

A-I-C-R-E-I

From: The Commanding Officer,
To: The Commander Task Force SIXTY-SEVEN.
Subject: Action Report, Night of 30 November - 1 December,
Off Northeast Coast of Guadalcanal.

- Enclosure:**
- (A) Report of Executive Officer on conduct of crew.
 - (B) Report of Executive Officer on events observed.
 - (C) Report of Radar Officer on performance of Sail George Radar equipment.
 - (D) Report of Gunnery Officer on Fox Dog Equipment.
 - (E) Report of Gunnery Officer.
 - (F) Report of Assistant Gunnery Officer.
 - (G) Track chart of U.S.S. DRAYTON.

1. The U.S.S. DRAYTON in company with units of Task Force SIXTY-SEVEN as organized on 29 November proceeded from Second Channel at zero hour of 2400 on 29 November 1942, to Guadalcanal area via Lengo Channel to intercept and destroy a Japanese force of eight destroyers and six transports reported to be intending to land reinforcements at Tassafarouga area at about 2300 the night of 30 November 1942.

2. The sortie and passage to the northwest was uneventful. From about 2030, 30 November, to 2050 the LAMSON and LARDNER were making contact with the force and augmented it as a unit in the rear. During this period the screening destroyers formed column ahead of cruisers four thousand yards to pass through Lengo Channel.

3. Order of ships from van to rear and composition of force was FLETCHER (senior officer of destroyers in the van), PERKINS, MAURY, DRAYTON, MINNEAPOLIS, NEW ORLEANS, PENSACOLA, HONOLULU and NORTHAMPTON, LAMSON (Commander NINE) and LARDNER.

4. The following is a narrative of the approach contact and action with enemy units, times of events recorded by this vessel are inconsistent and prevent a positive chronological order of events. Insofar as this vessel is concerned original contact on five ships was made following an announcement of a contact from the FLETCHER at about 16,000 yards bearing about 282.

The DRAYTON picked up 113 unlisted men and 15 officers including a stretcher case and many widely scattered items. The use of a power hoist; the DRAYTON took in the unloading to the FLETCHER as the current direction. Upon completion of the pickup to the westward following recovery of the

ENCLOSURE (A) to
CO DRAYTON(DD366) 1tr
DD366/A1 6-3 Serial 05(S)
dated 1/18/43.

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Off Northeast Coast of Guadalcanal.

5. Radar plot gave a solution of zero speed. As the order to commence firing torpedoes the solution was still zero speed. The FLETCHER had announced his solution as speed of fifteen knots. Two torpedoes were fired from the port after mount at 2320 without any observed results. Torpedo course was target bearing of 250 true, range about 8,000 yards. As soon as torpedoes were fired FLETCHER ordered destroyers in the van to commence firing. This ship fired two starshell salvos at 12,000 yards at an opening radar range of 6,700 yards. Starshell illumination was maintained with one gun and 98 rounds of AA common were expended without any observed results. The targets were never sighted by persons on this ship even with starshell illumination. Shortly after destroyers opened fire the cruisers opened fire. No results observed. The BRAYTON ceased firing following movement of the FLETCHER and (in view of no visible targets and no observed results) course was altered to the right following the FLETCHER and destroyers in the van around Savo Island. Explosions were observed in our cruiser line as from torpedo hits and shortly thereafter firing ceased. While to the southward of Savo Island at about 2330 and while going westerly Sail George picked up what was believed to be two ships close inshore of the middle eastern side of the island which were lost quickly by the land blocking them out. The identity of these ships was unknown and the FLETCHER was advised to watch out for ships rounding the island. At about 2337 Sail George picked up three ships to the North of Cape Esperance and heading on a parallel course and believed to be enemy. The range as recorded by the Radar Officer was 12,000 yards; however at the time the Torpedo Officer said they were in range and I ordered four torpedoes fired one of which is alleged to have detonated and in view of the previous reports of performance of torpedoes I did not credit it as a hit. The destroyers continued around Savo Island as shown on the track chart without further engagement and came in contact with the HONOLULU which was standing to the northwest. The MAURY and PERKINS were ordered to stand by the NEW ORLEANS and FLETCHER and BRAYTON contacted the NORTHAMPTON and picked up survivors. The BRAYTON picked up 11 enlisted men and 15 officers including 4 stretcher cases and many widely scattered persons without the use of a power boat; the BRAYTON boat which was in the water was unloading to the FLETCHER as the current was setting in her direction. Upon completion of the picking up of survivors stood to the eastward following movements of the FLETCHER and proceeded

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to seaward headed for BUTTON, failed to contact HONOLULU at rendezvous and continued on track, finally effecting rendezvous with HONOLULU on the morning of the second of December, and arrived at BUTTON 1000, 2 December.

6. The actual composition of the enemy force is not known. Eight enemy ships are believed to have been identified by radar, type unknown except that there were evidently destroyers present.

7. Sail George and Fox Dog were mechanically satisfactory, and were used for search, and fire control. Search was conducted satisfactorily though solutions from tracking considered erroneous. The Fox Dog radar used to direct fire which was ineffective in view of absence of observed hits.

8. There were no material nor personnel casualties. Four life rafts used in effecting rescue of survivors were left at the scene. A torpedo wake was observed to pass eastern of this ship after the destroyers had ceased firing. This bit of information did not reach the commanding officer until the following day.

9. The officers and crew of the DRAYTON conducted themselves in a highly commendable manner and performed their duties as directed in a cool and orderly fashion. There were no outstanding performances above and beyond those required in the line of duty.

10. It is recommended that whenever possible meet the enemy in the open sea and keep heavy ships out of enclosed waters or areas where the enemy has the land for a background during night actions.

V. L. 1170.

J. E. COOPER.

Copy to: Comdespac
CDS-5
CDD-9

RECEIVED (S) 30
CO BUTTON AIR 2046/
116-3 Serial 057 of
December 3, 1942.

From: The Executive Officer.
To: The Commanding Officer.
Subject: Noteworthy Incidents and Conduct of Officers and Crew, report on.
Reference: (a) Article 948, U.S. Navy Regulations.

1. On November 30, 1942, at about 2300 local time, this ship participated in an attack on a Japanese naval force engaged in landing reinforcements on Guadalcanal Island, Solomon Islands. No incidents worthy of special note were observed during the battle.

2. The conduct of the officers and crew during the battle was admirable. All hands were observed to be calm and performing their duties to the best of their abilities. The ship's crew went to general quarters stations at 1850 and remained at their stations until 0800 the following morning. The engineering personnel on watch below are to be especially praised for their performance of duty for such a long time in hot fire-rooms and engine-rooms without relief.

3. The conduct of the officers and men was equally admirable in the subsequent rescue operations of the crew of the U.S.S. NORTHAMPTON. The action of Ensign J.F. Ryan, U.S.N., in assisting survivors in reaching the ship's motor whaleboat was particularly noteworthy. Ensign Ryan swam back and forth from the motor whaleboat to bring back survivors too exhausted to reach the boat of their own accord. Lieutenant W.H. Pope, MC., U.S.N., attended the wounded survivors with great devotion going without sleep for over thirty hours.

The DRAYTON followed on ground near island going astern. There followed a period of calm to the left while charges had been thrown a complete circle. At this time instructions were received to go to the assistance of the DRAYTON which could be seen burning fiercely with explosions to westward.

**ENCLOSURE (A) to
CO DRAYTON ltr DD366/
A16-3 Serial 057 of
December 3, 1942.**

**V.A. KING,
Lieut-Comdr., U.S.N.**

**CO DRAYTON ltr DD366, A16-3 Serial 057 of
December 3, 1942.**

U.S.S. DRAYTON (DD-366)
December 3, 1942.

From: The Executive Officer.
To: The Commanding Officer.
Subject: Report of Events Observed in Night Action of
November 30 - December 1, 1942.

1. Leading up to the engagement I was keeping a navigational track of the ship by means of the dead reckoning tracer, radar ranges and bearings on islands and peaks, and fathometer readings. When the SG radar picked up what was believed to be enemy ships the tracking group awaited information on which to determine course and speed of the enemy. Information received was erratic and inconsistent, probably due to shift from one target to others so that no tracking information of value was obtained.

2. When the firing began there was a long lull in the receiving of radar information. As it then appeared that no further information was being sent down to the chart house, I went to my battle station on Secondary conn. The ship was still firing, three or four salvos being fired while I was enroute to Secondary Conn after which firing ceased. The waters on the port side were well lighted by large numbers of star shells bursting toward the beach. No ships could be seen. At the same time several large fires which appeared to be ships burning were visible astern.

3. The DRAYTON was bringing up the rear in column of destroyers which now had Savo Island on the starboard beam and close aboard. The cruisers were firing salvos toward the beach on the port side. One cruiser appeared to be firing 40 MM guns at some unseen target on her starboard side. I still could not see any enemy ships nor did I see any at any time. The DRAYTON followed in column around Savo Island. When part way around the whole sea was lighted up brilliantly by an explosion and fire on the other side of Savo Island. This illumination lasted an appreciable length of time during which I looked all around but saw no ships other than the column of destroyers.

4. The DRAYTON followed on around Savo Island going completely around. There followed a period of turns to the left until course had been changed a complete circle. At this time instructions were received to go to the assistance of the NORTHAMPTON which could be seen burning fiercely with intermittent explosions to westward.

V.A. KING,
Lieut-Comdr., U.S.N.

ENCLOSURE (B) to
CG DRAYTON ltr DD366/A16-3 Serial 057 of
12/3/42

From: Ensign Conrad Meyer, III, U.S.N.R., Radar Officer.
To: The Commanding Officer.
Subject: Report on Night Battle of November 30 - December 1, 1942.

1. Upon entering the b-y off of Guadalcanal, I was very pleased to discover that the Sail George gave a very accurate picture of the shoreline, on both short and long scale. As we proceeded westward, we picked out the salient points of the shore, and by comparing them with a tracer chart of the area we were sure of our position all the time. We picked out the echo from Savo Island at 55,000 yards, and this island was on the scope (PFI) during the entire action, until we left early in the morning. We could plainly see the bulge of land which denoted Lunga Point (Henderson Field).

2. About the time we passed abeam of Lunga Point, we changed course to the northwest and began to increase our distance from the north shore of Guadalcanal. At this time we had a comprehensive picture of the tactical situation. We were the last ship in a column of four destroyers; about 2,000 yards astern of us were seven other ships, also in column - these were the five cruisers and the LAMSON and LARDNER. We could see the entire bay - Guadalcanal to the south, Florida Is. to the north, and Savo Island to the northwest. We were in a very good position to sweep both channels, to the north and south of Savo, and we reported to the bridge and director that except for our own ships and the land, there were no other echoes on the screen. We were maintaining a very sharp watch on that part of the coast of Guadalcanal near Tassafaronga where we expected to encounter the Japs. For the moment there were no ships along the coast.

3. At times we were asked by the bridge to give a bearing and range to the closest destroyer ahead, and while I realize that this information was necessary I would suggest that in the future, these requests be kept to a minimum. To give a range and bearing to a ship in one's own formation means that a definite period of time must be taken from our search, limiting our search to a very narrow bearing. After one of these ranges on a ship ahead of us, we resumed our search and discovered echoes from five ships lying close to the shore on the northern coast of Guadalcanal. They were not exactly at Tassafaronga, but were further up the coast to the northwest of Tassafaronga. The range of our initial contact was about 16,000 yards. I remember this well because, although we first discovered the ships on long scale, we shifted to short scale just a short while afterwards and found them on the outer edge of the scope. About this time we apparently changed course to the

December 3, 1948.

Subject: Report on Night Battle of November 30 - December 1, 1942.

left, about 270 T, and were on a heading to pass to the south of Savo. We had immediately reported the contact to control and the bridge, and were tracking the enemy to determine his course and speed. My first solution gave me no speed for the target, and I reported this immediately to the Torpedo Control Officer. During the next three or four minutes we had ample time to check our plot by reason of additional bearings and ranges, and each time we came out with a target speed of zero. I again gave the report that the target was dead in the water. During the period of tracking, some four or five minutes altogether, I think, our own ship maintained a steady course and speed, which made my job of tracking very simple. This fact, plus that several plots gave the same solution each time, convinced me that my solution was correct.

4. When the range had decreased to about 7,500 yards, I heard the sound of a torpedo being launched, and knew that we had begun to attack. After a wait of what seemed a full minute, our main battery opened fire. We had been sending bearing and ranges out continuously during this period to enable both the torpedo director to stay on the bearings of the target and the main battery director to locate the target in the Fox Dog scopes. I had reported five ships in the initial contact report, but during this period of tracking we had kept trained on the nearest one to us. (See drawing on last page.) After firing for a short while the order to cease fire was given. At this time we were again asked to give a bearing and range to the nearest destroyer ahead. We did this, and then began our sweep.

5. Just as we passed to the south of Savo, we had a picture on the PPI scope of two ships on the north side of Savo, very close to the beach, which had apparently been directly behind the island during this previous period and thus were undetected by our radar. These ships were on the scope for a very short time, not over 15 seconds, and were then lost to our sight as our ship continued on its course to the south of Savo. Since I did not think that our own cruisers had had time to move that far to the north and ahead of us, I was sure that the echoes on the screen were from enemy ships. This information was reported to the bridge and acknowledged, but since it seemed of such great importance at the time, I left the Radar Room and came out to the bridge, found the Captain, and made a verbal report of our contact. We were about due south of Savo now, not more than two miles from the beach. I had returned to the Radar Room just a short while when we picked up another contact, this time on our port side, about on the beam, 12,000 yards distant. There were three ships on a course which roughly paralleled our own (about 270 T) and were close to the shore on the northwestern tip of

Subject: Report on Night Battle of November 30 - December 1, 1942.

Guadalcanal. We tracked these ships for a while, giving a course and speed; I do not know if we fired any torpedoes at these targets. I never remember firing the second salvo of torpedoes. During the ensuing hours we were constantly picking out targets, giving course and speed, and bearing; I do not know if any of these later targets were fired at by us. I am sure that these three ships which we saw on our port beam were Japs, however; it would have been impossible for any of our cruisers which had been a couple of thousand yards astern of us, to pass us in the dark, and open out to 12,000 yards on our beam, while we were making in the neighborhood of twenty-six or seven knots all the time. (See drawing).

6. Upon rounding Savo and coming back into the harbor from the north of the island, I had expected to see our column of cruisers still in formation. Instead, I was startled to see a number of ships, spread out over the entire bay, in no semblance of order. I did not find out until an hour or so later that several of our ships had been damaged, and forced to break from formation. For the next half-hour we steamed on a course of about 135 T, which was taking us back in the direction in which we had entered the bay in direction of Lenge Channel. During this time we were making contact reports on the various ships we met as we steamed along, giving courses and speeds on them as we went along. There was no way by which we could identify these ships by radar, and I assumed that each new contact was an enemy until proven otherwise.

7. About the time we were passing Henderson Field on our beam, we swung around, and steering a course of about 315 T, headed back for Savo. We had approached to a very close range of the island when we received the word "standby to pick up survivors". By this time, our scopes were almost completely cleared of ships, except for those directly ahead which we knew to be friendly, and two more which seemed to be circling us to the east at a very slow speed. We gave courses and speeds on these two ships for fully fifteen minutes before we got the word that it was probably the NEW ORLEANS and a destroyer escort. After that, and during the next hour or two while we were dead in the water picking up survivors, we kept a careful watch on these two ships, reporting them at frequent intervals.

8. From the time we picked up the survivors, until we left the bay through Lenge Channel, we had nothing further to report. We did make contact on three ships lying close to the beach on the northern shore of Guadalcanal; however, since daylight was setting in, these ships were identified as two destroyers and a burning cruiser, and were presumed to be ours.

MEMORANDUM FROM LIEUTENANT I. D. DEWEY, U.S. NAVY, GUNNERY OFFICER,
U.S.S. DRAYTON

SUBJECT: Performance of FD radar during night action of
November 30 - December 1, 1942.

1. The performance of this vessel's FD radar during the night action of Task force SIXTY SEVEN on November 30 - December 1, 1942 was considered satisfactory. Initial contact of the enemy vessels was made by the SG radar and the bearing and range phoned to the director immediately. The director trained on this bearing and an FD contact was immediately obtained at a range of about 16,000 yards. FD contact was then maintained without difficulty. Frequent SG contacts were available as a check. The principal difficulty on the FD screen was the large number of pips on the screen due to the land background. This difficulty was overcome by use of the SG radar ranges and bearings as a check and once the correct pip was located in the notch no difficulty was experienced in keeping it there.

2. Firing was opened using full radar control as no targets were visible to anyone on the director. The director trainer used his trainer's scope and reported he was able to keep his pips matched without difficulty both before and during the firing. The pointer used his optics and the arrangement was that as soon as he saw any ships in his optics he was to announce the fact to the trainer who would then shift to his trainer's telescope. At about the 15th salvo the pointer announced that we were bearing on a ship that was firing. The trainer shifted to his optics but at first was unable to see anything and shifted back to the radar scope. Later he succeeded in picking up the target visually, although at no time could he clearly see anything through his telescope, shifting back to the radar scope frequently as a result.

3. The principal unsatisfactory point about the FD set was the fact that no hits were observed on the target. However, it is realized that this may be due to other causes such as errors in the rangekeeper solution. Another disappointment in the set was the fact that it was not possible to observe our splashes on the screen and spot. No splashes at all were observed. The SG radar sent up one spot which was reported as a straddle - but from the results observed this must have been in error. A further disappointment was the fact that in using full radar control the trainer necessarily swings from one side to the other a degree or two in keeping his pipe matched. This apparently caused the spotter to lose track of our tracers and he was totally unable to spot the fall of shot as a result.

4. Subject to the above deficiencies the performance of the FD radar was satisfactory.

U.S. NAVY
December 3, 1942.

From: Lieutenant I.D. Dewey, U.S. Navy, Gunnery Officer.
To: The Commanding Officer.
Subject: Report of Night Action of Task Force 67 on
November 30 - December 1, 1942.

1. The first contact with the enemy force was an SG radar contact made at about 2312. This contact apparently was made practically simultaneously by this ship and several others in the formation and was immediately sent up to us on the director by phone. The director and guns were immediately trained out on that bearing which was about on the port bow and no sooner had we done so than contact was obtained on the PD radar. Due to the land background many pips were visible on the PD screen and the operator was told to use the closest one which jibed with the SG values which were being continuously sent up by phone. Radar plot sent up a target speed of zero and this value checked with the rangekeeper solution. It was used throughout the subsequent firing.

2. At about 2320 I heard the "swish" of our torpedoes being fired and practically simultaneously received the order for the guns to load starshells. At about 2321 the order to "Commence firing" was given. It was my intention to fire an opening three salvo starshell spread in accordance with the standard destroyer doctrine but after the second salvo was fired "check fire" was received from the bridge. The command to "resume fire" was given a few seconds later with one gun continuing to fire starshells and the others common projectiles. Fire was opened under full radar control at a radar range of 6600 yards. No targets were visible when fire was opened and even after starshell illumination was established no target was visible. However, firing was continued using full radar control. At about the 15th salvo the director pointer sang out that we were bearing on a ship that was firing. Evidently this was what we had been firing at all along but we had been unable to see it until he commenced firing. At about the 20th salvo another "check fire" was received from the bridge and I requested permission to "resume fire" as we were bearing on this ship. The word to "resume fire" was then received. On the 41st salvo the word was received to "cease fire". No hits were observed to have been made upon the enemy. This ship fired a total of 141 rounds of which 98 were common projectiles and 43 were illuminating projectiles.

3. The performance of the director and gun crews was most commendable. Three minor casualties occurred during the firing. Two of these were misfires attributed to faulty primers, the

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**Subject: Report of Night Action of Task Force 67 on
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first occurring on the third salvo on gun #4. The gun captain of gun #4 after attempting to fire his gun several times by all available methods ordered his personnel to stand clear, opened up the gun, threw the powder overboard, loaded another charge and the gun fired perfectly throughout the remainder of the action, missing about eight salvos while handling the casualty. The other misfire occurred on the last salvo on gun #2. On this gun regular bang-fire procedure was carried out as "cease firing" had been given. The third casualty which occurred was a "bale of hay" on gun #3 on about the 20th salvo caused by an over-anxious rammerman.

to the left. The second salvo appeared to be regular. Bang fire was given, and I pulled out the follow-up salvo and shifted gun #2 to local power. When fire was resumed gun #3 continued to fire successfully, while guns #1 and #4 were silent.

I.D. DEWY,

Due to the large number of starballe bursting and our own director indicator being out of the line of fire, I had much difficulty identifying by starballe. I did not see a single enemy ship during the entire course of the action. I kept tracking the starballe. In one degree change, four or five degrees to either side of the line of fire, I could see small splashed, gun fire, smoke, and explosions in the direction we were firing, but no ships. About ten minutes later, when about twenty rounds were fired, we again checked fire. About ten seconds later, during the check fire period, there was an incident which occurred about 500 yards from the side of the ship, and then quickly died out leaving a red burning spot on the water. About five or ten seconds later, along the same line of bearing but slightly to the right and beyond, there was another large explosion. This had the appearance of an enormous director display, and was followed by a smaller shot of flame as from the first ship.

About fifteen seconds later we resumed fire again at a ship which was firing at us. This time I could see our search sweeping over the gun flashes, but still could not see the ship. The order came to bring the starballe in closer; I had been firing them all to target at 12,000 yards. I brought them in to about 9,000 yards, in 1,000 yard steps, but was unable to see the enemy, except for gun flashes. After about fifteen or twenty rounds we ceased fire. I imagine the time was then about 2330. Our column of destroyers was making a starboard change of course at this point. We then tracked the battery out to starboard, on our own side, and were on the starboard bow. A great deal of smoke was seen from the destroyers ahead in column, but we changed course to port and brought were

**ENCLOSURE (R) to
CD BRAYTON ltr DD366/A16-3
Serial 057 dated 12/3/42.**

REPORT BY ASSISTANT GUNNERY OFFICER OF NIGHT ACTION -
November 30 - December 1, 1942.

Shortly after the bridge had informed us that the time was 2245, SG Radar reported contact with five ships off the shore on our port hand. About one-half hour later, Taccogna, ES3c., reported to me that one of the leading ships had fired torpedoes to port. While making this report to the Gunnery Officer, we fired our own torpedoes.

At 2321, almost immediately after firing our torpedoes, the word was given to illuminate with starshells. The first salvo was fired along the line of fire, and the second salvo 100 miles to the left. The second salvo appeared to be ragged. Check fire was given, and I pulled out the follow-up knobs and shifted gun 3 to local power. When fire was resumed gun 3 continued to fire starshells, while guns 1, 2 and 4 commenced firing common shells.

Due to the large number of starshells bursting and our own director swinging back and forth across the line of fire, I had much difficulty identifying my starshells. I did not see a single enemy ship during the entire course of the action. I kept rocking the starshells, in one degree steps, four or five degrees to either side of the line of fire. I could see shell splashes, gun fire, smoke, and explosions in the direction we were firing, but no ships. About two minutes later, after about twenty rounds were fired, we again checked fire. About ten seconds later, during the check fire period, there was an immense sheet of orange flame from a ship bearing 165° relative. This flame seemed to extend outward from 500 yards from the sides of the ship, and then quickly died out leaving a red burning spot on the water. About five or ten seconds later, along the same line of bearing but slightly to the right and beyond, there was another large explosion. This had the appearance of an enormous fireworks display, and was followed by a similar sheet of flame as from the first ship.

About fifteen seconds later we resumed fire again at a ship which was firing at us. This time I could see our stars bursting over the gun flashes, but still could not see the ship. The order came to bring the starshells in closer; I had been firing them all to burst at 12,000 yards. I brought them in to about 9,000 yards, in 1,000 yard steps, but was unable to see the enemy, except for gun flashes. After about fifteen or twenty rounds we ceased fire. I imagine the time was then about 2330. Our column of destroyers was making a starboard change of course at this point. We then trained the battery out to starboard, on Savo Island, which was on the starboard bow. A great deal of smoke was coming from one of the destroyers ahead in column, but soon stopped. We then changed course to port and brought Savo Island on to the beam.

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December 3, 1942.
REPORT OF ASSISTANT GUNNERY OFFICER OF NIGHTY ACTION -
November 30 - December 1, 1942 (CONT)

Starshells began to burst on the port side about 2 or 3,000 yards away. They kept getting closer, to within about 200 yards, but never quite reached us. About the time the last star burst, I saw a display of fighting lights bearing 165° relative, which I took to be on one of our cruisers. Immediately after they went out, the cruiser began firing to port and I could see return fire from a ship bearing 200° relative. The fire continued for about 5 salvos, when the ship bearing 200° relative went up in a sheet of flame like the other two ships I had seen earlier in the action. During the firing I could see the tracers of the ships bearing 200° relative go away over the cruiser and appear to land about 135° relative.

About half a minute later, the cruiser, or a ship on the same bearing (165° relative), commenced firing to starboard with what appeared to be 40 mm. These were fired either at the tip of Savo Island, or at an object hidden behind the island. I observed no results from this. All the above action took place in about 5 or 10 minutes.



A few minutes later, as we continued to steam around Savo Island, we got action port from the bridge, and fired torpedoes on that quarter. I received a report from Gun 4 that two torpedoes had passed astern of us. I immediately looked back and distinctly saw what could have been the wake from a torpedo about 10 yards from the stern and perpendicular to the ship's wake. We kept steaming parallel to the coast of Savo Island. About three minutes later, an enormous glare of light came from behind Savo Island and silhouetted the island entirely.

After this, we circled Savo Island until we could see two fires which appeared to be burning ships. We steamed toward these for a time then changed course 90° left, and later 90° left again, on a reverse course away from the fires. After this, we made several changes of course that I cannot recall correctly, and during which we flashed our fighting lights several times. These were answered by other ships at different points.

M.L. COON, Jr.,
Lieut(jg), U.S. Naval Reserve.

ENCLOSURE (F) to
CO DRAYTON ltr 80366/A16-3
Serial 057 of 12/3/42.

USS DRAYTON
NOV. 30 DEC. 1 1942
GRAPHICAL SCALE 21,786 AT LAT 9°20'S



SAVOL.

MOMENTARY RADAR CONTACT AT 2330

3 SHIPS INITIAL CONTACT BY RADAR AT 2338

250° T GUNFIRE TORPEDOES

AREA WHERE SURVIVORS WERE PICKED UP

SANDFLY PASSAGE

FLORIDA

Tulagala

Bungama

NGGELA CHANNEL

SEALARK CHANNEL

GUADALCANAL

Tassafaronga

Lungo Pt.

Toyoma Pt.

LENGO CHANNEL