST, USN - Gunnery Officer -

Although the flashless powder used undoubtedly acted to reduce the blinding glare of night firing, and undoubtedly helped to hide our gunflashes from the enemy, the dense clouds of smoke and sparks from the forward guns across the director line of sight prevented effective observation of fire and precluded the possibility of picking up the target in the sights had it been visible. Because of this excessive smoke from the flashless powder, it was impossible to observe from the director whether or not any hits were made. Machine gun groups reported following our tracers to the target and observing several hits. Radar later reported that there were splashes "all around the target" as observed on the "PPI" screen. "Check fire" was ordered by the control officer when radar reported the "PIP" had disappeared and that there was but one contact left on the screen. Checking the range and bearing of this contact showed that it was the burning cruiser. All loaded guns were immediately unloaded through the muzzle. Fire was not reopened.

There was absolutely no material or personnel casualties whatsoever during the firing. This shows clearly the splendid job of upkeep being done by the gunner's mates and fire controlmen on this ship in spite of little or no tender availability for upkeep and repair in the last few months.

At no time was the ammunition supply to any of the guns insufficient. All hands performed their jobs like veterans, although very few men on board had ever seen action before.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

That fire control radar be installed on this ship immediately so that fire can be commenced and sustained without depending on the "Sugar George" radar and CIC for ranges and bearings and target solution.

IDENTIFICATION OF THE BURNING VESSEL.

The outline of the burning vessel was formed by the flaming fuel oil which surrounded it. Topside rigging, especially aft, was burning fiercely. Suddenly a tremendous explosion, apparently the after magazines, came from aft of the silhouetted after turret. Bright

9. COMMENT BY Lieut.(jg) C.O. HOLMQUIST, USN - Gunnery Offber -

burning fragments in the center of a solid ball of flame shot high into the air, and the sea and sky for miles around flashed into view. At this time I could clearly see and identify the after gun turrets of the type mounted on a KUMA or NATORI class cruiser. Three stacks and a high bridge structure forward, also features of a KUMA or NATORI, were visible. The burning debris slowly settled back down into the water and left the blazing outline of the cruiser burning more brightly than ever.

V. - COMMENDATIONS WERE MERITED -

The Commanding Officer is most happy to report that prior to and during the action the entire ship's company performed their assigned duties in a most loyal, diligent and intelligent manner. Of the 242 men and 19 officers on board, 92 men and 3 officers have previously participated in action (The Marshall and Gilbert Raids); thus, for the great majority it was their first action and each and every man performed his job well and ably.

The following personnel are to be particularly commended for their participation in the action and by separate correspondence recommendations for awards are being made:

Lieutenant Albert Royal Olsen, USN - Silver Star.
Lieut.(jg) Carl Oreal Holmquist, USN - Legion of Merit (Officers Degree).
Lieut.(jg) Robert Louis Gilbert, USNR - Silver Star.
Dean Allen Savage, Radarman Third Class, U. S. Navy - Silver Star

Laurence August Hilt, Chief Torpedomans Mate (PA) U. S. Navy - Legion of Merit (Degree of Legionaire).

Francis Gregory J. Kennedy, Gunners Mate First Class, U. S. Navy - "do"
Walter Elbert Farmer, Radio Technician First Class, U. S. Navy - "do"
Patrick Francis McEnany, Yeoman First Class, U. S. Navy - "do"
Edwin Duff Hawkins, Torpedoman's Mate Second Class, U. S. Navy - "do"
John Olaf Tangnese, Torpedoman's Mate Second Class, U. S. Navy - "do"

V. - COMMENDATIONS WHERE MERITED (Cont'd) -

Lee Richard Schuler, Torpedoman's Mate Second Class, U.S.N.R.	- Legion of Merit (Degree of Legionaire).
Fantley Model Pinkston, Torpedoman's Mate Third Class, U.S.N.R.	- "do"
Walter Frederick Henckle, Torpedoman's Mate Third Class, U.S.N.R.	- "do"
Alfred Nelson, Radarman Third Class, U.S.N.R.	- "do"

VI. - LESSONS LEARNED -

It is strongly believed that the outstanding reasons for the highly successful action can be summarized as follows:

1. Utilizing to the maximum degree destroyers maximum offensive power.

Destroyers for the first time in this war known to the writer were successfully and correctly handled in making a coordinated torpedo attack.

Torpedoes are and will at least for the present remain the main offensive armament of destroyers. It is obvious that for any real destruction of the enemy ships by destroyers the torpedo must be the weapon used.

2. Thorough indoctrination of Subordinate Commanders.

A complete and thorough understanding on the part of "All Hands" as to the plans for battle and maneuvers to be taken in various situations. At the conference held the morning of 6 August 1943, the "Battle Plan" was gone over and discussed by Commander Task Group 31.2 with the result that the "Skippers" were given a definite idea of what action could be expected from the Group Commander in carrying out his basic plan.

3. The apparent complete "surprise" achieved on the enemy.

It is the belief of this writer that the enemy did not know of our presence until he was hit. Visibility was such that the ships could not be seen and although the Officer-of-the-Deck of this ship and the

VI. - LESSONS LEARNED (Cont'd) -

Assistant Gunnery Officer later stated they sighted flashes of the white wake of the enemy ships when they were abeam, there is no man or officer on board who can state that he sighted the Jap ships until after they were hit. The opinion has been advanced that the Japanese ships were heavily loaded with troops and while they were aware of our presence they were seeking to evade action by their high speed and therefore did not desire to disclose their location by opening fire. This may be true but it seems highly improbable that any Japanese Commander could hope to evade action with U. S. forces at this stage of the war at ranges less than 4,000 yards. There should be no doubt in their minds by this time that we have radar and know how to use it.

The Gunnery Officer who on this ship can furnish the best evidence that the large ship was a cruiser states that their after turret was trained amidships, and this fact alone makes the writer almost positive that they were unaware of our presence.

Probably the surprise was attained by the faulty operation or design of the Japanese radar. Our forces were relatively close to the Kolombangara shore line and the radars in the Japanese ships were no doubt experiencing a great amount of land interference. Probably the Japanese radars are not sufficiently sensitive to locate objects close to land and this is offered as the chief explanation why they were unable to detect our presence.

RECOMMENDATIONS (Material).

1. Install spare "PPI" screen on the bridge for use of Division Commander and Captain. This need is immediate and while authorized, the spare "PPI" has not yet become available for installation.

2. Install quick closing door on chart house. In this ship the "Sugar George" transmitter and receiver and "Sugar Charlie" transmitter are located in the chart

VI. - LESSONS LEARNED (Cont'd) -

RECOMMENDATIONS (Material)(Cont'd)

house and as the doors must be securely dogged down during gunfire to keep both "Sail Cast" and "Sugar George" radars from going out of commission, it becomes a real job to get in the chart house. During this action the Division Commander went below several times to look at the "PPI" scope and each time the doors had to be undogged and resecured, taking precious seconds for the operation.

When the spare "PPI" scope is installed, the need for entering the chart house during action will be reduced, but not wholly eliminated and quicker opening doors should be installed. Under separate correspondence request for alteration is being submitted and in the meantime this ship will try to obtain a quick opening door at the first opportunity.

3. Install "Fox Dog" radar. This is an approved alteration but inasmuch as DUNLAP together with FANNING required a special "tailor made" antennae, it has not yet been installed. "Sugar George" radar is just not able to take care of all the demands of navigational data, position of our forces, tracking information and range and bearings for torpedo and gunfire.

4. A need for a complete CIC unit thoroughly considered, studied, designed and installed. This ship has another uncompleted alteration for this job, and in the meantime has improvised a "set up" mainly by ships force which is used to track contacts, both surface and air. This works well but the effort involved could be greatly reduced by the installation of a properly designed plotting desk. It is strongly recommended that in this ship the chart house as such be rebuilt with the idea first and foremost of providing space and facilities for plotting contacts and secondly as a stowage for charts, H.O. publications and other navigational equipment. This can be easily accomplished by Navy Yard and could possibly be done by forces afloat provided sufficient time was made available for this work.

VI. - LESSONS LEARNED (Cont'd) -

RECOMMENDATIONS (~~Material~~)(Cont'd)

5. The great need for improved communications, coordination, and cooperation between the "Black Cats" operating in the Solomon area and the destroyers of Task Force 31. This ship spent a total of fifteen days in the area and on five nights was engaged in operations up the "slot". During this entire period not a single transmission was heard from a "Black Cat" although a radio receiver was tuned to the assigned frequency in use each night. It was thought possibly this might be the DUNLAP radio receiver, but as numerous transmissions were heard from PT Boats (who were also on the same frequency) and when other ships of the force also reported that they had no luck in hearing the "Black Cats" it became apparent that any communication between destroyers and "Cats" would be just luck. This deficiency can easily be corrected by arranging for Communication tests but more important by an exchange of ideas, opinions, troubles, plans, etc., around a conference table, attended by responsible destroyer and aviation personnel.

6. This engagement insofar as the torpedo set-up was concerned was almost a duplicate of our Radar Torpedo Practice with one slight but highly important difference. That difference being T-A-R-G-E-T S-P-E-E-D. The rapidity with which this attack developed was startling. It was only six minutes from the time target was discovered until torpedoes were on their way, and while that time proved sufficient it was not the manner in which we train. With the old Japanese ships capable of high speeds and their newer ships capable of even higher speeds I believe and strongly recommend that target speed fo our torpedo practices be increased to a minimum of 24 knots. If we can hit them at the high speeds, I firmly believe no great concern need be felt for our accuracy and ability at the lower speeds.

7. It had been the practice in this ship to have a recorder for "TBS" log stationed on the bridge near the loud speaker during general quarters. This proved to be a mistake for the following reasons:

VI. - LESSONS LEARNED (Cont'd) -

RECOMMENDATIONS (~~Material~~)(Cont'd)

7.(Cont'd)

(a) Insufficient light to permit transmissions being recorded.

(b) Lack of sufficient space and room. There is little enough room on a destroyer bridge at the best, and during darkness with "All Hands" in life jackets, accessibility is a real problem. For these reasons the "TBS" recorder is at "General Quarters" now stationed in the chart house where he has light and sufficient room to record all transmissions unhampered by the bridge noises and orders, and it is recommended that other destroyers give consideration to the location of this recorder.


1 "0" Time (Leading Ship)
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very close together
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
Enemy forces at contact
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2341 Fired Torpedoes
2253 Opened Five 5" Battery
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Baic Torpedo Course 266°T
0010 Large Explosion of enemy ship
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2333
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2312
2301
2241
2228
2250
2217
2207
2159
Point Option
Baka Point
Vella Lavella
Hiapow Island
Gizo Island
Tom-bulo
Vanga Point
Battle of Vella Gulf
6-7 August 1943
USS Dunlop
Scale 1" = 2 miles
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