

August 8, 1943.

ing Officer.
ier in Chief, 1st Fleet.
ier Task Group 31.2
nder Task Force THIRTY-ONE.
(3) Commander 3rd Fleet.

Subject: Vella Gulf Night Action of August 6-7, 1943 - report of.

Reference: (a) PacFlt Conf. Ltr. 24 CL-42.

Enclosure: (A) Composite Chart of Action.
(B) Tracing of Radar Plot of Enemy Movements.
(C) Statements of eye witnesses of battle.

1. At about midnight, August 6, 1943, in Vella Gulf, Task Group 31.2 engaged and sank with torpedoes and gunfire an enemy force composed of one heavy cruiser and three destroyers. Our own forces received no casualties.

2. PRELIMINARY OPERATIONS:

Detailed information concerning enemy forces was not available. Previous experience of our PT boats had been that enemy barge movements were taking place in the southern part of Vella Gulf from the south tip of Vella LaVella to coves along the southern coast of Kolombangara. In addition, at 1545, August 6, a search plane reported an enemy heavy cruiser in position Lat. 4-50 S, Long. 153-00 E., on course 230°T, speed 15 knots. This ship was in position to reach Vella Gulf by midnight.

In accordance with Comtaskforce 31 dispatch 50814 of August, the mission of this force was to seek out and destroy any enemy surface forces, including shipping, in Vella Gulf. The plan of the Task Group Commander was to approach from the south of Rendova Island, enter Vella Gulf, via Gizo Straits at about 200 and conduct sweeps along both shores of Vella Gulf until 0200, retiring "down the slot." The force was divided into two divisions: A-1 consisting of DUNLAP, CRAVEN, and MAURY; A-2 consisting of LANG, STACK, and STERETT. Task Group Commander was in the DUNLAP. In accordance with the plan, the force entered Gizo Straits on course 050°T, speed 15 knots, at 2200; DUNLAP guide, divisions in column with guide of Division A-2 keeping true bearing 150 from DUNLAP. In case of enemy contact on destroyers or larger, it was planned that Division A-1 would attack with torpedoes with Division A-2 creating a diversion by gunfire support. All ships were at general quarters. Three "Black Cats" were in the area to

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August 8, 1943.

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scout for us, but other than reporting on station, they had not communicated with us. At 2230 course was changed by division column movements to 124°T, and the northern approach to Blackett Strait was swept. At 2300 course was changed by similar method to 000°T, for a sweep along the eastern and northern shores of Kolombangara Island. At 2325 course was changed to 030°T and speed increased to 25 knots. Wind was from the southeast, force one. Sky overcast with intermittent drizzles. Sea calm, no moon, visibility very low.

3. CHRONOLOGICAL LOG OF BATTLE:

At about 2330 DUNLAP reported a S.G. radar contact over T.B.S. bearing 120°T, distant 6000 yards. The contact persisted, and DUNLAP believed it reliable, but as it could not be verified by any other ship, the task group commander decided to regard it a phantom contact.

At 2336 DUNLAP reported Sail George radar contact over T.B.S. on three ships bearing 350°T, distance 19,700 yards. CRAVEN obtained similar contact at same time. Radar plot commenced tracking immediately. At 2337 the Task Group Commander asked CRAVEN over T.B.S. if we had contact. We replied "affirmative". He then ordered Division A-1 to change course to 335°T and to prepare to fire torpedoes. At 2338 Fox Dog radar obtained contact at 15,000 yards. Sail George radar shifted to short scale and the PFI scope revealed that the contact consisted of four ships in column. Radar Plot announced solution enemy course 165°T, speed 26 knots. At 2339 Radar Plot announced solution course 180°T, speed 26 knots. This checked with gun director, using full radar control, and with DUNLAP's solution. CIC gave solution to Torpedo Officer who made setup on torpedo director. Radar Plot continued tracking; bearing designator on gun and torpedo directors had been cut in from the moment of contact. Range was closing rapidly, but the enemy did not open fire, maneuver radically, or give any other indication that he knew of our presence. At 2342, with the range at 4300 yards, the Task Group Commander ordered Division A-1 to fire a full salvo of torpedoes, broadside fire to port. We immediately fired 8 torpedoes, full radar control, individual target plan, using second ship in column as point of aim. At 2344 this division changed course to 090° to starboard by ships' turn. Division A-2, meanwhile, was taking station to the South and West to support with gunfire. At 2346 four torpedo hits were observed in rapid succession from left to right. Each hit produced a red ball of

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August 8, 1943.

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flame followed shortly thereafter by violent internal explosions. Two ships were literally blown to pieces and a third, the heavy cruiser, suffered successive violent explosions and soon became a mass of flames. At this time Division A-2 opened fire with their five inch batteries. At 2352 Division A-1 changed course to 180°T. At 2353 CIC and SG radar operator observed only two pips remaining on PPI scope. Comparison with gun director established one as the burning cruiser. The other was apparently a destroyer about 7000 yards to the south of the cruiser, still moving. Radar plot and Fox Dog started tracking this target. At 2359 this division was ordered to commence firing with five inch battery. CRAVEN opened up with full radar control on destroyer target, range about 8000 yards. Gunnery Officer observed that this target also appeared to be under tact and fire was checked. Our Sail George radar went out of commission. At about this time, STACK reported seeing a destroyer sink. At 0003 this division changed course to 310°T and stood toward burning cruiser. At 0004 CRAVEN commenced firing with five inch battery at burning cruiser using partial radar control. Fire was ceased after 10 salvos because the Commanding Officer was uncertain as to the location of other ships of our division. At 0019 Fox Dog radar went out of commission. At 0020 this division changed course to 090°T to keep clear of the line of fire of Division A-2. At 0022 Destroyer seen to sink near stern of burning cruiser. At 0027 other ships of our force reported their SG and FD radar screens clear. At 0030 both divisions adjusted their formations and commenced maneuvering to approach the blazing wreckage. For about 25 minutes this division circled the spot at about 1500 yards. The cruiser had sunk and there was much burning oil and wreckage in the water with a mingled smell of burning fuel oil, diesel oil, and wood. The smell of burning wood and diesel oil was unusually strong. Survivors were observed in the water. The Task Group Commander prepared to pick up survivors, but the MAURY reported engineering difficulties, and the decision was made to retire with Division A-1, leaving Division A-2 to attempt to pick up survivors for intelligence purposes. At 0116 Division A-1 commenced retirement on course 050°T, speed 22 knots. This ship remained at general quarters until 0815 after passing the Russell Islands. Division A-2 proceeded to Tulagi independently.

4. SPECIAL COMMENTS ON ENEMY FORCES:

- ⑤ It is believed that the enemy force consisted of one heavy cruiser and three destroyers. No definite identification as

DECLASSIFIED

August 8, 1943.

S-E-C-R-E-T

Subject: Vella Gulf Night Action of August 6-7, 1943 - report
of.

to the type of the cruiser can be made, but the following salient features were observed: (a) two low S.P. stacks; (b) raked, built up mainmast with pole mast; (c) high catapult (?) abaft mainmast; (d) two superimposed turrets aft. No enemy communications (including recognition signals) were heard or seen, but some observers report hearing attempts on the part of the enemy to jam the T.B.S. by shouting and jabbering in Japanese. The enemy used no smoke or other evasive maneuvers. Some observers report seeing enemy tracers headed in this direction and division A-2 reported seeing the enemy take this division under fire. There are reports also that shore batteries on Kolombangara were firing; but no splashes were observed, and the enemy fire, such as it was, had no effect. Enemy personnel casualties were undoubtedly high; there was no opportunity for orderly abandonment.

5. SPECIAL COMMENTS ON OWN FORCES:

Gun and torpedo batteries performed magnificently. There were no material casualties except on gun #2 which experienced a misfire and a "bale of hay", missing six salvos. No other guns missed a salvo. With the exception of the mishap on gun #2, gun crews, torpedo crews, and control parties performed their jobs superbly. Communications were at all times effective. Many petty officers and men commented "It was just like in drill". Eight torpedoes Mk.15 heads set to explode on contact only, and 66 rounds of 5"/38 cal. A.A. common, Mk. 18 fuze, were expended, fuzes set for 45 seconds. Five inch projectiles hits were observed to be extremely effective. One four gun salvo from Division A-2 was seen to completely obliterate the superstructure of a destroyer, and numerous explosions as result of 5 inch hits were seen on the cruiser. Flash eliminators on the torpedo tubes and flashless powder for the gun battery greatly exceeded expectations in effectiveness.

Too much praise cannot be give the Sail George radar. Not only did it enable us to detect the enemy force coming down along Vella LaVella, and subsequently obtain their course and speed, but it also was invaluable for navigation and for keeping track of our own ships. It is a marvelous instrument and one that gives us a tremendous advantage over the enemy. Had he been able to detect our ships against the land background of Kolombangara Island, the attack would doubtless have cost us heavily in material and personnel losses. The Fox Dog radar was alos of valuable assistance. We opened fire with five inch on the one remaining destroyer in

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August 8, 1943.

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full radar control. It is uncertain how much our fire contributed to the sinking of the ship, but it is significant that we were able to track, obtain a solution, and open up on an enemy without once seeing him. One fault still remains, however. Both radars succumbed to the shock of gun fire. The SG lasted for eight salvos, while the FD, strangely enough, went out just after the final salvo was fired. There is need for improvement in shock-proofing in that respect. Both radars were restored to peak operational efficiency before retirement.

Combat Intelligence Center functioned smoothly and was able to furnish valuable information to gunnery and torpedo control and to the commanding officer in addition to navigating the restricted waters of Gizo Strait. The Executive Officer was stationed at the PPI scope in the emergency cabin together with the SG, SC-1, sound gear operators and the air plot officer. The assistant navigator and the radar officer were stationed in the chart house. From the emergency cabin the Executive Officer was in communication with bridge and gun control via JA phone and with radar plot and torpedo control via 3JW. He received T.B.S. information by means of an additional speaker installed there. In that way he was able to identify navigational landmarks, evaluate contacts, disseminate information to control stations, and keep the Captain advised at all times, thereby leaving the captain free to conn the ship and make necessary decisions without being burdened with countless details. When alterations are effected installing remote PPI scopes and setting up a complete CIC in the chart house, this activity will be even more effective.

6. Commendations are the subject of separate correspondence.

7. LESSONS LEARNED AND RECOMMENDATIONS:

(a) Our night destroyer attack is a deadly weapon and must be fully exploited.

(b) This is the first battle where destroyers were handled tactically as they should be: as an offensive unit.

(c) Our full radar control of torpedoes and guns make us far superior to the enemy in any night action.

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DD382/A16-3
Serial 081.

U.S.S. CRAVEN (DD382)

Reg. No.

140

R.S. No.

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DECLASSIFIED

August 8, 1943.

S-E-C-R-E-T

Subject: Vella Gulf Night Action of August 6-7, 1943 - report
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(d) Our destroyer doctrine is sound, and our years of hard work will pay dividends, providing we use destroyers offensively and not for the protection of cruisers and battle-ships, as they have been used in the past.

(e) Torpedoes should be set to hit; they will function properly.

(f) Our S.G. radar is a superb instrument and well merits all the praise it has received.

(g) All ships should have ample flashless powder for night action.

(h) This action proves the value of an efficient C.I.C. in destroyers. What might have otherwise been a confusing series of reports and orders became a coordinated flow of evaluated information because of C.I.C.

(i) Gunfire should not be initiated until torpedoes have hit or until the enemy has taken the attacking ship under fire.

(j) All destroyers should be equipped with photographic equipment at the earliest possible time.

F. T. WILLIAMSON.

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6

USS CRAVEN COMPOSITE TRACK CHART

VELLA GULF ACTION

AUGUST 6-7, 1943



USS CRAVEN RADAR PLOT OF ENEMY FORCE VELLA GULF ENGAGEMENT AUG 6-7, 1943

ENEMY SHIPS
RANGE 15000

165°
COURSE 52°
SPEED 26

COURSE 180°
SPEED 28

HITS
SCORED

X X SHIPS
X X DEAD IN
X WATER

FIRST 2 TORPEDOES
TARGET BEARING 308°
TO R. COURSE 170°
RANGE 4300
FIRING COURSE 335°
SPEED 25

COURSE 52°
SPEED 26

CRAVEN
PLOT BEGAN 2336

PLOTTING INTERVAL 30 Sec

PLOTTING SCALE 1" = 500 YDS

ENCLOSURE (2)

Scale 1" = 4000 YDS

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U.S.S. CRAVEN (DD382)

STATEMENT OF Carter WELLS, TM3c, USNR:

I had the phones on and was awaiting action on Tube #1. The first word came from the bridge that there was a contact on our port bow, I do not remember the bearing or range. The word was sent to prepare the port tubes, while the bridge talker gave information about the contact. He was uncertain as to just what the contact was, and I believe that he reported transports and quite a few ships in the convoy. Later, however, he said that they were fighting ships since they were traveling at 26 knots. Meanwhile, during the readying of the mounts, the contacts were fast closing, until we came to about 5000 yards, which was our last report from the bridge.

The tubes were ready, the standard speed, intermediate, was left on the torpedoes. I do not remember any specific orders for changing the depths, though I understand from subsequent words, that the depths were set for 5 and 9 feet.

The order for "Steady" was given and then the firing lights were lit. The torpedoes were then fired, in the usual sequence, with every one being shot out perfectly. The target seemed to be visible with the naked eye, though I suspect that I thought I saw them.

After what seemed many minutes, but apparently were only three or four, I said to Houghton that it seemed to me that the shots were duds since there was no explosions. Lewis, on the director, seemed to feel the same, since he said he wished for a blast. Just then a blast, about 5000 yards on our port quarter was visible and audible. It was quickly followed by a series of blasts, louder and more visible. The first blast results lasted only a short time, whereas the second series led to other explosions, accompanied by huge billows of flame and much debris shooting toward the sky. I only remember three definite explosions from torpedoes. The other blasts came from the shelling operations of our and the accompanying ships. I remember with what remarkable accuracy the bombing took place. Because of our shifting course and we stayed on our tube, we could not watch the blasting and explosions of the ships. I do remember seeing at one time, the distinct silhouette ~~had/did~~ of a smaller ship near the large fires, and about two minutes later that silhouette had disappeared. As we approached the burning mass, we all remarked about the peculiar odor of the smoke. It seemed mostly that of kerosene.

Within about ten or fifteen minutes (at such a time, time or distances seem hard to estimate accurately) we were told to prepare for another run, for another ship which we missed. After some time searching, we ~~left~~ this last one to the other task force and departed.

My reaction to the evenings events was more confidence in our own detection work and feeling that the Jap radar equipment is very inadequate. Our results bear out the value of the surprise element.

(10)

CARTER WELLS.

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U.S.S. CRAVEN (DD382)

STATEMENT OF Patrick Gerald LYNCH, FC2c, USN:

Shortly after we fired our fish, there were several explosions and in the flames I saw two ships. One appeared to be a destroyer which sank immediately following a flaming explosion amidships. By this time, flames were pouring out of the other ships; I could see a cruiser in the flames and one destroyer to the right of it. As the fires built up, I could distinctly see two ships to the left of the cruiser which were destroyers.

Shells from the supporting force were landing among the sinking ships and there were several large explosions on the cruiser.

During the explosions, I clearly saw one ship sink (a destroyer) the turrets and superstructure of the cruiser, and one destroyer on its' side and sinking bow first.

PATRICK GERALD LYNCH.

(11)

ENCLOSURE (C)

DECLASSIFIED
SECRET

U.S.S. CRAVEN (DD382)

STATEMENT OF Charles Patterson TRIGLER, SM3c, USN:

My battle station is on the starboard side of the Signal Bridge. At approximately 2340, I saw four fish fired from the U.S.S. DUNLAP. I walked aft to speed flag bag on signal bridge and saw two fish fired from forward port tube and four from aft port tube. Shortly after, I saw four explosions; the first seemed to hit forward of heavy ship and second aft. The other two seemed further apart, apparently hitting two destroyers. Saw one destroyer burning badly from gun fire, then large explosions; saw her sink; saw about four very large explosions on cruiser. Noted her after turret and superstructure very clearly. Saw shells hit cruiser and explode. I could actually see salvos of 2 and 3 projectiles hit superstructure of cruiser and explode. Saw several salvos hit a destroyer and saw her sink. Saw cruiser sink.

CHARLES PATTERSON TRIGLER.

ENCLOSURE (c)

(12)

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SECRET

U.S.S. CRAVEN (DD382)

STATEMENT OF William Alton LEWIS, TM1c, USN:

The interval between launching and the first explosion was, in minutes, very short, but in tense and hopeful waiting, it was practically a lifetime.

My job, being to close the circuits from firing panel on bridge to the electrical firing keys on the tubes. I was quite busy concentrating on correct timing that should come between the firing of each "fish", therefore, I didn't hear a great deal of the chatter that took place on the wing of the bridge.

At the instant of the explosion, it appeared to me that the first was a "tin-can" which sunk within a matter of seconds. The second and third apparently caught the cruiser. Both of these were more visible and created much more flame than #1. Number four followed immediately which seemed to be another "tin-can". There were, no doubt, more explosions following these very shortly, but I was watching the cruiser burn, and what looked like a destroyer dead in the water between us and the burning ship, therefore, I am unable to say how many fish hit their targets and exploded after the first four.

All ships of our force remained in rather close to the burning cruiser and its' escorts and hammered the ones left afloat with five inch, which was exceedingly effective.

WILLIAM ALTON LEWIS.

(13)

ENCLOSURE (C)

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

U.S.S. CRAVEN (DD382)

STATEMENT OF Martin Woodrow Hullender, Y1c, USN:

My first visual knowledge of the engagement was obtained at approximately 285° relative bearing. The target angle of the ships were 265-275 (estimated).

At the time of their 270° relative bearing, we were passing through the wakes of the fish fired by the DUNLAP, during which time our fish were well on their way.

The first explosion was seen at 195° relative. The second explosion was only a few degrees to the right of the first.

As we swung right, firing of 5" batteries was observed at 080° relative from ships in other division. As we came around, we opened fire on 070°-110° relative.

I am an eye witness to only three (3) ships, one of which I think was a heavy cruiser and two destroyers. One destroyer appeared to be larger than the other. The smaller of the two destroyers was foolishly steaming around the burning ship when I last saw her.

The results of the 5" firing must have been good, as projectiles were seen to land directly "on" the target, while others landed in the immediate vicinity and to the right of the target.

My opinion as to what I saw, in regard to types of ships, is based fully on the gun mounts carried by those vessels.

MARTIN WOODROW HULLENDER.

ENCLOSURE (C)

(14)

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U.S.S. CRAVEN (DD382)

STATEMENT OF Lyle Wesley MOWERY, CTM, USN:

Shortly before midnight of August 6, I was notified by the men on the torpedo tubes that we had contacted four (4) enemy ships on the radar, range 19,000 yards. Immediately after contact was picked up, the port battery was told to match up pointers by talker at torpedo director. Primers were already inserted. I stood-by at the breach end of tube four. In just a few minutes, word came down that the ships were 9000 yards away and making 26 knots. Then very soon word came down to stand-by to fire. Torpedomen on tubes turned on their ready lights. The talker on tube four relayed all the word that came down from director, on to me. So in case we had to fire local control we could use speed and target angle of the enemy in our set up. Then they commenced firing. We fired eight torpedoes, full salvo on port battery. They sure went out nice. As soon as the eighth torpedo cleared the barrel, I received word to stand-by to fire curved fire astern on starboard battery, but we didn't fire that side. Our three ships withdrew at good speed.

In a few minutes, I saw an explosion of fire dead astern, and about a second later two more explosions, one right after the other, just a little to the right of the first one. When the second and third explosion went, I could see the bow of a ship to the left of them; it looked like a destroyer.

One of the ships kept burning and exploding for quite a while. It looked like a very big ship. All our destroyers fired a few rounds of ammunition, were making some good hits. They fired a few rounds back, but weren't hitting anybody. After the big enemy ship sunk, there was still fire on the water which looked like oil burning. We went up close to it, and I could smell oil very plainly.

LYLE WESLEY MOWERY.

(15)

ENCLOSURE (c)

DECLASSIFIED
SECRET

U.S.S. CRAVEN (DD382)

STATEMENT OF ENSIGN, John Joseph TIERNEY, USNR.

I saw four distinct bursts of flames when the torpedoes hit. One small ship on fire sank immediately. Another appeared to drift aft to the side and sank stern first almost immediately with its' bow in flames and still protruding from the water. By this time, there were three distinct fires on the large vessel -- one forward, one aft, one midships, that silhouetted her and her surroundings. It is my impression that one destroyer approached or drifted near the large ship. It was immediately struck with a full salvo by gun fire which completely hurled her superstructure and caused it to burst into flame from end to end. It appeared to be hit astern by repeated gun fire which caused her to sink.

Regarding torpedo explosions; Although I believe there were only four visible separate explosions, the large ship burst into three similar fires that closely resembled the one caused by the first explosion. This explosion and the ones on the other ships hit, was a dull yellow blob. The first four blobs of fire seemed to hit in this order. The first hit occurred a few, possibly 5 or 6 seconds before the second one. The same time, possibly slightly less, elapsed between the second and the third-and-fourth which two occurred with no appreciable interval between. The explosions seemed like this to me:

1st
X
Sank
immediately

2nd--drifted off and sank shortly after
X No. 1.

X--3rd.
X----- --4th.

JOHN JOSEPH TIERNEY.

(16)

ENCLOSURE (C)

9 19

PART III
CONFIDENTIAL
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Page

UNITED STATES SHIP *CRAVEN*

Friday
(Day)

6
(Date)

Aug, 19 *47*
(Month)

Zone description *(-11)*

Position	0800	1200	2000
Lat.	<i>Anchor</i>		
Long.	<i>PURVIS BAY, B.S.I.</i>		

OPERATIONAL REMARKS
(WAR DIARY)

0-4 Anchored off entrance to Purvis Bay, Solomon Islands, in 28 fathoms of water with 75 fathoms of chain. Anchorage bearing as follows: Hutchinson Point 350°T, distant 1000 yards. Ship in darkened and condition of readiness III set on gun battery. Baiters 1 and 2 in use and ready for steaming on 3 minute notice; regular sea watch set.

Yd. Ed. Perkins Jr.
Lieut. USNR

4-8 Anchored as before. 0630 Lighted ship.

R. E. Comgers
H. (J.S.) USNR

8-12 Anchored as before. 0816 Sounded special sea details and made all preparations for getting underway. 0831 Underway with Captain at the Conn; Navigator on the bridge steering various courses at various speeds proceeding to Tulagi Harbor, B.S.I. 0852. Moored portside side YOG 44 in Tulagi Harbor 0857 Commenced receiving fuel over forward. 1014 Completed fueling forward having received 1004 barrels fuel oil. 1115 Sounded special sea details and made all preparations for getting underway. 1133 Underway from Tulagi Harbor, Captain at the Conn; Navigator

Approved:

Examined:

Commanding Officer.

Navigator.

PART III
CONFIDENTIAL
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Page _____

UNITED STATES SHIP *Craven*

Friday 6 *August*, 1942
(Day) (Date) (Month)

Base description *E211*

Position	0800	1200	2000
Lat.			
Long.			

OPERATIONAL REMARKS
(WAR DIARY)

on the bridge. Proceeding astern U.S.S. STACK to sea.
1150 Began steaming on course 260°T. and pyc at 20 kts.
1151 Changed Course to 265°T. and pyc 1200 Changed
Course to 262°T. and pyc, speed to 25 kts. taking
station on U.S.S. DUNCAN.

Hugh C. Ralston
701751 USNR

12-16 Steaming as before on base course 262°T at 25 knots,
taking station 1.5090. 1216 Changed base course to 259°T.

1230 On station 1.5090. Guide and OTC in U.S.S. Dunlap.

1315 U.S.S. Stack, U.S.S. Lang, and U.S.S. Stennett joined
formation. 1337 Changed base course to 262°T. 1406 Changed
speed to 23 knots. 1524 Changed base course to 286°T.

J. D. Oliver, Jr.
11119 USN

16-18 Steaming as before in special AA cruising
disposition on course 286°T. at 23 knots. 1705 Changed
speed to 25 knots.

W. W. Parkerson Jr
Lieut. USNR

18-20 Steaming as before on course 286°T at 25 knots.
1810 Formed division column formation, order of ships
in division A-1: USS DUNLAP, CRAVEN, and MAURY;
division A-2 in column formation astern. 1828 Darkened
ship and set condition of readiness III on Torpedo
battery. 1905 Changed course to 307°T. by column
movement.

W. W. Parkerson Jr
Lieut. USNR

Approved:

Examined:

Commanding Officer.

Navigator.

UNITED STATES SHIP *Garrett*

Friday 6 August, 1943
(Day) (Date) (Month)

Zone description *(-)/1*

Position	0800	1200	2000
Lat.			
Long.			

OPERATIONAL REMARKS
(WAR DIARY)

20-24 Steaming as before on course $307^{\circ}T$. at 25 knots in column formation. 2119 Changed course by column movement to $000^{\circ}T$. 2138 Passed GANONGGO Island abeam to port. 2146 Changed speed to 15 knots. Manned all battle stations for search of Vella Gulf for enemy vessels and small craft. 2154 Changed course by column movement to $050^{\circ}T$. for passage of GIZO Strait. 2228 Changed course to $124^{\circ}T$, division A-2 Took station bearing $150^{\circ}T$ at 4000 yards. 2329 Changed course to $030^{\circ}T$ and changed speed to 25 knots. 2335 Made radar contact on four enemy vessels bearing $349^{\circ}T$. at 19000 yards distant. 2336 Changed course to $335^{\circ}T$. To close and attack enemy force. 2342 Division A-1 commenced torpedo fire to port at approximately 4000 yards range. Eight torpedoes expended, no casualties. Changed course by ship's turn to $080^{\circ}T$. for retirement. 2345 Observed three definite and one possible torpedo hit on enemy force composed of 1 heavy cruiser and 3 destroyers. 2347 Division A-2 commenced firing on enemy. 2349 Changed course to $180^{\circ}T$. 2357 Commenced firing with gun battery at range of approximately 8000 yards.

H. W. Berkenhoff
Lieut. USNR

Approved:

Examined:

H. F. Williamson
Commanding Officer.

H. D. Dawson
Navigator.

STATES SHIP *Groven*

Sot
(Day)

7
(Date)

Aug, 19*43*
(Month)

Base description *G11*

Position	0800	1200	2000
Lat.			
Long.			

OPERATIONAL REMARKS
(WAR DIARY)

0-4 Steaming on course 000°T. at 25 knots in company with USS Dunlap and Maury as division A-1. Division A-2 operating in immediate vicinity as a unit with both divisions under tactical command of Comtaskgroup 31.2. Ship is at general quarters and engaging a Japanese force of three destroyers and one heavy cruiser with gun battery. 0003 Altered course to 000°T. Three enemy ships steaming fiercely. 0005 Changed course to 320°T. ^{ceased firing.} 0007 Observed heavy explosion on enemy cruiser. 0020 Changed course to 090°T. 0028 Changed course to 000°T. 0035 Changed course to 210°T to search area of burning ships for any enemy vessels attempting to escape; ^{four vessels sunk.} 0052 Changed course to 290°T. 0055 Changed course to 320°T. 0057 Commenced maneuvering on various courses searching for any surviving enemy ships; 0114 Division A-1 in column formation altered course to 050°T. and commenced retirement from Vella Gulf; division A-2 maneuvering in area in attempt to pick up survivors. 0125 Changed course to 090°T. 0145 Changed course to 105°T. 0242 Formation speed changed to 20 knot conforming to maximum speed of USS MAURY. Look station on starboard bow of USS MAURY at 1500 yards, USS Dunlap screening port bow. 0251 Changed speed to 21 knot. 0300 Changed course to 130°T. 0340 Changed speed to 23.5 knots.

W. W. Perkins Jr
Lieut. USNR

Approved:

Examined:

Commanding Officer.

Navigator.

UNITED STATES SHIP *Corwin* *507* *7* *August*, 19*43*
(Day) (Date) (Month)

Zone description *(-11)*

Position	0800	1200	2000
Lat.	<i>TWO MILES NORTH</i>	<i>Moored -</i>	
Long.	<i>OF SAVO ISLAND</i>	<i>Tulagi, B.S.I.</i>	

OPERATIONAL REMARKS
(WAR DIARY)

*7-8 Steaming as before on course 130° T at 23 1/2 knots.
0630 Lighted ship. 0637 Changed course to 100° T.*

*Yd. W. Burkman Jr.
Lieut. USNR*

8-12 Steaming as before on course 100° T. at 23 1/2 knots. 0815 Secured from general quarters and set condition of readiness III on gun battery. 0913 changed base course to 093° T (pp). 0942 changed base course to 107° T (pp). 1042 Stationed all Special sea detail and commenced maneuvering on various courses and at various speeds conforming to the channel entering TULAGI, B.S.I. 1115 moored starboard side to USS STACK in company with YOG 44. Draft: fwd, 12'-9"; aft, 13'-0". 1125 Commenced receiving fuel from YOG 44.

*R E Conyers
Jr (j.g.) USNR*

12-16 Moored as before receiving fuel from YOG-44. 1312 Completed fueling having received 929 barrels of fuel oil 1500 Commenced receiving torpedoes aboard from torpedo storage depot, Tulagi Harbor, B.S.I.

*Hugh C. Ralston
Jb (j.g.) USNR*

Approved:

Examined:

Commanding Officer.

Navigator.

UNITED STATES SHIP *Graven*

Sat. 7 August, 19 *43*
(Day) (Date) (Month)

Zone description *- (11)*

Position	0800	1200	2000
Lat.			<i>Anchored</i>
Long.			<i>Tulagi, B.S.I.</i>

OPERATIONAL REMARKS
(WAR DIARY)

16-18 Moored as before. 1630 Sounded special sea details.
1722 Underway, captain at the conn, navigator on the bridge.
Steering various courses at various speeds, approaching
anchorage. 1728 Anchored in Berth #6, Tulagi Harbor, in
26 fathoms of water, using 30 fathoms of chain. Draft forward
14' 3", draft aft 12' 7". 1730 Sounded special sea details.

J. D. Oliver, Jr.
Lt. (j.g.) USN

18-20 Anchored as before. 1830 Darkened ship.

W. W. Persherson Jr.
Lieut. USNR

20-24 Anchored as before

R. E. Conyers
Lt. (j.g.) USNR

Approved:

Examined:

H. F. Williamson
Commanding Officer.

H. D. Dawson
Navigator.